The accuracy of analysts' dividend forecasts around the world

We examine the link between the accuracy of consensus analysts' dividend forecasts, earnings predictability and dividend policies of firms in 39 countries from 1995 to 2004. For firms that display stronger dividend smoothing, as modeled by Lintner [Lintner, J., 1956. Distribution of incomes of corporations among dividends, retained earnings and taxes. American Economic Review 46, 97–113], there is a lower correlation between dividend and earnings forecast errors, with less of the earnings uncertainty being passed into dividend uncertainty. The link between earnings and dividend forecast errors is weaker in common-law, capital market-based countries and in countries with well-developed financial (debt and equity) markets, where firm managers have greater incentives to smooth dividends and to use dividends for signaling.     

Initiating coverage,broker reputation and management earnings forecasts in Australia

We examine more than 5000 recommendations made by Australian brokers in the period 1996–2001. We find evidence that initiating recommendations produce greater share price responses than continuing recommendations, particularly for hold, underperform and sell recommendations. We also find evidence that initiating recommendations made by higher‐reputation brokers and those made in the absence of a management earnings forecast attract different share price responses. Finally, we find that share price responses to initiating recommendations, conditional on the market consensus recommendation, are significantly different to continuing recommendations.     

The accuracy of technological forecasts, 1890–1940

Predictions of future technological changes and the effects of those changes, made by Americans between 1890 and 1940, are compared to the actual outcomes. Overall, less than half of the predictions have been fulfilled or are in the process of fulfilment. The accuracy of predictions appears at best weakly related to general technical expertise, and unrelated to specific expertise. One expert (or non-expert) appears to be as good a predictor as another. Predictions of continuing status quo are not significantly more or less accurate than predictions of change. Predictions of the effects of technology are significantly less accurate than predictions of technological changes.     

The accuracy of earnings forecasts in IPO prospectuses on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange

This paper examines the accuracy of earnings forecasts made by managers of Malaysian initial public offerings (IPOs) during the period 1984–1995. It is a mandatory requirement for Malaysian IPOs to furnish earnings forecasts together with the opinions thereon of the auditors and the lead underwriter in their prospectuses. Their accuracy is measured by forecast errors, absolute forecast errors, squared forecast errors and standardised forecast errors. The results suggest that, on average, managers under-forecast earnings by 33.37%. A comparison with the naive no change model in earnings suggests that 96 out of 122 companies outperform this model. A number of company specific characteristics (size, age, forecast interval, gearing, proportion of shares retained by owners, auditor reputation and industry) are tested. The results reveal that both the age and industry classification of the company are statistically significant, and that management earnings forecasts are particularly inaccurate where firms experience a decline in earnings. Key words: accuracy of prospectus earnings forecasts, initial public offerings, accounting in Malaysia.     

The accuracy of OECD forecasts of the international economy: balance of payments

This paper examines the accuracy of forecasts of the international economy made by the OECD. Our large data set, comprising some 5500 pairs of forecasts and outcomes, includes one-, two-, and three-step ahead semi-annual forecasts of eight components of the balance of payments for the G7 economies over a 20-year period. There is considerable variation in the accuracy of these forecasts. Although they are generally superior to naive and time-series predictions, there are some marked exceptions particularly as the forecast horizon lengthens. Forecasting error is overwhelmingly non-systematic. However, our study reveals numerous instances of forecasts which could be improved by a simple linear correction, or by incorporating information contained in known, recent forecast errors. The OECD's forecasts of services and private transfers, and official transfers are cause for particular concern: the accuracy of these forecasts is low, often below that of corresponding time-series forecasts, and rationality tests indicate that they are most prone to inefficiency and inconsistency.     

The accuracy of IPO earnings forecasts in Thailand and their relationships with stock market valuation

In order to help reduce information asymmetry between managers and prospective investors, IPO prospectuses in Thailand are required to publish managers' forecasts of the forthcoming year's earnings. This type of direct disclosure is especially important in a developing economy such as Thailand where financial intermediaries and information vendors are relatively sparse, and where investors are rarely professionals. Our results demonstrate that managers' earnings forecasts are much more accurate than extrapolations of historical earnings. We show that forecast accuracy is related to underpricing, and it has a directional, but not statistical, association with one-year stock returns and one-year wealth relatives.     

Corporate risk management and dividend signaling theory

This article investigates the effect of corporate risk management on dividend policy. We extend the signaling framework of Bhattacharya [1979. Bell Journal of Economics 10, 259–270] by including the possibility of hedging the future cash flow. We find that the higher the hedging level, the lower the incremental dividend. This result is intuitive. It is in line with studies suggesting that cash flows’ predictability decreases the marginal gain from costly signaling through dividends and the assertion that corporate hedging decreases cash flow volatility. It is also in line with the purported positive relation between information asymmetry and dividend policy (e.g., Miller and Rock [1985. The Journal of Finance 40, 1031–1051]) and the assertion that risk management alleviates the information asymmetry problem (e.g., DaDalt et al. [2002. The Journal of Future Markets 22, 261–267]). Our theoretical model has testable implications.     

Retail minority shareholders and corporate reputation as determinant of dividend policy in Australia

This paper investigates the influence of retail minority shareholders in the determination of corporate dividend policies of Australian companies. While retail investors are typically also minority shareholders and therefore perceived in academic literature to have limited influence on corporate dividend decisions, casual empiricism suggests the contrary. We hypothesise that corporate reputation serves as a device aligning managers' incentives with retail minority shareholder interests, and that the propensity to manage for corporate reputation is positively related to the degree of retail shareholder base. We find empirical evidence of managers of Australian companies catering to the retail investors' preference for dividends when setting dividend policy, even when they are minority shareholders, so long as the proportion of these retail shareholders relative to the total shareholder base is high. Our results are robust when controlled for the factors of size, profitability, financial leverage, signalling, agency costs and franking credits.     

Assessing the accuracy and dispersion of real estate investment forecasts

Existing empirical evidence has frequently observed that professional forecasters are conservative and display herding behaviour. Whilst a large number of papers have considered equities as well as macroeconomic series, few have considered the accuracy of forecasts in alternative asset classes such as real estate. We consider the accuracy of forecasts for the UK commercial real estate market over the period 1999–2011. The results illustrate that forecasters display a tendency to under-estimate growth rates during strong market conditions and over-estimate when the market is performing poorly. This conservatism not only results in smoothed estimates but also implies that forecasters display herding behaviour. There is also a marked difference in the relative accuracy of capital and total returns versus rental figures. Whilst rental growth forecasts are relatively accurate, considerable inaccuracy is observed with respect to capital value and total returns.     

Analyst reputation and management earnings forecasts

Prior studies show that analysts with high reputation are influential in the market. This paper examines whether managers consider analyst reputation in shaping their voluntary disclosure strategy. Using Institutional Investor magazine’s All-American (AA) rankings as a proxy for analyst reputation, we find that the coverage of AA analysts is positively associated with the likelihood of quarterly management earnings forecasts (MEFs). We also find that AA analysts’ forecast optimism is more positively associated with the likelihood of MEFs than non-AA analysts’ forecast optimism when the firm is covered by AA analysts. Analyses based on AA analyst coverage changes and AA status changes confirm the relation between analyst reputation and MEFs. We further find that analyst reputation influences other MEF properties, such as forecast news, bias, and revisions, and that our results are robust to alternative measures of analyst reputation. Further analyses show that market reactions at quarterly earnings announcements are more positive (negative) when firms meet/beat (miss) AA analysts’ forecasts than when firms meet/beat (miss) non-AA analysts’ forecasts. Collectively, our findings suggest that managers strategically provide voluntary forecasts by taking into account the reputation of individual analysts following their firms.     

The dividend month premium

We find an asset pricing anomaly whereby companies have positive abnormal returns in months when they are predicted to issue a dividend. Abnormal returns in predicted dividend months are high relative to other companies and relative to dividend-paying companies in months without a predicted dividend, making risk-based explanations unlikely. The anomaly is as large as the value premium, but less volatile. The premium is consistent with price pressure from dividend-seeking investors. Measures of liquidity and demand for dividends are associated with larger price increases in the period before the ex-day (when there is no news about the dividend) and larger reversals afterward.     

Does corporate governance transparency affect the accuracy of analyst forecasts?

Using country‐level proxies for corporate governance transparency, this paper investigates how differences in transparency across 21 countries affect the average forecast accuracy of analysts for the country's firms. The association between financial transparency and analyst forecast accuracy has been well documented in previous published literature; however, the association between governance transparency and analyst forecast accuracy remains unexplored. Using the two distinct country‐level factors isolated by Bushman et al. (2004 ), governance transparency and financial transparency, we investigate whether corporate governance information impacts on the accuracy of earnings forecasts over and above financial information. We document that governance transparency is positively associated with analyst forecast accuracy after controlling for financial transparency and other variables. Furthermore, our results suggest that governance‐related disclosure plays a bigger role in improving the information environment when financial disclosures are less transparent. Our empirical evidence also suggests that the significance of governance transparency on analyst forecast accuracy is higher when legal enforcement is weak.     

Official forecasts and management of oil windfalls

Official forecasts for oil revenues and the burden of pensioners are used to estimate forward-looking fiscal policy rules for Norway and compared with permanent-income and bird-in-hand rules. The results suggest that fiscal reactions have been partial forward-looking with respect to the rising pension bill, but backward-looking with respect to oil and gas revenues. Solvency of the government finances might be an issue with the fiscal rules estimated from historical data. Simulation suggests that declining oil and gas revenue and the costs of a rapidly graying population will substantially deteriorate the net government asset position by 2060 unless fiscal policy becomes more prudent or current pension and fiscal reforms are successful.     

Terrorism activities and long-term annual management forecasts

We study the effects of terrorist attacks on firms’ long-term annual management earnings forecasts bias. We find that the managers of firms located closer to the epicenters of attacks are more likely to issue optimistic long-term annual earnings forecasts relative to the managers of a control group of unaffected firms. The exposure effect is stronger for more severe terrorist events, and firms with more uncertain fundamentals and less geographic diversification. In addition, we document that managers’ forecast optimism intensifies for firms with stronger negative stock market reaction to the terrorist event, for CEOs with higher ability and for companies that are more likely to issue equity or engage in acquisitions following the terrorist event. Overall, our results are consistent with the idea that long-term annual earnings forecasts are used by managers to counterbalance the short-term pessimistic response to terrorist attacks.     

The effect of Regulation FD on the properties of management earnings forecasts

We investigate Regulation FD’s (FD) effect on management earnings forecast properties. We posit FD’s prohibition on private manager-analyst communication reduces (increases) optimism (pessimism) in management earnings forecasts. Prior to FD, managers could avoid publicly retracting prior optimistic forecasts by privately communicating with analysts, who could lower investor expectations with a new analyst forecast. After FD, managers with optimistic forecasts must either publicly admit their optimism by issuing a new management forecast or they must negatively surprise investors at the earnings announcement. Further, FD forces managers to use public forecasts instead of private communications to establish beatable expectations. Our evidence suggests FD reduced optimism in management forecasts. This reduction in optimistic bias is not offset by an increase in pessimistic bias. Consistent with this, we further find post-FD improvements in forecast accuracy and informativeness. We find no such changes around several potentially confounding events or for foreign firms surrounding FD. Overall, our evidence suggests FD improved firms’ forecast properties (less bias, greater accuracy, and greater informativeness).     

Mandatory IFRS adoption and management forecasts: The impact of enforcement changes

We examine how concurrent enforcement changes affect the positive relationship between mandatory IFRS adoption and firms’ voluntary disclosure. We show that the increase in the issuance of management forecasts after IFRS adoption is smaller for firms from IFRS-mandating countries with concurrent enforcement changes than for those from countries without such changes. We find no difference in the increase of forecast informativeness between firms from IFRS-mandating countries without concurrent enforcement changes and firms from non-IFRS-mandating countries; however, firms domiciled in IFRS-mandating countries with concurrent enforcement changes exhibit a significantly smaller increase in forecast informativeness. Our findings suggest that better IFRS enforcement distinctly weakens (strengthens) the positive effect of IFRS adoption on voluntary (mandatory) disclosure.     

The association between qualitative management earnings forecasts and discretionary accounting in the Netherlands

This paper examines whether there is an association between discretionary accounting and the accuracy of long-run forecasts of annual earnings disclosed voluntarily by Dutch companies in the directors’ report. In particular, investigations were made of the consistency in the sign and direction of discretionary accounting techniques and qualitative earnings forecasts. Long-run forecasts are defined, for the purposes of this paper, as forecasts made at least seven months before the year-end. Although not mandatory, qualitative forecasts are released by well over 60% of the listed companies in the Netherlands. Empirical results indicate that there is consistency in the sign and direction of qualitative earnings forecasts and discretionary accounting. After adopting discretionary accounting, the forecast errors are reduced if the company can reach the management earnings forecast (target). In the event that reserves are insufficient to accomplish this goal, managers choose their next best option and take an earnings bath in order to maximize reserves available for future use. By partitioning the sample in various sub-sets it is shown that earnings management and forecast errors occur most in the extreme ranges of financial performance. Overall, the study shows that management engages in discretionary accounting to present results in line with the disclosed qualitative earnings forecasts in their directors’ reports. Whilst discretionary accounting may clearly improve the consistency of companies’ earnings forecasts released via the directors’ reports and the actual earnings, managers’ earnings forecasts are sometimes disclosed in anticipation of planned discretionary accounting actions.     

Reputation management and the disclosure of earnings forecasts

In this paper, managers differ from each other in terms of the probability that they are ??forthcoming?? (and disclose all the earnings forecasts they receive) or ??strategic?? (and disclose the earnings forecasts they receive only when it is in their self-interest to do so). Strategic managers choose whether to disclose their forecasts based on both the disclosure??s effects on their firms?? stock price and on their reputation among investors for being forthcoming. Our findings include: strategic managers can build a reputation for being forthcoming by disclosing unfavorable forecasts; managers?? incentive to build a reputation for being forthcoming may be so strong that they disclose even the most negative forecasts; as managers become more concerned about their reputation: (a) the current price of the firm in the event the manager makes no forecast increases; (b) managers who have a high probability of behaving strategically (as forthcoming) in the future issue forecasts more (less) often in the present.