Disentangling Treatment Effects of Active Labor Market Policies: The Role of Labor Force Status Sequences

This paper estimates treatment effects of two active labor market policies – a training program and a wage subsidy scheme – on participants' employment probabilities. The analysis is based on unique data from the 18th wave of the Polish Labor Force Survey containing detailed and extensive individual labor force status histories. We discuss two variants of an exact covariate matching procedure adapted to the specific nature of the data. Our study confirms and reinforces a point raised in recent research [Heckman, J.J., Smith, J.A. The Pre-programme Earnings Dip and the Determinants of Participation in a Social Programme: Implications for Simple Programme Evaluation Strategies. The Economic Journal 1999; 109; 313-348., Heckman, J.J., Smith, J.A. The Determinants of Participation in a Social Program: Evidence from a Prototypical Job Training Program. Journal of Labor Economics 2004; 22; 243-298.], that pre-treatment labor force status dynamics play a decisive role in determining program participation. We implement a conditional difference-in-differences estimator of treatment effects based on these individual trinomial sequences of pre-treatment labor market status. The estimator employs a “moving window” technique that nicely controls for changes in the macroeconomic environment over time. Our findings suggest that training raises individual employment probability, while wage subsidies display negative treatment effects for participants in the Polish case.     

Economics of personnel and human resource management

The new economics of personnel and human resource management is analysed, including its current prominence as well as its historical antecedents. The economic paradigm as applied to personnel and human resource economics is illustrated through a variety of examples in the personnel area. These involve economic phenomenon (e.g., fixed hiring costs, asymmetric information, option values) highlighting their implications for personnel issues, as well as personnel phenomenon (e.g., deferred compensation, pensions, mandatory retirement) highlighting their economic rationale. Other phenomenon that otherwise seem difficult to explain or paradoxical are analysed including: superstar salaries; long-hours and overtime coexisting with unemployment and underemployment often within the same organisation; the reluctance of seemingly risk averse workers to accept small wage cuts to avoid the possibility of a layoff; the payment of fringe benefits that may not be valued by many employees; the “regular” hiring of temporary workers when permanent workers are available; egalitarian pay structures and fairness in compensation; the persistent reporting of vacancies on the part of firms but a reluctance to raise wages to fill those vacancies; the use of piece rates in some jobs and salary structures that are based on relative ranking of workers in other jobs; and tenure or “up-or-out” rules where people who are not promoted are required to leave rather than work for lower pay. The concluding section focuses on elements that are common across these applications.     

Recall bias in the displaced workers survey: Are layoffs really lemons?

This paper examines how the extent of recall bias in the Displaced Workers Surveys affects the often-cited empirical results found by Gibbons and Katz [Gibbons, R., Katz, L.F., 1991. Layoffs and lemons. Journal of Labor Economics 9 (4), 351−380] for the lemons effect of layoffs. Their finding that workers displaced by layoffs experience larger wage losses than do those displaced by plant closings is not due to the stigma attached to the layoff events. Rather it partly stems from recall bias in the 1984 and 1986 DWS, but mostly reflects the fact that workers displaced by layoffs have significantly higher predisplacement wage-tenure profiles than do those displaced by plant closings, while there is no such difference in postdisplacement wage-tenure profiles. A similar analysis using the 2000 and 2002 DWS shows that predisplacement wage losses are not different between workers displaced by layoffs and those displaced by plant closings.     

Estimating the effects of the minimum wage in a developing country: A density discontinuity design approach

This paper proposes a framework to identify the effects of the minimum wage on the joint distribution of sector and wage in a developing country. I show how the discontinuity of the wage distribution around the minimum wage identifies the extent of noncompliance with the minimum wage policy, and how the conditional probability of sector given wage recovers the relationship between latent sector and wages. I apply the method in the “PNAD,” a nationwide representative Brazilian cross‐sectional dataset for the years 2001–2009. The results indicate that the size of the informal sector is increased by around 39% compared to what would prevail in the absence of the minimum wage, an effect attributable to (i) unemployment effects of the minimum wage on the formal sector and (ii) movements of workers from the formal to the informal sector as a response to the policy.     

Productivity, employment and labor demand in Polish industry in the 1980s: Some preliminary results from enterprise-level data

The paper uses annual data from a panel of 334 Polish industrial enterprises over the period 1983–1988 to test empirically a simple neoclassical approach to the socialist labor market. First, an enterprise production function is estimated. The paper finds that for most enterprises, the resulting estimated marginal product of labor exceeds the wage paid by the enterprise by a considerable margin, suggesting general excess demand for labor. The paper then looks at how the difference between the MPL and the wage is related to the rate of change of employment, and finds that firms where the MPL is higher than the wage — firms which in a neoclassical model would have a large excess demand for labor — do not shed labor any more slowly than other firms.     

Labour adjustment costs: Estimation of a dynamic discrete choice model using panel data for Greek manufacturing firms

In this paper we estimate a dynamic structural model of employment at firm level. Our dataset consists of a balanced panel of 2790 Greek manufacturing firms. The empirical evidence of this dataset stresses three important stylized facts: (a) there are periods in which firms decide not to change their labour input, (b) there are periods of large employment changes (lumpy nature of labour adjustment) and (c) the commonality is employment spikes to be followed by smooth and low employment growth periods. Following Cooper and Haltiwanger [Cooper, R.W. and Haltiwanger, J. “On the Nature of Capital Adjustment Costs”, Review of Economic Studies, 2006; 73(3); 611–633], we consider a dynamic discrete choice model of a general specification of adjustment costs including convex, non-convex and “disruption of production” components. We use a method of simulated moments procedure to estimate the structural parameters. Our results indicate considerable fixed costs in the Greek employment adjustment.     

Minimum wages and training

The paper analyzes the influence of minimum wages on firms' incentive to train their employees. We show that this influence rests on two countervailing effects: minimum wages (i) augment wage compression and thereby raise firms' incentives to train and (ii) reduce the profitability of employees, raise the firing rate and thereby reduce training. Our analysis shows that the relative strength of these two effects depends on the employees' ability levels. Our striking result is that minimum wages give rise to skills inequality: a rise in the minimum wage leads to less training for low-ability workers and more training for those of higher ability. In short, minimum wages create a ”low-skill trap.” We indicate that this effect may be important empirically. Finally, including workers' incentives to train themselves makes no major difference to our results.     

The dynamics of regional inequalities

This paper analyses the link between regional inequalities and GDP per capita at the country-level. Our starting hypothesis is that the evolution of regional inequalities should follow a bell-shaped curve as national GDP per capita rises since growth by its very nature is unlikely to appear everywhere at the same time, as has been argued by a number of authors, from Kuznets [Kuznets, S., (1955), Economic growth and income inequality, American Economic Review 45(1), 1–28] to Lucas [Lucas, R.E., (2000), “Some macroeconomics for the 21st century”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 (1), 159–168]. We test this hypothesis econometrically using semi-parametric estimation techniques and regional data for a panel of European countries. Our results provide strong support for such a bell-shaped curve and are robust to changing the regional administrative units and the time period, as well as controlling for other possible determinants of regional inequalities. We also find support for this hypothesis when considering non-European countries.     

Tiebout's tale in spatial economies: Entrepreneurship, self-selection, and efficiency

This paper establishes the existence and efficiency of equilibrium in a local public goods economy with spatial structures by formalizing Hamilton's [Hamilton, B.W., 1975. Zoning and property taxation in a system of local governments Urban Studies 12, 205–211] elaboration of Tiebout's [Tiebout, C., 1956. A pure theory of local public expenditures. Journal of Political Economy 64, 416–424] tale. We use a well-known equilibrium concept from Rothschild and Stiglitz [Rothschild, M., Stiglitz, J.E., 1976. Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: an essay on the economics of imperfect information. Quarterly Journal of Economics 40, 629–649] in a market with asymmetric information, and show that Hamilton's zoning policy plays an essential role in proving the existence and efficiency of equilibrium. We use an idealized large economy following Ellickson, Grodal, Scotchmer and Zame [Ellickson, B., Grodal, B., Scotchmer, S., Zame, W.R., 1999. Clubs and the market, Econometrica 67, 1185–1217] and Allouch, Conley and Wooders [Allouch, N., Conley, J.P., Wooders, M.H., The Tiebout Hypothesis: On the Existence of Pareto Efficient Competitive Equilibria, (2004), mimeograph]. Our theorem is directly applicable to the existence and efficiency of a discrete spatial approximation of mono- or multi-centric city equilibria in an urban economy with commuting time costs, even if we allow the existence of multiple qualities of (collective) residences, when externalities due to traffic congestion are not present.     

Does pay affect productivity or react to it?: Examination of U.S. manufacturing

There may be a bi-directional relationship between wages and labor productivity. According to conventional theory, employers reward improvements in productivity by raising pay. It also has been argued that wage increases can provide an incentive to improve productivity. This study applies a technique by Geweke to identify the feedback between pay and productivity in U.S. manufacturing. For the 1949–1998 period, measures of directional feedback indicate that both “pay as reward” and “pay as incentive” behaviors have occurred, but the results vary across manufacturing subsectors.     

Microworlds and Simuworlds: Practice fields for the learning organization

Management is one of the few professions, the authors note, in which members have no formal “rehearsal space” for honing their skills. In response to this need, organizations such as The Center for Creative Leadership, MIT's Learning Center, and The Stern School of Business at New York University have created a brave new world of management simulations—“practice fields” for the learning organization. Some of these new games (“simuworlds”) use computer programs to replicate an entire industry and give participants an opportunity to play out one company's strategy in that setting. Other simulations (“microworlds”) engage participants in complex behavioral role playing, based on scenarios that typically develop within a company. Still other simulations combine both approaches. The authors take their point of departure from Peter Senge's definition of the “learning barriers” that develop in any organization: solving fragmented “problems” rather than dealing with systemic issues; overemphasis on competition at the expense of cooperation; and a failure to innovate until forced to do so. The new simulations, the authors argue, are particularly useful in helping managers learn how to overcome these barriers.     

最低工资对正规部门、非正规部门工资和就业的影响

本文根据是否遵守最低工资标准,将劳动部门分为正规部门和非正规部门。利用中国健康与营养调查（CHNS）微观数据,运用固定效应模型和Multinomial Logit模型,本文实证研究了2004年以来,最低工资对正规部门和非正规部门工资和就业的影响。研究发现：最低工资每提高1%,正规部门工资会增加0.5%,非正规部门平均工资下降统计不显著,而处于最低工资线附近的非正规部门劳动者工资下降0.77%;最低工资提高使得失业者向非正规部门流动,而非正规部门劳动者向正规部门流动,最终将有利于劳动者在正规部门就业。因此,政府在制定最低工资制度时应全面考虑最低工资标准作用效果的部门差异。     

Land use externalities, open space preservation, and urban sprawl

Parcel data on residential land conversion are used to investigate how land use externalities influence the rate of development and modify policies designed to manage urban growth and preserve open space. Several “smart growth” policies are found to significantly influence land conversion, including a development clustering policy that concentrates development and generates preserved open space. In addition to directly affecting a parcel's hazard rate of conversion, this policy is found to affect neighboring parcels' conversion by generating a positive open space externality that hastens their development. The implication that the clustering policy could generate a more sprawled pattern of development is explored using spatial simulation.     

Black markets and pre-reform crises in former socialist economies

Boycko [Q. J. Econ. 107 (1992) 907] and others showed that wage increases in a socialist economy result in longer queues and lower output. Beyond a certain level of shortages, wage increases may lead to a “near collapse” of the economy. We show that the presence of black markets alleviates this outcome. In particular, wage elasticity of output is always smaller in the framework that includes heterogenous agents and black markets.     

Employment protection reforms,employment and the incidence of temporary jobs in Europe: 1996–2001

This paper uses longitudinal data on individuals from the European Community Household Panel over the 1996–2001 period to investigate the impact of reforms of employment protection systems in nine countries on the incidence of employment and of temporary jobs for wage and salary workers. Important features of the research design include the use of individual fixed effects models as well as the inclusion of country-specific trends in the dependent variable. A robust finding is that policies making it easier to create temporary jobs on average raise the likelihood that wage and salary workers will be in temporary jobs. This effect is felt primarily when the regional unemployment rate is relatively high. However, there is no evidence that such reforms raise employment. Thus, these reforms, while touted as a way of jump-starting individuals' careers in the job market, appear rather to encourage a substitution of temporary for permanent work.     

“Agreeing to disagree” type results: a decision-theoretic approach

This paper explores interactive epistemology within Morris’ [S. Morris, Alternative definitions of knowledge, in: M.O.L. Bacharach, L.-A. Gerard-Varet, P. Mongin, H.S. Shin (Eds.), Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Amsterdam, 1997, pp. 217–233] framework of knowledge. Specifically, this paper proves a generalized “agreeing to disagree” result. The major features of this formalization are: (i) non-expected utility receives a unified treatment; (ii) the information structure is not necessarily partitional; (iii) Aumann’s celebrated result of “agreeing to disagree” and Milgrom and Stokey’s well-known result of “no trade” are derived as special cases. This paper also presents some new extensions of the “no trade theorem”.     

农民的工资性收入问题探析

当前工资性收入的不断快速增长成为农民收入增长的一个重要渠道。农民工资性收入增长同时受到劳动力素质的制约,存在就业困难的现象,所以工资性收入的水平也就较低,并且增长的速度也较为缓慢等。怎样可以增加农民工资性的收入问题,就要优化调整农村整体的经济结构,促进发展农民的密集型产业,分配好剩余价值以及调整与工资之间的关系,从而提高农民的工资收入,此外,还应逐步的加强完善和改革农民的就业制度以及农民的文化教育等方面,为就业创造出更多的条件。     

Discrete choice modeling with nonstationary panels applied to exchange rate regime choice

This paper develops a regression limit theory for discrete choice nonstationary panels with large cross section (N) and time series (T) dimensions. Some results emerging from this theory are directly applicable in the wider context of M-estimation. This includes an extension of work by Wooldridge [Wooldridge, J.M., 1994. Estimation and Inference for Dependent Processes. In: Engle, R.F., McFadden, D.L. (Eds.). Handbook of Econometrics, vol. 4, North-Holland, Amsterdam] on the limit theory of local extremum estimators to multi-indexed processes in nonlinear nonstationary panel data models.It is shown that the maximum likelihood (ML) estimator is consistent without an incidental parameters problem and has a limit theory with a fast rate of convergence N^1/2T^3/4 (in the stationary case, the rate is N^1/2T^1/2) for the regression coefficients and thresholds, and a normal limit distribution. In contrast, the limit distribution is known to be mixed normal in time series modeling, as shown in [Park, J.Y., Phillips, P.C.B., 2000, Nonstationary binary choice. Econometrica, 68, 1249–1280] (hereafter PP), and [Phillips, P.C.B., Jin, S., Hu, L., 2007. Nonstationary discrete choice: A corrigendum and addendum. Journal of Econometrics 141(2), 1115–1130] (hereafter, PJH).The approach is applied to exchange rate regime choice by monetary authorities, and we provide an analysis of the empirical phenomenon known as “fear of floating”.