Are IPO investors rational? Evidence from closed-end funds

Why buy a closed-end fund at IPO, when it is likely to trade at a discount in a few months’ time? One theory suggests that buying a new fund is justified by an initial period of investment outperformance. A second theory is that new funds are launched to provide access to assets that are temporarily illiquid and to exploit the subsequent liquidity gain while a third theory asserts that buyers of new issues are not fully rational but are influenced by time-varying sentiment. This paper tests the three theories using data from UK-traded closed-end equity-fund IPOs over 1984–2006. The empirical results provide strong support for the influence of sentiment but provide little or no support for the two other theories.     

Rating the rating agencies: Anticipating currency crises or debt crises?

We revisit the question whether sovereign ratings predict financial crises. In line with previous studies, we find that ratings do not predict currency crises and are instead downgraded ex-post. However, the likelihood of currency crisis and the implied probability of sovereign default are not closely linked in emerging markets post-1994. When debt crises are defined as sovereign distress – when spreads are higher than 1000 basis points or 10 percentage points – we find that access to international capital markets is reduced by half. In addition, although sovereign distress events last for typically 5.2 consecutive months, they can persist for longer periods up to nine quarters. Finally, lagged ratings and ratings changes, including negative outlooks and credit watches, are useful in anticipating sovereign distress.     

Are consistent pegs really more prone to currency crises?

This paper evaluates the treatment effect of consistent pegs (i.e., a policy in which countries actually adopt announced pegged regimes) on the occurrence of currency crises to examine whether consistent pegs are indeed more prone to currency crises than other regimes. Using matching estimators as a control for the self-selection problem of regime adoption, we find that countries with consistent pegs have a significantly lower probability of currency crises than countries with other exchange rate policies. More interestingly, we find that countries with consistent pegs have a significantly lower probability of currency crises than those with a “fear of announcing a peg” policy (i.e., a policy in which countries actually adopt pegged regimes but do not claim to have pegged regimes). The results stand up to a wide variety of robustness checks.     

How do individual investors trade?

This paper examines how high-frequency trading decisions of individual investors are influenced by past price changes. Specifically, we address the question as to whether decisions to open or close a position are different when investors already hold a position compared with when they do not. Based on a unique data set from an electronic foreign exchange trading platform, OANDA FXTrade, we find that investors’ future order flow is (significantly) driven by past price movements and that these predictive patterns last up to several hours. This observation clearly shows that for high-frequency trading, investors rely on previous price movements in making future investment decisions. We provide clear evidence that market and limit orders flows are much more predictable if those orders are submitted to close an existing position than if they are used to open one. We interpret this finding as evidence for the existence of a monitoring effect, which has implications for theoretical market microstructure models and behavioral finance phenomena, such as the endowment effect.     

Why do companies issue sukuk?

This paper investigates the determinants for firms to choose sukuk over conventional bond. We investigate the potential impact of information asymmetries through moral hazard and adverse selection to explain why firms prefer using sukuk. We perform logit regressions of the choice of debt type to determine which characteristics lead a firm to issue a sukuk rather than a bond. We use a dataset of sukuk and conventional bond issuances in Malaysia from 2004 to 2013. We find evidence of the influence of information asymmetries and adverse selection on the choice of the sukuk market.     

Why do accruals predict earnings?

Higher accruals are associated with lower subsequent earnings. We show this phenomenon can be explained by the way sales, profits, and working capital respond to changes in a firm's product markets. Empirically, high accruals predict high subsequent sales growth but a long-lasting drop in both profits and profitability. Accruals also predict an increase in future competition, suggesting that accruals are correlated with abnormally high—and, in equilibrium, transitory—true profitability that attracts new entrants to the industry. Overall, the predictive power of accruals is better explained by product-market effects than by measurement error in accruals or diminishing returns from investment.     

Why are some mutual funds closed to new investors?

Fund families typically claim that closing a fund protects the fund's superior performance by preventing it from growing too large to be managed efficiently. Even though funds with better performance and larger size are more likely to be closed, there is no evidence that closing a fund can indeed protect its performance. Instead, fund closing decisions are more likely to be motivated by spillover effects – by closing a star fund, the fund family signals its superior performance and also brings investors' attention and investments to other funds in the family. Some evidence exists to suggest that the closing strategy is effective in generating higher inflows into the rest of the family, at least in the short run.     

Why do intermediaries divert search?

We analyze the incentives to divert search for an information intermediary who enables buyers (consumers) to search affiliated sellers (stores). We identify two original motives for diverting search (i.e., inducing consumers to search more than they would like): (i) trading off higher total consumer traffic for higher revenues per consumer visit; and (ii) influencing stores’ choices of strategic variables (e.g., pricing). We characterize the conditions under which there would be no role for search diversion as a strategic instrument for the intermediary, thereby showing that it occurs even when the contracting space is significantly enriched. We then discuss several applications related to online and brick‐and‐mortar intermediaries.     

How does capital affect bank performance during financial crises?

This paper empirically examines how capital affects a bank’s performance (survival and market share) and how this effect varies across banking crises, market crises, and normal times that occurred in the US over the past quarter century. We have two main results. First, capital helps small banks to increase their probability of survival and market share at all times (during banking crises, market crises, and normal times). Second, capital enhances the performance of medium and large banks primarily during banking crises. Additional tests explore channels through which capital generates these effects. Numerous robustness checks and additional tests are performed.     

Why do people save in cash? Distrust,memories of banking crises,weak institutions and dollarization

The paper analyzes why households hold sizeable shares of their assets in cash at home rather than at banks – a phenomenon that is widespread in many economies but for which information is scarce. Using survey data from ten Central, Eastern and Southeastern European countries, I document the relevance of this behavior and show that cash preferences cannot be fully explained by whether people are banked or unbanked. The analysis reveals that a lack of trust in banks, memories of past banking crises and weak tax enforcement are important factors. Moreover, cash preferences are stronger in dollarized economies where a “safe” foreign currency serves as a store of value.     

Can exchange traded funds be used to exploit industry and country momentum?

There is overwhelming empirical evidence on the existence of country and industry momentum effects. This line of research suggests that investors who buy country and industry portfolios with relatively high past returns and sell countries and industries with relatively low past returns will earn positive risk-adjusted returns. These studies focus on country and industry indexes that cannot be traded directly by investors. This raises the question of whether country and industry momentum effects really can be exploited by investors or whether they are illusionary in nature because they exist only on non-tradable assets. We analyze the profitability of country and industry momentum strategies using actual price data on exchange traded funds (ETFs). We find that over the sample periods during which these ETFs were traded, an investor would have been able to exploit country and industry momentum strategies with an excess return of about 5 % per annum. These returns cannot be explained by unconditional exposures to the Fama–French factors. The daily average bid-ask spreads on ETFs are substantially below the implied break-even transaction cost levels. Hence, we conclude that investors who are not willing or able to trade individual stocks may use ETFs to benefit from momentum effects in country and industry portfolios.     

Why do traders choose dark markets?

We examine U.S. equity trader use of dark and lit markets. Marketable orders executed in the dark have lower information content and smaller fill rates. Dark orders take longer to execute, but they execute at more favorable prices. Traders are more likely to go dark when the bid-ask spread is wider and those with higher dark participation are more sophisticated. Although market regulators have expressed concern over the rise in dark trading, our results indicate that dark markets provide important benefits to traders that lit markets do not.     

Why do private firms adopt IFRS?

Do private firms voluntarily adopt IFRS? If so, why? Answers to these questions have been very limited so far, mainly due to the absence of financial data on private firms. In this paper, I exploit the German setting where the financial statements of private firms are widely available. I estimate multi-period logit regressions on the choice between national GAAP and IFRS for the consolidated financial statements of nearly 3000 German private firms with more than 14,000 firm-years in the period 1998–2010. My results suggest that the expected net benefits of IFRS adoption vary substantially across the group of private firms, depending on their financing needs, governance system, and organizational and informational complexity. Specifically, I find that private firms using IFRS have more growth opportunities, are more leveraged, are externally rated, seek to raise external capital by issuing public bonds or equity, are registered as a stock corporation, are characterized by private equity (PE) involvement, have more international sales and operations, and have a Big Five auditor. These insights should be of great interest to both preparers and regulators in the current debate about the future of financial reporting in private firms.     

Why do fund managers increase risk?

This paper examines the relationship between the increase in fund risk and subsequent cash flows. We attempt to test the hypothesis that an increase in fund risk actually increases the net flows of equity funds, which is a basic assumption of risk shifting. We find that a change in fund risk has a positive and convex relationship with the fund's net flows. The effect of risk changes on net flows is a natural consequence of its effects on inflows and outflows. This paper's empirical results are robust to return frequency, fund age, and fund size. Our findings create incentives for managers to shift risk as documented in the mutual fund literature.     

Firms,do you know your currency risk exposure? Survey results

This paper surveys the currency risk management practices of Swiss industrial corporations. We find that industrials are unable to quantify their currency risk exposure and investigate possible reasons. One possibility is that firms do not think that they need to know because they use on-balance-sheet instruments to protect themselves before and after currency rates reach troublesome levels. This is puzzling because performing a rough estimate of at least the exposure of cash flows is not prohibitive and could be valuable. Another puzzling finding is that firms use currency derivatives to hedge/insure individual short-term transactions, without apparently trying to estimate aggregate transaction exposure.     

Do hedge funds trade on private information? Evidence from syndicated lending and short-selling

This paper investigates an important contemporary issue relating to the involvement of hedge funds in the syndicated loan market. In particular, we investigate the potential conflicts of interest that arise when hedge funds make syndicated loans and take short positions in the equity of borrowing firms. We find evidence consistent with the short-selling of the equity of the hedge fund borrowers prior to public announcements of both loan originations and loan amendments. We also find that hedge funds are more likely to lend to highly leveraged, lower credit quality firms, where access to private information is potentially the most valuable and where trading on such information could lead to enhanced profits. Overall, our results have important implications for the current debate regarding regulating the hedge fund industry.     

Exchange rate regimes,capital controls,and currency crises: Does the bipolar view hold?

This paper empirically examines the link between de facto exchange rate regimes and the incidence of currency crises in 84 countries from 1980 to 2001 using probit models. We employ the de facto classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) that allows us to estimate the impact of relatively long-lived exchange rate regimes on currency crises with much greater precision. We find no evidence that, as the bipolar view argues, intermediate regimes have a significantly higher probability of currency crises than both hard pegs and free floats. Using the combined data of exchange rate regimes and the existence of capital controls, we also find that hard pegs with capital account liberalization have a significantly lower probability of currency crises than intermediate regimes with capital controls and free floats with capital controls. Hence, the bipolar view does not strictly hold in the sense that intermediate regimes are significantly more prone to currency crises than the two extreme regimes. However, the fact that hard pegs with capital account liberalization are substantially less prone to currency crises is worthy of note.     

Why do privatized firms pay higher dividends?

We examine state income and reputation incentives to account for the high dividends of privatized firms. Consistent with these agency-cost based incentives, we show strong and robust evidence that the extent of state ownership is positively related to corporate dividends. We distinguish between the empirical importance of these incentives using variation in the rule of law to protect minority shareholders, the fiscal deficit and the political orientation of the state. Our findings show that an incentive to enhance the state's reputation with minority shareholders can account for the high dividends of privatized firms.     

Why do bank-dependent firms bear interest-rate risk?

I document that floating-rate loans from banks, particularly important for bank-dependent firms, drive most variation in firms’ exposure to interest rates. I argue that banks prefer to supply floating-rate loans, due to their finite ability to transform short-duration deposit liabilities into long duration assets. Three key findings support this argument: banks with more floating-rate liabilities make more floating-rate loans, hold more floating-rate securities, and quote lower prices for floating-rate loans. Intermediary funding structures therefore help determine what types of contracts non-financial firms use. Banks transmit rising policy rates to firms by contractually raising interest rates on existing loans, not just by reducing the supply of new loans.