Closing the regional equity capital gap: The role of informal venture capital

There is evidence from a number of countries that small firms encounter a shortage of long-term investment finance, particularly at start-up and initial growth. Expansion of the institutional venture capital industry has done little to fill this equity gap on account of its preference for making large investments in established companies and management/leveraged buyouts. Moreover, the supply of venture capital exhibits a high level of spatial concentration. Initiatives by state/provincial and local governments, most notably in economically lagging regions, to increase the supply of risk capital for start-ups and early stage businesses have at best provided a very partial, and often costly, solution. A more appropriate approach to increasing the supply of start-up and early stage finance is to facilitate the more efficient operation of theinformal venture capital market. Informal investors, or business angels, are private investors who provide risk capital directly to new and growing businesses in which they have no family connection. Most business angels are unable to find sufficient investment opportunities and so have substantial uncommitted funds available. There is also considerable scope for expanding the population of business angels. The most cost-effective means of closing the equity gap is therefore for the public sector to underwrite the operating costs of business introduction services whose objective is to overcome the two main sources of inefficiency in the informal venture capital market, namely the invisibility of business angels and the high search costs of angels seeking investment opportunities and entrepreneurs seeking investors, by the provision of a channel of communication between informal investors and entrepreneurs seeking finance.     

The informal venture capital market: Aspects of scale and market efficiency

Risk capital is a resource essential to the formation and growth of entrepreneurial ventures. In a society that is increasingly dependent upon innovation and entrepreneurship for its economic vitality, the performance of the venture capital markets is a matter of fundamental concern to entrepreneurs, venture investors and to public officials. This article deals with the informal venture capital market, the market in which entrepreneurs raise equity-type financing from private investors, (business angels). The informal venture capital market is virtually invisible and often misunderstood. It is composed of a diverse and diffuse population of individuals of means; many of whom have created their own successful ventures. There are no directories of individual venture investors and no public records of their investment transactions. Consequently, the informal venture capital market poses many unanswered questions.The author discusses two aspects of the informal venture capital market: questions of scale and market efficiency. The discussion draws upon existing research to extract and synthesize data that provide a reasonable basis for inferences about scale and efficiency.Private venture investors tend to be self-made individuals with substantial business and financial experience and with a net worth of $1 million or more. The author estimates that the number of private venture investors in the United States is at least 250,000, of whom about 100,000 are active in any given year. By providing seed capital for ventures that subsequently raise funds from professional venture investors or in the public equity markets and equity financing for privately-held firms that are growing faster than internal cash flow can support, private investors fill gaps in the institutional equity markets.The author estimates that private investors manage a portfolio of venture investments aggregating in the neighborhood of $50 billion, about twice the capital managed by professional venture investors. By participating in smaller transactions, private investors finance over five times as many entrepreneurs as professional venture investors; 20,000 or more firms per year compared to two or three thousand. The typical angel-backed venture raises about $250,000 from three or more private investors.Despite the apparent scale of the informal venture capital market, the author cites evidence that the market is relatively inefficient. It is a market characterized by limited information about investors and investment opportunities. Furthermore, many entrepreneurs and private investors are unfamiliar with the techniques of successful venture financing. The author's scale and efficiency inferences, coupled with evidence documenting gaps between private and social returns from innovation, prompt questions about public as well as private initiatives to enhance the efficiency of the informal venture capital market.The article concludes with a discussion of Venture Capital Network, Inc. (VCN), an experimental effort to enhance the efficiency of the informal venture capital market. VCN's procedures and performance are described, followed by a discussion of the lessons learned during the first two years of the experiment.     

Trademarks and venture capital valuation

This study investigates the role of trademarks in the start-up valuations of venture capitalists (VCs). Our results show that the number and breadth of trademark applications have inverted U-shaped relationships with the financial valuations of start-ups by VCs. The findings also indicate that in later funding rounds, the value of trademark applications decreases when the start-up progresses into more advanced development stages. Start-ups should consider these findings when seeking funding from VCs and should stress their market and growth orientations and their willingness to protect their marketing investments by highlighting their trademark activities.     

Pre-seed government venture capital funds

This paper analyses a Pre-seed Fund (PSF) government venture capital (VC) program for the purpose of improving our understanding about effective public policy towards entrepreneurial finance. The PSF program is a public-private partnership started in 2002 for the purpose of fostering more investment in nascent high-tech entrepreneurial firms in Australia. Data from Venture Economics indicate PSFs are the primary provider of seed stage VC in Australia, but PSFs are not more likely to invest in high-tech firms than other types of VC funds. PSFs have smaller portfolios (number of investees) per manager than other types of VC funds, and are more likely to invest in firms resident in the same state, but do not stage and syndicate more frequently than other types of VC funds. Overall, therefore, the structure of the program has given rise to mixed performance in terms of finance and governance provided to nascent high-tech entrepreneurial firms. As well, there is also suggestive evidence that the PSF program diminishes the incentives for Innovation Investment Funds (a previously existing Australian government VC fund program) to invest in seed stage ventures, and hence competing government initiatives appear to be crowding out one another. Further evidence suggests that among the four PSFs in existence, one PSF has outperformed the other PSFs in regards to the investee firm patents and financial statement performance, even though this fund has invested less money and charged lower management fees than its counterparts. Hence, a further implication is that the impact of government-sponsored VC funds depends not only on the design of the program but also on the selection of the VC managers carrying out the investments.

Incremental impact of venture capital financing

This paper investigates the differences in the return generating process of venture capital (VC)-backed firms and their peers that operate without VC financing. Using a unique hand-picked database of 990 VC-backed Belgian firms and a complete population of Belgian small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), we focus on the extent to which the presence of a VC investor affects the sensitivity of a firm’s returns to the changes in the capital structure, in the operating cycle, and in the industry dynamics. The differences may stem from the (self-) selection of better companies into VC portfolios, from the venture capitalists’ (VCs) value-adding activities, and/or from both. We examine these factors in the context of a complex simulation procedure which allows separating selection from value-adding when traditional approaches are difficult to implement. Our results indicate that VC-backed firms are able to extract more rent from the changing industry conditions and from the optimizations in their capital structure. The presence of VCs in the firm’s equity seems to have only a marginal effect on the operating cycle efficiency. Overall, the results are suggestive of the value-adding being the main driver of the VC-backed firm’s performance.     

论企业资本运作的风险控制

作者结合近几年的工作实践,对企业资本运作的认识和如何搞好企业的资本运营提出一些看法和体会,与大家共同研究探讨.     

Growth patterns of the European venture capital industry

Although the European venture capital industry has become nearly as important as its American counterpart, little research has been done to describe its nature and importance. This study gives in the first place an overview of the importance of the venture capital industry in the major European countries. Thereafter, we look for funding and investment patterns in the different European countries. We hypothesize that there is a difference between countries in which the venture capital industry is just emerging, and those where the venture capital industry is since long established.The data are mainly, but not solely, taken from the yearly statistics of the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) and cover the period 1984–1989. The characteristics we look at are: (1) the sources of the funds flowing into the industry, broken down with respect to investor type and geographical location of the investor; and (2) the investments, broken down with respect to investment stage (using the EVCA definitions of the different stages), geographical location, degree of syndication, and industrial sector of the investee companies. In Europe as a whole, the most important group of investors are the banks (28%), the pension funds (17%), and the insurance companies (12%). Banks dominate the Swiss industry (48%); corporate investors dominate the German, Swedish, and Portuguese industries, whereas these are nearly completely absent in Denmark (2%), Ireland (4%), and the United Kingdom (5%). Eighty percent of all venture capital funds are raised domestically, 7% in another European country, and the remaining 13% in a non-European country.Almost half of the European investments (44%) are made in the expansion stage; management buy-outs (MBOs) account for another 36%. Only 14% is invested in seed or start-up companies, much less than the 30% in the U.S. Half of the venture capital investments in the United Kingdom are buy-outs. The highest start-up investment activity takes place in Austria and Spain. On average, more than half (54%) of the invested amount in Europe is syndicated, but only 6% internationally, while 10% is invested internationally.We also search for similarities and dissimilarities in the characteristics of the sources of funds and of the investments. The hypothesis is that a growth pattern can be distinguished, determining the maturity of the venture capital industry in a particular country. The characteristics that we think would discriminate most among the different industry stages are the importance of government agencies, pension funds, and insurance companies (sources of funds); of start-up, later stages, or MBO investments; and the percentage of international and syndicated investments. Cluster analyses show that there is a growth pattern, but it is less clear than expected. Characteristics of mature industries are a bigger size, relative to the gross national product of the country, the presence of pension funds and insurance companies as investors in the industry, the syndication of the deals, and the absence of the government as an investor, in the 1980s, investments in management buy-outs are mainly done by the mature industries. No pattern can be distinguished for the investments in early or later stages.The major implication from this study is the fact that the European venture capital industry cannot be approached as a single, undifferentiated industry. Each country has its own structures, institutions, and policies, which make the venture capital industries in the different countries have unique characteristics. Moreover, the European venture capital industry has different characteristics than the American industry; this has to be taken into account when comparing both industries.     

浅议风险资本与高新技术企业的公司治理

当前,由于风险投资在高新技术企业中所占的股权巨大,使得高新技术企业的公司治理变得复杂、特殊.风险资本市场本身具有风险性强、涉及范围广等特点,只有使其功能充分发挥出来,才能促进风险资本的合理开发,促进高新技术企业的技术创新,才能使高新技术企业的公司治理顺利开展.本文主要从风险资本最基本的运作原理入手,分析目前高新技术企业的公司治理过程中存在的风险,以及高新技术企业如何在各种风险中吸引风险投资.     

The impact of institutional sources of capital upon the minority-oriented venture capital industry

Venture capital (VC) funds specializing in investing equity capital in minority-owned businesses have grown rapidly over the past decade, fueled by the willingness of major institutional investors to support this traditionally neglected niche. We investigate impacts of public pension funds upon the minority VC sector. These funds, providing over half of all capital invested in minority VCs, selectively invest, seeking to fund only those VCs likely to generate high returns. Although they attempt to pick the winners, our findings indicate that they have failed to do so. The influence of public pension funds upon the minority VCs is nonetheless real, skewing investing away from traditional practices and toward those of the venture capital mainstream. In the process, minority VCs funded by pension fund money invest in high-tech fields more than other minority-oriented VC funds do. Further, they are less likely to fund minority-owned small firms, focusing increasingly upon firms owned by nonminority Whites. Neither of these trends has resulted in increased returns. Rather, diverting minority-oriented VCs away from their traditional mission of investing in minority firms operating in a broad range of industries has resulted in lower returns over the years studied.     

Technology commercialization, incubator and venture capital, and new venture performance

This study examines the effects of technology commercialization, incubator and venture capital supports on new venture performance from the resource-based view. This study uses regression analysis to test the hypotheses in a sample of 122 new ventures. The findings highlight the role of technology commercialization as a mediator between organizational resources, innovative capabilities, and new venture performance. Also, the empirical evidence indicates that incubator and venture capital supports moderate the effects of technology commercialization on the performance of new ventures. Finally, this study discusses managerial implications and highlights future research directions.     

Trust and controllability in venture capital fundraising

This study discusses a model of success in venture capital (VC) fundraising. We develop this model based on agency and trust theory. The model is tested against quantitative data collected from 151 limited partners (LP) with headquarters predominantly in North America and Europe. Beyond the well-known criterion of the VC firm's track record, results suggest that trust and perceived controllability shape the investment decisions of those LPs. Moreover, antecedents of these main factors are evaluated. In sum, this study shows how fundraising VC firms can systematically manage the fundraising process.     

Social capital of venture capitalists and start-up funding

How does the social capital of venture capitalists (VCs) affect the funding of start-ups? By building on the rich social capital literature, we hypothesize a positive effect of VCs?? social capital, derived from past syndication, on the amount of money that start-ups receive. Specifically, we argue that both structural and relational aspects of VCs?? social networks provide VCs with superior access to information about current investment objects and opportunities to leverage them in the future, increasing their willingness to invest in these firms. Our empirical results, derived from a novel dataset containing more than 1,500 first funding rounds in the Internet and IT sector, strongly confirm our hypotheses. We discuss the implications of our findings for theories of venture capital and entrepreneurship, showing that the role and effect of VCs?? social capital on start-up firms may be more complex than previously argued in the literature.     

The export intensity of venture capital backed companies

In this study we examine how venture capital (VC) firms influence the export behavior of their investee companies. VC firms perform an important governance function for investee companies by providing monitoring and value-added activities. Drawing on agency theory, the resource-based view of the firm and governance life-cycle theory we hypothesize that the relationship between VC governance resources and investee exporting behavior is moderated by investment stage. Employing a sample of 340 VC-backed firms, our results confirm this hypothesis. Monitoring resources are most effective in promoting export behavior for late-stage ventures and value-added resources in promoting export behavior in early-stage ventures.

Determinants of venture capital investments in emerging markets

Jeng and Wells (2000) initialized the examination of venture capital (VC) determinants across countries. Meanwhile, we enlarge their scope using aggregated VC funding in 118 countries, 78 being considered emerging markets, using panel data from 2000 to 2013. We show that M&A activity, legal rights and investor protection, innovation, IP protection, corruption and also corporate taxes and unemployment have impact. We reveal the economic magnitude and direction of impact of the determinants to be different for the two country categories for several parameters, enhancing previous research by emphasizing that VC investment drivers can be different for developed and developing countries.     

The impact of venture capital on the persistence of innovation activities of start-ups

In this study we investigate the impact of early stage venture capital on innovation activities of start-ups. This is done based on a cohort of start-ups that is representative of all firms founded in Switzerland in 1996/97, as recorded by a census of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office for this period. We analyze not only the impact of early stage venture capital on innovation performance 3 years after firm foundation, but also 6 and 9 years after firm start, respectively, for those firms that survived and reported continuously innovation activities (persistence of innovation). The results support neither the hypothesis of a positive impact on initial innovation activities nor the hypothesis of a positive time-persistent effect on innovation performance of start-ups.     

Financing entrepreneurship: Bank finance versus venture capital

This paper examines the entrepreneur's choice between bank finance and venture capital. With bank finance, the entrepreneur keeps full control of the firm and has efficient incentives to exert effort. With venture capital finance, there is a two-sided moral hazard problem as both the entrepreneur and venture capitalist (VC) provide unverifiable effort. The entrepreneur benefits from the VC's managerial input but must surrender partial ownership of the venture, thus diluting the entrepreneur's incentive to provide effort. Venture capital tends to be preferred to bank finance when VC productivity is high and entrepreneurial productivity is low.     

Participating convertible preferred stock in venture capital exits

This paper develops a theory of the participating convertible preferred (PCP) stock commonly used in venture capital settings. I show that the participation and convertibility features of PCP stock can be used to reduce information asymmetry between the venture and potential investors at the time of exit. Further, the convertibility feature of PCP helps in alleviating the problem of insufficient entrepreneurial effort. I then derive implications for the two most common types of exits in venture capital—initial public offerings and trade sales—and explain how US venture capital markets differ from other VC markets.