Insider trading and managerial incentives

We derive conditions under which permitting manager “insiders” to trade on personal account increases the equilibrium level of output and the welfare of shareholders. These increases are produced by two effects of insider trading. First, insider trading impounds information about hidden managerial actions into asset prices. This impounding of information allows shareholders to make better personal portfolio-allocation decisions. Second, allowing insider trading can induce managers to increase, on average, the correlation between their personal wealth and firm value beyond the level dictated by the employment relationship alone. This increased correlation increases managerial incentives. When these two effects are only weakly present, permitting insider trading harms shareholders, because insider trading reduces shareholder control over the performance–compensation relationship. In addition, when managerial effort incentives are high and corporate governance costs are low, managers may prefer insider-trading restrictions because such restrictions force shareholders to offer them a larger fraction of output through the employment relationship.     

Insider trading and risk aversion

This paper is a continuous time version of Holden and Subrahmanyam (Economics Letters 44 (1994) 181). The paper extends Kyle (Econometrica 53 (1985) 1315) by introducing risk aversion on the side of the monopolist informed trader and allows for the liquidity traders instantaneous demand to depend on cost of trading, as well as on the risk of the stock. The main result of the paper is that, in equilibrium, the price pressure decreases with time regardless of the elasticity of the liquidity demand function.     

Insider trading and shareholder investment horizons

This paper examines the effects of shareholder investment horizons on insider trading. We find that insiders are less likely to trade on private information and the profitability of insider trades is lower when shareholder investment horizons are longer. We further examine two channels through which shareholders with longer investment horizons can impede insider trading: direct monitoring and better information environment. Consistent with the direct monitoring channel, we show that insiders in firms with longer shareholder investment horizons are more likely to shift trades from the month right before earnings announcements to the month right after earnings announcements. Moreover, the impact of investment horizons are stronger in firms with higher ex ante litigation risk, with lower corporate governance quality, and that are not targets of hedge fund activists. Consistent with the information environment channel, we show that longer shareholder investment horizons increase the frequencies of information disclosure and insiders in firms with longer shareholder investment horizons are more likely to trade in an isolated manner rather than in sequences.     

Insider trading and firm-specific return volatility

Roll (J Financ 43:541–566, 1988) argues that firm-specific stock return volatility may result either from informed trading or from noise trading that is unrelated to information. In this paper we provide evidence that insider purchases are inversely related to the idiosyncratic volatility of stocks. We also find that stock idiosyncratic volatilities are generally inversely related to future 6- and 12-month returns. Our results are primarily driven by the timing of insider sales rather than insider purchases. The results are consistent with an information-based explanation of firm-specific return volatility.     

Insider trading,growth opportunities and the market reaction to new financing announcements*

Abstract

This paper explores the profitability of momentum strategies, by investigating if a momentum strategy is superior to a benchmark model once the effects of data-snooping have been accounted for. Two data sets are considered. The first set of data consists of US stocks and the second one consists of Swedish stocks. For the US data strong evidence is found of a momentum effect and hence the hypothesis of weak market efficiency is rejected. Splitting the sample in two parts, it is found that the overall significance is driven by events in the earlier part of the sample. The results for the Swedish data indicate that momentum strategies based on individual stocks generate significant profits. A very weak or no momentum effect can be found when stocks are sorted into portfolios. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, results show that data-snooping bias can be very substantial. Neglecting the problem would lead to very different conclusions.     

Insider trading with correlation between liquidity trading and a public signal

We analyse a Kyle-type continuous-time market model in which liquidity trading is correlated with a noisy public signal that is released continuously. We show that, in contrast to the previous literature, Kyle's λ, the price sensitivity to the order flow, can even be non-monotonic, depending on the correlation structure. We also show that the introduction of an additional public signal does not necessarily improve the informational efficiency of the market, depending on the correlation.     

Insider employee stock option trading and stock prices

The question of which factors determine corporate bonds pricing is investigated by analysing the spreads of eurobonds issued by major G-10 companies during the 1991–2001 period. Three main results emerge from the analysis. First, bond ratings appear as the most important determinant of yield spreads, with investors’ reliance on rating agencies judgments increasing over time. Second, the primary market efficiency and the expected secondary market liquidity are not relevant explanatory factors of spreads cross-sectional variability. Finally, rating agencies adopt a different, ‘through the cycle’, evaluation criteria of default risk with respect to the forward looking one adopted by bond investors.     

Insider and liquidity trading in stock and options markets

We analyze the introduction of a nonredundant option, whichcompletes the markets, and the effects of this on informationrevelation and risk sharing. The option alters the interactionbetween liquidity and insider trading. We find that the optionmitigates the market breakdown problem created by the combinationof market incompleteness and asymmetric information. The introductionof the option has ambiguous consequences on the informationalefficiency of the market. On the one hand, by avoiding marketbreakdown, it enables trades to occur and convey information.On the other hand, the introduction of the option enlarges theset of trading strategies the insider can follow. This can makeit more difficult for the market makers to interpret the informationcontent of trades and consequently can reduce the informationalefficiency of the market. The introduction of the option alsohas an ambiguous effect on the profitability of insider trades,which can either increase or decrease depending on parametervalues.     

Insider trading as a signal of private information

There is substantial evidence that insider trading is presentaround corporate announcements and that this insider tradingis motivated by private information. Using real estate investmenttrusts that choose to reappraise themselves as our sample, weestablish that the appraisals contain information, but findno market response to the public announcement of this informationin these appraisals. We consider two possible explanations forthis inconsistency: the first that the appraisal informationis not highlighted in earnings reports and hence remains unobserved;and the second that insiders trade on the appraisal informationin the time that elapses between the appraisal and its publicannouncement We find strong support for the second hypothesis,with insiders buying (selling) after they receive favorable(unfavorable) appraisal news, especially for negative appraisals.We also find that positive (negative) appraisals and net insiderbuying (selling) elicit significant positive (negative) abnormalreturns during the appraisal period     

Insider trading law enforcement and gross spreads of ADR IPOs

Using American Depositary Receipt (ADR) IPOs from 34 countries during 1980-2004, we find that, on average, the enforcement of insider trading laws reduces the underwriter gross spread by 49-61 basis points, which is about 10-12% of the average gross spread for ADR IPOs. This relation is present regardless of whether issuers have a prior listing or whether issuers are from developed or emerging markets. The association becomes stronger for ADRs underwritten by less prestigious underwriters and for issuers that are involved in privatization. The political institutions in the issuers’ home markets also affect gross spreads.     

Insider transfer trading of banking companies around exchange listing

This paper examines insider transfer trading of banking companies before and after their listing on the Taiwan Stock Exchange. During the pre-listing period, we uncover significantly negative abnormal returns after insiders announce their plans to transfer stocks, as well as significant price reversals following the subsequent disclosure of unfulfilled transfers. However, after listing, we observe little market response to the initial announcement, and nor is any price revision observed for partial/no transfer information. For both periods, the substantial increases in turnover provide further evidence on the flow of information from insider trading. Additionally, the propensity and profitability of insider transfers are documented. Overall, empirical results indicate that dissemination of information on insider transfer trading before listing can negatively influence the stock price, while information on insider transfers posted after listing attracts only limited attention. Consequently, the evidence is consistent with the implications associated with the managerial timing of listing decisions.     

Insider trading activity,tenure length,and managerial compensation

In this study, insider trading activity is used as part of a managerial compensation structure. The wage structure changes with the tenure duration of the insider. Managers with shorter tenure rely more on insider profits as part of their compensation. On the other hand, managers with longer tenure execute insider transactions with lower profits. Different measurements of insider profits using calendar day returns of insider transactions, holding period returns for different horizons, or weighted average cumulative abnormal returns for the executive all lead to the same conclusion. The results are robust to various well-known empirical models, such as the CAPM model, the Fama and French (1993) three factor model, or the Carhart (1997) four factor model. Insider trading profits have increased in recent years overall, especially after the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) implementation of Rule 10b5-1 in 2000. Therefore, the design of a wage schedule incorporating insider trading activity has become more relevant.     

Insider trading in sequential auction markets with risk-aversion and time-discounting

We extend Kyle's [Kyle, A. S. 1985. “Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading.” Econometrica 53, 1315–1335] analysis of sequential auction markets to the case in which the insider is risk-averse and discounts her trading profits as her private information is long-lived. We see that time-discounting exacerbates the impact of risk-aversion on the optimal trading strategy of the insider. Ceteris paribus, a larger degree of risk-aversion or a smaller time-discount factor induces the informed agent to consume more rapidly her informational advantage increasing the liquidity and efficiency of the securities market.     

Insider trading,stock return volatility,and the option market's pricing of the information content of insider trading

We find strong evidence that net insider selling is positively associated with future stock return volatility, consistent with insider selling increasing outside investors’ uncertainty. The positive effect of net insider selling is significantly stronger when the volatility is measured around the earnings announcement. Apparently, option prices do not fully reflect the information content of insider trading for future volatility. More specifically, we find no evidence that option traders adjust the implied volatility for the insider trading effect in a timely manner. Consequently, net insider selling is significantly associated with future option straddle returns and delta neutral returns.     

Insider trading,future earnings,and post-earnings announcement drift

This paper examines the association between insider trading prior to quarterly earnings announcements and the magnitude of the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD). We conjecture and find that insider trades reflect insiders’ private information about the persistence of earnings news. Thus, insider trades can help investors better understand and incorporate the time-series properties of quarterly earnings into stock prices in a timely and unbiased manner, thereby mitigating PEAD. As predicted, PEAD is significantly lower when earnings announcements are preceded by insider trading. The reduction in PEAD is driven by contradictory insider trades (i.e., net buys before large negative earnings news or net sells before large positive earnings news) and is more pronounced in the presence of more sophisticated market participants. Consistent with investors extracting and trading on insiders’ private information, pre-announcement insider trading is associated with smaller market reactions to future earnings news in each of the four subsequent quarters. Overall, our findings indicate insider trading contributes to stock price efficiency by conveying insiders’ private information about future earnings and especially the persistence of earnings news.     

Insider trading and response to earnings announcements: the impact of accelerated disclosure requirements

This paper contributes to the debate on the consequences of increased disclosure regulation by investigating the effects of expedited reporting requirements of Form 4 filings, mandated by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX), on the market response to earnings announcements. We first confirm that SOX reduces opportunistic insider trading without deterring insider trading due to diversification needs, and that post-SOX, opportunistic insider trades more strongly reveal upcoming earnings surprises. We then document that, at the earnings announcement date, earnings response coefficients (ERCs) are lower when earnings are preceded by opportunistic insider trades. We conclude that accelerated disclosures of insider transactions mandated by SOX lend to more informationally efficient prices prior to earnings announcements. Our findings stand as one piece of evidence suggesting positive externalities from recent Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosure regulation and add to the scarce evidence on the consequences of changes in Form 4 filing requirements.     

Insider trading and future stock returns in firms with concentrated ownership levels

We investigate the relationship between insider trading and stock returns in firms with concentrated ownership. To this end, we employ data from East Asian countries which span the period January 2003 to May 2012. Consistent with the previous literature, we find a significantly negative relation between the selling activity of insiders and stock returns. However, contrary to studies which focus on highly developed markets, we find that the buying activity of insiders is also inversely related to future stock returns. Our analysis shows that top directors with higher ownership levels drive this result, suggesting that the trading activity of insiders is not always associated with profit-making motives and can be explained by their level of ownership. Furthermore, we demonstrate that a trading strategy which focuses solely on purchases made by top directors with high ownership levels yields negative returns. The paper has important implications for outside investors who mimic the trading activity of insiders with the aim to realise profits.     

Price performance of common stock new issues

The paper studies both the initial and aftermarket performance (measured by risk-adjusted returns) on newly issued common stocks which were offered to the public during the 1960s. The results confirm that average initial performance is positive (11.4 percent), while the distribution of returns is skewed so that the subscriber of a single random new issue offering has about an equal chance for gain or loss. The results are generally consistent with aftermarket efficiency. Positive initial performance along with aftermarket efficiency indicate that new issue offerings are underpriced. The paper provides insights into this underpricing mystery, but does not solve it.     

An unreliable canary: Insider trading,the cash flow hypothesis and the financial crisis

This paper investigates whether measures of aggregated insider trading could have predicted the wider economic change that occurred in the UK around the time of the financial crisis. Seyhun's (1988, 1992) cash flow hypothesis is the underpinning rationale driving the investigation. Within a vector auto-regressive framework, this study disentangles the relationship between returns and the activities of insiders in UK listed firms in order to validate Seyhun's assertions in this context. Findings suggest that, unlike the US, the relationship is not present. Instead, aggregate measures of trading decisions show that insiders are more likely driven by public perception than by private information.     

Delegated trading and the speed of adjustment in security prices

Institutional trading arrangements often involve the portfolio manager delegating the task of trade execution to a separate division within the firm. We model the agency conflict that arises in this setting and show that optimal performance benchmarks often create an incentive to execute orders contrary to concurrent information flow. We hypothesize that aggregate contrarian trading resulting from widespread application of such benchmarks leads to delays in the assimilation of information in security prices. Using institutional trading data, we document the hypothesized contrarian trading pattern and relate the pattern to price-adjustment delays in the response of individual stocks to index futures returns. The evidence supports the assertion that delegated institutional trading contributes to these delays.