Abandoned mergers and the market for corporate control

This paper investigates the financial performance cf a sample of UK firms involved in abandoned mergers during the period 1977–81. Predictions derived from a broadly neoclassical theory of merger activity are tested empirically and implications for the theory of the firm are discussed. Using an extension of discriminant analysis for firms in our samples we cannot find any evidence to suggest that the market for corporate control exercises discipline in completed mergers or in abandoned ones. In the latter case we suggest that the motives for takeovers tend to reflect managerial rather than shareholder interests.     

内部控制模式与公司控制权

不同的人拥有公司控制权会对公司实施不同的控制,带来不同的业绩.本文介绍了公司控制权的变迁,得出与之相应的内部控制模式,并且针对有关问题给出了解决的对策.     

Emotions in litigation contests

This paper introduces the concept of emotions into the standard litigation contest. Positive or negative emotions emerge when litigants either win or lose at trial and depend in particular on the level of defendant fault. Our findings establish that standard results of litigation contests change significantly when emotions are taken into account. We show that emotions may increase or decrease individual and total equilibrium contest effort, introduce an asymmetry into the contest, and reinforce or weaken a plaintiff’s incentives to bring a suit. In addition, we consider how emotions impact on justice.     

Delegation and strategic incentives for managers in contests

Owners usually want their managers to maximize profits. As the literature on strategic delegation has shown it may be beneficial to owners to put a positive weight on sales in the optimal linear incentive scheme for managers to make them behave more aggressively in the market. This paper shows that if the competition between the managers can be characterized as a contest, owners may induce their managers to maximize sales. Moreover, there is a first‐mover advantage for owners when choosing their incentive schemes. If delegation is endogenous the type of contest will determine whether all owners delegate their decisions to managers or not. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managerial incentives and corporate control auctions

An analysis of the sequence of bidding in corporate control contests involving white knights reveals a category of white knights termed as ‘delayed bid’ white knights who make their bid after two consecutive hostile bids. The ‘immediate bid’ white knights make their bid in relative haste after the first hostile bid. Overpayments by white knights are much larger for the ‘immediate bid’ white knights. An analysis of the respective compensation packages shows that the managers of the ‘immediate bid’ white knights have a lower proportion of their income linked to stock value (relative to their annual cash income) compared to ‘delayed bid’ white knights and hostile bidders.     

An analysis on corporate governance

Corporate governance has become one of the major international issues that have succeeded in attracting a good deal of public interest in recent years, especially since the recent spate of ＂world famous＂ scandalous corporate failures. Today, it is considered that corporate governance plays an important role in the economic health of corporations and society in general. Improving corporate governance is a systematic project, it is necessary to the internal governance and external governance of the ways multi-pronged.     

Deadlines in stochastic contests

We consider a two-player contest model in which breakthroughs arrive according to privately observed Poisson processes. Each player’s process continues as long as she exerts costly effort. The player who collects the most breakthroughs until a predetermined deadline wins a prize.We derive Nash equilibria of the game depending on the deadline. For short deadlines, there is a unique equilibrium in which players use identical cutoff strategies, i.e., they continue until they have a certain number of successes. If the deadline is long enough, the symmetric equilibrium distribution of an all-pay auction is an equilibrium distribution over successes in the contest. Expected efforts may be maximal for a short or intermediate deadline.     

Contingent payments in selection contests

The early literature on research contests stressed the advantages of a fixed prize in inspiring R&D effort. More recently the focus has moved towards endogenizing the rewards to research activity in these tournament settings, since this can induce extra effort or enhance the surplus of the buyer. We focus on a research contest as a means of selecting a partner for an R&D enterprise, in an informational setting in which the established providers of R&D services know more about each others’ relative capabilities than does the buyer/sponsor. An alternative use of our model is in choosing between prospective patentees where the Patent Trading Office has less information on the patents than the competitors. This asymmetry creates a source of inefficiency if a rank order contest is used as a selection device; we show how the contest can be modified to improve selection efficiency, while maintaining its simplicity (as only ordinal information is required). The modification that we suggest involves endogenizing the prizes that are awarded contingent upon whether a contestant wins or loses the contest. Furthermore, the payment system and the selection mechanism are detail-free. This paper is part of the project “The Knowledge-Based Society” sponsored by the Research Council of Norway (project 172603/V10).     

Optimal information exchange in contests

We study optimal exchange of private information in a two-player all-pay auction contest with independent private binary values. A benevolent information center who is informed about the players’ values facilitates the exchange of information by disclosing a signal publicly. The informativeness of the signal determines the monotonicity of the unique symmetric equilibrium and the players’ expected payoff. We characterize the upper bound of players’ expected payoff and the corresponding optimal signals utilizing such a relation between the informativeness and the payoff. When the players are ex ante sufficiently heterogeneous, the optimal signals work through an information-rent channel by inducing allocative efficient contests. When the players are ex ante sufficiently homogeneous, the optimal signals work through an unlevel-playing-field channel by inducing asymmetric contests. In order to guarantee efficient allocation, a regulator can punish any exchange of information when the players are sufficiently homogeneous and impose no restrictions when they are sufficiently heterogeneous.     

Endogenous coalition formation in contests

This paper analyzes coalition formation in a model of contests with linear costs. Agents first form groups and then compete by investing resources. Coalitions fight for a prize that is assumed to be subject to rivalry, so its value is non-increasing in the size of the group that obtains it. This formulation encompasses as particular cases some models proposed in the rent-seeking literature. We show that the formation of groups generates positive spillovers and analyze two classes of games of coalition formation. A contest among individual agents is the only stable outcome when individual defections leave the rest of the group intact. More concentrated coalition structures, including the grand coalition, are stable when groups collapse after a defection, provided that rivalry is not too strong. Results in a sequential game of coalition formation suggest that there exists a non-monotonic relationship between the level of underlying rivalry and the level of social conflict.

“If men were supplied with every thing in the same abundance, justice and injustice would be equally unknown among mankind.” David Hume (1740), A Treatise of Human Nature

I thank Luis Corchón, Joan Esteban, Michelle Garfinkel and József Sákovics for their comments and suggestions on the paper.     

An analytical approach for making management decisions concerning corporate restructuring

Internal corporate restructuring activities, such as downsizing, sale or termination of a business line, facility closure, consolidation, or relocation, often occur as part of managerial strategies intended to improve efficiency, control costs, and adapt to an ever‐changing business environment. Such actions frequently result in fundamental changes in a business's organization, its strategies, its systems, and its operations. They can unsettle a business and often significantly affect current and future earnings and cash flows. In this paper we propose a novel decision‐making model through the use of the dynamic programming technique to illustrate how management can determine the optimal timing and appropriate restructuring actions that maximize the benefits of a restructuring program. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An empirical analysis of the corporate control,tax and incentive motivations for adopting leveraged employee stock ownership plans

This paper examines three motivations for leveraged ESOP adoption: as a takeover defense, as a mechanism for providing incentives to employees and as a vehicle for tax savings. ESOP adoption is more likely for companies with a higher predicted probability of takeover, but ESOP adopters have many characteristics that are different from takeover targets. Companies that adopt ESOPs can be distinguished from non-adopting companies based on characteristics associated with the tax and incentive effects of these plans. The size of the ESOP is shown to depend primarily on the tax and incentive characteristics.     

On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests

I analyze the optimal favoritism in a complete-information all-pay contest with two players, whose costs of effort are weakly convex. The contest designer could favor or harm some contestants using one of two instruments: head starts and handicaps. I find that any given player’s effort distribution is ranked in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance according to how (ex post) symmetric the players are in terms of competitiveness. Consequently, as long as the designer values effort from both contestants, “leveling the playing field” is optimal regardless of which instrument is used.     

Risk preference heterogeneity in group contests

We analyze the first model of a group contest with players that are heterogeneous in their risk preferences. In our model, individuals’ preferences are represented by a utility function exhibiting a generalized form of constant absolute risk aversion, allowing us to consider any combination of risk-averse, risk-neutral, and risk-loving players. We begin by proving equilibrium existence and uniqueness under both linear and convex investment costs. Then, we explore how the sorting of a compatible set of players by their risk attitudes into competing groups affects aggregate investment. With linear costs, a balanced sorting (i.e., minimizing the variance in risk attitudes across groups) always produces an aggregate investment level that is at least as high as an unbalanced sorting (i.e., maximizing the variance in risk attitudes across groups). Under convex costs, however, identifying which sorting is optimal is more nuanced and depends on preference and cost parameters.     

Sabotaging in contests with monitoring efforts

This paper considers a 3‐stage contest with both sabotage and monitoring efforts that aim to reduce sabotage. In the first stage, the regulator sets his monitoring efforts for each contestant. In the second stage, each contestant determines his sabotaging efforts, based on the monitoring efforts that were imposed by the regulator. In the third stage, each contestant determines his productive efforts in the contest. The results supply a justification to exert monitoring efforts because these efforts may benefit both the contestants and the regulator (a win‐win situation). Furthermore, the paper defines the conditions where exerting monitoring efforts would be worthwhile.     

基于公司治理的会计控制问题探讨

有效的会计控制对于公司治理结构的优化及推行均有重要作用;反过来,公司治理结构直接影响会计控制的有效性。公司治理与会计控制具有“共生互动”的关系,因而会计控制须纳入公司治理的整体架构当中,做到两个同步：一是在搭建公司治理结构的过程中,同步设计会计组织架构及运行机制;二是在公司治理配套制度体系建设过程中,同步建立会计监督和资金监控机制。     

An analysis of environmental corporate social responsibility

This article investigates corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices while taking into account their product substitutability and environmental responsibility. CSR firms, integrating environmental and social concerns into its business operations, are introduced. The effects of the firms' social concerns, environmental responsibility, and product substitutability are all captured. First, firms' social concerns improve both outputs and CSR firms' objective function value, while reducing the profit maximization firm's profits. Second, environmental responsibility has the contrary effects. Both the outputs and the objective function values of both firms decrease with their product substitutability. Finally, social concern effects on CSR firms' performance are uncertain.