Optimal monetary and fiscal policies in a search theoretic model of monetary exchange

Search models of monetary exchange commonly assume that terms of trade in anonymous markets are determined via Nash bargaining, which generally causes monetary equilibrium to be inefficient. Bargaining frictions add to the classical intertemporal distortion present in most monetary models, whereby agents work today to obtain cash that can be used only in future transactions. In this paper, we study the properties of optimal fiscal and monetary policy within the framework of Lagos and Wright (2005). We show that fiscal policy can be implemented to alleviate underproduction while money is still essential. If lump sum monetary transfers are available, a production subsidy can restore the efficiency of monetary equilibria. The Friedman rule belongs to the optimal policy set, but higher inflation rates are also possible. When lump-sum monetary transfers are not available, equilibrium allocations are generally not first-best. Nevertheless, fiscal policy still results in substantial welfare gains. Money can be extracted from circulation via a sales tax on decentralized market activities, and the Friedman rule is only optimal if the buyer has relatively low bargaining power.     

Tax reform in a two-class growth model

This paper analyzes the welfare and distributional effects of tax reforms in a two-class model with exogenous labour supply. It extends the empirically calibrated, standard life-cycle model to include both pure life-cycle savers and households with an altruistic bequest motive. The tax reform simulations cover the move from an income to a wage and a consumption tax, respectively. The role of borrowing constraints is studied and a dynamic analysis of tax reforms using a static expectation approach is performed. The simulation results indicate that the two tax reforms have different impacts on the welfare of the two classes: while the pure life-cycle savers are better off with the consumption tax, the altruistically motivated households gain more under a wage tax. The results further show that while the introduction of a consumption tax is distributionally neutral, the move to a wage tax substantially increases income and wealth inequality.     

Dynamic monetary and fiscal policy and the government budget constraint: A growth equilibrium

This paper investigates a dynamic macroeconomic model with the government-budget constraint. The model deviates from many previous studies by assuming that long-run equilibrium is characterized by all stock variables growing at rates which imply an unchanging interest rate. Of the two solutions, one is the standard constant-assetstock equilibrium while the other is either a positive- or a negative-growth equilibrium. One of the solutions is always locally stable while the other is locally unstable. Consequently, when the constant-asset-stock equilibrium is unstable (stable) the positive-(negative-) growth equilibrium is stable (unstable).     

On the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policies in a Keynesian model

One of the central problems in macroeconomics is the comparison of the effectiveness of various monetary and fiscal policy measures for regulating output and employment. Opinions on this issue are quite varied. This paper analyses this controversy in the framework of a non-Walrasian model with price rigidities. It studies a monetary economy where money is the sole medium of exchange in the model ‘money buys goods and goods buy money; but goods do not buy goods’. The works of Benassy, Dreze, Malinvaud and Younes are utilised for constructing a model of Keynesian unemployment equilibrium.     

Distortionary fiscal policy and monetary policy goals

We reconsider the role of an inflation conservative central banker in a setting with distortionary taxation. To do so, we assume monetary and fiscal policy are decided by independent authorities that do not abide to past commitments. If the two authorities make policy decisions simultaneously, inflation conservatism causes fiscal overspending. But if fiscal policy is determined before monetary policy, inflation conservatism imposes fiscal discipline. These results clarify that in our setting the value of inflation conservatism depends crucially on the timing of policy decisions.     

Government debt and optimal monetary and fiscal policy

How do different levels of government debt affect the optimal conduct of monetary and fiscal policies? And what do these optimal policies imply for the evolution of government debt over time? To provide an answer, this paper studies a standard monetary policy model with nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition and adds to it a fiscal authority that issues nominal non-state contingent debt, levies distortionary labor income taxes and determines the level of public goods provision. Higher government debt levels make it optimal to reduce public spending, so as to dampen the adverse incentive effects of distortionary taxes, but also strongly influence the optimal stabilization response following technology shocks. In particular, higher debt levels give rise to larger risks to the fiscal budget and to tax rates. This makes it optimal to reduce government debt over time. The optimal speed of debt reduction is missed when using first-order approximations to optimal policies, but is shown to be quantitatively significant in a second-order approximation, especially when technology movements are largely unpredictable in nature.     

A note on the optimal choice of monetary and fiscal policy

This paper studies the instrument-target problem associated with a simple macroeconomic model with conditions of uncertainty. The purpose of the paper is to demonstrate that if a model is linear with nonstochastic coefficients and with additive disturbances and if the policy objective is to maximize the expected value of the quadratic loss function, then it is the choice of endogenous variables that alters the expected loss value. This contrasts with the findings of Poole, Sargent, Turnovsky, et al., in which the expected losses are compared for different instruments while endogenous variables are changed at the same time. Thus, if basic model specifications are unchanged, an important cause for different expected losses under different policy instruments is seen to lie in the choice of endogenous variables.     

The design of monetary and fiscal policy: A global perspective

We study the emergence of multiple equilibria in models with capital and bonds under various monetary and fiscal policies. We show that the presence of capital is indeed another independent source of local and global multiplicities, even under active policies that yield local determinacy. We also show how a very similar mechanism generates multiplicities in models with bonds and distortionary taxation. We then explore the design of monetary policies that avoid multiple equilibria. We show that interest rate policies that respond to the output gap, while potentially a source of significant inefficiencies, may be effective in preventing multiple equilibria and costly oscillatory equilibrium dynamics.     

Further evidence on monetary and fiscal policy coordination

The extent to which fiscal and monetary policies respond to inflation and unemployment and the degree to which policy makers coordinate their policies have important implications for their usefulness as instruments of economic stabilization. Using a framework of minimizing a policy maker's loss function, subject to the state of the economy, this paper tests for the joint determination of monetary and fiscal policies. Our results show that the pre-Reagan/Bush and pre-Volcker/Greenspan eras can be characterized by a noncooperative game between the two policies. For the Reagan/Bush and Volcker/Greenspan regimes, our results are consistent with a cooperative game in which fiscal policy dominates and monetary policy accommodates. Our results also have implications for the possibility of future cooperation by policy makers.Financial support from Southwest Texas State University and DePaul University is gratefully acknowledged.     

Optimal fiscal and monetary policy under sticky prices

This paper studies optimal fiscal and monetary policy under sticky product prices. The theoretical framework is a stochastic production economy. The government finances an exogenous stream of purchases by levying distortionary income taxes, printing money, and issuing nominal non-state-contingent bonds. The main findings of the paper are: First, for a miniscule degree of price stickiness (i.e., many times below available empirical estimates) the optimal volatility of inflation is near zero. Second, small deviations from full price flexibility induce near random walk behavior in government debt and tax rates. Finally, price stickiness induces deviation from the Friedman rule.     

Anticipated monetary and fiscal policy effects on output

This paper is a test of the LSW proposition. In a Sargent and Wallace model, two different formal money supply mechanisms are incorporated. One is based on the government budget restraint and the other on the Fed's reaction function. Neither is a pure feedback mechanism. The stochastic process of output is a function of the interaction of the monetary and fiscal policy parameters with the models' disturbances. Thus, the question of the LSW proposition comes down to an empirical issue. The models are then estimated by 3SLS. The results are not incompatible with the policy ineffectiveness proposition.     

Compatibility between monetary and fiscal policy under EMU

The debate over the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) as a part of European Monetary Union, has highlighted the need to assess the extent to which fiscal policies of union members should be constrained as a pre-requisite for price stability within the union. In this paper, we develop a two country open economy model, where each country has overlapping generations of finitely lived consumers who supply labour to imperfectly competitive firms which can only change their prices infrequently. We examine the case where the two countries have formed a monetary union, but where the fiscal authorities remain independent. We show that the fiscal response required to ensure stability of the real debt stock is greater when consumers are not infinitely lived. In principle, this allows for some compensating behaviour between governments, but we show that the scope for compensation is limited. The monetary authority can abandon its active targeting of inflation to stabilise the debt of at most one fiscal authority, and any other combination of policies will either result in price level indeterminacy and/or indefinite transfers of wealth between the two economies. Finally, in a series of simulations we show that fiscal shocks have limited impact on output and inflation provided the fiscal authorities meet the (weak) requirements of fiscal solvency. However, when monetary policy is forced to abandon its active targeting of inflation, then fiscal shocks have a much greater impact on both output and inflation.     

Federal fiscal transfer rules in monetary unions

This paper considers simple rules for federal fiscal transfers that automatically redistribute funds among member states of a monetary union to counteract adverse idiosyncratic shocks. The transfer rules target regional differences in nominal GDP, consumption spending, labor income, and fiscal deficits. Targeting regional fiscal deficits is the only rule that reduces consumption fluctuations and that promotes interregional consumption risk sharing, but the overall welfare effect is negative. In contrast, targeting regional differences in labor income yields the largest welfare gains, but it also yields the largest fluctuations in consumption and real GDP. It is demonstrated that the welfare gains primarily stem from reducing the allocative inefficiency of input factors caused by nominal rigidities. The optimal transfer rule essentially implies a combination of consumption spending and labor income targeting, and it primarily targets the allocative inefficiency of factor inputs at the cost of lower interregional consumption risk sharing.     

Games of monetary and fiscal interactions in the EMU

This paper constructs various models of the EMU and ECB when member countries have different objectives. Voting in pursuit of national interest can yield moderate and stable inflation. The metaphor of Walsh-type contracts implements a monetary policy rule that averages the member countries’ most preferred rules. In a repeated relationship where a country suffering a large adverse shock can use political bargaining to subvert the ECB's commitment, the optimal rule should incorporate some flexibility to forestall that. Finally, freedom of national fiscal policies undermines the ECB's monetary commitment; this may justify fiscal constraints like the Stability and Growth Pact.     

A simple model for study of the determination of the price level and the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy

Summary A representative-agent model with money holdings motivated by transactions costs, a fiscal authority that taxes and issues debt, no production, and a convenient functional form for agents' utility is presented. The model can be solved analytically, and illustrates the dependence of price determination on fiscal policy, the possibility of indeterminacy, even stochastic explosion, of the price level in the face of a monetary policy that holdsM fixed, and the possibility of a unique, stable price level in the face of a monetary policy that simply pegs the nominal interest rate at an arbitrary level.In a rational expectations, market-clearing equilibrium model with a costlessly-produced fiat money that is useful in transactions, the following things are true under broad assumptions.- A monetary policy that fixes the money stock may (depending on the transactions technology) be consistent with indeterminacy of the price level—indeed with stochastically fluctuating, explosive inflation.- A monetary policy that fixes the nominal interest rate, even if it holds the interest rate constant regardless of the observed rate of inflation or money growth rate, may deliver a uniquely determined price level.- The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium price level cannot be determined from knowledge of monetary policy alone; fiscal policy plays an equally important role. Special case models with interest-bearing debt and no money are possible, just as are special cases with money and no interest-bearing debt. In each the price level may be uniquely determined.Determinacy of the price level under any policy depends on the public's beliefs about what the policy authority would do under conditions that are never observed in equilibrium.These points are not new. Eric Leeper [1991] has made most of them within a single coherent model. Woodford [1993], in a representative agent cash-in-advance model, has displayed the possibility of indeterminacy with a fixed quantity of money and the possibility of uniqueness with an interest-rate pegging policy. Aiyagari and Gertler [1985] use an overlapping generations model to make many of the points made in this paper, without discussing the possibility of stochastic sunspot equilibria. Sargent and Wallace [1981] and Obstfeld [1983] have also discussed related issues.This paper improves on Leeper by moving beyond his analysis of local linear approximations to the full model solution, as is essential if explosive sunspot equilibria are to be distinguished from explosive solutions to the Euler equations that can be ruled out as equilibria. It improves on the other cited work by pulling together into the context of one fairly transparent model discussion of phenomena previously discussed in isolation in very different models.We study a representative agent model in which there is no production or real savings, but transactions costs generate a demand for money. The government costlessly provides fiat money balances, imposes lump-sum taxes, and issues debt, but has no other role in the economy. We make restrictive assumptions about the form of the utility function and the form of a transactions cost term in the budget constraint.The model could be extended to include production, capital accumulation, non-neutral taxation, productive government expenditure, and a more general utility function without affecting the conclusions discussed in this paper. Indeed the model I informally matched to data in an earlier paper [1988] makes some such extensions. While such an extended model is more realistic, it is harder to solve. The version in my earlier paper [1988] was solved numerically and simulated. The bare-bones model of this paper allows an explicit analytic solution that may make its results easier to understand.This paper improved following comments from participants at seminars at Yale and the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank. Eric Leeper and James Robinson were particularly helpful. Comments from Michael Woodford led to important corrections and clarifications.     

Time inconsistency problems and commitments of monetary and fiscal policies

Within a policy game, where monetary and fiscal authorities are subject to a time inconsistency problem vis-à-vis a monopoly-union, we provide additional support for commitments of either authority: monetary commitment moderates fiscal time inconsistency problems, and fiscal commitment moderates monetary time inconsistency problems. In contrast with the benefits of commitments, a regime of coordinated monetary and fiscal policy may turn out to be counterproductive.Comments and suggestions from Torben M. Andersen and one anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. Errors and omissions are, of course, my own responsibility.     

Jointly optimal monetary and fiscal policy rules under liquidity constraints

We study the welfare properties of an economy where both monetary and fiscal policies follow simple rules, and where a subset of agents is liquidity constrained. The welfare benefits of optimizing the fiscal rule are far larger than those of optimizing the monetary rule. The optimized fiscal rule implements strong automatic stabilizers that primarily stabilize the income of liquidity-constrained agents, rather than output. Transfers targeted to liquidity-constrained agents are the preferred fiscal instrument. The optimized monetary rule exhibits super-inertia and a weak inflation response. Optimized simple rules perform as well as the optimal policy under the timeless perspective.     

Stochastic and structural fiscal policy in a monetary stationary economy

In the framework of a monetary asset pricing model which is simple enough to generate closed form formulae for equilibrium price functions the interactions between output, fiscal policy, and asset markets is investigated. With money yielding liquidity services in the exchange process real stock prices are negatively correlated with anticipated (stochastic) fiscal policy changes, while the impact of unanticipated (structural) fiscal policy on the stock market depends qualitatively on the ‘business cycle’ of the economy. It is shown that the monetary character of the economy, more precisely the role of money in the exchange process, is critical for the relationship between fiscal policy and real share prices. Moreover, while contingent fiscal policy measures may be successful in stabilizing the real interest rate on money they are incapable of achieving a stable term structure of the real rate on stocks. In contrast, uncontingently higher public expenditures generally promote the volatility of the real rates on financial assets.     

The interaction between monetary and fiscal policies in Turkey: An estimated New Keynesian DSGE model

This paper estimates a New Keynesian open economy DSGE model for Turkey by using Bayesian estimation technique for the period of 2002:q1–2009:q3. It studies fiscal and monetary policy interactions and their role in stabilisation of the economy using a small-scale model following the methodology outlined in Lubik and Schorfheide (2007). The general features of the model can be summarised as follows: Calvo style nominal price rigidities, perfect exchange rate pass-through, complete international asset markets, rule of thumb price setters and distortionary taxation.