私营企业职工参与系统的和谐性分析

我国私营企业职工参与系统的和谐性较差。要实现私营企业职工参与系统的和谐,就要进行企业产权制度改革。     

私营企业职工参与系统的和谐性分析

我国私营企业职工参与系统的和谐性较差.要实现私营企业职工参与系统的和谐,就要进行企业产权制度改革.     

我国私营企业职工参与制度分析

当前我国私营企业已经建立了较为完备的职工参与系统,具体包括职工代表大会制度、职工董事职工监事制度和集体谈判制度等.但从制度设置来看,表现出私营企业与国有企业之间的不平衡,而且,在职工参与系统的运行方面也表现出运行效果差的特点.究其原因,在于私营企业的古典产权制度特征.因此,实现产权制度的变革、建立现代产权制度是私营企业发展的必然趋势.     

中国企业产权改革浅析

在西方现代产权制度理论的基础上,剖析中国现代企业在产权制度改革上的不足,进一步探讨在新经济中,如何深化对国有产权制度的改革,塑造符合社会主义市场经济的又有活力的国有资产产权结构,以及充分认识私营企业在产权发展中的弊端,如何帮助私营企业引进先进的现代产权管理方式,打破现有的产权束缚,完善企业治理机制,发挥私营企业的巨大潜力。     

基于制度变迁条件下中国私营企业产权制度模式分析

制度变迁由于受到初级行动团体和次级行动团体的影响,其变迁模式在不同的发展阶段呈现出不同的表现特征。本文通过对改革开放30年来中国私营企业在不同发展阶段的制度变迁模式所做的实证研究,深刻分析了中国在进行经济体制转轨的不同时期影响私营企业产权制度变迁的主体因素,并通过对中央政府、地方政府、非政府组织和私营企业四大主体之间存在的相互博弈关系的研究,提出了未来一个时期内中国私营企业产权制度变迁的模式应该是一种由企业主导、非政府组织、地方政府作为润滑剂或者中介并与中央政府相互协调与相互制衡的“双回路制度变迁模式”。最后就如何优化该产权制度的变迁模式提出了政策建议。     

论家族制私营企业的制度缺陷与创新

我国私营企业大都采用的家族治理模式中的制度缺陷,成为阻碍私营企业发展的重要因素。文章认为,家族制私营企业治理制度创新的目标是建立产权制度、管理制度的创新,其主要包括治理主体的创新与治理机制的创新。     

规范私营企业会计核算的研究

随着我国市场经济的发展,私营企业越来越多,为我国经济的增长起到了推动的作用,私营企业会计核算一直是困扰会计管理工作的一个难点问题,本文就如何规范私营企业会计核算进行分析,希望为私营企业会计核算工作的规范提供一些参考。     

私营企业破产问题的探讨

在我国经济社会中,私营企业无疑是一个重要而庞大的经济群体,由于此类企业本身的特点及经济环境的影响,它们面临着较大的破产风险,如何建立和完善我国私营企业的破产机制,更好地处理私营企业的破产问题,是我国法律界和经济学界面临的共同课题。     

论私营企业的产权制度变迁

产权问题不仅存在于公有制企业之中，私营企业也存在产权问题。尤其是私营企业发展达到一定规模与层次，市场格局发生转折之后。其内在的产权问题便凸现出来。成为制约企业进一步发展的重要因素。本文分析私营企业产权制度变迁的需求诱致、主要制约因素，并探讨其适宜的演进路径。     

浅谈现代产权制度

建立现代产权制度是完善我国基本经济制度的内在要求。本文从现代产权制度的概念及特征入手,从构建现代企业制度、完善市场经济体制两个方面阐述了建立健全现代产权制度的重要性。并探讨了如何建立健全现代产权制度。     

What Makes Humans Economically Distinctive? A Three-Species Evolutionary Comparison and Historical Analysis

The fundamental problem, of what makes humans economically distinctive, is addressed here by using a highly focused cross-species analysis to examine the evolution of property relations. Chimpanzees and bonobos are compared with mobile human foragers, and it is argued that our egalitarian political practices, in conjunction with variance-reduction practices we applied prehistorically to large-game meat consumption, led to a critical evolutionary transformation. The transition began with private property at the ancestral level, but ended with humans having not only private property, but communal property. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Marketising the commons in Africa: the case of Ghana

The recent surge in the marketisation of the commons in Africa – especially of water bodies – warrants careful political economic analysis. Three questions remain intractable: (1) Were there markets in the beginning? If so, how have they transformed and if not, how did markets arise and transform over the years? (2) what are the outcomes of such markets for people, their livelihoods, and their environment? And (3) how to interpret the outcomes of water markets and whether water should be commodified at all. For new institutional economists, water markets have arisen because of the inferior nature of Indigenous or customary systems which are incapable of offering precisely what water markets offer Africa: economic and ecological fortunes. Using an institutional political economy approach and drawing on experiences in Ghana, the paper investigates the social history of marketisation of the commons and probes the effects of marketisation in terms of absolute, relative, and differential/congruent outcomes as well as the opportunity cost of the current water property rights regime. The empirical evidence shows that markets have been socially created through imposed and directed policies. Some jobs have been created through investment, but such employment is not unique to marketisation and private investment. Indeed, the private model of property rights has worsened the distribution of water resources not only within different property relations in Africa but also between diverse property relations. Water markets have been responsible for much displacement and trouble not only for communities but also nature. Overall, there is no necessary congruence between the promises made by new institutional economists and how communities experience water markets. Tighter regulations for the use of inland and transboundary water sources might temporarily halt the displacement of communities sparked by marketisation of the commons, but only one fundamental change can guarantee community well-being: to regard the access to and community control of water as constitutionally sanctioned human rights and as res communis.     

从文化资源产权属性的演变谈文化体制改革

文化资源传统上是纯粹的公共产品,完全由国家提供。随着人们文化消费需求的上升及传媒技术的发展,文化资源的经济价值越来越高,其产权属性逐步由公共产品转变为准公共产品,甚至转变为私人产品。伴随文化资源产权属性的演变,要求文化管理体制进行相应的改革。     

Private enforcement and social efficiency

This paper makes precise the distributional consequences and social efficiency of private enforcement of property rights. Properties of different values are subject to predation and owners choose between self-defense and private enforcement services. A distributional conflict of interest arises as private protection purchased by rich owners deflects predators on low value properties. The market structure of enforcement and development affect the distribution of property income through relative changes in the security of high and low values property. Moreover, because of the externality enforcers impose on poorer owners, the availability of private enforcement may constrain the policy of a benevolent State.     

我国私有财产权法律保护文本考察

财产权并不是一个简单的逻辑范畴,而更多的表现为历史的范畴,是一定历史时期社会关系的反映。制度的形成往往渊源于思想的启蒙,制度的变迁往往也是思想嬗变的结果。在每个历史时代中,财产权以各种不同的方式在完全不同的关系下面发展着。如果关注西方资本主义国家的财产权法律保护的历史变迁过程中可以清晰地看到,随着社会经济的发展,法律对私有财产权的态度已在逐步地由侧重于绝对保护到相对保护的社会整体利益的平衡转型。而作为社会主义的中国对于私有财产权的法律保护则走过了一条迥然不同的道路。     

Endogenous strength of intellectual property rights: Implications for economic development and growth

The key institution that determines sustained growth in R&D-based growth models is the strength of intellectual property rights, which are usually assumed to be exogenous. In this paper we endogenize the strength of the intellectual property rights and show how private incentives to protect these rights affect economic development and growth. Our model explains endogenous differences in intellectual property rights across countries as private incentives to invest in property rights generate multiple equilibria. We show that the resulting institutional threshold offers an explanation for why the effect of a transfer of institutions from one country to another depends on the quality of the institutions that were imported.     

A Dynamic Model of Privatization with Endogenous Post-Privatization Performance

This paper presents a dynamic model of privatization, driven by improved institutional protection of private property rights and constrained by the buyer's financial constraints. Government ownership is more efficient than private ownership when private property rights are insecure. Improved institutional protection of property rights over time creates the need to privatize. The buyer's financial constraints affect the timing of privatization, causing the firm's post-privatization performance either to improve or to deteriorate in the short run. Financial constraints also have the possibility of inducing an underpricing phenomenon during privatization where the firm is priced below both what the buyer is willing to pay and the buyer's ability to pay. Faster institutional development calls for earlier privatization, but it also has the potential to either create or exacerbate deadweight losses associated with inefficient privatization. A host of empirically testable implications are derived.     

地下水灌溉系统产权制度的创新与理论解释——小型水利工程的实证研究

水资源管理制度和政策越来越被认为是解决日益严重的水资源短缺问题的重要手段。本项研究的主要目的是分析我国地下水灌溉系统产权制度的创新过程和诱导因素 ,为国家引导和制定合理的水资源管理政策提供理论和实证依据。本项研究采用了定量研究的方法 ,建立了地下水灌溉系统产权制度创新模型 ,分析数据来源于作者对河北省 3县 3 0个村的实地调查。研究结果表明 ,80年代以来 ,以河北省为代表的地下水灌溉系统的产权制度逐渐从集体产权向非集体产权演变。影响地下水灌溉系统产权制度创新的主要因素是水资源开发利用程度、生存环境、社区经济条件、社区人力资本、市场发育程度、水利财政政策和水利信贷政策等因素。本项研究还对如何引导产权制度创新更快更有效的发展提出了一些政策建议。