Economic Viewpoint: Does broad money matter?

Last October the Chancellor of the Exchequer suspended the target for the broad money supply (£M3). It was reinstated in this year's Budget with a range of 11 to 15 per cent. Its growth is currently exceeding even that apparently generous target. (On the terms of the original Medium-Term Financial Strategy in 1980, the growth should have been cut to 5 to 9 per cent by 1983–4.) Does this rapid growth of £M3 matter? Does it raise the threat of higher inflation some time in the future, or can the government now readily abandon £M3 completely and concentrate instead on some other measure of the money supply – or indeed abandon monetary targeting altogether? The relevance of £M 3 as an intermediate target depends on whether there is a stable demand for it. We report econometric evidence which suggests that there is a stable demand for £M3, which depends, among other things, on the rate of inflation. We believe that the unexpectedly rapid growth of the money supply since 1981 partly reflects an adjustment of desired money balances to lower inflation. But once this process of adjustment is complete, monetary growth must be brought to far lower levels. We conclude that the government should continue to use £M3 as an intermediate target, supported, as at present, by a narrow measure.     

Comment:The Statistical Relationship between the Money Supply and the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement

A controversy has recently broken out as to whether the PSBR influences the money supply in the UK. Clearly if this relationship does not exist much of the basis of the government's macroeconomic strategy falls away since the government is acting on the assumption that by controlling the PSBR it will be able to control money supply growth and hence inflation in the medium term. This argument has been forcibly stated in the recent Green Paper on Monetary Control (Cmnd 7858) and is enshrined in the Medium-term Financial Strategy that was announced in the March Budget.     

The MTFS or the EMS: Which Way for Credible Monetary Policy?

Since the latter part of 1988, the primary policy objective has been to head off a rise to double digit inflation. To this end, interest rates have been raised from 7112 per cent to 14per cent, while the public sector is running a large fiscal surplus. Despite this apparently very tight policy stance, policy is deficient in a crucial respect: it lacks credibility. The all too public divisions within government have weakened the efficacy of monetary policy, especially in financial markets. The ongoing uncertainty over who is in charge of the conduct of policy - No. 10 or No. 11 - further undermines confidence. The most urgent priority must be to reassert clear priorities and guidelines. In this Viewpoint, we consider how best to restore the credibility of monetary policy. There are two main possibilities: first, to reassert the Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS) in an appropriate form; or to join the (Exchange Rate Mechanism of the) European Monetary System (EMS). We argue that it will be very hard to derive credibility benefits from a reassertion of the MTFS: because of the inflation record of the past decade and the twists and turns of past versions of the MTFS, a mere restatement will not resolve the uncertainties that result from known differences within the government. In particular, any restatement will rely on discretion and judgement in its implementation and this will weaken its beneficial effects on expectations. Instead we argue that entry into the EMS offers a tougher and more credible commitment for monetary policy. The Chancellor has been pushed to rule out UK entry until the second half of 1990 at the earliest, but the government should make a virtue of this by announcing a firm dale for entry next year. In the interim, it should encourage a debate about the appropriate rate for entry, a debate which will increasingly guide the foreign exchange market. The government should make it clear that in choosing this rate it will do so with the commitment to low inflation very much in mind, favouring a high exchange rate. Once in the EMS, the government should rule out the possibility of devaluing the pound in an EMS realignment. This provides a firm non- discretionary anchor for both monetary policy and inflation expectations. With this commitment, the principal gain from EMS entry will be establishing a regime of low inflation for the next decade: in this, choice of the exchange rate will be less crucial than the fact of entry.     

The fiscal and monetary response to COVID‐19: What the Great Depression has – and hasn't – taught us

Although some regard the New Deal of the 1930s as exemplifying an aggressive fiscal and monetary response to a severe economic crisis, the US fiscal and monetary policy responses to the COVID‐19 crisis have actually been far more substantial – and, so far, much more effective in reviving aggregate spending. Although many fear that these responses, and the large‐scale increase in bank reserves especially, must eventually cause unwanted inflation, the concurrent sharp decline in money's velocity has thus far more than offset any inflationary effects of money growth, while forward bond prices reflect a general belief that inflation will remain below 2 per cent for at least another decade. Notwithstanding the growth of the Fed's balance sheet, Fed authorities can always check inflation by sufficiently raising the interest return on bank reserves. Nonetheless, recent developments have heightened the risk of ‘fiscal dominance’ of monetary policy at some point in the future.     

The monetary policy strategy of the Bank of England in 2020–21: An assessment

Excessive money creation during the Covid pandemic has resulted in Britain's worst episode of inflation since 1990–91. The backdrop to this failure of monetary policy is the Bank of England's aggregate demand/aggregate supply framework together with the Monetary Policy Committee's neglect of broad money. An alternative way to operate monetary policy is urgently needed. A significantly improved monetary policy outcome could be achieved by shifting from trying to steer the economy using interest rates and quantitative easing or quantitative tightening to reliance on the relative stability of income velocity (the ratio of nominal GDP to broad money) as a means of managing aggregate demand.     

Assumptions–Central Forecast

We continue to make our best guesses about likely policy developments rather than assuming 'unchanged' policies. In the central forecast we assume that the broad thrust of policy is unchanged, i.e. we have made the technical assumption that the present government is returned in the next General Election. But, because an election must be held within the next 15 months, we also consider the medium-term prospects under alternative economic policies. (For details see p. 19.) In the central forecast. e herefore. we assume that policy will continue to be guided-though not completely determined-by an extended Medium- Term Financial Strategy (MTFS). For 1983-4 the MTFS requires the PSBR to be 23/4% per cent of GDP at market prices. Given official inflation and output forecasts, the Chancellor is therefore aiming for a 1983-4 PSBR of £8bn (Autumn Statement, p. 13). In the central forecast. however, we have assumed that the Budget of 15 March will give greater weight to the political objectives of cutting income tax and maintaining the attack on inflation, even if this implies slippage from the MTFS targets. Specifcally we have assumed that the standard rate of income tax will be cut by lp. that personal tax allowances will be raised by 12 per cent and that indirect taxes will be raised by only half the amount required for full revalorisation. This amounts to a total tax giveaway (compared with unchangedpolicy) of £1 1/2 and results in a PSBR of just over £9bn. 3.1 per cent of GDPat market prices.     

[2] Assumptions

We have attempted in this forecast to make our best guesses about the likely development of policy over the coming years rather than to assume 'unchanged policy'. We assume that, at least until 1984, the broad framework of policy will be that provided by the Mediwn-Term Financial Strategy, which provides a target for the growth of the money supply (ł M3) and a path for the PSBR.
The forecast suggests that one objective of the MTFS, which was to reduce the PSBR as a percentage of GDP at market prices, remains feasible. However, we do not now expect the 1983–4 PSBR guideline of 2 per cent to be achieved until 1984–5, and we expect the growth of sterling M3 to remain outside the target range right through the forecast period, even though real interest rates remain positive.     

Bounded interest rate feedback rules in continuous-time

This paper analyzes the dynamic consequences of interest rate feedback rules in a flexible-price model where money enters the utility function. Two alternative rules are considered based on past or predicted inflation rates. The main feature is to consider inflation rates that are selected over a bounded time horizon. We prove that if the Central Bank's forecast horizon is not too long, an active and forward-looking monetary policy is not destabilizing: the equilibrium trajectory is unique and monotonic. This is an advantage with respect to active and backward-looking policies that are shown to lead to a unique but fluctuating dynamic.     

Briefing Paper: Why has the economy recovered?1

By the end of last year GDP (though strike affected) was 9 per cent higher than in the first half of 1981, an annual growth rate of 2.5 per cent. In this Briefing Paper we seek to explain the recovery from the recession. We conclude that much of the recovery represents a natural response of the economy after the oil and price shocks of 1979-80. The recovery occurred in spite of the deflationary Budget of 1981 and the sharp rise in interest rates in the autumn of 1981. Since 1981 fiscal policy has been stable, whereas the original intention was to tighten fiscal policy progressively in subsequent years. This stability and the fall in the inflation rate that accompanied it allowed growth to resume. We believe that the upturn would have been rather weaker (though inflation would have been lower) if the progressive tightening of the original Medium- Term Financial Strategy had been adhered to.     

Monetary Policy and the Stock Market: Theory and Empirical Evidence

This paper gives a comprehensive review of the literature on the interaction between real stock returns, inflation, and money growth, with a special emphasis on the role of monetary policy. This is an area of research that has interested monetary and financial economists for a long time. Monetary economists have been interested in the question whether money has any effect on real stock prices, while financial economists have investigated whether equity is a good hedge against inflation. Empirical studies show that money can be helpful in predicting future stock returns. Empirical evidence also suggest that equity is not a good hedge against inflation in the short run but may be so in the long run. The short-run negative relation between stock returns and inflation can easily be explained by theoretical models. If the central bank conducts a countercyclical monetary policy this will result in a negative relation between inflation and stock returns, while if it conducts a procyclical policy we could observe a positive relation. According to both theoretical and empirical studies investors receive an inflation risk premium for holding equity.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

After six years of steadily rising OECD output, fears of a significant rise in world inflation are now increasing. In the last year there has been a slight pick-up in inflation with producer prices up nearly d per cent. But prompt action by the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates before the presidential election appears to have damped inflationary expectations in the US and has given Japan and Germany an opportunity to tighten monetary policy without causing major currency fluctuations. It is also apparent that the other possible source of world inflation, commodity prices, is not a problem. OPEC over-production has ensured that the oil price remains weak and other commodity prices appear to have stopped rising after a brief acceleration at the beginning of the year. Nevertheless the major imbalances in world trade are declining only slowly and without a change in fiscal policy in the major economies it is difficult to believe that minor changes in monetary policy will be sufficient if the process of adjustment begins to falter. Despite these risks, we take a sanguine view of world prospects. Tighter monetary policy should effect a slowdown in world growth next year (already indicated by recent developments, particularly in the US) and this should be sufficient to control inflation which we expect to peak at just under 5 per cent at the beginning of next year. From 1990 onwards we see steady growth accompanied by low inflation.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

This forecast release examines the latest monthly indicators. In general they are in line with the detailed forecast published in February; retail sales have recovered from the fall in 1977 and price inflation is firmly in single figures, whilst output is showing only slight signs of recovery. The most disturbing indications are for money supply and the exchange rate. Monetary growth has been above the limit and the exchange rate has drifted in a manner that we did not expect until later this year. These indicators are related and give a clear warning for the Budget strategy. Unless the rate of monetary growth is brought back below 12 per cent it will not be possible to maintain a stable exchange rate. The target of maintaining single-figure inflation would then be virtually impossible.     

POST-BUDGET ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS OF OIL PRICE CHANGES

In this Forecast Release we update our February forecast to take account of the Budget and other new information, particularly about oil prices and the exchange rate. This updated forecast is then used as the basis for a set of three simulations in which we explore the consequences of lower oil prices, a fall in the exchange rate and a tightening of fical and monetary policy. The main conclusions are first that the Budget (the contentr of which we broadly anticipated) has not significantly changed our assessment of the short-term prospects for output and inflation. However, a detailed examination of the Government's revenue and expenditure estimates suggests that fiscal policy in 1983-4, though broadly in line with the Medium-Term Financial Strategy, has been loosened compared with 1982-3 by rather more than appears from the PSBR projections. We ako believe that there is a risk that the PSBR will be significantly higher than officially forecast in 1983-4.
Our simulations show the size of the PSBR overshoot in the event of a further sharp fall in the oil price. I f this were accompanied by a fall in the exchange rate, inflation would quickly be back in double figures. Whether the exchange rate falls or not a lower oil price gives significant output gains. However, if the authorities reacted by tightening fiscal and monetary policy, inflation would be broadly the same as in the Post Budget forecast, but there would still be output gains from the lower oil price.     

Evaluating inflation targeting based on the distribution of inflation and inflation volatility

In this paper the Financial Development Index (FDI) is used to rank 57 of the world's leading financial systems. Its calculation is based on the following 7 economic pillars: (1) Institutional environment, (2) Business environment, (3) Financial stability, (4) Banking financial services, (5) Non-banking financial services, (6) Financial markets, and (7) Financial access. Pillar (4) is constructed from bond markets, stock markets, foreign exchange markets, and derivative markets. Pillar (5) includes a country's IPO activity, namely the IPO market share, IPO proceeds amount, and IPOs share of world IPOs. The stock market index provides a short-term account of financial activities, whereas the FDI provides a long-term broader account of the financial structure and health of an economy. As the performance and success of a given monetary policy would less likely be judged on short-term dynamics, it seems sensible to use the annual FDI as one of several economic and country attributes in a policy evaluation of Inflation Targeting. The paper offers a potential outcomes analysis of the impact of inflation targeting on inflation and inflation volatility, and focuses on advanced economies that adopt ⿿inflation targeting⿿ as a formal monetary policy. In order to deal with the counterfactual question, namely what would be the inflation rate for an adopting country had it not adopted this policy, the paper offers a new matching technique that subsumes the traditional propensity scores methods as a special case. The paper has different proposals for assessing ⿿matching⿿ based on the whole distribution of any ⿿scores⿿. Additionally, the paper goes beyond the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) and examines the entire distribution of inflation and its ⿿variability⿿. It is found that the adoption of inflation targeting has helped lower inflation (not just the mean) for the targeting countries. However, it is shown that exact numerical quantification of this policy effect is as highly subjective as choosing ideal social welfare functions. The paper also finds no evidence of a larger gain for ⿿late adopters⿿ of inflation targeting. As for inflation variability, there is some robust evidence of small and often statistically insignificant reduction in variability due to targeting.     

THE MONETARY CONUNDRUM

The broad money supply, sterling M3, has grown by 14.1 per cent (ie an annual rate of over 30 per cent) over the past six months. Over the same period the narrow money supply definition (M1) has increased by only 4.4 per cent, while the difference between the two money supply measures — broadly speaking, the interest bearing component of sterling M3 — has grown by no less than 23.1 percent. The real economy is showing all the signs of a severe monetary squeeze with stocks and imports falling rapidly, while the balance of payments and the exchange rate are exceptionally strong. Over the past six months, industrial production (excluding North Sea oil) has fallen by 7.9 per cent while wholesale prices have risen by only 4.2 per cent. Thus, there is a double conundrum: the sharply different growth trends in M1 and sterling M3, and the contrast between the explosive growth of sterling M3 and the subdued behaviour of the real economy.
One possible answer to this puzzle, spelt out in more detail in the following pages of this Forecast Release, is that the rate of interest being paid on the interest-bearing component of sterling M3 is now abnormally high. Consequently, the asset demand for the interest-bearing component of sterling M3 is exceptionally large, with the result that both the non-interest-bearing component of the money stock (ie M1) and the real economy are being squeezed Under these circumstances, the short-run behaviour of sterling M3 may not be an entirely reliable guide to the behaviour of the real economy.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

The package that was announced just as we completed our June forecast has, for the time being, produced a more stable financial position. The exchange rate has stopped falling and by mid-July the Smithsonian index had reached 62, the highest level since March. Short- and long-term interest rates have stopped rising. We still emphasise, however, that control over DCE and the money supply has been achieved artificially through direct controls on the banks. The government has achieved short-run consistency between its fiscal and monetary policy, but in the longer term its fiscal policy is inconsistent with its hopes of keeping inflation in single figures. No incomes policy will succeed unless it is accompanied by policies designed to achieve a consistent exchange rate path. The issue has been given prominence by the recent proposals for a European currency system. In the June Economic Outlook we argued that the maintenance of exchange rate stability with the Deutschmark (unless West Germany can be persuaded to increase the growth of its money supply) would require major cuts in the Budget deficit over the next three years. The same monetary constraints would apply whether we joined a fixed exchange rate system or unilaterally decided to hold the exchange rate. If the government seriously wants to control inflation a reduction in the Budget deficit will be essential.     

Adaptive learning and monetary exchange

This paper investigates three classic questions in monetary theory: How can an intrinsically worthless asset, such as fiat money, maintain value as a medium of exchange? What are the short-run and long-run effects of a change in the money supply? What is the social cost of inflation? I answer these questions using a microfounded model of monetary exchange that replaces the rational expectations assumption with an adaptive learning rule. First, I show that monetary exchange is a robust arrangement in the sense that agents are able to learn the stationary monetary equilibrium while the non-monetary equilibrium is unstable under learning. Second, an unanticipated monetary injection has real effects in the short-run because learning the value of money takes time. In the long run, agents successfully learn the value of money, hence money is neutral. Third, under a constant money growth policy, an increase in the growth rate of money increases output in the short-run producing a short-run Phillips curve. A ten percent increase in the money growth rate has a social cost of 0.41 percent of output per year. Alternatively, a ten percent decrease in the money growth rate has a social benefit of 0.37 percent of output per year.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

Clear signs that the world recovery is underway have e merged in the first half of 1983. We have revised our forecast upwards and predict an increase of 1 3/4 per cent in OECD GNP in I983 and a further 3% per cent in 1984. By hirtorical standards such a recovery would be extremely modest and would not be expected to trigger off a resurgence in inflation. If so GNP could advance a further 2% per cent in each of I985 and 1986. However, there is a danger that the relaration of monetary policy in the US in conjunction with the expansionary fiscal stance will bring about a very rapid upswing in the second half of 1983, thereby generating upward pressures on US interest rates. If, as the Presidential election approaches, these pressures are resisted and US monetary growth maintains its recent rapid expansion, an increase in the rate of inflation would be likely in 1984. If this were met with a tighter policy response (higher interest rates both in the US and elsewhere) after the election, the prospects would be for a sharp slowdown in the world economy in 1985.     

Forecast Summary

Output is expected lo grow steadily for the next four years, continuing the recovery which has been in progress since I981. The underlying rate of growth is forecast to slow down next year as the world economy also slows, though because of the miners' strike actual recorded growth next year will be higher than this. However, throughout the period output grows more rapidly than its historical trend. This growth is accompanied by steady increases in labour productivity, and unemployment is forecast to rise. With fiscal and monetary policy following the guidelines set by the Medium-Term Financial Strategy, inflation stays at about its current level or falls slightly.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

Last year saw the most coordinated cyclical upturn in the world economy since the early I970s, with OECD output rising 4per cent, industrial production and world trade even more rapidly. The boom in demand, which followed five years of continuous expansion, has outstripped supply and prices have begun to accelerate. To tackle inflation, the G7 monetary authorities have tightened policy over the last year, reversing the short-lived drop in interest rates necessitated by the stock market crash. This tightening may have to go further, especially in Germany and Japan where the effects of a rising oil price and higher indirect taxes are being exacerbated by currency depreciation. Although the rise in interest rates came too late to stop inflation rising, it has beet pursued with sufficient vigour to prevent inflation from seriously breaching the 5 per cent level. It is on these grounds that we forecast a relatively soft lending for the world economy on output, with growth continuing at 2.5–3per cent, accompanied by a limited reduction in inflation which stays in the 4–5per cent range. Progress on current account balances is also likely to be sluggish: in the absence of a serious attack on the budget deficit, the US deficit is likely to stay in the region of $140bn a year.