Political Business Cycles and Partisan Politics: Evidence from a Developing Economy

This paper explores whether the evidence supports the Political Business Cycle (PBC) theory, Partisan Theory (PT), and Rational Partisan Theory (RPT) using stock market data from Turkey, a rapidly growing developing economy. The results indicate that the PBC hypothesis is not supported by the data. We find permanent partisan effects in the conditional variance but not in returns. The conditional volatility of the returns is higher during the periods in which a leftist party or a coalition government is in office. We also find that the stock market returns temporarily decreases (increases) at the beginning of a right‐wing (left‐wing) government, providing evidence in favor of RPT.     

THE PARTISAN MODEL OF MACROECONOMIC CYCLES: MORE THEORY AND EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES*

The “Partisan Theory” of macroeconomic policy is based on the idea that political parties typically weight nominal and real economic performance differently, with left-party governments being more inclined than right-party ones to pursue expansive policies designed to yield lower unemployment and higher growth, but running the risk of extra inflation. Given suitable assumptions about the structure of the macroeconomy, partisan models imply a political signal in demand management, output and inflation movements originating with shifts in party control of the government. In this paper I develop and test with postwar US data a revised Partisan model that allows for (i) uncertainty among policy authorities about the sustainable output growth rate and therefore about how aggregate demand expansions will be partitioned between extra output and extra inflation, and (ii) ex-post and projective learning and preference adjustment under such uncertainty. Dynamic numerical analysis of a small, stylized political-economic model based on these extensions of Partisan Theory generates within-sample forecasts that correspond remarkably well to the observed pattern of price, output and nominal spending fluctuations under the parties.     

Speculation,interest arbitrage,and the forward foreign exchange rate of the Canadian dollar: Updated evidence

This note presents updated estimates of the reduced forms of the “Modern Theory of the Forward Foreign Exchange Rate” and of the “Interest Parity Theory” for Canada for the period 1962–1977. The evidence does not support the Modern Theory's hypothesis of a significant effect of speculation on the forward rate, and supports the hypothesis of effective interest arbitrage only for the most recent period 1976–1977.     

Rational Partisan Theory: Evidence for Seven OECD Economies

According to the Rational Partisan Theory of business cycles ("RPT"), ex ante uncertainty about the outcome of elections will generate post-election output growth fluctuations. This paper employs vote prediction equations and opinion polls to compute election win probability estimates for 62 elections in seven OECD economies. The probability estimates are used to calibrate partisan intervention terms entered in output growth regressions. For the UK and, to some extent, Canada and Australia, our results are supportive of the RPT. For the US, the calibrated intervention terms are dominated by a partisan dummy variable turned on after each election.     

The econometrics of rational partisan theory

This study develops an econometric intervention model representing the standard empirical approach to testing Alesina's (1987) Rational Partisan Theory implication that elections lead to short-term changes in output growth and unemployment., This intervention approach may be subject to two econometric difficulties., First, the cyclical nature of the autoregressive variables suggest the regression residuals may be serially correlated., Second, the election intervention variable may be endogenous to the cyclical variables., Empirical support for the model is mixed., Ordinary Least Squares estimates for both series produce a coefficient for the intervention variable which is of the predicted sign but not significant., The output growth regression results are robust to serial correlation and endogeneity concerns., For unemployment, controlling for serial correlation generates a significant coefficient, but adjusting for endogeneity does not.,     

A Note on Economic Content and Test Validity

This note offers some practical, easily used tips on how teachers can determine whether tests under consideration for classroom use are “valid,” that is, whether they measure what they are supposed to measure.     

Reciprocity: theory and facts

The importance of reciprocity is not new in economics. Contractual market exchanges and long-run interactions are both situations based on self-interested reciprocal behaviour. However, reciprocity is not only a behaviour but also a motive that sometimes appears to be inconsistent with self-interest. This fact produces a tension between those who try to explain reciprocal behaviour within the standard framework and those who aim at enlarging it with the introduction of additional behavioural principles. This special issue collects a selection of papers presented at the International Conference “Reciprocity. Theory and facts” were the two perspectives were compared and discussed. In this Introduction note we provide first a broad view of the role of reciprocity in economics and then a quick introduction to each of the contributions enclosed in this special issue.     

How do voters perceive changes to the rules of the game? Evidence from the 2014 Hungarian elections

Voters often rely on partisan attachments as they evaluate new policy proposals, but does partisanship also color their interpretation of incumbent efforts to entrench themselves in power by changing the “basic rules of the political game”? We explore this question by taking advantage of a rare instance where a single party held a supermajority sufficient to unilaterally amend the constitution and overhaul the electoral system. We embedded a randomized experiment in a panel survey around the 2014 Hungarian elections, providing respondents with different information about recent changes to the Hungarian electoral rules. While respondents were largely pessimistic about the reforms, providing information yielded no significant effects on their views on the elections' legitimacy. But when information was presented alongside partisan cues, respondents became more negative in their views. Subgroup analysis shows that this effect is concentrated entirely among those not supporting the incumbent. Partisan differences in opinion dwarf any treatment effects we were able to induce. We provide evidence that these findings are unlikely the result of a well-informed populace. Rather, we provide the first experimental evidence that partisan-motivated reasoning applies not only to public policy under fixed institutions but also to changes to the institutional rules of a political system. Incumbents can exploit strong partisan attachments to reduce political competition.     

The distance between Buchanan's “An Economic Theory of Clubs” and Tiebout's “A Pure Theory of Local Public Expenditures”. New insights based on an unpublished manuscript

This article introduces Buchanan's comment on Tiebout's “A Pure Theory of Local Public Expenditures”. It helps us to understand the nature of the relationship between Buchanan and Tiebout. Usually, it is claimed that Buchanan modelled Tiebout's insights, that there exists a Buchanan-Tiebout hypothesis, and that Buchanan in 1965 complemented what Tiebout had written in 1956. We show that Buchanan could not have written “An Economic Theory of Clubs” as a complement of “A Pure Theory of Local Public Expenditures”. He disagreed with Tiebout's ideas on mobility because he saw mobility as a cause of inefficiencies and not a cause of homogeneity in groups. This is what we show by putting Buchanan's comment on Tiebout into historical perspective. It appears that Buchanan interpreted Tiebout 1956 from the perspective of his works on fiscal federalism from the early 1950s. We show that there is a continuity between Buchanan's work from the early 1950s and his works in the early 1970s; and Buchanan's way of reading Tiebout is part of it. Hence, when he wrote “An Economic Theory of Clubs”, Buchanan was convinced that Tiebout was wrong and that he was offering an alternative framework for public economics.     

Balancing corporate culture: Grid-group and Austrian economics

The aim of this paper is twofold: firstly to discuss the foundations of Grid-Group “Cultural Theory” and highlight the compatibility with Austrian economics, and secondly to apply this framework to the context of organisational culture. My claim is that “Corporate Cultural Theory” provides a rigorous and grounded social anthropological framework to take Austrian economics beyond its traditional uses and improve upon competing explanations of corporate culture.     

Veblen,Veblenian Social Practices,and Prosperity Theology

Abstract:

At the turn of the twentieth century (1910), Veblen published an essay which explored the relationship between Christianity and capitalism by focusing on the interaction between the two institutions as they evolved. Veblen’s analysis begins by detailing the evolution of Christianity prior to the age of industrialized capitalism, after which he explores the evolutionary interplay between the two. Just over ten years prior to the publication of this essay (1899), Veblen published the Theory of the Leisure Class while over ten years after the publication of the essay (1923), Veblen dissected the sales efforts of Christianity in a note titled “Salesmanship and the Churches.” Nearly 100 years later, these three works together explain a modern and distinctly American religious movement—Prosperity Theology. This research argues that Prosperity Theology as practiced in the United States over the past nearly half century embodies and integrates all three of these works by Veblen and proposes the conceptual term “Veblenian Social Practice.”     

Diversity as a Means of Individualizing Instruction

Judith Yates asserts that “… tests do not necessarily enable us to infer anything about what students have learned or the manner in which they have learned it.” She then concentrates on the tailoring of instruction to the individual, discussing the evidence for the existence of many different learning styles, and the possible influence of these styles on learning. She explains the concepts of “field independence” and “field dependence,” and presents their possible implications for economic education.     

Introduction: Reform in the Provision of Health Care

The term “sustainable consumption” is subject to many interpretations, from Agenda 21's hopeful assertion that governments should encourage less materialistic lifestyles based on new definitions of “wealth” and “prosperity”, to the view prevalent in international policy discourse that green and ethical consumerism will be sufficient to transform markets to produce continual and “clean” economic growth. These different perspectives are examined using a conceptual framework derived from Cultural Theory, to illustrate their fundamentally competing beliefs about the nature of the environment and society, and the meanings attached to consumption. Cultural Theory argues that societies should develop pluralistic policies to include all perspectives. Using this framework, the paper examines the UK strategy for sustainable consumption, and identifies a number of failings in current policy. These are that the UK strategy is strongly biased towards individualistic, market-based and neo-liberal policies, so it can only respond to a small part of the problem of unsustainable consumption. Policy recommendations include measures to strengthen the input from competing cultures, to realize the potential for more collective, egalitarian and significantly less materialistic consumption patterns.     

Testing the efficiency of the Athens Stock Exchange: Some results from the banking sector

In this study we test the efficient market hypothesis in the Athens Stock Exchange for a number of selected stocks from the banking sector. We distinguish between a “weak” and “semistrong” version of the hypothesis depending on the agents' information sets. For the “weak” version we apply a recently developed test by Brock, Dechert and Scheinkman (1987) to test for the presence of nonlinear structure in the residuals of rates of return regressions of these stocks. To test the “semistrong” form of the efficiency hypothesis we carry out tests of cointegration following the methodology of Granger and Engle (1987). We find no noticeable presence of nonlinearties in the standardized residuals for these series. Also we find no evidence of cointegration and hence no Granger causality between the different stocks. Our findings support the “weak” and “semi-strong” versions of the efficient market hypothesis.     

MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND ELECTIONS IN OECD DEMOCRACIES*

The purpose of this paper is to test for evidence of opportunistic “political business cycles” in a large sample of 18 OECD economies. Our results can be summarized as follows: 1) We find very little evidence of pre-electoral effects on economic outcomes, in particular, on GDP growth and unemployment; 2) We see some evidence of “political monetary cycles,” that is, expansionary monetary policy in election years; 3) We also observe indications of “political budget cycles,” or “loose” fiscal policy prior to elections; 4) Inflation exhibits a post-electoral jump, which could be explained by either the pre-electoral “loose” monetary and fiscal policies and/or by an opportunistic timing of increases in publicly controlled prices, or indirect taxes.     

Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control

This note examines critically two welfare theorems proved by Gary Becker in his “Economics of Discrimination.” Becker demonstrated that discrimination diminishes the welfare of a discriminating group. He also derived a necessary condition for a group which is the victim of discrimination to be made relatively worse off. These results are shown to depend critically on the assumption that disciminators incur psychic costs which nondiscriminators do not. When the same market equilibrium results from psychic benefits, “discriminators” are shown to gain from having a taste for favoritism and the group discriminated against is shown always to be made worse off.     

Fake Sales: A Dynamic Pricing Perspective

Some sellers display high “regular” prices, but mark down these prices the vast majority of the time, advertising the good as “on sale” or “discounted”. This note suggests a framework for understanding the practice, emphasising the role of buyer uncertainty about their future valuations for the good. We argue that so‐called “regular” prices set buyers’ expectations regarding future prices, expectations that need not be tethered to the prices actually set. By manipulating upwards buyers’ expectations of future prices, the seller can increase demand for the good at the current “sale” price, increasing profits.     

“ENVIRONMENT”, “NEEDS” AND REAL INCOME COMPARISONS(1)

Conventional measures of national product make no pretence of including everything that affects welfare. As increasing attention is being paid to environmental pollution, the problem of incorporating certain non-economic variables into the analysis of well-being becomes more relevant. The object of this note is to show how a difference in “needs” for, and hence expenditures on, anti-pollutants, which will show up in conventional national accounts comparisons as differences in “tastes”, should be converted into differences in real income.     

Learning,forecasting and optimizing: An experimental study

Rational Expectations (RE) models have two crucial dimensions: (i) agents on average correctly forecast future prices given all available information, and (ii) given expectations, agents solve optimization problems and these solutions in turn determine actual price realizations. Experimental tests of such models typically focus on only one of these two dimensions. In this paper we consider both forecasting and optimization decisions in an experimental cobweb economy. We report results from four main experimental treatments: (1) subjects form forecasts only, (2) subjects determine quantity only (solve an optimization problem), (3) they do both and (4) they are paired in teams and one member is assigned the forecasting role while the other is assigned the optimization task. All treatments converge to Rational Expectation Equilibrium (REE), but at different speeds. We observe that performance is the best in treatment 1 and the worst in Treatment 3. We further find that most subjects use adaptive rules to forecast prices. Given a price forecast, subjects are less likely to make conditionally optimal production decisions in Treatment 3 where the forecast is made by themselves, than in Treatment 4 where the forecast is made by the other member of their team, which suggests that “two heads are better than one” in term of the speed of finding the REE.     

Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching

In this note, we demonstrate that the problem of “many-to-one matching with (strict) preferences over colleagues” is actually more difficult than the classical many-to-one matching problem, “matching without preferences over colleagues.” We give an explicit reduction of any problem of the latter type to a problem of the former type. This construction leads to the first algorithm which finds all stable matchings in the setting of “matching without preferences over colleagues,” for any set of preferences. Our construction directly extends to generalized matching settings.