U.S. POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND LOAN PRICING

Using U.S. Department of Justice data on state-level political corruption, we find that banks charge higher loan spreads (all-in-drawn spreads) to firms in states with higher corruption and that these effects are more pronounced for firms facing financial constraints but less pronounced for firms experiencing greater external monitoring. These results are robust to additional controls, alternative corruption measures, a measure of the lack of oversight of lobbyist activities, and the use of instrumental variables. Overall, our findings are consistent with the harmful corruption environment hypothesis, which states that banks charge higher loan spreads to firms in states with greater political corruption environments as these firms are susceptible to making suboptimal financial decisions to fend off rent-seeking behavior.     

企业并购与工商银行业务创新

企业重组在我国方兴未艾,对专业机构的投资银行业务产生了强大的需求,这为商业银行拓展企业并购业务提供了良好的发展契机.本文首先从理论上分析了商业银行开展企业并购业务的必要性和可行性,分别设计了对并购公司和目标公司服务的功能定位和服务步骤;其次对工商银行参与过的三起企业并购案例进行了实证分析,指出银行参与企业并购不仅能降低企业的并购成本、提高成功率,对银行自身保全资产、调整信贷结构、拓展业务空间也有重大意义,同时也指出了银行方面存在的不足之处;最后,对工商银行如何加强和改善企业并购业务提出了一系列政策建议,并呼吁创造良好的外部环境.     

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE: A COMPARISON OF GERMANY, JAPAN, AND THE U.S.

Contrary to assertions that there are fundamental differences in the efficiency of "market-based" and "relationship-oriented" corporate governance systems, this article presents evidence that the German, Japanese, and American systems appear about equally effective in disciplining poor managerial performance. For example, both the job security and total compensation of German and Japanese managers appear to be tied to stock performance and current cash flows- measures that some would refer to as "short-term"-to roughly the same extent as those of U.S. managers. Furthermore, the punishments and rewards for German and Japanese managers are not more sensitive to sales growth-a measure some would refer to as "long-term"-than those of their U.S. counterparts.
But, if there is no clear difference between the three governance systems in responding to poor stock and earnings performance, there is one important difference: the U.S. system is more effective than the German and Japanese systems in discouraging successful companies from overinvest-ing. One reason for this is the fact that U.S. managers hold much larger equity positions than managers in Japan and Germany. Another important factor, however, is the difficulty faced by Japanese companies in returning capital to their shareholders. Dividends are minimal; and, until 1995, it was illegal for a Japanese company to repurchase its stock.     

EVALUATING SOCIAL POLICIES: PRINCIPLES AND U.S. EXPERIENCE

Invariably, studies, proposals, and plans for social programscontain a strong recommendation for evaluation and monitoring.Reliable information about what works and why is clearly vitalfor improving existing programs or designing future ones. Makingsuch assessments requires effective methods of evaluation. Policymakerswho use these evaluations need to know about the methods—the pitfalls to watch for and the relative advantages and disadvantagesof different techniques in different situations. This articledescribes these evaluation methods and the experience accumulatedin the United States in applying them in practice.      

CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN THE U.K., GERMANY, AND FRANCE

Like its U.S. counterpart, the U.K. corporate ownership and governance system can be characterized as an outsider system with a large number of public corporations, widely dispersed ownership (though with growing concentrations of institutional shareholdings), and well-developed takeover markets. By contrast, the much smaller number and proportion of publicly traded German and French corporations are governed by insider systems--those in which the founding families, banks, or other companies have controlling interests and in which outside shareholders are not able to exert much control.
The different patterns of ownership in the U.K. and in France and Germany give rise to different incentives and corporate control mechanisms. Concentrated ownership would seem to encourage longer-term relationships between the company and its investors. But, while perhaps better suited to some corporate activities with longer-term payoffs, concentrated ownership could also lead to costly delays in undertaking necessary corrective action, particularly if the owners receive "private" benefits from owning and running a business. And, although widely dispersed ownership may increase the likelihood that corrective action will be sought prematurely (as outsiders rush to sell their shares in response to a temporary downturn), the presence of well-diversified public owners may also be more appropriate for riskier ventures requiring large amounts of new capital investment.
Thus, concentrated ownership, while having the potential to reduce information costs and to strengthen incentives to maximize value, can also impose costs in two ways: (1) by forcing managers and other insiders to bear excessive company-specific risks that could be transferred to well-diversified outsiders; and (2) by allowing insiders to capture private benefits at the expense of outsiders.     

美、德金融环境对其风险投资影响的比较及其借鉴

风险投资是技术创新和金融创新相结合的必然结果,是一种与产业资本运营相结合的金融创新活动.德国属于银行主导型的金融体制,美国属于市场主导型的金融体制,两国的产融结合模式不同.从宏观上看,美国的金融环境为其风险投资的发展提供了有利条件,德国的金融环境在一定程度上对其风险投资的发展有负面影响.具体分析,美、德两国由于其金融环境不同,使得风险投资在资金来源、投资方向退出方式和风险企业的约束与激励机制等方面存在很大的差异.我国目前的金融体系限制了风险资本的来源,同时对风险投资的退出也形成制约.因此,我国风险投资的发展应从增加风险投资资金来源及建立第二板市场入手.     

COMPETITION AND MERGER ACTIVITY IN THE U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY

In this article we examine the U.S. telecommunications industry during a period of rapid deregulation to determine the effects of a deregulatory shock on industry competition and merger activity. We show that merger activity exhibits a clear wave‐like pattern, regardless of the listing status of the participants. Increased competition and IPO activity following deregulation increased cash‐flow volatility and probability of exit while the introduction of new technology increased dispersion of economic efficiency across the industry. These changes resulted in a significant increase in merger activity. Competition also played an important role in shaping “who buys whom?”