What we know,what we still need to know: the Asian currency crisis revisited

From the literature on currency crises, it is widely understood that weak economic fundamentals increase tremendously the probability of currency crises, especially in emerging markets. However, what was not known is that an accumulation of small problems interacting with each other can be equally damaging. Using a new technique, a combination of Classification and Regression Tree (CART) and Logit regression, this paper re‐examines the causes of the Asian currency crisis in 1997–98. The results indicate that although weak fundamentals were at the root of the crisis, only self‐fulfilling panic and herd behaviour can explain the severity of the crisis. Contrary to previous empirical research, our results indicate that the Asian crisis was caused by the accumulation of small fragilities rather than large deficiencies in the macroeconomic fundamentals. An important policy implication of such findings is the need for governments not to underestimate small problems, which, when they interact, can create chaos. Another novelty of this paper is the interpretation of the crisis in terms of the concepts of trigger and vulnerability, using an empirical model that captures the magnitude of the self‐fulfilling panic and its contribution to capital reversal and eventually to the collapse of the currencies.     

The Korean stock market volatility during the currency crisis and the credit crisis

This paper studies the volatility of the Korean stock market during the Asian currency crisis of 1997–1998 and the global credit crisis of 2008–2009. We use a fad model with Markov switching heteroskedasticity, which was first proposed by Kim and Kim (1996). Using the monthly data from January 1980 to October 2009, we find that the volatility of the transitory component of the stock return, or fads, increased during the currency crisis, but did not rise much during the credit crisis. It implies that the stock price fluctuations were not driven by irrational sentiments during the recent global crisis as much as during the former crisis. However, when we consider the dollar value of the Korean stock index in order to estimate the volatility that foreign investors confront, we find that the volatility of the transitory component was raised during the credit crisis as well as during the currency crisis. That is, foreign investors experienced greater volatility than domestic investors in the recent financial market turmoil. This asymmetric volatility that domestic and foreign investors face is one of the characteristics of the credit crisis.For more detailed analysis, the same model was applied to the weekly data from January 2005 to October 2009 and provided the result that the data measured by won–dollar exchange rates were more increased than the raw data. It holds that foreign investors confronted much greater volatility than domestic investors while the stock volatility was relatively lower in the credit crisis state than in the currency crisis state.     

Capital requirement and financial crisis: The case of Japan and the 1997 Asian crisis

This study investigates the direct link between the implementation of the 1988 Basel capital requirement in Japan and the shrinkage of banks’ foreign assets, particularly in Thailand in the 1990s. The empirical analysis proceeds in two stages. The first stage investigates the hypothesis that the capital crunch in Japan induced Japanese banks to alter their portfolios and reduce their foreign assets. The second step tests the hypothesis that the change in behaviour of the Japanese banks induced the increase of the probability of financial crisis in Asia. Our results support the responsibility of the Japanese capital requirement, among other factors, in triggering the 1997 Asian financial crisis as an external common shock and give a new angle on the financial crisis literature.     

The lira and the pound in the 1992 currency crisis: Fundamentals or speculation?

The prevalent explanation of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) currency crisis of September, 1992 is that myopic speculation prevailed over the “fundamentals.” Our paper explores the reasons why the Italian lira and the U.K. pound were attacked and, subsequently, forced out of the ERM. The crisis was sparked by a common awareness that political unification and the commitment to monetary union had petered out in the summer of 1992, leaving the field open to speculators to pick countries with the weakest fundamentals (Italy) or with policy makers who feared jeopardizing an economic recovery by keeping the currency in the ERM (the U.K.).     

国际货币体系改革——金融危机后的思考

美国次贷危机引发的全球金融危机,使现行国际货币体系—牙买加体系的缺陷进一步暴露出来:美元本位制放纵了美国的过度消费,国际资本流动缺乏监管以及不稳定的汇率体系加剧了危机蔓延。虽然对国际货币体系的改革面临美元霸权、改革成本高等方面的阻碍,但改革现行的IMF以及扩展国际救助范围,加强金融监管力度已然成为改革方向。     

Contagion in the stock markets: The Asian financial crisis revisited

This paper presents empirical evidence of herding contagion in the stock markets during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, above and beyond macroeconomic fundamental driven co-movements. We analyze the cross-country time-varying correlation coefficients among the stock prices for the countries of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea, and the Philippines, between crisis and tranquil periods. Macromodels are constructed and implemented to capture the pure contagion effects on the markets. After controlling for the economic fundamentals for the five countries, the paper finds strong evidence of herding contagion.     

China's vulnerability to currency crisis: A KLR signals approach

In this paper we use the Kaminsky–Lizondo–Reinhart (KLR) [Kaminsky, G., Lizondo, S., Reinhart, C., 1998. Leading Indicators of Currency Crises. International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 45, 1–48.] approach to conduct an ex-post study of the probabilities of China suffering a currency crisis during the period of January 1991 to December 2004. Two high-probability periods are identified: July 1992–July 1993 and August 1998–May 1999. The first period correctly predicts China's 1994 devaluation. The second period predicts currency devaluation in the aftermath of the Asian crisis, which did not occur. The results of the model indicate that the fundamentals were weak enough for China to experience contagion of the Asian crisis, and raise the question of the possible role of China's institutional arrangements in preventing the crisis. The paper further analyzes the economic fundamentals of China that drive the high probability of crises, and provides some suggestions for further reform.     

The causes and impact of the african debt crisis

This article examines the African debt crisis. It focuses on factors leading to the accumulation of the debts and their impact on the debtor nations. The significance of the study lies in the fact that the African debt burden presents a gruesome picture of hopelessness. This is reflected by the continent’s massive debt of $230 billion, equivalent to almost three times the continent’s annual export earnings. This is expected to jump to $550 billion by the year 2000. Africa’s crushing debt burden has become one of the most important factors constraining recovery and development. As the United Nations Children’s Fund estimates, one thousand people die each day in Africa because of the debt crisis. The analysis shows that due to the multifaceted nature of the causes of the debt crisis, both creditors and debtors should agree on the options for dealing with the crisis. It further shows that there is the urgency for Africa to tackle its numerous sociopolitico-economic problems. Africa can make real economic progress only when it begins to get on top of its debt crisis.     

The evolving renminbi regime and implications for Asian currency stability

The Chinese authorities described the management of the renminbi after its 2005 unpegging from the US dollar as involving a basket of trading partner currencies. Outside analysts have detected few signs of such management. We find that, in the 2 years from mid-2006 to mid-2008, the renminbi strengthened gradually against trading partners’ currencies within a narrow band. In mid-2008, the financial crisis interrupted this experiment and the bilateral renminbi/dollar exchange rate stabilised at 6.8. The 2006-2008 experience suggests that a shared policy of gradual nominal effective appreciation renders East Asian currencies quite stable against one another. Such a shared policy would create favourable conditions for regional monetary cooperation.     

Time-varying beta and the Asian financial crisis: Evidence from the Asian industrial sectors

This paper empirically investigates the effects of the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, and the period immediately afterwards, on the time-varying beta of four industrial sectors (chemical, finance, retail and industry) of Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. We apply daily data from 1992 to 2002 and the bivariate MA-GARCH model (BEKK) to create the time-varying industrial betas. Results provide evidence of the influence of the Asian financial crisis, and the period after, on the time-varying industrial betas of these countries. These results may have implications for investors who are interested in portfolio risk management.     

An empirical study on the hysteresis of currency substitution in Cambodia

This paper examines whether the currency substitution (CS) phenomenon in Cambodia is in a hysteresis state. We employ a simple model of money-in-the-utility function with two currencies (home and foreign), in which the effect of network externalities on the use of foreign currency is taken into account. The equation derived from the model is estimated using the autoregressive distributed lag approach to cointegration for the period from June 1993 to June 2009. Our estimation results indicate that (1) there exists a stable, long-run relationship among the variables considered, (2) the CS ratio increases when people expect a higher rate of depreciation in the exchange rate, and most importantly, (3) there is evidence supporting the existence of a network externality, thereby implying the hysteresis of the CS phenomenon in Cambodia. Given the characteristics of the CS process in Cambodia, any measure or policy option to bring down the CS degree must be carefully considered.     

Tests of microeconomic foundations of Asian common currency areas

The formation of the euro bloc sparked renewed interest in other potential common currency areas. Swofford [Swofford, J. L. (2000). Microeconomic foundations of an optimal currency area. Review of Financial Economics, 9, 121–128] set forth some microeconomic foundations for a common currency area. In this paper, some results from tests of these microeconomic foundations for various hypothesized Asian common currency areas are presented. These results can be viewed as broadly favorable for the formation of some Asian common currency areas.     

From the Asian crisis to the global credit crisis: reforming the international financial architecture redux

2008 was marked by the tenth anniversary of the Asian crisis and the debate over how to reform the international financial architecture but also by the outbreak of the most serious global credit crisis in generations. This paper reviews the debate over how to strengthen the international monetary and financial system in this light. An earlier version of this paper was presented to a meeting of the Tokyo Club, Tokyo, Japan, 11–12 November 2008. Comments of the participants there and of the editors of this journal are acknowledged with thanks. I am grateful as well to the Tokyo Club for permission to publish this revised version. Financial support from the Coleman Fund Risk Management Research Center at the University of California, Berkeley is acknowledged with thanks.

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金融危机下对建立超主权货币问题的思考

在第二次全球金融峰会召开之际,周小川行长发表文章《关于改革国际货币体系的思考》,提出对特别提款权进行改造,使之成为全球最主要的储备货币。本文在此基础上,针对金融危机形势下国际货币体系内在缺陷的突显,提出了建立超主权货币的背景、意义、问题及相关对策。     

Real exchange-rate changes in the European community: The empirical evidence and its implications for European currency unification

Zusammenfassung Reale Wechselkurs?nderungen in der Europ?ischen Gemeinschaft: Der empirische Befund und seine Bedeutung für die Europ?ische W?hrungsvereinigung. — In diesem Beitrag wird-anders als von der Theorie des optimalen W?hrungsgebiets-ein umfassendes Kriterium für die ?konomische Wünschbarkeit einer W?hrungsvereinigung vorgeschlagen, das der empirischen Verifizierung zug?nglich ist: der Bedarf an realen Wechselkurs?nderungen zwischen den potentiellen Mitgliedern der W?hrungsunion. Die Europ?ische Gemeinschaft wird im folgenden an diesem Mabstab gemessen. Dabei zeigt sich, daβ die Europ?ische Gemeinschaft mit einiger Wahrscheinlichkeit ein weniger geeignetes W?hrungsgebiet ist als die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Italien oder die USA. Ein Vergleich der realen und der nominalen Wechselkurs?nderungen zwischen den neun Mitgliedsl?ndern beweist jedoch, daβ die erheblichen (nominalen) Wechselkurs?nderungen der letzten fünf Jahre überwiegend auf mangelnde Koordination der nationalen Geldpolitiken und nur in geringem Maβe auf strukturelle Divergenzen (reale Wechselkurs?nderungen) zurückzuführen sind. Eine Gegenüberstellung der durchschnittlichen innergemeinschaftlichen realen Wechselkurs?nderungen in den Jahren 1967–1970 und 1971–1975 ergibt, daβ die Bereitschaft zur wirtschafts-politischen Koordination sogar im Zeitverlauf nachgelassen hat; der Fehlschlag der Bemühungen um eine europ?ische W?hrungsunion kann nicht durch ungünstige wirtschaftliche Ereignisse (einen verst?rkten Bedarf an realen Wechselkurs?nderungen) erkl?rt werden. Der Versuch, dem Ziel der europ?ischen W?hrungsunion durch wirtschafts-politische Koordinierungsbemühungen n?her zu kommen, ist — so lautet die abschlieβende These — wahrscheinlich aus grunds?tzlichen ?konomischen Erw?gungen zum Scheitern verurteilt; erfolgversprechend erscheint aus ?konomischer Sicht nur eine Strategie der Zentralisierung.

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Résumé Les variations des taux de change réels dans la Communauté Européenne: L’analyse empirique et ses conséquences pour l’unification monétaire européenne. Contrairement à la théorie de la zone monétaire optimale, l’auteur propose un critère de la souhaitabilité de l’unification monétaire qui est en même temps compréhensif et sujetible à la vérification empirique: le besoin de variations des taux de change réels parmi les membres potentiels de l’union monétaire. En suite, cette norme est appliquée à la Communauté Européenne. Il se montre que la Communauté est probablement une zone monétaire moins appropriée que la R.F.A., l’Italie ou les Etats Unis. Une comparaison des variations des taux de change réels et nominels parmi les neuf pays membres prouve que, cependant, les variations considérables des taux nominels pendant 1970–1975 étaient dues principalement au défaut d’une coordination des politiques monétaires et assez peu à des divergences structurelles (c.à.d., à des variations des taux de change réels). En fait, si l’on compare les variations intra-communautaires moyennes des taux de change réels en 1967–1970 et 1971–1975, il se montre que l’échec du projet de l’union monétaire ne s’explique pas par des événements-économiques défavorables (c.à.d., par un besoin plus fort de variations des taux de change réels), mais par un relachement de la volonté coordinatrice. Selon la thèse finale, il y a des raisons d’ordre économique qui indiquent que probablement chaque essai d’approcher le but de l’union monétaire par une stratégie coordinatrice est a priori condamné à l’échec; du point de vue économique seulement une stratégie de centralisation promet du succès.

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Resumen Variaciones reales de los tipos de cambio en la CEE: Los resultados empíricos y su importancia para la union monetaria europea. — En este trabajo se establece — a diferencia de la teoria de las zonas monetarias óptimas — un criterio general para la deseabilidad económica de una union monetaria, que es posible ser verificado empfricamente: la necesidad de variaciones en la tasa de cambio real entre miembros potenciales de una union monetaria. La CEE se analiza más adelante bajo este criterio. El resultado del análisis fue que la CEE es con alguna probabilidad una zona monetaria menos adecuada que Alemania Federal, Italia o los EEUU. Una comparación de las variaciones reales y nominales de las tasas de cambio entre los nueve estados miembros de la CEE demuestra, sin embargo, que las variaciones (nominales) sustanciales en las tasas de cambio de los últimos cinco a?os se debieron preponderantemente a falta de coordinación en las politicas monetarias nacionales y en menor medida a divergencias estructurales (variaciones en la tasa de cambio real). Una comparación de las variaciones promedio en las tasas de cambio reales dentro de la Comunidad en los a?os 1967–1970 y 1971–1975 muestra, que la predisposición para coordinar politicas económicas ha disminuido a traves del tiempo; el fracaso de los intentos por formar una union monetaria no se puede explicar por medio de hechos económicos desfavorables (una mayor necesidad de variaciones cambiarias reales). El intento de acercarse a la meta de una union monetaria europea a traves de empe?os en la coordinación de politicas económicas está — así dice la tesis final — probablemente condenado a fracasar debido a consideraciones económicas básicas; una estrategia de centralización parece ser desde el punto de vista económico la única que promete éxitos.

     

Cross-country causes and consequences of the 2008 crisis: Early warning

This paper models the causes of the 2008 financial crisis together with its manifestations, using a Multiple Indicator Multiple Cause (MIMIC) model. Our analysis is conducted on a cross-section of 107 countries; we focus on national causes and consequences of the crisis, ignoring cross-country “contagion” effects. Our model of the incidence of the crisis combines 2008 changes in real GDP, the stock market, country credit ratings, and the exchange rate. We explore the linkages between these manifestations of the crisis and a number of its possible causes from 2006 and earlier. We include over sixty potential causes of the crisis, covering such categories as: financial system policies and conditions; asset price appreciation in real estate and equity markets; international imbalances and foreign reserve adequacy; macroeconomic policies; and institutional and geographic features. Despite the fact that we use a wide number of possible causes in a flexible statistical framework, we are unable to link most of the commonly cited causes of the crisis to its incidence across countries. This negative finding in the cross-section makes us skeptical of the accuracy of “early warning” systems of potential crises, which must also predict their timing.     

最优货币区理论与“亚元”区构想

一、传统的最优货币区理论 货币一体化这种国际货币合作的形式有时也被称作最优货币区。根据《新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典》的定义，最优货币区是这样一种区域，在此区域内，一般的支付手段或是一种单一的共同货币，或是几种货币，这几种货币之间具有无限可兑换性，其汇率在进行经常交易和资本交易时互相盯住，保持不变，但是区域内国家与区域以外的国家之间的汇率保持浮动。货币单一化则是在货币一体化的基础上形成单一储备，     

全球金融危机背景下的我国货币错配问题研究

我国的货币错配具有一些自身的特点,表现为巨额正外币资产头寸,在全球金融危机背景下,这将带来巨大的风险挑战。因此加强对货币错配问题的研究对于宏观经济政策的制定特别是对汇率制度的改革,具有非常重要的现实意义。本文首先通过估计我国的货币错配水平,分析我国的货币错配现状,指出全球金融危机背景下的风险挑战,进而提出相应的风险防范措施。