On preserving the reservation wage property in a continuous job search model

The purpose of this article is to examine a continuous model of job search. Job offers are received randomly over time according to a renewal process. The wage offers are assumed to be positive, independent, and identically distributed random variables. There is a search cost of c monetary units per unit time. The only decision the searcher must make is when to stop searching and accept an offer. It is shown that the optimal stopping strategy which maximizes the searcher's expected net return over the class of all stopping times possesses the reservation wage property, provided that the interarrival time between two successive job offers in NBUE (new better than used in expectation).     

IT'S ABOUT TIME: IMPLICATIONS OF THE PERIOD LENGTH IN AN EQUILIBRIUM SEARCH MODEL

Empirical evidence suggests that transitions between employment states are highly clustered around the first day of each workweek or month. I analyze the effect of this phenomenon by presenting an equilibrium search model in which the period length is a parameter determining the degree of clustering. Infinitesimally short periods result in a continuous‐time model with bilateral meetings, whereas longer time periods introduce the possibility of recall or simultaneity of job offers. In this environment, I show that the period length has a profound effect on equilibrium outcomes, including the unemployment rate, unemployment duration, and the cross‐sectional wage distribution.     

Outsiders' threat and consecutive offers

Summary. We study the effects of outsiders' threat and consecutive offers in the two-person bargaining model of Shaked and Sutton (1984). In our first model, there are no outsiders and the firm can make two consecutive offers for every given number of periods. Our first model has the same unique equilibrium as in Shaked and Sutton (1984). In our second model, the firm can switch between rival partners but cannot change the alternating proposing sequence. Our second model has the same perfect equilibrium as in Rubinstein (1982). So the key factor that leads to the equilibrium of Shaked and Sutton (1984) is the possibility of firm's consecutive offers, not the outsiders' threat. Received: 23 December 1998; revised version: 21 May 1999     

Directed search with heterogeneous firms: an experimental study

Directed search models labor markets where workers observe wages before deciding where they will apply. This paper tests this model for the case of heterogeneous firms in a laboratory experiment. The theory predicts that more productive firms offer higher wages and workers apply more often to these higher wages. In consequence, more productive firms are more likely to match and the market is more efficient than the prediction of an alternative model where search is random. The main results of the experiment are that average firms offer wages that are close to or a little lower than the theoretical predictions but highly variable and workers apply more often to high offers but not to the extent predicted. The markets are no more efficient than random search predicts, because of the variation in wage offers.     

Changes in income inequality and the black market premium

Italian firms are top users of trade credit in an international comparison. The paper offers some clues to the determinants of this stylized fact exploiting the answers of about 1900 manufacturing firms on a wide range of contractual features, separately for domestic and foreign customers. The main finding of the univariate analysis is that, with the almost totality of transactions made on credit, there is no evidence that this way of financing is more expensive than loans. An econometric investigation shows that discounts offered have the expected effect of reducing payment delays mostly for customers located abroad, where customary credit periods are shorter and creditors’ rights protection is more effective. The result is consistent with the poor explanatory power of discounts received in regressions for the trade debt period of domestic firms.     

Bargaining Outcomes with Double-Offer Arbitration

Increasingly, arbitration is becoming used to resolve bargaining disputes in a variety of settings. Reducing dispute rates is often listed as a main goal in designing arbitration mechanisms. Conventional arbitration and final-offer arbitration are two commonly used procedures, but theoretical examinations of these arbitration procedures show that disputants’ final bargaining positions do not converge and disagreement is likely. This article contains results from a set of experiments designed to compare bargaining outcomes under the two commonly used arbitration procedures with outcomes under an innovative procedure called “double-offer” arbitration (Zeng et al., 1996). This procedure requires that disputants make two final offers at impasse: a primary and a secondary offer. The arbitrator evaluates the pairs of offers using a linear criterion function, and theory suggests the secondary offers converge to the median of the arbitrator’s preferred settlement distribution. Because the procedure’s rules are that convergence of offers generates a settlement at those offers, this theoretical convergence result implies that arbitration is not needed in the end. Experimental results indicate that dispute rates in double-offer arbitration are, on average, about the same as dispute rates in conventional arbitration. However, other results show reason to favor double-offer arbitration. Specifically, in repeated bargaining, there is concern over whether use of an arbitration procedure becomes addictive and makes bargainers more likely to use the procedure in the future-a “narcotic effect.” The data show that double-offer arbitration is non-addictive, whereas both conventional and final-offer arbitration are.     

Learning to search

Consumer search behavior in a market characterized by differentiated products is investigated in terms of a psychological reinforcement learning model. It is demonstrated that under these assumptions, consumers will vary in their propensities toward search despite similarities in search costs. There is no ‘equilibrium’ search behavior for an individual household, but there does exist a unique equilibrium distribution of search propensities. Although the behavioral hypothesis which underlies the model is quite different from the usual Bayesian formulations, the mean of the equilibrium distribution has properties which are very similar to those of normative Bayesian search models.     

Intertemporal separability in overlapping-generations models

In a pure exchange overlapping-generations model with many goods, but a single consumer with preferences separable between two periods of life, there are (generically) finitely many equilibria in which money has no value. If money has value, then (generically) there is at most one dimension of indeterminacy. This property does not generalize to a model with many consumers and general preferences. It is shown why a separable representative consumer implies such strong conclusions. It is also shown that the absence of income effects leads to similar results.     

Optimal search behaviour in a model with increasing costs

A search model incorporating increasing search costs and limited duration of price offers is investigated. It is shown that optimal behaviour is characterized by increasing reserve prices.     

The Southeast Asian Economies in the Age of Discontent

This paper investigates the effects on and responses of five middle‐income Southeast Asian economies to the current global environment of authoritarian populism, the retreat from economic liberalism, and the appeal of anti‐globalization movements. While the political histories and institutional capabilities of the five – Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam – vary greatly, these economies have a history of at least moderately fast economic growth for extended periods, and of increasing regional and global economic integration. We argue that most of the factors behind the discontent with globalization in the rich economies are not present to the same degree in these countries, and that there has therefore been no major retreat from the economic policy settings that have underpinned their past economic success. However, there are no grounds for complacency. Economic growth is slowing in some of the countries, economic insecurity remains widespread, and the development of durable independent institutions has lagged economic growth.     

SEARCH DIRECTION AND WAGE DISPERSION*

In a directed search model, we allow the unemployed and the vacancies to choose whether to send or receive wage offers. This determines the market structure. There are several equilibria but a unique evolutionary stable one. Wage offers are made under incomplete information about the number of offers, and the equilibrium strategies involve mixing. This results in wage dispersion. We show that if the unemployment–vacancy ratio is close to unity, the stable equilibrium consists of two submarkets with opposite search directions. Otherwise, the long side of the market sends offers. The stable equilibrium is efficient, given the frictions.     

Buying Online: An Analysis of Shopbot Visitors

Abstract. We conduct an empirical study on the search and purchasing behavior of buyers on an Austrian price comparison site. On such a market a consumer typically searches for the cheapest price of a given product. Reliability and service of the supplier, however, are other important characteristics of an offer. We find robust evidence of consumer behavior that can be described as a two‐stage procedure: shoppers first select a group of candidate offers based on the price only; then, in the actual buying decision consumers tradeoff a lower price with higher reliability of the retailer.     

An Empirical Equilibrium Job Search Model With Search on the Job and Heterogeneous Workers and Firms

In this article we present and estimate a synthesis of previous equilibrium search models, allowing for continuous distributions of workers' opportunity costs of employment as well as firms' productivities. The model allows for on-the-job search, and we assume that job offer arrival rates for workers are independent of their labor-market state. We derive the theoretical implications of these assumptions, we provide simulations, and we develop a semiparametric estimation procedure that we apply to a dataset of individual labor-market histories.     

On linear models with rational expectations which admit a unique solution

Based on a generalization of Doob's theorem, the method used in this paper is applied to derive the unique reduced form a general linear model containing rational expectations of the current endogenous variables made in several previous periods. In this procedure there is no need for assumptions on the structure of the policy instruments.     

Asset prices and expected monetary policy: evidence from daily data

This article explores the relationships among Libor, gold prices, the exchange rate, oil prices, fed funds futures prices and stock prices at a daily frequency. This article examines whether expected monetary policy, measured by changes in the prices of fed funds futures contracts, reacts to high frequency changes in asset prices and, in turn, whether asset prices respond to changes in expected monetary policy. The article reveals that there are statistically significant relationships between expected US monetary policy and shocks to Libor and exchange rates. It also reveals that there is no evidence of a systematic relationship between stock prices and expected monetary policy changes. Splitting the data into expansionary and recessionary periods using NBER dating, we find results for the expansionary periods that are very similar to the results for the entire period. For the periods of recession, we find little evidence of significant linkages between markets.     

Covariance breakdowns and connectedness of crude oil futures markets with non-synchronous data

ABSTRACT

This article identifies the breakdowns in the covariance of three benchmark crude oil futures markets (WTI, Brent and Dubai) and investigates the changes of market connectedness across the breakdown periods. As the crude oil futures are traded in different regions, this article eliminates the non-synchronous trading data by employing the Vector Moving Average structure and the Bayesian data augmentation approach, which keeps the integrity of original data without changing its properties. The results show that there are significant breaks in the covariance structure of crude oil futures markets. The breakdown periods are consistent with the periods when the market volatilities are at high level and the returns are volatile. The changes of market connectedness are independent of the covariance states, which supports the globalization hypothesis for the crude oil market. The results also suggest that there is more information flow out of the WTI than to the WTI during the sample period, particularly during the breakdown periods in 2008–2009.     

Human Capital and Growth: New Evidences from African Data

Assuming that all firms have rising marginal costs, merger between a dominant firm and one of the firms in the competitive fringe is considered. The effects on market price and output, profits and market power are shown when the dominant firm operates as a two-plant firm after merger and output arises from both plants. It is proved that if merger offers no efficiency gain, then market price always rises; and if merger results in efficiency gain, then market price falls if and only if there are sufficiently large number of firms in the fringe. In any case, there is profit incentive for merger to take place. [611]     

Contractual distortions in a market with frictions

This paper analyses contract design in a decentralized market environment with frictions. While principals (e.g., firms) have all contractual power, their market power is constrained as agents (e.g., workers) can choose to wait and search for better offers. We find that results depend crucially on how market frictions affect agents’ utilities. With type-independent costs of search and waiting, equilibrium contracts are always first-best. If agents are impatient and discount future payoffs, however, distortions vanish only gradually. In the latter case, we also characterize equilibrium offers and show that the market exhibits two types of externalities, both of which are absent in the case of type-independent costs of search.     

Testing for Granger causality in distribution tails: An application to oil markets integration

This paper proposes an original procedure which allows for testing of Granger-causality for multiple risk levels across tail distributions, hence extending the procedure proposed by Hong et al. (2009). Asymptotic and finite sample properties of the test are considered. This new Granger-causality framework is applied for a set of regional oil markets series. It helps to tackle two main questions 1) Whether oil markets are more or less integrated during periods of extreme energetic prices movements and 2) Whether price-setter markets change during such periods. Our findings indicate that the integration level between crude oil markets tends to decrease during extreme periods and that price-setter markets also change. Such results have policy implication and stress the importance of an active energetic policy during episode of extreme movements.     

Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs

This paper characterizes the equilibria of first price auctions with participation costs in the independent private values environment. Bidders use cutoff strategies to decide whether they will participate in the auction. It is shown that, when bidders are homogeneous, there always exists a unique symmetric equilibrium, and further, there is no other equilibrium when valuation distribution functions are inelastic. When distribution functions are elastic at the symmetric equilibrium, there exists an asymmetric equilibrium. Inelasticity/elasticity includes concavity/convexity of distribution functions as a special case. We find similar results when bidders are heterogeneous.