Gradual Retirement: An Additional Option in Work and Retirement

Abstract

Aging of the population raises many questions and issues for individuals, families, and society: economic, political, social, psychological, medical, ethical, moral, religious, and legal, all of which bear on the quality of life in its many dimensions. Economic security in old age is one rubric under which many of the problems and their possible solutions may be discussed. How a society arranges for its members to work and retire is an important facet in the provision for old-age economic security.

This article is concerned with the implications of demographic and labor force changes for work and retirement. It discusses the role of gradual (or phased) retirement in introducing flexibility into the range of choices between work and retirement.

Section 1 explains the rationale for gradual retirement. Section 2 spells out the barriers to implementing gradual retirement programs, including legal barriers and barriers relating to pension plan objectives. Section 3 discusses some possible solutions for implementing gradual retirement programs. Section 4 describes some selected examples of gradual retirement programs, and Section 5 contains concluding remarks.     

Factors Affecting Retirement Mortality

Abstract

As many countries consider mandatory individual retirement accounts as their answer to a secure social security system, the question arises as to whether all workers can get true “market value” annuities when they retire. It is clear today that private-sector life annuities are priced assuming that the applicant is healthy—very healthy. Very little underwriting or risk classification now exists in the individual annuity marketplace. However, if a large percentage of the population were looking to annuitize their social security accounts upon retirement, there would be strong pressure for more risk classes in the annuity-pricing structure.

Even without the advent of individual accounts for social security, the authors of this paper feel there may be real market opportunities for more risk classification in the individual annuity market and the offering of “impaired life annuities.” Given that this pressure does or might soon exist, this paper reviews 45 recent research papers that look at factors that affect mortality after retirement. In particular, factors that seem to be important in predicting retirement mortality include age, gender, race and ethnicity, education, income, occupation, marital status, religion, health behaviors, smoking, alcohol, and obesity. for each factor, this paper gives highlights relative to the named factor of the impact expected from that variable as described in the 45 reviewed research papers.

The authors believe there is a wealth of information contained in the summaries that follow, and it is our sincere hope that this paper will cause an increased interest in a more broadly based risk classification structure for individual annuities.

Summaries of the 45 papers can be found at www.soa.org/sections/farm/farm.html.     

Social Security and Private Transfers in Developing Countries: The Case of Peru

Do social security systems "crowd out" private transfers fromyounger to older generations? This question has generated muchtheoretical discussion, but little empirical work exists toconfirm or refute this crowding-out hypothesis. We investigatethe connection between social security and private transfersin Peru, using the Peruvian Living Standards Survey, and findthat private transfers from young to old would have been nearly20 percent higher without social security benefits. This indicatesthat the Peruvian social security system is less effective atdelivering benefits to the elderly than a simple assignmentof government expenditures would suggest. Social security'sdisplacement of private transfers, while significant, is lessthan that predicted by models with widespread altruistic transfers.     

Voting on Pensions with Endogenous Retirement Age

It is often argued that the observed trend towards early retirement is due mainly to the implicit tax imposed on continued activity of elderly workers. We study the relevance of such a distortion in a political economy model with endogenous age of retirement. The setting is a two-period overlapping generations model. Individuals differ in their productivity. In the first period they work a fixed amount of time; in the second, they choose when to retire and then receive a flat rate pension benefit. Pensions are financed by a payroll tax on earnings in the first and in the second period of life. Such a tax is non distortionary in the first period; it is distortionary in the second period. We allow for some rebating of the second period tax. Individuals vote on the level of the payroll tax given the rebate which can range from 0 (biased system) to 100% (neutral system). We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a voting equilibrium and study its properties. Under these conditions, high tax rates are supported by all the old and by low productivity young individuals. We show that the pivotal voter is a young individual. The number of young individuals who have higher wage than the pivotal voter equals half the total population. We also show that the introduction of a bias increases the political support for the pension system. Finally, we study the simultaneous determination of the bias and the tax rate through a voting procedure and show that the equilibrium (if any) implies a bias which is always positive and may or not be larger than one.     

Aging and Retirement: Evidence Across Countries

How do demographic factors influence retirement? Using a large cross-country data set, I show that in countries with a larger share of elderly in their population the length of retirement is longer. This result holds true if I control for wealth effects, and when the effective labor force participation rate of the elderly is used instead of the official retirement age. Retirement policies and the social security size are strictly related: a new variable, representing the aggregate relevance of retirement policies, turns out to be significant in explaining the size of social security. Finally, the total amount of social security transfers is positively related with the increase of the elderly population, while in per capita terms this relation is not significant.     

Impacts on Economic Security Programs of Rapidly Shifting Demographics

Abstract

This paper analyzes in some detail potential impacts on economic security programs—government, employer, and individual—that the aging of the baby boom generation may create. It begins by defining what is meant by “population aging” and concludes that fertility shifts are more important than improving life expectancy. It also argues that calling the baby boom the “postwar baby boom” is inaccurate and will lead to missed targets for product development and marketing. Finally, this section of the paper notes that the most rapidly growing segment of the population will be the oldest old—those age 85 and over, who will also put the greatest stress on the provision of health care and retirement income security.

The paper then looks at other demographic shifts of importance, in particular female labor force participation rates. The impact of shifting demographics is reviewed for each sponsor of economic security programs: the government (health care and social security); the employer (pension plans and group benefits); and the individual. Points of concern and offsetting opportunities for the insurance industry are noted. Finally, the paper looks at whether we will be able to “afford” the sudden retirement of the baby boom. The conclusion is that this will be affordable if we can convince a portion of the labor force to stay active longer, and if we have healthy productivity growth rates. The problems of an aging population can all be viewed as opportunities for those who have the map.     

How Behavioral Finance Can Inform Retirement Plan Design1

Several key lessons for pension design have emerged in the last decade from behavioral economics and finance research. This article analyzes the insights from this literature on how workers decide to save, manage their retirement investments, and draw down their assets in retirement. The aim is to understand how workers and retirees deviate from the rational, well‐informed agents that underpin economic theory, public policy, and often retirement plan design. The evidence suggests that many people save too little, others make poor investment decisions, and still others spend their accumulated assets too quickly in retirement. The “behavioral” reasons for such tendencies include overconfidence, limited self‐control, the overvaluation of the present at the expense of the future, susceptibility to “framing,” and an aversion to realizing losses. By shedding light on why people fail to achieve an ideal outcome on their own, this literature offers practical guidance to plan sponsors and policymakers who must design, regulate, and evaluate the institutions that help provide for economic security in old age. More specifically, the literature suggests that the plan design should be made automatic for the many individuals unwilling to exercise full control over their retirement savings choices. Recommended design features include automatic enrollment, scheduled annual savings increases, and default investment options or managed account programs that represent optimal portfolio choices.     

Issues for Implementing Phased Retirement in Defined Benefit Plans

Abstract

U.S. society is aging. The nature of work has changed from work that requires physical strength to work based on knowledge. As a result, workers are beginning to phase into retirement rather than going directly from full-time work to full retirement. From a retirement income perspective, many final-average-pay defined benefit plans have features that make phased retirement difficult at best and detrimental at worst. U.S. pension law and regulations present barriers to phased retirement if the phased retiree wants to receive a portion of available pension benefits during phased retirement.

This paper examines private sector options to encourage phased retirement and to eliminate the disincentives that currently affect defined benefit plans. It offers alternative calculations of final average pay that do not penalize the part-time worker. It also demonstrates that the plan’s early retirement reduction and late retirement increase can be set to maintain actuarial equity throughout phased retirement. The paper presents benefit calculations with equal actuarial values for various payout patterns.

The paper discusses the coordination between phased retirement and subsidized early retirement. Finally, the paper notes some of the changes in ERISA that will be needed to facilitate phased retirement in defined benefit plans, especially for participants who want to receive pension distributions while working part time.     

EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECT OF TAXES ON FIRMS' DECISIONS TO RETIRE DEBT EARLY

We examine the effect of marginal tax rates on the decision to retire debt early. Other factors that have been linked to the debt retirement decision are also investigated, including leverage adjustment and the value associated with the immediate recognition of a loss for tax purposes on early retirement. Results indicate that firms that retire debt early have lower marginal tax rates than firms that do not retire debt early. This finding is consistent with the proposition that firms are motivated to retire debt early by an incentive to reduce tax shields that cannot be used efficiently. Further, firms that retire debt early are more highly leveraged than firms that do not retire debt early. Evidence also suggests that some firms retire debt early at a loss to reduce currently taxable income.     

我国职工退休年龄影响因素的实证研究

当前我国劳动力逐渐短缺,职工退休年龄直接关系到我国劳动力供给的数量和结构。使用2011年在广东省21个地市的问卷调查数据,研究影响职工退休年龄问题的影响因素。实证研究表明,工资、工龄对职工退休年龄的影响显著为正。养老金对男职工退休年龄的影响显著为负。机关事业单位职工的退休年龄更晚。教育年限对女职工的影响显著为正。已婚、...     

Whither the mixed economy?

Following his articles “Towards a more stable state” and “Changing ethics of distribution” in Futures (December 1972 and June 1971) Sir Geoffrey Vickers now explores the causes of instabilities inherent in Western mixed economies. Internally, these derive from the need increasingly to subordinate market choice to political choice; externally from the need to support international exchanges by unrequited transfers of purchasing power comparable to those on which mixed economies are already dependent internally.     

Wages,productivity, and retirement

Pensions, both state provided and privately provided, affect incentives to retire. But private pensions are part of the long term compensation package, and altering pensions not only affects retirement incentives, but also wages. A key factor in determining whether retirement occurs at the appropriate age is the relation of productivity to alternatives. When wages, coupled with public and private pension accrual, deviate from worker productivity, private retirement incentives are distorted. Sometimes this results in too much early retirement, creating fiscal difficulties. Sometimes, it results in a desire for delayed retirement, which argues for mandatory retirement rules. Pay compression, where wages do not vary across individuals as much as productivity, exacerbate distortions. Defined benefit pension plans tend to create incentives to retire after a certain number of years of work. Defined contribution plans do not have this feature. Public plans should be designed noting their interaction with incentives that are already inherent in the private wage and pension schemes.     

At What Age Do You Expect to Retire? Retirement Expectations and Increases in the Statutory Retirement Age

We analyse the extent to which an increase in the statutory retirement age affects individuals' retirement expectations. Understanding how individuals adjust their expectations is crucial to the evaluation of this policy, since retirement expectations directly affect other important decisions such as labour supply, engagement in (further) education and, of course, savings and investments. We consider the 2007 German pension reform that legislated an increase in the statutory retirement age from 65 years to 67. Our analysis is based on a longitudinal study that directly asks respondents at what age they expect to retire. Using a difference‐in‐differences approach, we look at the changes in subjective retirement expectations over time and estimate the extent to which they can be attributed to the 2007 reform. We find that the reform shifted the retirement expectations of the younger cohorts, although there is some heterogeneity in the way individuals adjusted. While there are no significant differences between men and women, lower‐educated individuals failed to revise their expectations. As these individuals usually acquire both lower pension claims and lower private savings, the fact that they have been slower in updating their retirement expectations causes concern regarding their income security after retirement.     

Determinants of planned retirement age

Determinants of planned retirement age are analyzed. The prediction equation indicates that planned retirement age increases substantially as people get older, and increases somewhat with higher noninvestment income. Social Security reform should recognize that the capacity to continue working and the ability to afford to retire both influence the age at which people plan to retire. The range of planned retirement ages suggests that research on the adequacy of retirement preparation should focus on planned retirement age. Financial planners should consider the finding that planned retirement age increases with age.     

Portfolio Choice over the Life-Cycle when the Stock and Labor Markets Are Cointegrated

We study portfolio choice when labor income and dividends are cointegrated. Economically plausible calibrations suggest young investors should take substantial short positions in the stock market. Because of cointegration the young agent's human capital effectively becomes “stock‐like.” However, for older agents with shorter times‐to‐retirement, cointegration does not have sufficient time to act, and thus their human capital becomes more “bond‐like.” Together, these effects create hump‐shaped life‐cycle portfolio holdings, consistent with empirical observation. These results hold even when asset return predictability is accounted for.     

Forced retirement risk and portfolio choice

Current literature on the effect of labor income on portfolio choice overlooks that workers face a risk of being forced to retire before their planned retirement age. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, this paper finds that the forced retirement risk is both significant and highly correlated with stock market fluctuations. Using a life-cycle portfolio choice model, this paper shows that forced retirement risk makes labor income near retirement stock-like. Therefore, contrary to conventional wisdom, those who are still working but near retirement should have a lower share of risky assets in their financial portfolios than retirees do.     

Social welfare effects of tax-benefit reform under endogenous participation and unemployment: an ordinal approach

This paper analyzes the social welfare effects of tax-benefit reforms in a framework integrating endogenous labor supply and unemployment. We adopt an ordinal approach to social welfare comparisons by searching for “socially desirable” reforms that would improve social welfare for an entire class of social welfare functions. In the model, there is a discrete distribution of individuals’ productivities and individuals are heterogeneous with respect to leisure preferences (or disability of work). Labor supply decisions are limited to the participation decision. Unemployment is modeled in a search and matching framework with individual wage bargaining. For the social welfare analysis, the model is calibrated for Switzerland. Starting from a situation with an unemployment benefit scheme, the introduction of in-work benefits is shown to be a “socially desirable” reform: it would be unanimously preferred to the current situation according to all social welfare functions based on the criteria of Pareto, anonymity, and the principle of transfers. This result holds for two different types of preference heterogeneity (leisure preferences or disability of work) and also for the case where job search effort cannot be monitored.     

Corruption as an organizational process: Understanding the logic of the denormalization of corruption

This article discusses the basic assumptions of an individualist vision on corruption. A different argument based on “social density” of the phenomenon is proposed instead: the process of normalization of corruption. Under this umbrella, corruption is a political concept that looks to impose a particular vision on what are “right” behaviors based on a sharp and unrealistic separation of the public and private sphere. A review of the organizational literature on corruption is developed, with the aim of understanding how organizational processes of socialization triggers behaviors that make corrupt acts to appear as “normal” under the organizational logic. Persons find themselves in a “slippery slope”, generating agreements and social dynamics that are able to produce corrupt logics under the normal life of an organization. A plea for discussing the social processes needed to “un-normalize” corruption is defended a conceptualization that goes beyond an individualist and moralist vision of the phenomenon.     

Corrupción como proceso organizacional: comprendiendo la lógica de la desnormalización de la corrupción

This article discusses the basic assumptions of an individualist vision on corruption. A different argument based on “social density” of the phenomenon is proposed instead: the process of normalization of corruption. Under this umbrella, corruption is a political concept that looks to impose a particular vision on what are “right” behaviors based on a sharp and unrealistic separation of the public and private sphere. A review of the organizational literature on corruption is developed, with the aim of understanding how organizational processes of socialization triggers behaviors that make corrupt acts to appear as “normal” under the organizational logic. Persons find themselves in a “slippery slope”, generating agreements and social dynamics that are able to produce corrupt logics under the normal life of an organization. A plea for discussing the social processes needed to “un-normalize” corruption is defended a conceptualization that goes beyond an individualist and moralist vision of the phenomenon.