Institutional investment and the changing role of public equity markets: International evidence

Using country-level data, we study the relation between institutionalization of capital and various measures of reliance on public equity markets. For developed and developing countries, assets under institutional management (mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies) are negatively related to the number of listed companies, market capitalization, and trading volume. The negative relationships are estimated on the margin, as other factors such as GDP have countervailing positive partial effects and are generally stronger for more highly developed countries. Results indicate that as direct ownership of equity by retail investors is displaced by investing through institutions, financial systems become less public-market-centric.     

CARE Conference Hong Kong Polytechnic University,June 9, 2014: Equity Financing for Early‐Stage Companies in China

Many of the smaller private‐sector Chinese companies in their entrepreneurial growth stage are now being funded by Chinese venture capital (VC) and private equity (PE) firms. In contrast to western VC markets, where institutional investors such as pension funds and endowments have been the main providers of capital, in China most capital for domestic funds has come from private business owners and high net worth individuals. As relatively new players in the market who are less accustomed to entrusting their capital to fund managers for a lengthy period of time, Chinese VCs and their investors have shown a shorter investment horizon and demanded a faster return of capital and profits. In an attempt to explain this behavior, Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner of Harvard Business School have offered a “grandstanding hypothesis” that focuses on the incentives of younger, less established VCs to push their portfolio companies out into the IPO market as early as they can—and thus possibly prematurely—to establish a track record and facilitate future fundraising. This explanation is supported by the under‐performance of Chinese VC‐backed IPOs that has been documented by the author's recent research. Although they continue to offer significant opportunities for global investors, China's VC and PE markets still face many challenges. The supervisory system and legal environment need further improvement, and Chinese funds need to find a way to attract more institutional investors—a goal that can and likely will be promoted through government inducements.     

Legality and venture capital exits

This paper introduces an analysis of the impact of Legality on the exiting of venture capital investments. We consider a sample of 468 venture-backed companies from 12 Asia-Pacific countries, and these countries' venture capitalists' investments in US-based entrepreneurial firms. The data indicate IPOs are more likely in countries with a higher Legality index. This core result is robust to controls for country-specific stock market capitalization, MSCI market conditions, venture capitalist fund manager skill and fund characteristics, and entrepreneurial firm and transaction characteristics. Although Black and Gilson (1998) [Black, B.S., Gilson, R.J., 1998. Venture capital and the structure of capital markets: banks versus stock markets. Journal of Financial Economics 47, 243–77] speculate on a central connection between active stock markets and active venture capital markets, our data in fact indicate the quality of a country's legal system is much more directly connected to facilitating VC-backed IPO exits than the size of a country's stock market. The data indicate Legality is a central mechanism which mitigates agency problems between outside shareholders and entrepreneurs, thereby fostering the mutual development of IPO markets and venture capital markets.     

Going Public: An Empirical Investigation of U.S. Bound Israeli IPOs

Between 1985–2003, more than 120 Israeli companies went public in the U.S., bringing the accumulated number of U.S. bound, Israeli initial public offerings (IPOs) to a figure greater than all other foreign countries combined. In this study, we compare the short and long run performance of Israeli IPOs to that of similar international and U.S. IPOs. Holding all else equal, we find that Israeli IPOs are significantly less underpriced than their local and foreign counterparts. As we examine the characteristics of Israeli issuers, we find that they differ than those of other foreign and local issuers in some important dimensions that compensate investors for information asymmetry and risk. First, compared to their home market capitalization size, U.S. bound Israeli IPOs, are significantly larger than the IPOs conducted by their foreign counterparts. Second, Israeli issuers tend to perform better than other foreign and U.S. local IPOs during our entire period of observation. Third, to a large extent, the Israeli firms in our sample have products, licensing or franchising relationships or venture capital funds with strong roots in the U.S. prior to the IPO. And fourth, the relevant investor community of Israeli IPOs, at least at the early stages, is small and overwhelmingly American. Our findings are consistent with prior studies documenting that firms raising capital outside of their domicile country are typically a select group of high quality firms in need of external financing that cannot be sufficiently provided in their home market.     

Growth Capital‐Backed IPOs

Growth capital investing is the financing of growing businesses that are investing in tangible assets and the acquisition of other companies. Growth capital is common in retailing, restaurant chains, and health care management, and represents 12% of all venture capital (VC)‐backed initial public offerings (IPOs). Since 1980, investing in growth capital‐backed IPOs has produced mean three‐year style‐adjusted buy‐and‐hold returns of +25.2%, in contrast to style‐adjusted returns of approximately zero for other VC‐backed and buyout‐backed IPOs. One‐third of growth capital‐backed IPOs are rollups and these have produced much higher returns for investors than rollups without a financial sponsor.     

Measuring and Explaining the Impact of Productive Efficiency on Economic Development

A limitation of most empirical cross-country studies that focuson determinants of GDP or GDP growth is that they fail to distinguishexplicitly between inputs used in production and conditionsthat facilitate production. For example, physical capital, humancapital, and labor are production inputs, whereas the qualityof institutions, macroeconomic stability, and market qualityare conditions that facilitate production. This article takesthis distinction seriously and uses a stochastic frontier approachto study factors affecting economic performance. A panel dataset of 71 countries for the 1980–98 period is used toestimate a production frontier with physical capital, humancapital, and labor as inputs. The article also analyzes whatdrives productive efficiency, using the institutional framework,macroeconomic stability, market quality, and urbanization aspossible explanatory factors. Urbanization turns out to be animportant determinant, with the rule of law, inflation rate,and market quality also affecting productive efficiency.     

Venture capital reputation and investment performance

I propose a new measure of venture capital (VC) firm reputation and analyze its performance implications on private companies. Controlling for portfolio company quality and other VC-specific factors including experience, connectedness, syndication, industry competition, exit conditions, and investment environment, I find companies backed by more reputable VCs by initial public offering (IPO) capitalization share (based on cumulative market capitalization of IPOs backed by the VC), are more likely to exit successfully, access public markets faster, and have higher asset productivity at IPOs. Further tests suggest VCs’ IPO Capitalization share effectively captures both VC screening and monitoring expertise. My findings have financial implications for limited partners and entrepreneurs regarding their VC-sorting activities.     

Liquidity,Technological Opportunities,and the Stage Distribution of Venture Capital Investments

This paper explores the determinants of the stage distribution of European venture capital investments from 1990 to 2011. Consistent with liquidity risk theory, we find that the likelihood of investing in earlier stages increases relative to all private equity investments during liquidity crisis years. While liquidity is the main driver of acquisition investments and, to some extent, of expansion financings, technological opportunities are overall the main driver of early and late stage venture capital investments. In contrast to the dotcom crash, the recent financial crisis negatively affected the relative likelihood of expansion investments, but not of early and late stage investments.     

Venture capital funds and the public equity market

This paper considers the relationship between the public equity market and the returns to venture investing using a dataset which is derived from the records of two large limited partners who have been investing in venture capital for almost 30 years. Evidence is found to suggest that market conditions over the investment cycle, and exit conditions at the time of exit in particular, are an important determinant. This paper also investigates whether any other aspects of the venture investment process respond to events in the broader market. While general trends are evident in the venture investment cycle, only the intensity of the investment process is found to respond to events in the public equity market.     

风险分散与中国混合型基本养老保险制度改革研究

本文从参保人养老投资风险分散角度研究混合型基本养老保险制度设计。通过构建一个两期消费模型,综合考虑参保人所面临的人口结构、工资增长率、养老基金投资等风险因素,本文研究了混合型基本养老保险制度中现收现付制与基金积累制的最优比例,并利用中国数据进行了测算与敏感性分析。研究发现:引入小规模个人账户基金积累制可以分散人口老龄化给现收现付制所带来的风险,中国实行混合型基本养老保险制度有其合理性;但如果要维持40%～45%的养老金替代率水平,中国基本养老保险制度的财务可持续性会面临较大挑战。     

TOWARD A GLOBAL MODEL OF VENTURE CAPITAL?

While the U.S. still accounts for about two‐thirds of the world's total private equity fund‐raising and investment, other countries have been adopting American practices and are experiencing significant growth in their private equity markets. In fact, a case can be made that a global market for venture capital and private equity is emerging, at least in Western Europe and North America, where venture markets are seeing significant convergence in funding levels, investment patterns, and realized returns. To date, however, the European Union has had little success in establishing community‐wide commercial laws, taxation regimes, or corporate governance policies, so each country's private equity funds are organized in segmented national markets, and investment also tends to be largely localized. The Asian markets are even more fragmented: venture capital shows no sign of taking root in Japan, and China lacks the basic legal infrastructure needed to support a vibrant venture capital market. Venture capitalists create value through their role as active investors, and government and business leaders around the world have come to realize that venture capital and private equity investing can be a significant force in promoting economic development and technological progress. In general, countries with English common law codes offer greater protection to inves‐tors; the ratio of venture capital spending to GDP for common law countries is nearly double that in civil law countries. Government efforts to promote venture capital would probably be better focused on eliminating regulatory road‐blocks, lowering taxes, and provid‐ing a favorable investor climate. In the meantime, it appears that pri‐vate equity fund‐raising and invest‐ment have hit their cyclical lows and are poised to surpass $250 billion globally within three or four years and to reach one‐half trillion dollars by the end of the decade. The author also predicts that India, whose history as a former British colony has given it a common law framework as well as system of elite universities and technical institutes known for the quality of its gradu‐ates, should become one of the five leading venture capital markets by the end of this decade.     

养老金改革考验我们经济学的功底和智慧北大核心

本文从四个方面思考中国养老金改革问题。一是指出养老金改革是一个多维复杂的系统。宏观角度涉及养老金缺口问题和资本市场健康发展,微观角度与生产率密切相关。从国际比较来看,中国的老龄化程度比全球平均水平更严重,但养老金储备属于全球较低水平。从增强养老保障可持续性看,可能有延长退休年龄、增加储蓄、减少替代率、增加预筹资金并确保资金保值增值等四种办法。二是提出中国养老金改革的总体框架。本文建议建立一个较为综合的衡量目标,比如G30采用的"终身财务安全度量(Lifetime Financial Security,简称LFS)"的方法,跨部门比较政策效果,讨论维持在同一框架内,避免各说各话。本文还提出,中国养老金制度从DB型转向DC型,可以采取历史还原法和名义账户的办法,解决养老金改革转轨中的代际公平问题,以及城乡差别、所有制差别问题。三是提出"N对1"养老金发放模式与30余个养老金管理机构数量等养老金经营管理设想,并指出养老金投资回报与风险偏好须匹配,结合我国资本项目开放进程考虑养老金全球化投资。四是从住房、民粹主义等非金融领域,延伸思考养老金改革的复杂性。最后,本文总结指出,中国养老金改革是一项考验经济学功底和智慧的重大课题,应从多个维度全面分析、讨论、测算、论证,高度重视养老金改革对相关各方的激励作用,做出大胆有效的改革。     

What lures cross-border venture capital inflows?

We investigate if economic factors drive gross and net cross-border venture capital inflows differently. Using a dataset of venture capital investments in European and North American countries from 2000 to 2008, we find that higher expected economic growth goes hand in hand with higher gross as well as net inflows, while higher market capitalization and a more favorable environment for venture capital intermediation entail higher gross inflows, but lower net inflows. The latter two findings may suggest that cross-border venture capital inflows partly compensate for potential limits in domestic venture capital supply. However, the findings may also reflect that venture capitalists’ locational decisions depend on the viability of capital markets.     

Government venture capital and cross-border investment

We use data on venture capital investments from 26 countries from 1998–2013. We investigate the following questions: Do domestic government sponsored venture capital funds augment or curtail domestic private venture capital funds from cross-border investment? Do government sponsored venture capital funds attract or repel foreign private venture capital investment? The results show that a preponderance of mixed-structured over pure-structured government venture capital investment has a crowding-in effect overall: it attracts domestic and international private venture capital to the domestic venture capital market while simultaneously increasing total private venture capital investment. In contrast, a preponderance of pure-government over mixed-government venture capital fund investment repels foreign private venture capital investment (has a crowding out effect). We find that both these effects are more pronounced for domestic rather than foreign private venture capital and that the attraction effect is stronger than the repulsion effect.     

It Ain't Broke: The Past,Present, and Future of Venture Capital

This article presents a selective history of the U.S. venture capital (VC) industry, a discussion of the current state of the market, and some predictions about where the market is going. There is no doubt that the U.S. venture capital industry has been very successful. The VC model has provided an efficient solution to a difficult problem—that of enabling people with promising ideas but often limited track records to raise capital from outside investors. A large fraction of IPOs, including many of the most successful, have been funded by venture capitalists, and the U.S. VC model has been copied around the world. Armed with this historical perspective, the authors view with skepticism the recent claims that the VC model is broken. In the past, VC investments in companies have represented a remarkably constant 0.15% of the total value of the stock market; and commitments to VC funds, while more variable, have been consistently in the 0.10% to 0.20% range. Both of these percentages have continued to hold in recent years. And despite the relatively low number of IPOs, the returns to VC funds this decade have largely maintained their historical relationship to the overall stock market. To be sure, VC investment and returns continue to be subject to boom-and-bust cycles. But if the recent period has most of the features of a bust, the authors view today's historically low level of commitments to U.S. VC funds as a fairly reliable indicator of relatively high expected returns for the 2009 and (probably) 2010 vintage years. Perhaps the most promising future role for venture capital, as the authors suggest in closing, is to increase the productivity of the corporate research and development function through various kinds of partnerships and outsourcing arrangements.     

Should I stay,or should I go? – How fund dynamics influence venture capital exit decisions

We investigate the determinants of venture capital (VC) exit behavior after the lockup expiry in initial public offerings (IPOs) by considering insights from prospect theory and behavioral finance for the first time. Hereby, the paper concentrates on the under-researched relationship between fund managers and the limited partners investing in these funds. The results from a proprietary dataset of 292 U.S. VC-backed IPOs from 1991 to 2008 imply that VC firm characteristics and fund dynamics have a significant influence on the exit extent after the lockup expiry and may not always be in line with limited partners' interests, hinting at the relevance of behavior grounded in prospect theory. In particular, first-time funds keep their shares longer after an IPO, whereas funds satisfied with current fund performance cash out soon after the end of the lockup period.     

Biomarker of Quality? Venture‐backed Biotech IPOs and Insider Participation

Corporate financial managers of biotech firms need long‐term financing to reach key milestones, and that requires a long‐ term capital structure. They must balance a mix of investors with different objectives and different investment horizons that includes traditional venture capitalists and also hedge funds and mutual funds. This study helps practitioners understand the complex role of exit decisions, as venture capitalists seek better exit strategies and performance. IPOs are financing but not “exit” moves. In addition to certifying firm value, insider purchasing of shares in the IPO offering has two major consequences. First, venture capitalists reallocate large sums of capital from early‐stage to late‐stage deals that are expected to have lower risk (but also lower expected return) and shorter time to exit. Second, the speed at which VCs exit after the IPO depends on the firm ownership structure after the IPO and the stock liquidity. Going public with a significant participation by venture capitalists will probably increase the post‐IPO ownership and decrease the free float of the stock, implying a delay of the exit and the realization of the capital gains from the investments. Although this study has focused exclusively on the biotechnology industry, insider participation is not unique to it. Biotech's venture brethren in the software and technology industries also have insider participation in IPOs. During 2003–2015, approximately 41 venture‐backed firms outside of the biotechnology sector had insider participation.     

The Performance of Private Equity‐Backed IPOs

My paper examines the aftermarket performance of private equity‐backed initial public offerings (IPOs) and compares it to the performances of equivalent samples of venture capital‐backed and other nonsponsored issues on the London Stock Exchange during the period 1992‐2005. The evidence suggests marked differences across the three groups in terms of market size, industry classification, first‐day returns, and key operating characteristics at the time of flotation. In fact, private equity‐backed IPOs are larger firms in terms of sales and assets, more profitable, and relatively modest first‐day returns. In the three years following the public listing, they display better operating and market performance when compared to other IPOs and the market as a whole.     

Institutional affiliation and the role of venture capital: Evidence from initial public offerings in Japan

The presence of venture capital in the ownership structure of U.S. firms going public has been associated with both improved long-term performance and superior “certification” at the time of the initial public offerings (IPOs). Many of the major venture capital firms in Japan are subsidiaries of securities firms that may face a conflict of interest when underwriting the venture capital-backed issue. In Japan, we find the long-run performance of venture capital-backed IPOs to be no better than that of other IPOs, with the exception of firms backed by foreign-owned or independent venture capitalists. When venture capital holdings are broken down by their institutional affiliation, we find that firms with venture backing from securities company subsidiaries do not perform significantly worse over a 3-year time horizon than other IPOs. On the other hand, we find that IPOs in which the lead venture capitalist is also the lead underwriter have higher first-day returns than other venture capital-backed IPOs. The latter result suggests that conflicts of interest influence the initial pricing, but not the long-term performance, of IPOs in Japan.     

DOES VENTURE CAPITAL REQUIRE AN ACTIVE STOCK MARKET?

The United States has both an active venture capital industry and well-developed stock markets. Japan and Germany have neither. The authors argue that this is no accident— that venture capital flourishes especially, and perhaps only , when venture capitalists can exit from successful portfolio companies through initial public offerings (IPOs), which in turn require an active stock market.
Understanding the link between the stock market and the venture capital market requires understanding the contractual arrangements between entrepreneurs and venture capital providers, particularly (1) the importance of exit by venture capitalists and (2) the implicit contract over control between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs created by the possibility of exit through an IPO. This possibility gives entrepreneurs a valuable option that, in the event they are successful, allows them to reacquire control of their enterprises from venture capitalists.