A bargaining theory of the firm

Suppose that a firm has several owners and that the future is uncertain in the sense that one out of many different states of nature will realize tomorrow. An owner’s time preference and risk attitude will determine the importance he places on payoffs in the different states. It is a well-known problem in the literature that under incomplete asset markets, a conflict about the firm’s objective function tends to arise among its owners. In this paper, we take a new approach to this problem, which is based on non-cooperative bargaining. The owners of the firm play a bargaining game in order to choose the firm’s production plan and a scheme of transfers which are payable before the uncertainty about the future state of nature is resolved. We analyze the resulting firm decision in the limit of subgame-perfect equilibria in stationary strategies. Given the distribution of bargaining power, we obtain a unique prediction for a production plan and a transfer scheme. When markets are complete, the production plan chosen corresponds to the profit-maximizing production plan as in the Arrow–Debreu model. Contrary to that model, owners typically do use transfers to redistribute profits. When markets are incomplete, the production plan chosen is almost always different from the one in a transfer-free Drèze (pseudo-)equilibrium and again owners use transfers to redistribute profits. Nevertheless, our results do support the Drèze criterion as the appropriate objective function of the firm.     

A note on Peltzman's theory of offsetting consumer behavior

A re-estimation of the basic Peltzman (1975) model using a richer data set strongly indicates that mandated automobile safety legislation has been important in reducing traffic fatalities. There is little or no evidence of offsetting consumer behavior.     

A theory of firm decline

We study the problem of an investor that buys an equity stake in an entrepreneurial venture, under the assumption that the former cannot monitor the latter's operations. The dynamics implied by the optimal incentive scheme is rich and quite different from that induced by other models of repeated moral hazard. In particular, our framework generates a rationale for firm decline. As young firms accumulate capital, the claims of both investor (outside equity) and entrepreneur (inside equity) increase. At some juncture, however, even as the latter continues to grow, invested capital and firm value start declining and so does the value of outside equity. The reason is that incentive provision is costlier the wealthier the entrepreneur (the greater is inside equity). In turn, this leads to a decline in the constrained-efficient level of effort and therefore to a drop in the return to investment.     

Leverage,managerial monitoring and firm valuation: A simultaneous equation approach

The paper examines how leverage and managerial ownership relate to firm valuation. It is argued that both leverage (which serves as an external monitoring function) and managerial ownership (which serves as an internal monitoring function) affect firm value, while internal monitoring by managers and external monitoring through debt were viewed as substitutes or complements. After controlling for the effect of exogenous variables, the results reveal the existence of a substitution monitoring effect between debt and the managerial group. Additionally, firm valuation is found to exert a significant influence on managerial ownership and vice versa. Robustness tests indicate a weak but growing role of bank debt as a disciplinary mechanism.     

Strategic managerial incentives and cross ownership structure: A note

In this note, we study the behavior of firms competing in a Cournot duopoly framework where owners and managers are separate identities and where cross-participation at the ownership level exists. We find that depending on the degree of cross ownership, managerial incentives may be more or less towards profit maximizing behavior. Moreover we show that limited cross-participation may be a way for owners to obtain collusive behavior without apparently offending Anti-Trust laws.We would like to thank M. P. Espinosa, C. Matutes, J. D. Pérez Castrillo, J. Ricart, V. Salas, X. Vives, and an anonymous referee for their comments and suggestions. I. Macho-Stadler's research was partially supported by the project PGV 9022.1. The usual disclaimers apply.     

A note on the theory of demand-led growth

This paper presents a demand-led growth model where an exogenousinvestment function drives capital accumulation through a Bernoullidifferential equation. In such a framework investment generatessavings through changes in capacity utilisation and/or incomedistribution, making economic growth totally demand-led. Takinga Structuralist perspective the model is constructed to be consistentwith different Keynesian closures for the investment function,as well as with different assumptions about savings' adjustmentto investment.     

Regret theory and the competitive firm: A comment

In a recent paper, Wong [Wong, K. P. (2014), Regret theory and the competitive firm. Economic Modelling, 36, 172–175.] develops a model to examine the production behavior of a regret averse competitive firm. Wong discusses the sufficient condition to ensure the conventional result that the optimal output level under uncertainty is less than that under certainty hold. Our contributions in this note are two-fold. Firstly, we point out that Wong's condition in terms of the first order derivatives of the utility function and the regret function is actually not sufficient. Secondly and more importantly, we show that a sufficient condition should be in terms of the relatively increase rate of the first order derivatives of the two functions. That's, it's the ratio of the risk aversion and regret aversion degree that matters. Our proposed condition requests that the firm should be not too regret averse.     

A note on disequilibrium growth theory

Disequilibrium growth theory is an extension of disequilibrium theory to a neo-classical growth model. The real wage is not supposed to adjust instantaneously to ensure full employment. Behavior of capital accumulation may be different according to a regime of unemployment, full employment or overemployment.     

后现代企业理论的兴起——对企业的新古典、契约与能力理论范式的超越

完整的企业理论,必须能从企业发展史及启示未来的角度,提供令人信服的与企业发展实际相符的答案。在当今占据企业理论主导地位的三种理论中,无论是新古典经济学,还是企业的契约理论以及企业能力理论,都没有提供一个历史的、逻辑一致而又具有广泛解释性的答案。斯蒂格利茨深刻地指出,关于企业的动态行为机制和能力形成的理论,目前的研究进展依然不大。然而可喜的现象是,契约理论与企业能力理论已经出现相互溶合、取长补短的新趋势,这表明企业理论出现了新的综合趋势。同时,在后现代企业时代,能够透彻把握企业发展现实的企业理论的创新与拓展显得尤为重要。     

Regret theory and the competitive firm

This paper examines the production decision of the competitive firm under uncertainty when the firm is not only risk averse but also regret averse. Regret-averse preferences are characterized by a modified utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex-post suboptimal alternatives. The extent of regret depends on the difference between the actual profit and the maximum profit attained by making the optimal production decision had the firm observed the true realization of the random output price. If the firm is not too regret averse, we show that the conventional result that the optimal output level under uncertainty is less than that under certainty holds. Using a simple binary model wherein the random output price can take on either a low value or a high value with positive probability, we show the possibility that the firm may optimally produce more, not less, under uncertainty than under certainty, particularly when the firm is sufficiently regret averse and the low output price is very likely to prevail.     

A note on representability of consumer's behavior

Summary. We offer an alternative approach to the study of representability of choice behavior in a competitive framework that is based on recent advances in utility theory (cf. Alcantud and Rodrí guez-Palmero (1999)). Our technique enables us to tackle this classical problem efficiently in fairly general situations, thus obtaining alternative sufficient conditions as well as different proofs and generalizations of prior results. Received: July 14, 1999; revised version: February 15, 2001     

A simple theory and evidence on the determinants of firm R&D

This paper derives a simple, but informative, model of firm R&D to figure out key factors that determine firm R&D effort. The model suggests a demand-pull, technology-push theory of R&D by showing that a firm's profit-maximizing R&D expenditure is determined jointly by both demand-side factors and technology-side factors. The former includes demand size (firm sales) and consumer preference over quality and price and the latter includes R&D cost structure or the production-cost effect of product R&D and firm-specific technological competence. In addition, the model shows that other things being equal, the stock of exogenous technological knowledge, including the firm's previously accumulated technological knowledge, relevant to current R&D which is negatively related with current R&D effort. An empirical analysis of firm R&D intensities and technological capabilities of more than 1600 firms in nine industries across six countries provides supportive evidence for the theory. Further, the theory implies that R&D intensity or the R&D-to-sales ratio is independent of firm size unless firm size affects technological competence and that given consumer preference and R&D cost structure facing all firms in the same industry, the distribution of firm-specific technological competence among firms determines the distribution of firm R&D intensities within the industry.     

A note on duality in consumer theory

Summary. In this paper we will show that upper semicontinuity of the indirect utility function implies the upper semicontinuity of the direct utility function. By strengthening the assumptions, one can also deduce the continuity of the utility function. Based on indirect utility functions a model of consumer behavior will be established. Received: December 26, 1996; revised version: August 25, 1997     

On the opportunism-independent theory of the firm

Previous developments in the opportunism-independent theoryof the firm are either restricted to special cases or are derivedfrom the capabilities or resource-based perspective. However,a more general opportunism-independent approach can be developed,based on the work of Demsetz and Coase, which is neverthelesscontractual in nature. This depends on ‘direction’,that is, deriving economic value by permitting one set of actorsto direct the activities of another, and of non-human factorsof production. Direction helps to explain not only firm boundariesand organisation, but also the existence of firms, without appealingto opportunism or moral hazard. The paper also considers theextent to which it is meaningful to speak of ‘contractual’theories in the absence of opportunism, and whether this analysiscan be extended beyond the employment contract to encompassownership of assets by the firm.     

A biased firm in a market with complementary products. A note on the welfare effects

We analyse a duopoly setting with complementary products, in which a firm has a bias about its absolute advantage. We show that the bias can internalize parts of the negative externality that the complementarity of goods creates implying a higher producer's surplus. Moreover, we analyse additional conditions, which lead to an increase in the consumer's surplus. Counterintuitively, we show that the presence of a bias can lead to a positive welfare effect.     

Consistent firm choice and the theory of supply

Summary. This paper analyzes the problem of deriving predictions, regarding supply behavior of a competitive firm, from prior consistency postulates about input-output choices made by such a firm. It extends the literature by introducing a consistency postulate for firm choice, which is weaker than profit-maximization. This consistency postulate is nevertheless both necessary and sufficient for supply responses predicted by the standard theory of firm choice based on the postulate of profit-maximization. Furthermore, our rationality postulate, in conjunction with another condition, is shown to be equivalent to firm choice behavior that can be rationalized in terms of profit maximization.Received: 11 April 2003, Revised: 26 April 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D21.Indraneel Dasgupta: I thank Bhaskar Dutta and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier versions.     

The welfare impact of a managerial oligopoly with an altruistic firm

I analyse the welfare impact of a mixed market with a private or public firm that is characterised by wider objectives or altruism, in the presence of an agency problem. Contrary to some earlier findings, the total surplus turns out to be increasing in the degree of altruism. This impact is stronger than without an agency problem, despite more stringent conditions for the market to remain mixed. The altruistic firm is more cost efficient, and viable if the market can remain mixed. A competition policy that encourages entry may increase welfare, but its scope is reduced by higher altruism.