Venture capitalists' decision criteria in new venture evaluation

What criteria do venture capitalists use to make venture investment decisions? The criteria venture capitalists use to make their venture investment decisions are of interest for several reasons. First, venture capitalists are conspicuously successful in their investment decisions. The success rate of venture capital-backed ventures is significantly higher than the success rate of new ventures generally (Dorsey 1979: Davis and Stetson 1984). A better understanding of the criteria used could lead to a better understanding of the reasons for this success.Second, a better understanding of the criteria for successful new ventures could lead to an improvement in the success rate of new ventures. Although there is no clear agreement on the precise rate, the failure rate among new ventures is generally viewed as significantly higher than the average failure rate (Dun and Bradstreet 1984; Van de Ven 1980; Shapero 1981).Finally, venture capitalists' investment criteria are of enormous import to entrepreneurs seeking venture funding. Such entrepreneurs require a significant infusion of capital in order to grow their businesses, and knowledge of the criteria sought by venture capitalists can aid entrepreneurs in gaining the necessary financing.This study attempts to uncover the criteria used by venture capitalists through semistructured interviews and verbal protocol analysis of venture capitalists' evaluations of actual venture proposals. Sixteen verbal protocols—in which the participants “think aloud” as they review business proposals— were made of venture capitalists' venture evaluation decisions.The findings of this study suggest that venture capitalists screen and assess business proposals very rapidly: the subjects in this study reached a GO/NO-GO decision in an average of less than six minutes on initial screening and less than 21 minutes on proposal assessment. In venture capitalists' initial proposal screening, key criteria identified include fit with the venture firm's lending guidelines and the long-term growth and profitability of the industry in which the proposed business will operate. In the second stage of proposal assessment, the source of the business proposal also played a major role in the venture capitalists' interest in the plan, with proposals previously reviewed by persons known and trusted by the venture capitalist receiving a high level of interest.In addition to the specific criteria identified and how they were used in reaching GO/NO-GO decisions, the findings of this study also were surprising for the lack of importance venture capitalists attached to the entrepreneur/entrepreneurial team and the strategy of the proposed venture during these early stages of the venture evaluation process.     

Why do venture capital firms exist? theory and canadian evidence

This paper investigates the role of venture capitalists. We view their “raison d’être” as their ability to reduce the cost of informational asymmetries. Our theoretical framework focuses on two major forms of asymmetric information: “hidden information” (leading to adverse selection) and “hidden action” (leading to moral hazard). Our theoretical analysis suggests four empirical predictions.1. Venture capitalists operate in environments where their relative efficiency in selecting and monitoring investments gives them a comparative advantage over other investors. This suggests strong industry effects in venture capital investments. Venture capitalists should be prominent in industries where informational concerns are important, such as biotechnology, computer software, etc., rather than in “routine” start-ups such as restaurants, retail outlets, etc. The latter are risky, in that returns show high variance, but they are relatively easy to monitor by conventional financial intermediaries.2. Within the class of projects where venture capitalists have an advantage, they will still prefer projects where monitoring and selection costs are relatively low or where the costs of informational asymmetry are less severe. Thus, within a given industry where venture capitalists would be expected to focus, we would also expect venture capitalists to favor firms with some track records over pure start-ups. To clarify the distinction between point 1 and point 2, note that point 1 states that if we look across investors, we will see that venture capitalists will be more concentrated in areas characterized by significant informational asymmetry. Point 2 says that if we look across investment opportunities, venture capitalists will still favor those situations which provide better information (as will all other investors). Thus venture capitalists perceive informational asymmetries as costly, but they perceive them as less costly than do other investors.3. If informational asymmetries are important, then the ability of the venture capitalist to “exit” may be significantly affected. Ideally, venture capitalists will sell off their share in the venture after it “goes public” on a stock exchange. If, however, venture investments are made in situations where informational asymmetries are important, it may be difficult to sell shares in a public market where most investors are relatively uninformed. This concern invokes two natural reactions. One is that many “exits” would take place through sales to informed investors, such as to other firms in the same industry or to the venture’s own management or owners. A second reaction is that venture capitalists might try to acquire reputations for presenting good quality ventures in public offerings. Therefore, we might expect that the exits that occur in initial public offerings would be drawn from the better-performing ventures.4. Finally, informational asymmetries suggest that owner-managers will perform best when they have a large stake in the venture. Therefore, we can expect entrepreneurial firms in which venture capitalists own a large share to perform less well than other ventures. This is moral hazard problem, as higher values of a venture capitalist’s share reduce the incentives of the entrepreneur to provide effort. Nevertheless, it might still be best in a given situation for the venture capitalist to take on a high ownership share, since this might be the only way of getting sufficient financial capital into the firm. However, we would still expect a negative correlation between the venture capital ownership share and firm performance.Our empirical examination of Canadian venture capital shows that these predictions are consistent with the data. In particular, there are significant industry effects in the data, with venture capitalists having disproportionate representation in industries that are thought to have high levels of informational asymmetry. Secondly, venture capitalists favor later stage investment to start-up investment. Third, most exit is through “insider” sales, particularly management buyouts, acquisitions by third parties, rather than IPOs. However, IPOs have higher returns than other forms of exit. In addition, the data exhibit the negative relationship between the extent of venture capital ownership and firm performance predicted by our analysis.     

New venture strategy and profitability: A venture capitalist's assessment

This study uses theoretically justified criteria from the industrial organization (IO) strategy literature and applies it to a new domain, namely, venture capitalists' decision making. Specifically, the study investigates the types of information venture capitalists utilize when evaluating new ventures and how venture capitalists use this information to assess likely new venture profitability. In the interest of advancing our understanding of the decision making policies of venture capitalists, this study addresses many of the limitations of previous research.A review of IO research suggests important relationships between a number of strategy variables and new venture profitability. Some of the relationships proposed by IO strategy research are contingent in nature. The strategy variables and their relationships with profitability are investigated in the domain of venture capitalists' decision making. Individual and aggregate decision making analyses identified those strategy variables (criteria) venture capitalists utilize in assessing likely new venture profitability, namely, timing, key success factor stability, lead time, competitive rivalry, educational capability, industry-related competence, timing × key success factor stability interaction, timing × lead time interaction, and timing × educational capability interaction.On average, the most important criterion for venture capitalists in their assessment of profitability is industry-related competence. The second tier of importance is competitive rivalry, timing, and educational capability. The third tier of importance is lead time, key success factor stability, and timing × lead time interaction. Other interactions are less important. Therefore, while venture capitalists use contingent decision policies, main effects dominate. If venture capitalists use a reported 8 to 12 minutes on average to evaluate a business plan (Sandberg 1986), then this study's findings may help the inexperienced venture capitalist allocate time towards assessing those attributes of primary importance. Although more complex relationships exist between the attributes, the inexperienced venture capitalist can take comfort from this study's findings that main effects dominant amongst senior venture capitalists. Senior venture capitalists may take less comfort from their importance placed on main effects in light of research from IO, which suggests the importance of contingent relationships. The results may also have practical application towards training.How should venture capital firms train their new employees? Should venture capital firms rely solely on experienced venture capitalists lecturing the inexperienced on the criteria they use in assessing a new venture proposal? Like most decision makers, venture capitalists have limited insight into their assessments and venture capital firms need to be aware of the gap between “espoused” policies and policies “in use.” The information being taught needs to be supplemented with venture capitalists' decision-making research that investigates decision policies “in use”, such as this study. Venture capitalist training could also involve experiential learning, in conjunction with cognitive feedback about the decision policies used, to accelerate the learning process. Experiential learning using cognitive feedback maximizes industry related learning while minimizing the cost of inexperienced decisions. For the entrepreneur seeking capital, this increased understanding of venture capitalists' decision making may help them better target their business plans and presentations at those criteria venture capitalists' find most critical to the profitability of a new venture.     

Limited attention and the role of the venture capitalist

This research analyzes the venture capitalist's incentives to maximize the profits of the entrepreneurs of ventures and the limited partners of a venture fund. Venture capital is a professionally managed pool of capital invested in equity-linked private ventures. Entrepreneurs turn to venture capitalists for financing because high-technology startup firms have low or negative cash flows, which prevent them from borrowing or issuing equity. In addition, venture capitalists are actively involved in management of the venture to assure its success. This solves the problem of startup firms that do not have the cash flows to hire management consultants.Venture capital contracts have three main characteristics: (1) staging the commitment of capital and preserving the option to abandon, (2) using compensation systems directly linked to value creation, and (3) preserving ways to force management to distribute investment proceeds. These characteristics address three fundamental problems: (1) sorting the venture capital among the entrepreneurial ventures, (2) providing incentives to motivate venture capitalists to maximize the value of the funded ventures, and (3) providing incentives to motivate entrepreneurs to maximize the value of the ventures. Venture capitalists fund only about a dozen projects a year out of a thousand evaluated. Each project may receive several rounds of financing. Payoffs to VCs can be very high or be a complete loss.The typical venture capital (VC) firm is organized as a limited partnership, with the venture capitalists serving as general partners and the investors as limited partners. General partner VCs act as agents for the limited partners in investing their funds. VCs invest their human capital by placing their reputation on the line. The goal is to begin to convert the investment into cash or marketable securities, which are distributed to the partners. VC management companies receive a management fee equal to a percentage (usually 2.5%) of the capital of each fund. They also receive a percentage (15–30%) of the profits of each fund, called carried interest. Periodic reports are made by the VC firm to the limited partners. Usually these are only costs of managing the fund, and so revenues are negative. Most contracts specify the percentage of time that the VC will devote to managing the fund.The analysis of this research deals with the incentives of the VC who has limited attention to be allocated between improving current ventures and evaluating new ventures for possible funding. The analysis shows that the VC, as agent for both the entrepreneur and the general partners, does not have the incentives required to maximize their profits. The VC allocates attention among ventures and venture funds less frequently than required to maximize the entrepreneurs' and limited partners' profits. However, the VC does maximize the total profits of all ventures. Because the VC considers the opportunity cost of attention, the VC's allocation of attention is efficient. The implication of this result is that, although the entrepreneurs and limited partners could be made better off with a different allocation of the VC's time, this would be an inefficient use of the VC's time.     

Venture capital investing for corporate development objectives

There is a significant new player emerging in the venture capital world whose participation is changing the way that the venture business is done. Domestic and foreign corporations have discovered that investing in venture capital adds a new dimension to their corporate development strategies and can also make an outstanding return on investment.Armed with serious amounts of cash, aware of the value of an association with their name and frequently possessing marketing power that a small company covets, corporations are competing with venture capitalists for the best deals. Obtaining a “corporate partner” is now an accepted part of a small company's financing strategy.For the corporate development executive, this activity provides a useful tool to widen the spectrum of participation in new technologies while retaining the entrepreneurial drive and reducing the cost and exposure of new ventures. However, it is not a panacea for growth and caution should be exercised to avoid creating unrealistic expectations.Both entrepreneurs and venture capitalists welcome this source of later-stage capital, providing it minimizes equity dilution and assists in product development, marketing and liquidity for their investment. However, it is a competitor for the venture capitalists in sourcing deals and a potential adversary for the entrepreneur when objectives clash. Additionally, entrepreneurs and venture capitalists often are suspicious of the corporation in the small company's boardroom.The objective of most corporations is the strategic benefits that can result from venture capital investing, such as acquisitions, technology licenses, product marketing rights, international opportunities and a window on technology. However, this objective is frequently mixed with a financial return objective and can lead to a confused strategy.Participation by corporations can take many different forms but usually begins with investments in several venture capital funds as a limited partner and evolves into direct investments in venture companies. Formation of a venture development subsidiary by the corporation is a demonstrated way to maximize the strategic rewards. If financial return is the only objective, then a stand-alone venture fund is the best vehicle.The most important factors for the strategic success of a corporate program are the creation of a high-quality deal stream and the use of outstanding people to interface between the corporation and the venture capital world. In addition, there has to be a long-term commitment, active involvement and a carefully devised internal communications strategy to promote and protect the program.Creation of a formal venture development subsidiary is probably the best way to maximize the strategic objectives. Lubrizol Enterprises operates as such a subsidiary of The Lubrizol Corporation and utilizes venture capital investing, acquisitions, partnerships, and contract research to develop strategic business units based on leading-edge technologies.     

Specialization versus diversification as a venture capital investment strategy

Much important work has informed us of rates of return earned by venture capitalists, the importance of venture capitalists to the “going public” process, and the criteria venture capitalists use to evaluate deals. This paper seeks to add to the literature by testing hypotheses, based upon both the finance and strategic management literature, regarding certain venture capitalist investment practices.Venture capitalists seek to control or manage risk (Driscoll 1974; MacMillan, Siegel, and SubbaNarasimha 1985). Financing structure and investment strategy provide several means for venture capitalists to do this. Tools available to the venture capitalist include portfolio diversification to spread risk across different industries, firms, or hot/cold IPO markets to minimize unsystematic or investment-specific risk. Information sharing, networking, and specialization can also be used to control unsystematic risk.Several hypotheses are developed from these conflicting perspectives. Data used to test the hypotheses are derived from responses to a survey of venture capitalists. Three hundred surveys were mailed to venture capitalists; 98, or 32.7%,returned usable responses.Portfolio diversification is a well-known means to control risk exposure by reducing unsystematic or specific risks. However, Bygrave (1987, 1988), as well as financial intermediation theorists, argues that maintaining a high degree of specialization is useful for controlling risk as well as for gaining access to networks, information, and deal flow from other venture investors. The analyses of this paper build upon Bygrave's work. We construct more rigorous tests to resolve the conflict between the diversification and information-sharing hypotheses. Our hypothesis tests were usually resolved in favor of the information-sharing view. For example, venture capitalists in the sample that were heavily involved in seed round financing were diversified across fewer numbers of firms and industries.Further evidence in favor of information sharing is seen in investment patterns across different financing stages. Diversification would imply maintaining a portfolio of investments across the different investment stages. The information sharing/specialization view would argue that it is best to stay focused on a single stage or several “connected” stages. The empirical evidence from the sample once again favors the specialization perspective.This research provides information of use to venture capitalists, as they seek information on how best to control risk; to entrepreneurs, as they learn of the factors venture capitalists consider in determining their investment strategy; and to academicians, as such studies provide insight to general industry practice and thus help to form the basis of classroom discussion and future research endeavors.     

Criteria used by venture capitalists to evaluate new venture proposals

A questionnaire was administered to one hundred venture capitalists to determine the most important criteria that they use to decide on funding new ventures. Perhaps the most important finding from the study is direct confirmation of the frequently iterated position taken by the venture capital community that above all it is the quality of the entrepreneur that ultimately determines the funding decision. Five of the top ten most important criteria had to do with the entrepreneur's experience or personality. There is no question that irrespective of the horse (product), horse race (market), or odds (financial criteria), it is the jockey (entrepreneur) who fundamentally determines whether the venture capitalist will place a bet at all.The question is if this is the case, then why is so much emphasis placed on the business plan? In a business plan there is generally little to indicate the characteristics of the entrepreneur—it is generally devoted to a detailed discussion of the product/service, the market, and the competition. To us, the implications are obvious—such content is necessary, but not sufficient. The business plan should also show as clearly as possible that the “jockey is fit to ride” —namely, indicate by whatever feasible and credible means possible that the entrepreneur has staying power, has a track record, can react to risk well, and has familiarity with the target market. Failing this, he or she needs to be able to pull together a team that has such characteristics and show that he or she is capable of leading that team.Factor analysis of the results indicate that venture capitalists appear to assess ventures systematically in terms of six categories of risk to be managed. These are: risk of losing the entire investment: risk of being unable to bail out if necessary; risk of failure to implement the venture idea; competitive risk; risk of management failure; and risk of leadership failure.Finally, three clusters of venture capitalists were identified: those who carefully assess the competitive and implementation risks: those who seek easy bail out; and those who deliberately keep as many options open as possible.     

Hybrid conjoint analysis: An estimation probe in new venture decisions

How venture capitalists select start-ups for financing has been an interesting topic for many researchers and practitioners. The underlying assumption is that people who make money investing in new businesses by assessing the proposals should be experienced enough to distinguish losers from winners. Our research study tested three models (self-explicated, conjoint and a hybrid—comprising the two previous ones—conjoint) in order to find out: 1. if these models could be applied to venture capital decision making and if so 2. to demonstrate the potential of conjoint analysis as a practical research method. 3. To test whether or not the characteristics of the entrepreneur, the product and the market replicate the venture capital decision.This research study confirms what normative literature on decision-making emphasizes: that in the first stage of an evaluation (screening), venture capitalists focus on a small subset of criteria in a non-compensatory process (i.e., an unacceptable value on one criterion cannot be offset by a high value of another one). The important criteria in this phase appear to be the entrepreneur's experience and the existence of a prototype for some decision-makers or unique features of the product for others. The screening step is more judgemental than analytic.In a second stage (the evaluation phase), however, venture capitalists end a detailed examination (due diligence process) by choosing the most preferred ventures through processes approximating compensatory rules; that is, a low but acceptable value on one criterion can be compensated by a high value on another. The most important criteria identified by the research in this second stage are criteria found in the previous stage, product gross profit margin and patent.Our research demonstrates agreement among venture capitalists in terms of one criterion to evaluate research proposals: managerial experience. As to the rest of the attributes tested, there was variation in the weights assigned to them.The findings of this pilot study also confirm the applicability of conjoint analysis as a research method in venture capital decision. The approach helps shed light on the decision rules applied, and permits the testing of previously researched criteria for predictive validity. The method has the advantage of retaining individual preferences and clustering them around venture capitalists' demographic and psychographic backgrounds (i.e., years of experience, type of education, life-style, and the like) or other types of information such as venture fund policies (size of the investment, type of industry, etc.).The major implication of the study for entrepreneurs is the importance of previous experience in the industry where they expect to develop their ventures, and a deep knowledge of the product (advantages over competition, technical, production, and cost feasibility) they are to produce and market. These are the factors that have the greatest influence on venture capitalists' evaluation of such projects.     

The impact of formal processes for market information acquisition and utilization on the performance of Chinese new ventures

The authors examine the performance impact of formal market information processes. Specifically, a theoretical model is developed that hypothesizes that formal processes for market information acquisition and utilization have direct and positive main effects on new venture success and is then tested using a sample of 222 new ventures located in China. Findings indicate that new venture success is positively correlated with the use of formal processes for market information acquisition and use. Moreover, the relative importance of formal processes to the acquisition and use of market information depends on whether the new venture serves an emerging or established market. In particular, the impact of formal processes for information acquisition is higher among new ventures that serve emerging markets. In contrast, the impact of formal processes for information use is higher among new ventures that serve established markets. We present managerial implications of our results. For example, a new venture with a strong market orientation can respond quickly to emerging marketplace needs, and can even seize the advantage from incumbents. If it is in an emerging market, however, the new venture management team should strive to excel at information acquisition; in an established market, it is important for the management team to excel at information utilization.     

Syndicated investments by venture capital firms: A networking perspective

The networking of 464 venture capital firms is analyzed by examining their joint investments in a sample of 1501 portfolio companies for the period 1966–1982. Some of the factors that influence the amount of networking are the innovativeness, technology, stage, and industry of the portfolio company. Using the resource exchange model, we reason that the relative amount of networking is explained primarily by the degree of uncertainty associated with an investment rather than by the sum of money invested.Among the findings of our study about venture capitalists are the following:The top 61 venture capital firms that managed 57% of the pool of venture capital in 1982 had an extensive network. Three out of four portfolio companies had at least one of the top 61 venture capital firms as an investor. Those top 61 firms network among themselves and with other venture capital firms. Hence they have considerable influence.Sharing of information seems to be more important than spreading of financial risk as a reason for networking. There is no difference in the degree of co-investing of large venture capital firms—those with the deep pockets—and small firms. Furthermore, where there is more uncertainty, there is more co-investing, even though the average amount invested per portfolio company is less. That, we argue, is evidence that the primary reason for co-investing is sharing of knowledge rather than spreading of financial risk. Venture capital firms gain access to the network by having knowledge that other firms need.It is likely that there will be increasing specialization by venture capital firms. Knowledge is an important distinctive competence of venture capital firms. That knowledge includes information such as innovations, technology, and people in specific industry segments. Among the portfolios of the top 61 venture capital firms are ones with a concentration of low innovative companies, others with a concentration of high innovative technology companies, and others with a no particular concentration. As technology changes rapidly and grows more and more complex, we expect that venture capitalists will increasingly specialize according to type of companies in which they invest. Only the largest firms with many venture capitalists will be like “department stores,” which invest in all types of companies. The smaller firms with only a few venture capitalists will tend to be more like “boutiques” which invest in specific types of companies, or in specific geographical regions around the world.We think that the networking of venture capital firms has the following implications for entrepreneurs:Entrepreneurs should seek funds from venture firms that are known to invest in their type of product. It speeds the screening process. If the venture capital firm decides to invest, it can syndicate the investment through its network of similar firms. And after the investment has been made, the venture capital firms can bring substantial expertise to the entrepreneur's company.Entrepreneurs should not hawk their business plans indiscriminately. Through their networks, venture firms become aware of plans that have been rejected by other firms. A plan that gets turned down several times is unlikely to be funded. Thus it is better to approach venture capital firms selectively.The extensive network of the leading venture capital firms probably facilitates the setting of a “market rate” for the funds they invest. The going rate for venture capital is not posted daily. Nevertheless, details of the most recent deals are rapidly disseminated through venture capitalists' networks. Hence, that helps to set an industry-wide rate for the funds being sought by entrepreneurs.Lastly, we give the following advice to strategic planners:Venture capital firms share strategic information that is valuable to others outside their network. Since they often invest in companies with emerging products and services, venture capitalists gather valuable strategic information about future innovations and technological trends. Thus, strategic planners should tap into venture capitalists' networks, and thereby gain access to that information. It is sometimes information of the sort that can revolutionize an industry.     

Venture capitalists and serial entrepreneurs

Habitual entrepreneurship is receiving growing attention, much of which has focused on entrepreneurs who have started more than one venture. This paper examines the importance of habitual entrepreneurs to the venture capital industry, with particular emphasis on those who have exited from an initial investment in the venture capitalist's portfolio, termed serial entrepreneurs. As venture capital markets mature, increasing numbers of entrepreneurs are likely to exit from their initial enterprises, creating a pool of entrepreneurs with the potential for embarking on subsequent ventures. Venture capitalists making investments may invest both in entrepreneurs starting new ventures and those who purchase a venture through a management buy-out or buy-in. On this wider basis, the paper develops a classification of types of serial venture. A number of issues are raised for venture capitalists, notably the relative attractiveness of reinvesting in exited entrepreneurs and the policy they adopt in tracking and assessing such individuals.The paper addresses venture capitalists' perspectives on investing in serial entrepreneurs based on a representative sample of 55 UK venture capitalists (a response rate of 48.7%, and a follow-up survey of those who had more extensive experience of serial entrepreneurs (23 respondents). The results of the survey show that despite a strong preference for using an entrepreneur who had played a major role in a previous venture, the extent to which exiting entrepreneurs are funded from their own portfolio again is limited, though there is more extensive use of such individuals in a consultancy capacity. In screening entrepreneurs exiting from previous ventures for subsequent investments, venture capitalists scored attributes relating to commercial awareness, experience in a particular sector, and personal ambition of the entrepreneur most highly.Venture capitalists do make extensive use of serial entrepreneurs who have exited from other venture capitalists' portfolios, primarily to lead management buy-ins. Indications from the survey are that venture capitalists rarely assess entrepreneurs formally at the time of exit and that it is unusual to maintain formal links with entrepreneurs after they have exited. These apparent shortcomings suggest that perhaps investment opportunities are being missed. Those venture capitalists preferring serial entrepreneurs generally had a larger volume of funds under investment and were rather older than those venture capitalists who do not prefer to use serial entrepreneurs, reflecting the possibility that longer established venture capitalists have had more opportunity and experience in relation to second-time entrepreneurs.Investment appraisal factors were subject to a principal components analysis to identify underlying dimensions/relationships between them. With respect to the general investment appraisal factors, five factors were identified. Two factors were related to track record; one of these reflected ownership experience, while the other represented management experience. The third factor was related to personal attributes such as age, knowledge, and family background. The fourth factor represented links to the funding institution, and the final factor (a single variable factor) concerned financial commitment. The principal components analysis for screening factors on management buy-ins produced a single factor comprising all variables. These factors were then subject to a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), with preference for use of a serial entrepreneur as the independent variable. The results suggest that there are significant differences between venture capitalists who prefer serial entrepreneurs and those who do not in respect to their business ownership experience, the length of their entrepreneurial careers, and the number of their previous ventures.The results of the study have implications for practitioners. First, the findings emphasize the importance of not considering previous venture experience in isolation but in the context of other key investment criteria. Second, the lack of strongly greater performance from serial, versus novice, entrepreneurs further emphasizes the care to be taken in assessing experienced entrepreneurs. Third, the relatively low degree of formal and rigorous post-exit assessment and monitoring by venture capitalists suggests that important opportunities to invest in experienced entrepreneurs may be missed.     

Relationships among Strategic Capabilities and the Performance of Women-Owned Small Ventures

This study of small, life-style ventures owned by women focuses on the strategic, firm-level factors related to business performance. A theoretical model drawing on the resource-based theory is developed and tested empirically. The model includes strategic capabilities, management styles, and their relation to performance. It is tested empirically on a sample of 220 Israeli female business owners. Analysis reveals that life-style venture performance is highly correlated with certain aspects of the business owner's skills as well as the venture&apops;s resources. Paradoxically, the owner/managers in the sample rate their skills and their venture's resources as being weak in precisely those areas that correlate positively with business performance. These findings suggest that performance of life-style ventures owned by women depends more on marketing, financial, and managerial skills than on innovation.     

Performance factors of small tourism ventures: The interface of tourism,entrepreneurship and the environment

Performance factors of small Israeli tourism ventures were examined using an integrated model that combines four theoretical approaches, each focusing on a different central facet: environmental milieu, institutional support, entrepreneurial human capital, and the venture's bundle of services. The current research developed an operational instrument for assessing environmental attractiveness components of tourism ventures and their relationship to performance. A factor analysis, based on this instrument, revealed three environmental factors: tourist-related infrastructure, options for excursions and scenery, including climate. An attractive environment contributed to higher revenues in tourism ventures; however, it did not assure profitability. The results indicate the dual nature of the impact of institutional support upon the tourism venture's performance. Regardless of the size and age of ventures, those obtaining the advisory type of assistance from the governmental tourism incubator performed less well than those ventures that did not obtain such support. By contrast, those tourism ventures that were financially supported by external sources performed better than those that were not financially supported. The explanation for this curious and seemingly contradictory finding may lie in the different criteria for receiving financial and advisory assistance. Success in persuading external sources to provide financial support would seem to be evidence of the soundness of the venture's planning and its economic viability. By contrast, insofar as virtually any venture in the area may apply for and obtain advisory assistance from the governmental tourism incubator, with no requirement to meet financial criteria of any kind, it could be that precisely the weaker ventures are being carried along by this form of assistance.Among the various entrepreneur's attributes examined, managerial skills provided the strongest association with the performance measures. The managerial skills were also found to be the most significant variable explaining performance relatively to the variables derived from the other three approaches. These results have implications regarding the nature of the support to be given by a governmental tourism incubator to entrepreneurs operating in the region. Given that lack of managerial skills is one of the main barriers to a venture's success, particularly in small businesses where the owners have to be involved in all areas of activity, the incubator needs to provide entrepreneurs with tailored regional business and management training tools to promote tourism venture development and success.The study also reveals that the number of services offered by a tourism venture made only a minor contribution in the revenues regression, which may indicate that providing a bundle of services for the tourist customer does not necessarily guarantee profitability. A noteworthy finding is the similarity in the differential association between the number of services offered and the performance measures, on the one hand, and attractiveness features with performance on the other. In both cases, these factors positively contribute to the revenues regression, but neither contributes to the profitability or income regression. This means that an attractive environment does contribute to higher revenues, in that more tourists choose to visit the tourist attractions; however, this does not assure profitability. Similarly, providing many services to the visitors may also contribute to higher revenues, but does not necessarily assure profitable business outcomes. The current findings indicate that small tourism venture profitability is contingent on human capital, especially the skills of the entrepreneurs running the venture. In accordance with our findings that managerial skills are so crucial for venture success, the main objective of advisory incubators should be to promote managerial competencies.     

Following the Crowd—Does Crowdfunding Affect Venture Capitalists’ Selection of Entrepreneurial Ventures?

Given the increasing popularity of crowdfunding as a new means to finance entrepreneurial ventures, we assess whether and how crowdfunding campaign‐specific signals that affect campaign success influence venture capitalists’ selection decisions in ventures’ follow‐up funding process. Our study relies on cross‐referencing a proprietary data set of 56,000 crowdfunding campaigns that ran on Kickstarter between 2009 and 2016 with 100,000 investments in the same period from the Crunchbase data set. Drawing on signaling theory and the microfinance literature, our empirical findings reveal that a successful crowdfunding campaign leads to a higher likelihood to receive follow‐up venture capital (VC) financing, and that there exists an inverted U‐shaped relationship between the funding‐ratio and the probability to receive VC funding. Further, we find statistical evidence that an endorsement by the platform provider has a likewise positive impact on the receipt of VC. Contrary to our expectations, word‐of‐mouth volume seems to be a negligible factor when it comes to follow‐up VC financing. Our results support the view that crowdfunding signals are factored into the VC’s funding decision in order to evaluate the potential of entrepreneurial ventures.     

Perceived risks and choices in entrepreneurs' new venture decisions

Though risk plays a central role in most entrepreneurial decision making, little empirical research has explicitly examined how the elements of risk, risk perceptions, and entrepreneurs' propensities to take risks influence choices among potentially risky entrepreneurial ventures. This experimental study asked a sample of entrepreneurs leading America's fastest growing firms to make choices among a series of hypothetical new ventures. The results indicate that such choices are influenced by the risks inherent in the new ventures, as evidenced by the pattern of outcomes anticipated in each venture, the entrepreneurs' differing perceptions of those risks, and differences in their personal propensities to take risks.The subjects in our sample of entrepreneurs tended not to choose ventures having a high degree of variability in their pattern of anticipated outcomes. This avoidance of outcome variability suggests that the sensitivity analyses commonly prescribed for examining new venture attractiveness may inhibit risk taking, and may deter potential investors from investing in their firms. New approaches to assessing and presenting new venture risk, other than the traditional best case/expected case/worst case approach, may be advisable, as well as sufficiently through market research to provide evidence of the degree to which market acceptance is likely for the venture's products or services.We also found an effect of differences in risk propensities among entrepreneurs on their new venture choices. This effect suggests not only that entrepreneurs should be wary of any biases they bring to their new venture decisions, but that prospective investors should consider the degree to which entrepreneurs in whom they choose to invest are well-matched to the investors' own risk-taking propensities.Finally, while our sample of entrepreneurs tended to shun high levels of variability in their new venture choices, they appeared willing to accept a considerable degree of hazard, or possible downside, in their new venture choices, presumably in pursuit of potentially significant gains. Entrepreneurs are advised to seek a clear understanding of the downside entailed in their proposed ventures, and develop strategies to mitigate the likelihood of adverse outcomes. Thus they will not jeopardize chances for near term success and attracting support of investors and others in later stages of the venture or in subsequent ventures.Our research did not attempt to examine how our subjects' choices would have played out in terms of performance, but the apparent biases which entrepreneurs' risk propensities bring to their assessment of proposed new ventures is a potentially important issue that merits further scrutiny. On one hand, such biases may lead to patterns of suboptimal decisions. On the other hand, our results suggest that investors should entrust their new venture investments to entrepreneurs whose risk propensities (and perhaps other personal characteristics) best match the needs of both the opportunity at hand and the investor's objectives. As many venture capitalists attest, the management of a proposed new venture should lie at the heart of their investment decision.     

Capital structure decision making: A model for family business

Most theoretical and empirical studies of capital structure focus on public corporations. Only a limited number of studies on capital structure have been conducted on small-to-medium size enterprises (SMEs), and this deficiency is particularly evident in investigations into factors that influence funding decisions of family business owners.Theory indicates that there is a complex array of factors that influence SME owner-managers' financing decisions. Recent family business literature suggests that these processes are influenced by firm owners' attitudes toward the utility of debt as a form of funding as moderated by external environmental conditions (e.g., financial and market considerations).A number of other factors have been shown to influence financing decisions including culture; entrepreneurial characteristics; entrepreneurs' prior experiences in capital structure; business goals; business life-cycle issues; preferred ownership structures; views regarding control, debt–equity ratios, and short- vs. long-term debt; age and size of the firm; sources of funding for growth; attitudes toward debt financing; issues relating to independence and control; and perceived risk and attitudes toward personal risk.Although these factors have been identified, until now there does not appear to have been any attempts to develop empirically-based models that show relationships between these factors and family business owners' financing decisions. Utilizing theories derived from divergent disciplines, this study develops an empirically tested structural equation model of financing antecedents of family businesses. Participants of our study involved a random sample of 5000 business owners who were mailed a 250-item Australian Family and Private Business questionnaire developed specifically for this investigation.Notably, our findings reveal that firm size, family control, business planning, and business objectives are significantly associated with debt. Small family businesses and owners who do not have formal planning processes in place tend to rely on family loans as a source of finance. However, family businesses in the service industry (e.g., retailers and wholesalers) are less likely to use family loans as are those owners who are planning to achieve growth through new products or process development. Use of capital and retained profits is likely for family businesses planning to achieve growth through an increase in sales but less is likely for family businesses in the manufacturing sector and lifestyle firms. In addition, debt and family loans are negatively related to capital and retained profits. Equity is a consideration for owners of large businesses, young firms, and owners who plan to achieve growth through increasing profit margins. However, equity is less likely to be a consideration for older family business owners and owners who have a preference for retaining family control.Our findings suggest that the interplay between multiple social, family, and financial factors is complex. In addition, our findings indicate the importance of utilizing theories that also help to explain behavioral factors (e.g., owners' needs to be in control) that affect financial structure decision-making processes. Practitioners and researchers should consider the dynamic interplay among business characteristics (e.g., size or industry), behavioral aspects of business financing (e.g., business objectives), and financial factors (e.g., gearing levels) when working with and researching family enterprises.     

Structuring deals and governance after the IPO: Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in high tech start-ups

In an effort to better understand the effects of venture capital investment on selected firm governance and financing structures, we examined the post-IPO experiences of 190 biotechnology and healthcare firms (see appendix). Our study revealed that in virtually all cases, the involvement of venture capitalists reduced the role of the founder-entrepreneur in strategic decision making. This was illustrated by the larger proportion of outside directors when venture capitalists invested and the smaller proportion of entrepreneurs who remained officers or in board positions after the IPO. We also found that venture capitalists rarely invested alone, and preferred to structure deals in which venture capital partners share both risks and rewards.     

Angels and non-angels: Are there differences?

The market for informal venture capital is an elusive and nearly invisible source of financing for entrepreneurial ventures. This market consists of a diverse set of high net worth individuals (business angels) who invest a portion of their assets in high-risk, high-return entrepreneurial ventures. The emerging consensus of the characteristics of the individual investor is that of a well-educated,middle-aged individual with considerable business experience and a substantial net worth. These informal investors appear to prefer investing in the early start-up stage of the venture and, if given a choice, prefer that their investments be located close to home. One consequence of this consensus is the tendency to assume that the traits of these business angels are as tightly clustered around the norm as are the traits of venture capital funds. They are not. In terms of their competence in the many areas of venture investing, these Individual investors range from the successful, cashed-out entrepreneur on the one hand to individuals with little or no experience with venture investing on the other. At the same time, little is known about the characteristics of high net worth individuals who never ventured where angels dare to tread, or about these non-angels' propensity to join the fold. Thus, this study seeks to fill the void by examining the characteristics of high net worth individuals regardless of their investment history or their interest in venture investing.An analysis of the data reveals three groups of high net worth Individuals: business angels with experience investing in entrepreneurial ventures, interested potential investors with no venture investment history but who express a desire to enter the venture investment market, and uninterested potential investors who under no circumstances would consider investing in entrepreneurial ventures as part of their investment strategy. Business angels and potential investors (both the interested and non-interested segment) share similar views about the economic significance of the entrepreneur and the difficulty in securing the equity capital for development of the venture. As the issues move from the general to the specific, divergence in investment attitudes takes place among the two groups, but this divergence is in terms of magnitude or intensity, rather than in contrasting or opposing views of the process. The potential investor tends to view investing in entrepreneurial ventures on a smaller scale than the active investor, especially in terms of the dollar amount committed to any one investment. While the business angel is more interested than the potential investor across all stages of financing, the interest for both groups increases as the type of financing progresses from the seed stage to expansion financing. In contrast, the potential investor is more likely to seek diversification as a motivation for venture investing than their angel counterparts.The potential investor pool is segmented into those potential investors who appear willing to take on the role of business angels and those individuals who have no desire to participate in the venture market. For the interested group to increase their interest in providing venture capital, these potential investors want assistance in monitoring the performance of the venture investment, followed by assistance in pricing and structuring. Both of these resources relate more to the technical aspects of venture investing and Indicate that these are the areas where the potential investor is least likely to have expertise. Other resources, such as finding and evaluating the investment opportunity, appear to represent less of a stimulus for the potential investor. In many respects, interested potential investors act like business angels across several dimensions. Both consider the later stages of the development of the venture as the preferred stage to invest. The business angel and interested potential investor prefer investments to be located relatively close to their primary residence and share similar views on the amount of the investment portfolio to allocate to venture investing. Where the interested potential investor and business angel clearly differ is on the scale of the commitment and the motivation for investing. The potential investor will commit a smaller dollar amount to any one venture, is more inclined to participate with other investors, and is more apt to see venture investing as a diversification strategy than is the seasoned business angel.     

Patents and Early‐Stage Financing: Matching versus Signaling

This paper investigates the role of patents on early‐stage financing. We consider two questions: are patents signals of quality and why do patents relate to venture capital (VC) financing but not angel financing? Analyzing data from 468 Canadian early‐stage ventures, we show that patents are not signals of quality. Instead, the data support a match‐on‐financing need hypothesis: ventures match with VCs, who have financial capacity to support their patent protection strategies.     

The potential of actuarial decision models: Can they improve the venture capital investment decision?

Venture capitalists (VCs) are considered experts in identifying high-potential new ventures—gazelles. VC-backed ventures survive at a much higher rate than those ventures backed by other sources Kunkel and Hofer 1991, Sandberg 1986, Timmons 1994. Thus, the VC decision process has received tremendous attention within the entrepreneurship literature. Nonetheless, VC-backed firms still fail at a surprisingly high rate (20%). Moreover, another 20% of the VC's portfolio fails to provide any return to the VC. Therefore, there is room for improvement in the VC investment process.The three staged investment process often begins with venture screening. First, VCs screen the hundreds of proposals they receive to assess which deserve further consideration. Those ventures that survive the initial stage are then subjected to extensive due diligence. Finally, the VC and entrepreneur negotiate terms of the investment. Considering the amount of time that due diligence and negotiation of terms may take, it is imperative that VCs minimize their efforts during screening so that only those ventures with the most potential proceed to the next stage. Yet, at the same time, the screening process should also be careful not to eliminate gazelles prematurely. VCs are in a quandary. How can they efficiently screen venture proposals without unduly rejecting high potential investments? The answer may be to use actuarial decision aides to assist in the screening process.Actuarial decision aides are models that decompose a decision into component parts (or cues) and recombine those cues to predict the potential outcome. For example, an actuarial model about the VC decision might decompose a venture proposal into decisions about the entrepreneurial team, the product, the market, etc. The sub-component decisions are than recombined to reach an overall assessment of the venture's potential. Such models have been developed in a number of decision domains (e.g., bank lending, psychological evaluations, etc.) and been found to be very robust. Specifically, these models often outperform the very experts that they are meant to mimic.The current study had 53 practicing VCs participate in a policy capturing experiment. The participants examined 50 ventures and judged each venture's success potential; would the venture ultimately succeed or fail. Likewise, identical information about each venture was input into two different types of actuarial models. One actuarial model—a bootstrap model—used information factors that VCs had identified as being most important to making a good investment decision. The second actuarial model was derived by Roure and Keeley (1990). The Roure and Keeley model best distinguished between success and failure in a study of 36 high-technology ventures. The bootstrap model outperformed all but one participating VC (he achieved the same accuracy rate as the bootstrap model). The Roure and Keely model, although less successful than the bootstrap model, outperformed over half of the participating VCs.The implications of this study are that properly developed actuarial models may be successful screening decision aides. The success of the actuarial models may be attributed to their consistency across different proposals and time. The models always weight the information cues the same. VCs, as are all human decision makers, may often be biased by differing salient information cues that cause them to misinterpret or ignore other important cues. For example, a VC may overlook product weaknesses if (s)he is familiar with the entrepreneur putting forth a particular proposal. Although the current study developed a generalized actuarial model, each VC firm could create screening models that fit it's particular decision criteria. The models could then be used by junior associates or lower level employees to perform an initial screen of received venture proposals thereby freeing senior associates' time.