论城市政府竞争、制度创新与知识溢出

随着经济的发展,城市政府更多地依靠制度创新促进地方经济的增长。在制度创新过程中,城市政府行为的核心是与其他地区竞争制度创新的进入权,因此,研究制度创新需要依托城市政府竞争的基础,创新成功的一个前提条件是城市政府之间较高的知识溢出。     

From Mass Flourishing to Vested Interests: A Conceptual Model for the Evolution of Organizational Institutions

Human flourishing requires the ability to operate from intrinsic motivation. The extent to which that can happen depends largely on how one’s surrounding institutions support a sense of autonomy, connectedness, and competence. I argue that the systematical prevalence of such conditions within an institution requires experiencing (i) exploration of the new in the emergence of the institution, and/or (ii) positive impact of its work on beneficiaries. The former is associated with the early phases of organizational evolution. The latter could be the source of flourishing in more established institutions, but hierarchies of power typically block it. Those with power are distanced from experiencing the impact of the institution on beneficiaries, structurally leading to priming through extrinsic motivations and vested interests. This leads to the need to further control those on the frontline who could experience the impact, which inhibits flourishing on their part as well.     

经济学视角下的制度变迁:内生性、驻存与演进

制度变迁的效率假说隐含地将经济体简约为一个绝对理性的最大化行为者,这种做法存在缺陷。就长期而言,制度变迁的本质是内生的,但也受到外部冲击的影响。制度演进过程既体现出路径依赖的特征,又不乏偶然性和机遇。经济因素或政治因素都可能导致内卷化,即长期陷入某种低效率或无效的制度安排。有效制度的演进可以通过多种途径而实现:它往往得益于一些偶然事件的影响或冲击,但也可能因经济行为者如利益集团的推动而出现。     

Competition and Participation in Religious Markets: Evidence from Victorian Scotland

In 1885, the largest churches in Scotland were engaged in a dispute about state funding. We use data generated in the course of that dispute to test two related hypotheses. First, as market size (proxied by population) increases, the competitiveness (or complexity) of the religious market structure will not decrease. Second, religious activity, as measured by giving per member, church income and participation, will not decrease as market competitiveness (or complexity) increases. Empirical evidence lends support to the first hypothesis, but casts doubt on the second, and the supply-side theories underpinning it, which posit a causal link between increased competitiveness (complexity) and higher levels of religious activity. In interpreting the results the importance of a rich understanding of institutional arrangements—particularly market structure, governance and financing—is underlined.     

兼并和伯特兰德竞争的价格效应分析

本文采用博弈论方法研究兼并和伯特兰德竞争对价格、竞争等的影响.首先,分布在两个市场中的寡头公司分别选择同市场或跨市场的兼并活动,其次,两个市场中的寡头公司进行伯特兰德竞争.结论显示,有关需求函数的各种约束条件是决定价格升高或下降的关键因素,从而揭示了价格效应产生的原理.美国航空业的案例研究支持模型的基本结论.     

Monetary Institutions,Monopolistic Competition,Unionized Labor Markets and Economic Performance*

Recent literature on the interactions between labor unions and monetary institutions features either a supply or a demand channel of monetary policy, but not both. This leads to two opposing views about the effects of central bank conservativeness. We evaluate the relative merits of those conflicting views by developing a unified framework. We find that: (i) the effect of conservativeness on employment depends on unions’ relative aversion to unemployment versus inflation, and (ii) for plausible values of this relative aversion (and more than one union), social welfare is maximized under a highly conservative central bank. We also evaluate the effects of centralization of wage bargaining and product market competition on unemployment and inflation.     

Knowledge-independent Invariance Rules for Copula Duration in Dungflies

In dung flies, copula duration decreases, and the proportional rate of sperm transfer increases, as male body size becomes larger. From a marginal value approach to optimal copula duration, we show that these relationships result in the product, , remaining approximately constant across the range of male body size. The expected proportion of a female's eggs fertilized by a copulating male, equivalent to 1 – e^–c·t , is likewise invariant with male body size. (Overbars and refer to the averages over female sizes). We assume that the information or cues a male can perceive about females forms a set of discrete recognition categories, each of which is uniquely recognizable by a male, but within which he cannot discriminate. There are then likely to be different male optima for the product between categories. But the invariance rules still hold within categories, independently of exactly what the recognition categories are, provided that all males perceive the same categories. For example, suppose that males of all sizes categorise females as either 'large', 'medium', or 'small'. Then though the optimal male strategy (product ) for (say) 'large' females may differ from the corresponding optima for the other two categories, it remains constant with male size across all the 'large' females. Further, the product should remain constant for all male sizes if we take the average across all females, or across any subset of recognition categories. We believe that these conclusions have general applicability and implications for optimal foraging under the marginal value theorem, and demonstrates how we can sometimes make predictions (e.g. the relation between copula duration and male body size in dungflies) without determining exactly what a forager 'knows'.     

Imperfectly competitive factor markets and price normalization

A two-sector general equilibrium model with imperfectly competitive labor markets is set up. Noncooperative equilibria with wage setting at the sectoral level are shown to depend on the choice of price-normalization rule even though all agents behave fully rationally. Hence, imposing rationality is not sufficient to deprive the choice of price-normalization rule of its importance. It is argued that the importance of the choice of price-normalization rule may follow from the strategic interaction of agents and not from imperfectness of competition per se, and some examples are provided.     

Schumpeterian process competition, welfare and laissez-faire: An experiment in artificial economic evolution

A simulation model is used to construct a regime of artificial economic evolution, where Schumpeterian process competition prevails, in the presence of technological uncertainty and bounded rationality. The output decision of the firm is represented by a behavioural algorithm, which allows for the presence of collusive behaviour. The purpose of the experiments is to go some way towards addressing the twin issues of the nature of the relationship between market structure and industry performance in a dynamic setting, and the contention that the evolutionary metaphor implies a laissez-faire stance with respect to policy issues. Under the simplifying assumptions of the model, experiments suggest that industries which generate high average concentration over a given period can compare favourably with industries that generate low average concentration, if the time profiles of both welfare and concentration are analysed. Also, the experiments suggest that the industry will naturally evolve a structure best suited to exploit the technological environment, but despite this there is still a role for intervention into the competitive process.     

一般均衡中的利率、确定性与最优规则

利率规则理论是以短期利率作为货币政策工具而发展起来的一套新的理论,它体现了货币经济学家在货币政策领域内的新的尝试和努力。在利率规则理论中,货币经济学家试图解决两个问题:利率规则冲击对非政策经济变量的短期影响是什么,以及一个好的利率规则应当具有怎样的性质。利率规则将短期利率作为非政策经济变量的内生反应函数,使得货币经济学家可以在一般均衡模型中探讨这两个问题。然而,由于利率规则从一开始就是出于一种偏好的设定,因此,讨论的结果并不符合稳健性和科学性的要求,这就削弱了理论预言的可靠性。在某种意义上,利率规则理论若想成为一门真正的"科学的艺术",它就必须为内生利率规则寻找到一个坚固的微观基础。本文梳理评述了利率规则理论在经验上和理论上的成就和不足。     

Institutions,assortative matching and cultural evolution

This paper studies the role of institution in a Darwinian evolutionary process of cultural selection. The primary function of an institution is to determine how citizens in a society are matched pairwisely to interact. We examine three different types of institutions: utilitarian, egalitarian, and Nash. Two cultural types stand out in the long run through the evolutionary process. The opportunistic cultural type maximizes individual payoff against another opportunistic cultural type, while the civic-minded cultural type maximizes the total payoff of a pair. We show that the structure of the underlying interactions among citizens plays a critical role. On the one hand, the evolutionary stability of the civic-minded cultural type requires supermodularity of the citizens’ payoff function under the utilitarian institution and log-supermodularity in addition under the Nash institution. On the other hand, the evolutionary stability of the opportunistic cultural type requires submodularity of the citizens’ payoff function under the utilitarian institution and log-submodularity under the Nash institution. Neither type’s evolutionary stability is guaranteed under the egalitarian institution.     

产业结构演进的一般规律及国际经验比较

产业结构演进的一般规律表明,技术密集化和信息化将是产业发展的方向,而技术创新和技术进步是产业结构演进的核心动力,政府科学合理的宏观引导是产业结构调整顺利实施的关键。通过深入分析日、韩两国产业结构调整的经验教训,指出我国的产业结构调整应结合国情,突出资源整合和集约开发,紧密围绕主导产业,形成协调配套的关联产业体系,促进产业集群的发展,全面提高产业竞争力和综合实力。     

制度产生、制度变迁的博弈浅析

制度经济学的研究对象和研究方法和博弈论有很多的相似性,本文利用博弈论对正式和非正式制度的产生和变迁 迁作了一定的分析。     

竞争战略、资本结构与企业业绩

文章认为,对于竞争性行业和垄断性行业的资本结构与企业业绩的相关性,可以尝试从不同的理论出发点来解释,对于竞争性行业而言,其保守的财务政策(低负债率)可能是基于行业竞争程度、资本市场条件以及企业竞争战略的理性商业选择,不一定是以往学者从代理问题出发得出的股权融资偏好。我国监管机构基于抑制股权融资偏好行为而制定的一系列股权融资约束似乎并未考虑到行业竞争程度的不同,这种资本市场的配置低效率使得我国上市公司面临着过度监管和监管不足并存的现象。     

Voluntary Environmental Agreements and Competition Policy

Voluntary environmental agreements are oftensuspected to promote collusive practicesbetween participating firms. The paperaddresses the antitrust implications ofGermany's voluntary Dual Management System forPackaging Waste Collection and Recycling (DSD). It uses analytical tools of the economictheory of the firm to examine features ofDSD's governance structure that were oftenidentified to impede competition. While thepaper does not argue that DSD performs asefficiently as a hypothetical solution in amore competitive setting, it shows that thesefeatures have an economic rationale from theviewpoint of the theory of the firm. Thegeneral conclusion is that it is necessary tocarefully analyze the institutional fine-tuningof a voluntary agreement in order to derive theoverall impact stemming from a formal lack ofcompetition. A more case-to-case-oriented,institutional research approach could thereforefruitfully supplement model-driven, theoreticalanalyses of voluntary environmental agreementsand their effect on market competition.     

Consumer myopia, standardization and aftermarket monopolization

In this paper, I show that the standard Bertrand competition argument does not apply when firms compete for myopic consumers who optimize period-by-period. I develop the model in the context of aftermarket. With overlapping-generations of consumers, simultaneous product offerings in the primary market and aftermarket establishes a price floor for the primary good. This constraint prevents aftermarket rents from being dissipated by the primary market competition. Duopoly firms earn positive profits despite price competition with undifferentiated products. Nonetheless, government interventions to reinforce aftermarket competition such as a standardization requirement may lead to the partial collapse of the primary market.     

刍议区域经济核心竞争力理论与实践

区域经济核心竞争力是指某一区域在经济发展过程中形成的不易被其他区域效仿的能带来经济高速发展的独特能力.它是区域经济在一系列发展过程和决策中形成的,具有独特优势的技术、文化或机制所决定的巨大的资本能量和经济实力.区域经济核心竞争力表现在区域经济绩效、政府效率、企业效率和区域内基础设施上,它是区域整体获得长期稳定的竞争优势的基础,是由区域经济发展战略和其实现战略的团队执行力决定的.因此,区域经济核心竞争力需要不断地适应环境变化,进行选择、打造恰当的战略和战略执行力;通过掌握核心技术,整合优势产业和形成特有品牌提升区域经济核心竞争力.     

Institutions as knowledge capital: Ludwig M. Lachmann's interpretative institutionalism

This article revisits the socioeconomic theory of the AustrianSchool economist Ludwig M. Lachmann. By showing that the commonclaim that Lachmann's idiosyncratic (i.e., eclectic and multidisciplinary)approach to economics entails nihilism is unfounded, it reachesthe following conclusions. (1) Lachmann held a sophisticatedinstitutional position vis-à-vis economics that anticipateddevelopments in contemporary new institutional economics. (2)Lachmann's sociological and economic reading of institutionsoffers insights for the problem of coordination.     

A cognition paradigm clash: Simon,situated cognition and the interpretation of bounded rationality

Simon’s notion of bounded rationality is deeply intertwined with his activity as a cognitive psychologist and founder of so-called cognitivism, a mainstream approach in cognitive psychology until the 1980s. Cognitivism, understood as ‘symbolic information processing,’ provided the first cognitive psychology foundation to bounded rationality. Has bounded rationality since then fully followed the development of cognitive psychology beyond symbolic information processing in the post-Simonian era? To answer this question, this paper focuses on Simon’s opposition during the 1990s to a new (paradigmatic) view of cognition called situated cognition, which has since put into question the entire view in cognitive psychology of humans as symbolic information processors. This paper then reads the cognitivism/situated cognition debate through the lens of current bounded rationality research in economics, in order (i) to inquire into whether it has tackled the issues in that controversy; (ii) to envisage possible new foundations for a cognitive psychology-based bounded rationality.     

中国银行业竞争的外部性经济学溯源

中国金融业全面对外资开放,银行业的竞争格局面临重塑.分析了中国银行业竞争态势,揭示了中外银行业竞争格局异同的深层文化因素和外部性理论的起源及其在金融产业经济中的发展过程,提出外部性理论演进对中国银行业竞争的启示.