The Predictive Value of Expenses Excluded from Pro Forma Earnings

We investigate the informational properties of pro forma earnings. This increasingly popular measure of earnings excludes certain expenses that the company deems non-recurring, non-cash, or otherwise unimportant for understanding the future value of the firm. We find, however, that these expenses are far from unimportant. Higher levels of exclusions lead to predictably lower future cash flows. We also find that investors do not fully appreciate the lower cash flow implications at the time of the earnings announcement. A trading strategy based on the excluded expenses yields a large positive abnormal return in the years following the announcement, and persists after controlling for various risk factors and other anomalies.     

Implications of Components of Income Excluded from Pro Forma Earnings for Future Profitability and Equity Valuation

Abstract:  This study addresses three research questions relating to total exclusions, special items, and other exclusions. Are each of these pro forma exclusion components forecasting irrelevant? Are each of the exclusion components value irrelevant? Are the valuation multiples on the exclusion components justified by their ability to forecast future profitability as predicted by the Ohlson (1999) model? Findings are generally consistent with the market-inefficiency results presented in Doyle et al. (2003) . Total exclusions are valued negatively by the market despite the prediction that total exclusions will be valued positively. Valuation results also suggest that stocks with positive other exclusions are overpriced.     

A Wealth-Based Explanation for Earnings Conservatism

This study extends research on earnings conservatism – the degree to which the accounting system recognizes bad news regarding future cash flows in a more timely manner than good news – by arguing that heterogeneous executives' risk attitudes will influence the degree of conservatism. Prior research has demonstrated that differences in earnings conservatism are mainly the result of differences in institutional factors (Basu (1997) and Ball et al. (2000a)). We hypothesize that more risk-averse managers, who demand a risk premium that offsets the effects of the variance in their compensation, will report more conservative earnings. Earnings conservatism will temper expectations among stakeholders about the future cash flows to be distributed thereby diminishing the likelihood of disappointing outcomes and potential litigation or threats for executives of being fired. The more risk-averse manager would be more inclined to reduce such conflicts, since they will have a destabilizing effect on his future compensation. The empirical results for a sample of Dutch companies over the period of 1983 to 1995 confirm our hypothesis: more risk-averse managers report earnings more conservatively than do less risk-averse managers.     

Accruals Management to Achieve Earnings Benchmarks: A Comparison of Pre-managed Profit and Loss Firms

Abstract:  This study examines whether firms with profits before accruals management are more likely than firms with losses before accruals management to meet or exceed earnings benchmarks when pre-managed earnings are below those benchmarks. We extend Brown (2001) by documenting that the differential propensity to achieve earnings benchmarks by profitable and nonprofitable firms results from differential accruals management behavior. We find that firms with profits before accruals management are more likely than firms with losses before accruals management to have pre-managed earnings below both analysts' forecasts and prior period earnings and reported earnings above these benchmarks.     

On the Use of Intra-Industry Information to Improve Earnings Forecasts

We investigate whether earnings forecasts are improved by earlier earnings disclosures by firms in the same industry. We find improvements for time series forecasts, but not for analysts' forecasts. Considering prior earnings announcements reduces correlations between forecast errors and security price reactions to earnings announcements, even when incorporating these announcements improves forecast accuracy. Our explanation for this anomaly, which is supported by additional analysis, is that intra-industry information facilitates predicting transitory, rather than permanent, earnings components. The question of whether information transfers improve earnings forecasts provides the context for the analysis, but the primary contribution is the documentation of intra-industry information transfers in a setting other than capital markets.     

Cross‐Firm Real Earnings Management

Our analysis is rooted in the notion that stockholders can learn about the fundamental value of any firm from observing the earnings reports of its rivals. We argue that such intraindustry information transfers, which have been broadly documented in the empirical literature, may motivate managers to alter stockholders’ beliefs about the value of their firm not only by manipulating their own earnings report but also by influencing the earnings reports of rival firms. Managers obviously do not have access to the accounting system of peer firms, but they can nevertheless influence the earnings reports of rival firms by distorting real transactions that relate to the product market competition. We demonstrate such managerial behavior, which we refer to as cross‐firm real earnings management, and explore its potential consequences and interrelation with the practice of accounting‐based earnings management within an industry setting with imperfect (nonproprietary) accounting information.     

Use of Fuller's Technique to Reduce Measurement Error in the Returns/Earnings Association

Empirical estimates of the earnings response coefficient have consistently been lower than theory predicts. This may be because empirical proxies for unexpected earnings contain measurement error. I demonstrate and evaluate the use of a recently developed technique by Fuller that yields consistent parameter estimates in the presence of measurement error. The empirical results indicate that this technique is successful at mitigating measurement error bias in the earnings response coefficient. The earnings response coefficient increases by as much as 52%. In contrast, replication of the techniques performed in previous studies increases the earnings response coefficient by only 8%.     

Non-GAAP Earnings Disclosures on the Face of the Income Statement by UK Firms: The Effect on Market Liquidity

This study benefits by a special feature of the UK information environment which allows UK firms to disclose non-GAAP earnings on the face of the income statement to examine two interrelated questions. First, we ask whether the decision to disclose non-GAAP earnings on the face of the income statement is related to the firm's financial performance and corporate governance characteristics, and second, we investigate the effect of this disclosure decision on market liquidity. Using a dataset of 1227 hand-collected firm-year observations during the period 2006–2013, we show that better governed firms and firms with weaker financial performance are more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings. Our evidence also suggests that this disclosure is associated with increased levels of market liquidity and the results hold after controlling for self-selection bias. We conclude that firms' decision to disclose non-GAAP earnings on the face of the income statement is more consistent with the incentive to provide information than to mislead the market.     

On the Market Reaction to Revenue and Earnings Surprises

Abstract:  This study extends Ertimur et al. (2003) and Jegadeesh and Livnat (2006a) by providing a contextual framework for the information content of revenue and earnings surprises. I find that the influence of earnings surprises (revenue surprises) on stock returns is lower (higher) in R&D intensive companies. Also, market reaction to earnings surprises is lower in the fourth quarter, and to revenue surprises it is higher in industries with oligopolistic competition. A comprehensive analysis indicates that, in contrast to previous studies for the full sample, in several contexts market reaction to earnings surprises is not higher than to revenue surprises.     

Managerial Ownership, Information Content of Earnings, and Discretionary Accruals in a Non–US Setting

This study employs Danish data to examine the empirical relationship between the proportion of managerial ownership and two characteristics of accounting earnings: the information content of earnings and the magnitude of discretionary accruals. In previous research concerning American firms, Warfield et al. (1995) document a positive relationship between managerial ownership and the information content of earnings, and a negative relationship between managerial ownership and discretionary accruals. We question the generality of the Warfield et al. result, as the ownership structure found in most other countries, including Denmark, deviates from the US ownership configuration. In fact, Danish data indicate that the information content of earnings is inversely related to managerial ownership.     

Earnings Conservatism, Litigation and Contracting: The Case of Cross‐Listed Firms

Abstract:   We compare earnings conservatism of UK companies cross‐listed in the US to that of UK companies without a US‐listing. We expect that conservatism will be more pronounced for cross‐listed firms than for firms with a UK listing only, because the cross‐listed firms face a stricter enforcement regime. Furthermore, cross‐listed firms may use a listing on a US exchange to signal high‐quality reporting to investors. Using a matched‐pairs research design, we find that earnings of UK cross‐listed firms are significantly more conservative than earnings of UK firms without a US listing. Moreover, cross listed firms display particularly high levels of conservatism during the early years of their cross‐listing. This indicates that firms use earnings conservatism to commit to highly demanding reporting requirements and in doing so communicate a perception of investor care.     

How Do Different Types of Investors React to New Earnings Information?

Abstract:   The purpose of this study is to investigate how different types of investors react to new earnings information. Using the extremely comprehensive official register of share holdings in Finland, we find that the majority of investors are more likely to sell (buy) stocks in a company after a positive (negative) earnings surprise and that they are biased towards buying after the disclosure of an annual report. Large investors show behaviour opposite to that of the majority of investors. We consider several possible explanations for this heterogeneous investor behaviour, of which differences in investor overconfidence emerges as the strongest candidate.     

Application of Anglo-American Principles of Consolidation to Corporate Financial Disclosure in Japan

The adoption by Japan of consolidated corporate reporting in 1977 may be viewed as an instance of the international transfer of Anglo-American practices of corporate reporting, and as a step towards international harmonization of accounting. Consolidation practices in Anglo-American nations are based on assumptions about the nature of corporate group associations. This paper examines the applicability of these assumptions to the corporate context in Japan. Personal interviews and analyses of group associations of listed Japanese corporations support three principal findings: (i) that historical and cultural determinants provide significant contrasts between corporate group associations in Japan and Anglo-American nations; (ii) that Anglo-American methods of consolidation fail to reflect adequately the nature of corporate group associations in Japan; and (iii) that the adoption of consolidation in Japan represented a response to situation-specific change stimuli rather than a general acceptance of the intrinsic merit of consolidation. The findings have implications for international accounting.     

'The apotheosis of holding company accounting': Unilever's financial reporting innovations from the 1920s to the 1940s

The annual reports of Unilever were widely hailed in the 1940s as outstanding examples of holding company accounting. The accounts did indeed contain many new and innovative features, including segment reporting of sales turnover. This contrasts with the frequently negative assessments of the company's reporting before World War II, and the fact that the company was on record as a relatively late adopter of consolidated statements. In this paper, Unilever's reporting practices from the 1920s to the 1940s are analysed. We argue that the reporting changes of the 1940s had clear antecedents in the 1920s and 1930s, when they emerged in conjunction with the transformation of Unilever from a family-dominated enterprise into a professionally managed organisation. We also argue that, in order to evaluate properly Unilever's pre-war reporting practices, one needs to take into consideration the nature of Unilever as a complex federation of companies, rather than a unitary organisation, and to examine the chairman's address at the annual general meetings. The speeches by Francis D'Arcy Cooper, in particular, contained important disclosures not found in the annual reports. By the early 1940s, Unilever's commitment to improve its financial reporting was sufficiently developed for its officials, in particular Geoffrey Heyworth and P.M. Rees, to play important roles in the drafting of the English Institute's Recommendations on Accounting Principles and in the deliberations of the Company Law Amendment Committee whose report led to the Companies Act 1947. We therefore conclude that Unilever should be ranked with such companies as Dunlop Rubber among the key actors in the modernisation of British financial reporting during the 1930s and 1940s.     

Expected earnings growth and the cost of capital: an analysis of accounting regime change in the European financial market

This study focuses on the relation between the cost of equity capital and earnings expectations when the properties of accounting that determine earnings vary across different regulatory regimes. More particularly, it addresses the European setting where different types of GAAP regime have continued to function in the presence of the gradual harmonization of the underlying legal framework, and where the adoption of internationally recognized accounting standards by certain firms has anticipated the requirement for International Financial Reporting Standards. On the basis of estimates of the cost of equity that are implied by analysts' earnings forecasts, the article provides evidence that financial market integration may have already contributed to mitigating the economic consequences of accounting diversity, and that switching to IFRS could have a short lived impact on capital markets. Moreover, based on firm level transparency and disclosure rankings provided by Standard and Poor's, it is shown how the quality of financial reporting conditions the implied cost of equity under different GAAP.     

Management by the Numbers: A Formal Approach to Deriving Informational and Distributional Properties of “Unmanaged” Earnings

We explore the theoretical relation between earnings and market returns as well as the properties of earnings frequency distributions under the assumption that managers use unbiased accounting information to sequentially decide on real options their firms have and report generated earnings truthfully, with the market pricing the firm based on those reported earnings. We generate benchmarks against which empirically observed earnings‐returns relations and aggregate earnings distributions can be evaluated. This parsimonious model shows a coherent set of results: reported losses are less persistent than reported gains, decision making diminishes the S‐shaped market response to earnings and earnings relate to returns asymmetrically in the way documented by Basu [1997]. Furthermore, the implied frequency distribution of aggregate earnings is neither symmetric nor necessarily single‐peaked. Instead, it may exhibit a kink at zero and look similar to the plots reported by Burgstahler and Dichev [1997]. However, within our model, none of these phenomena are due to reporting noise, bias, or some undesirable strategic managerial behavior. They are the natural consequences of using past earnings as the basis for value increasing managerial decision making that in turn generates the future earnings on which future decisions will be based.