Optimal money growth in a limited participation model with heterogeneous agents

This paper studies optimal money growth in a cash-in-advance production economy with heterogeneity in patience levels and know-how. We show that the rate of deflation suggested by the Friedman rule is limited by the subjective discount rate of the most patient agent in the economy. The output distortion due to cash-in-advance constraints on firms can completely be eliminated by means of the Friedman rule if and only if firms are run by the most patient agents.Received: 16 August 2003, Accepted: 22 March 2005, JEL Classification: D52, D90, E21, E41, E52Parts of this paper were completed while the first and second authors were visiting the University of York and Princeton University respectively. We are thankful for the hospitality of these institutions. The second author also acknowledges the hospitality and support of Bilkent University that he is currently visiting, the support from the Turkish Academy of Sciences in the framework of the ‘Distinguished Young Scientist Award Program’ (TUBA-GEBIP/2004), the grant awarded by the Scientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) under the NATO Science Fellowship Program as well as the support from the Center for Economic Design of Bogaziçi University. This paper was presented in the ERC/METU Second International Conference on Economics, Ankara, September 1998, and at seminars in Bilkent, Bogaziçi and Ohio State Universities. We thank, in particular, Emre Alper, Sumru Altug, Huw Dixon, Tatsuro Ichiishi, Ivan Pastine, Murat Sertel and Alan Sutherland for useful comments. We also thank two anonymous referees for comments and suggestions. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect that of the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey.     

Fisher information in record data

We present some general results on Fisher information (FI) contained in upper (or lower) record values and associated record times generated from a sequence of i.i.d. continuous variables. For the record data obtained from a random sample of fixed size, we establish an interesting relationship between its FI content and the FI in the data consisting of sequential maxima. We also consider the record data from an inverse sampling plan (Samaniego and Whitaker, 1986). We apply the general results to evaluate the FI in upper as well as lower records data from the exponential distribution for both sampling plans. Further, we discuss the implication of our results to statistical inference from these record data. Received: December 2001 Acknowledgements. This research was supported by Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Cientifico y Tecnologico (FONDECYT) grants 7990089 and 1010222 of Chile. We would like to thank the Department of Statistics at the University of Concepción for its hospitality during the stay of H. N. Nagaraja in Chile in March of 2000, when the initial work was done. We are grateful to the two referees for various comments that let to improvements in the paper.     

Efficiency and truthfulness with Leontief preferences. A note on two-agent,two-good economies

In exchange economies where agents have private information about their preferences, strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions are in general not efficient. We provide a restricted domain, namely the set of preferences representable by Leontief utility functions, where there exist mechanisms which are strategy-proof, efficient and individually rational. In two-agent, two-good economies we are able to provide an even stronger result. We characterize the class of efficient and individually rational social choice functions, which are fully implementable in truthful strategies.Received: 28 April 2003, Accepted: 23 June 2003, JEL Classification: D51, D71The author thanks Matthew Jackson, Jordi Massó and James Schummer for fruitful discussions, William Thomson for many valuable comments on an earlier version. A particular thank to Salvador Barberá for his fundamental help.     

Elections and strategic positioning games

We formalize the interplay between expected voting behavior and strategic positioning behavior of candidates as a common agency problem in which the candidates (i.e., the principals) compete for voters (i.e., agents) via the issues they choose and the positions they take. A political situation is defined as a feasible combination of candidate positions and expected political payoffs to the candidates. Taking this approach, we are led naturally to a particular formalization of the candidates' positioning game, called a political situation game. Within the context of this game, we define the notion of farsighted stability (introduced in an abstract setting by Chwe 1994) and apply Chwe's result to obtain existence of farsightedly stable outcomes. We compute the farsightedly stable sets for several examples of political situations games, with outcomes that conform to real-world observations.Received: 18 May 2001, Accepted: 22 January 2002, JEL Classification: C7, D7, D8Myrna H. Wooders: http://www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/Economics/wooders/An earlier version of this paper was completed while the first author was visiting the Department of Economics, University of Exeter. The first author gratefully acknowledges Exeter's support and hospitality. Similarly, the second author gratefully acknowledges the support and hospitality of the Centre for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) of the University of Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium and of the University of Cergy-Pontoise, France. Both authors are indebted to Amrita Dhillon, John Duggan and Gilat Levy for helpful comments about references. Both authors thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments.     

A mechanism implementing the proportional solution

We consider the problem of a commonly owned technology which transforms a single input into a single output. We are interested in implementing a social choice rule called theproportional solution. We introduce a mechanism which implements the proportional solution in Nash, strong (Nash) and undominated Nash equilibria. In the mechanism each agent announces only two numbers which can be interpreted as the total output and her share of the total input-output combination. This paper was originally titled "Doubly implementing the proportional solution." I would like to thank my advisor William Thomson for his detailed comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank Jeffrey Banks and Sung-Whee Shin for their comments. Two anonymous referees and an editor’s comments improved this paper substantially.     

Dictatorial voting operators

Voting operators map n-tuples of subsets of a given set X of candidates (the voters choices) into subsets of X (the social choice). This paper characterizes dictatorial voting operators by means of three conditions (the non-emptiness condition A1, the independence condition A2 and the resoluteness condition A3) motivated by the idea of transferring to the social choice properties common to all the voters choices. The result is used to refine Lahiris (2001) characterization and to derive dictatorial results in other three types of aggregation problems, in which choice functions are transformed into choice functions, binary relations into choices and binary relations into binary relations.Received: 20 May 2002, Accepted: 5 August 2003, JEL Classification: D70, D71Antonio Quesada: Present address: Departament dEconomia, Facultat de Ciéncies Económiques i Empresarials, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Avinguda de la Universitat 1, 43204 Reus (Tarragona), Spain. I would like to express my gratitude to the referees for their contribution to improve this paper.Part of this work was done at the Departament dAnálisi Económica, Facultat dEconomia, Universitat de Valéncia, Avinguda dels Tarongers s/n, 46022 Valéncia, Spain.     

Budgetary shocks and revenue adjustment: How governments respond to unexpected fiscal shocks

This paper uses panel data from seven Canadian provinces which received Equalization payments over the period 1980/81 to 1995/96 to examine how provinces adjust own-source revenue in response to past budget shocks. Governments respond symmetrically to past own-source revenue shocks: they increase or reduce own-revenue by $0.75 for every unexpected dollar shock in own-source revenue last year. In contrast, revenue responses to past grant shocks are asymmetric. Provinces lower own-source revenue by $0.87 in response to an unexpected extra dollar from Equalization last year. But, they make no adjustment following an unexpected Equalization shortfall. The magnitude of these responses suggest that provinces see a significant component of these shocks to be persistent. Lastly, the results with respect to past spending shocks are mixed. In contrast to recent empirical results on asymmetric responses to changes in grants, the results in this paper suggest that, at least in the short run, unexpected increases in Equalization are unlikely to have a large, stimulative effect on government spending.Received: February 2003, Accepted: November 2003, JEL Classification: H71, H77T. Snoddon: The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments of Ron Kneebone, participants at the CPEG conference, Calgary, June 2002, and seminar participants in the Department of Economics and Finance, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia, September 2002. I would also like to thank the two anonymous referees for their thoughtful comments.     

Bayesian Analysis in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">L</Emphasis><Superscript>1</Superscript>-Norm of the Mixing Proportion Using Discriminant Analysis

We consider the mixing proportion π in a mixture of two independent distributions, and establish the expression of its posterior density, in closed form and in terms of L ¹-norms of various related functions, using a prior beta and the optimal classification rule for the two populations provided by Discriminant analysis. A numerical example fully illustrates the concepts presented.Research partially supported by CRSNG 9249 (Canada). The authors wish to thank the Faculty of Science and the Department of Statistics of UNISA for their generous support that has led to this joint work. Also, thanks to Ms. Jeannette LeBlanc for her excellent technical support, and to an anonymous referee for very helpful comments that have helped to improve the presentation of the paper.     

Orthogonal expansions for the generalized Cramér-von Mises statistics

We provide a new proof for the representation of Cramér-von Mises statistics under (known) gamma and normal distributions. The new method uses orthogonal polynomials and provides an explicit form of the statistics from which the asymptotic distribution can be calculated.Acknowledgements This research was partially supported by FQM-331, FQM-270, BMF 2001-2378 and BMF2002-04525-C02-02. The authors are thankful to the referees for their suggestions and helpful comments.     

Proportionally adjusted marginal pricing method to share joint costs

We consider the cost sharing problem with divisible demands of heterogeneous goods. We propose a cost sharing method called Proportionally Adjusted Marginal Pricing (PAMP) method. PAMP is a nonadditive (in the cost function) extension of average cost pricing. We introduce an axiom called Local Independence (LI) and use LI together with Continuity, Proportionality, and Scale Invariance to characterize PAMP. Received: 23 March 2001 / Accepted: 16 November 2001 I thank Yves Sprumont, Hervé Moulin, and Ahmet Alkan for discussions, comments and suggestions. Thanks also go to the associate editor and the referees, whose comments and suggestions greatly improve the paper.     

Does better governance foster efficiency? An aggregate frontier analysis

We test the relationship between governance and macroeconomic technical efficiency on a sample of 62 countries, both developed and developing. We do so by applying Battese and Coelli (1995)s method at the aggregate level. We find that better governance, measured by six complementary indices each devoted to a different dimension of governance, is always associated with greater efficiency. However, when governance variables are tested against each other, we observe that government efficiency is the aspect of governance that most robustly affects aggregate efficiency.Received: September 2003, Accepted: August 2004, JEL Classification: C31, K40, O4We wish to thank Mohammed Chaffai and Jean-Yves Lesueur for their advice. We are also grateful to participants at the XVth Villa Mondragone International Economic Seminar on Markets, growth and global governance in Rome (June 2003), and seminar participants at the University Robert Schuman of Strasbourg, the University Louis Pasteur of Strasbourg, and the University Lumiére of Lyon, for their helpful comments. We are finally indebted to two anonymous referees whose constructive suggestions led us to substantially improve the paper. All remaining errors are ours.     

Strategy-proof allocation of fixed costs

An economy can produce and consume a fixed-cost excludable public good only if its members fully fund the cost of the good. In this paper, we characterize the entire class of mechanisms for the provision of the public good and its cost that are Pareto optimal among the set of strategy-proof, voluntarily-participatory, budget-balancing, non-bossy, and replacement-monotonic mechanisms. We demonstrate that this class of mechanisms is quite small and can be characterized as simple step-price mechanisms.Received: 10 July 2001, Accepted: 5 February 2003, JEL Classification: C72, D71This work was done while Dearden was visiting Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University, The Netherlands. He is thankful for their gracious hospitality. The authors thank the editors and reviewers for their thoughtful comments.     

Mechanism design for a solution to the tragedy of commons

We consider the problem of the tragedy of commons in cooperative production economies, and propose a mechanism to resolve this tragedy, taking into account that the coordinator cannot perfectly monitor each agent’s labor skill and each agent may have an incentive to overstate as well as understate his own skill. Even in such a situation, the mechanism implements the proportional solution (Roemer in Soc Philos Policy 6:74–92, 1989 and Roemer and Silvestre in J Econ Theory 59:426–444, 1993) in Nash and strong equilibria when it is played as a normal form game. Moreover, the mechanism triply implements the solution in Nash, subgame-perfect, and strong equilibria when it is played as a two-stage extensive form game. We are greatly thankful to Semi Koray, William Thomson, and an anonymous referee of this journal for their concrete and helpful comments on improving the paper. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Japanese Economic Association held at Hitotsubashi University in October 2001 and at the Conference on Economic Design held at NYU in July 2002. We are grateful to Takehiko Yamato for his useful comments in the former conference. We are also thankful to Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Kotaro Suzumura, and Yoshikatsu Tatamitani for their kind comments.     

To merge or not to merge: That is the question

In this paper we analyze the implementation of socially optimal mergers when the regulator is not informed about all parameters that determine social and private gains from potential mergers. We show that implementation requires a certain degree of agreement between social and private incentives. The most important example where this congruence is present is when the uncertainty refers to cost savings, because in this case society and firms want costs savings to be as high as possible. Then, it is possible to induce firms to truthfully reveal the costs savings induced by the merger.Received: 7 June 2001, Accepted: 14 June 2004, JEL Classification: D78, L13, L41This paper was presented at the First CODE meeting held in Barcelona, June 1997 and in seminars at the universities of Alicante, Caen, Carlos III, Bilbao, Complutense (Madrid) and Málaga. We would like to thank P. Amor ós, D. Cardona-Coll, P. Hammond, A. Lozano, C. Martinez, V. Merlin, D. Moreno, B. Moreno, D. Mookherjee, J. Naeve, P. Pereira, R. Renault, A. Snoy and F. Vega-Redondo for their useful comments. The authors are solely responsible for any remaining errors. They acknowledge financial support from CICYT BEC2002-02194, PB97-0120, BEC2001-0535 and the IVIE.     

Implementing efficient market structure

Abstract. This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke–Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the weighted sum of expected social surplus and expected tax revenue, and show that these mechanisms avoid budget deficits and prevent excessive entry. Received: 7 May 2001 / Accepted: 24 June 2002 We would like to thank seminar participants at Bonn and Berlin, in particular Peter Bank, Wieland Müller, and Urs Schweizer, the two anonymous referees, and the associate editor for most useful and exceptionally detailed comments. Financial support was received by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 373 (“Quantifikation und Simulation ?konomischer Prozesse”), Humboldt–Universit?t zu Berlin.     

Optimal procurement mechanisms for divisible goods with capacitated suppliers

Procurement auction literature typically assumes that the suppliers are uncapacitated [see, e.g. Dasgupta and Spulber in Inf Econ Policy 4:5–29, 1990 and Che in Rand J Econ 24(4):668–680, 1993]. Consequently, the auction mechanisms award the contract to a single supplier. We study mechanism design in a model where suppliers have limited production capacity, and both the marginal costs and the production capacities are private information. We provide a closed-form solution for the revenue maximizing direct mechanism when the distribution of the cost and production capacities satisfies a modified regularity condition [Myerson in Math Oper Res 6(1):58–73, 1981]. We also present a sealed low bid implementation of the optimal direct mechanism for the special case of identical suppliers. The results in this paper extend to other principle-agent mechanism design problems where the agents have a privately known upper bound on allocation. The authors would like to thank the anonymous referees for valuable suggestions and comments.     

Public goods provision: Unit-by-unit cost-sharing rules and the core

In a simple model of one public good producible from one input, we show that unit-by-unit cost-sharing rules have two properties. First, a unit-by-unit cost-sharing rulealways chooses a core allocation. Second, every allocation in the core will be chosen by at least one unit-by-unit cost-shring rule. We argue that costs should be shared on a unit-by-unit basis. We propose a simple mechanism to implement the family of unit-by-unit rules. Received: 18 May 2005, Accepted: 6 December 2005 JEL Classification: H41, C72, D78 I thank Hervé Moulin for helpful comments and discussions. All errors are mine. Financial support from the Hong Kong Research Grants Council under grant RGC-DAG99/00.BM52 is gratefully acknowledged.     

Manipulation via merging and splitting in claims problems

In claims problems, we study coalitional manipulations via claims merging and splitting. We characterize (division) rules that are non-manipulable via (pairwise) splitting and that also satisfy standard axioms of equal treatment of equals, consistency, and continuity. And we obtain a similar result for non-manipulability via (pairwise) merging.Received: 22 January 2002, Accepted: 5 February 2003, JEL Classification: C70, C71, D70I am grateful to William Thomson for many helpful comments and suggestions. I also thank Murat Sertel and an anonymous referee for many helpful suggestions for the revision. All remaining errors are mine.     

Recruitment,Training, and Career Concerns

We examine training and recruitment policies in a two‐period model that nests two forms of production, “routine” work where ability and effort are substitutes and “creative” work where they are complements. Alternative ways of improving average ability have opposite implications for agents' career concerns. Although teaching to the top (training complementary to ability) or identifying star performers increases agents' career concerns, teaching to the bottom has the opposite effect. The paper also makes more general comments relating to models of reputation.