Monetary Policy and Inflation in the 70s

An influential paper by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) has attributed the great inflation of the 1970s to the violation of the Taylor principle in the conduct of U.S. monetary policy (weak, indeterminacy inducing response to expected inflation). We evaluate this thesis in the context of a standard New Keynesian model against a version of the model that incorporates incomplete information learning about the true state of the economy. The likelihood‐based estimation of the model overwhelmingly favors the specification with indeterminacy over the alternatives with determinacy, independent of the presence and size of misperceptions.     

Quantifying the uncertainty about the fit of a new Keynesian pricing model

Recent studies by Gali and Gertler [1999. Inflation dynamics: a structural econometric analysis, Journal of Monetary Economics 44, 195-222] and Sbordone [2002. Prices and unit labor costs: testing models of pricing, Journal of Monetary Economics 49, 265-292] conclude that a theoretical inflation series implied by a forward-looking New Keynesian pricing equation fits post-1960 U.S. inflation closely. Their theoretical inflation series is conditional on (i) a reduced-form forecasting process for real marginal cost; and (ii) the calibration of the pricing equation. The present paper shows that both of these determinants are surrounded by considerable uncertainty. When quantifying the impact of this uncertainty on theoretical inflation, we can no longer say whether the forward-looking pricing equation explains observed inflation dynamics very well or very poorly.     

Inflation and Unit Labor Cost

We study two decompositions of inflation, π, motivated by the standard New Keynesian pricing equation of Gali, Gertler, and Sbordone. The first uses four components: lagged π, expected future π, real unit labor cost (ψ), and a residual. The second uses two components: fundamental inflation (discounted expected future ψ) and a residual. We find large low‐frequency differences between actual and fundamental inflation. From 1999 to 2011 fundamental inflation fell by more than 15 percentage points, while actual inflation changed little. We discuss this discrepancy in terms of the data (a large drop in labor's share of income) and through the lens of a canonical structural model.     

Pricing Models: A Bayesian DSGE Approach for the U.S. Economy

This paper compares and estimates three pricing mechanisms in the context of a small DSGE model of the U.S. economy. We interpret our results as favoring the pricing mechanism presented in Wolman (1999 Wolman model) over the New Keynesian model with indexation ( Gali and Gertler 1999 , Smets and Wouters 2004a ) and the sticky information model of Mankiw and Reis (2002) . The key factor that explains the performance of the Wolman model is that the data reject the key assumption of the New Keynesian model that the firm's probability of price change is constant over time and independent of the contract's vintage. Our results also show that incorporating indexation in the New Keynesian model represents a poor expedient in matching the autocorrelation function of the inflation process over the last 20 years.     

中国宏观调控工具的选择及效应研究

基于中国的宏观调控政策事实,本文在Gali（1992）基础上构建了包含数量型货币 政策、价格型货币政策和财政政策的SVAR模型,并运用1995年-2017年的宏观数据进行了实证 检验。SVAR模型的实证显示,数量型货币政策对产出和通胀均有正向效应,价格型货币政策 对当前宏观经济增长作用有限,扩张性财政政策对产出和通胀均有快速显著的正向刺激作用。     

How Important Is Money in the Conduct of Monetary Policy?

I consider some of the leading arguments for assigning an important role to tracking the growth of monetary aggregates when making decisions about monetary policy. First, I consider whether ignoring money means returning to the conceptual framework that allowed the high inflation of the 1970s. Second, I consider whether models of inflation determination with no role for money are incomplete, or inconsistent with elementary economic principles. Third, I consider the implications for monetary policy strategy of the empirical evidence for a long‐run relationship between money growth and inflation. And fourth, I consider reasons why a monetary policy strategy based solely on short‐run inflation forecasts derived from a Phillips curve may not be a reliable way of controlling inflation. I argue that none of these considerations provides a compelling reason to assign a prominent role to monetary aggregates in the conduct of monetary policy.     

Optimal monetary policy under low trend inflation

In the monetary policy literature it is common to assume that trend inflation is zero, despite overwhelming evidence that zero inflation is neither empirically relevant nor a practical objective for central bank policy. We therefore extend the standard New Keynesian model to allow for positive trend inflation, showing that even low trend inflation has strong effects on optimal monetary policy and the dynamics of inflation, output and interest rates. Under discretion, the efficient policy deteriorates and there is no guarantee of determinacy. Even with commitment, targeting non-zero trend inflation leads to substantial welfare losses. Our results serve as a warning against indiscriminate use of models assuming zero trend inflation.     

On Targeting Frameworks And Optimal Monetary Policy

We show that speed limit policy, a monetary policy strategy that focuses on stabilizing inflation and the change in the output gap, consistently outperforms flexible inflation targeting and flexible price level targeting in empirical medium‐scale DSGE models under discretionary policymaking. In contrast to small‐scale New Keynesian models, this welfare ranking of the targeting frameworks is not overturned when inflation dynamics are mostly backward‐looking. Importantly, the performance of the speed limit policy shows less sensitivity to its parameterization than other frameworks that target the inflation rate or the price level.     

The New Keynesian Phillips Curve: From Sticky Inflation to Sticky Prices

The New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) model of inflation dynamics based on forward-looking expectations is of great theoretical significance in monetary policy analysis. Empirical studies, however, often find that backward-looking inflation inertia dominates the dynamics of the short-run aggregate supply curve. This inconsistency is examined by investigating multiple structural changes in the NKPC for the U.S. between 1960 and 2005, employing both inflation expectations survey data and a rational expectations approximation. We find that forward-looking behavior plays a smaller role during the high and volatile inflation regime to 1981 than in the subsequent period of moderate inflation, providing empirical support for sticky price models over the last two decades. A break in the intercept of the NKPC is also identified around 2001 and this may be associated with U.S. monetary policy in that period.     

Monetary conservatism and fiscal policy

Does an inflation conservative central bank à la Rogoff (1985) remain desirable in a setting with endogenous fiscal policy? To provide an answer we study monetary and fiscal policy games without commitment in a dynamic, stochastic sticky-price economy with monopolistic distortions. Monetary policy determines nominal interest rates and fiscal policy provides public goods generating private utility. We find that lack of fiscal commitment gives rise to excessive public spending. The optimal inflation rate internalizing this distortion is positive, but lack of monetary commitment generates too much inflation. A conservative monetary authority thus remains desirable. When fiscal policy is determined before monetary policy each period, the monetary authority should focus exclusively on stabilizing inflation. Monetary conservatism then eliminates the steady state biases associated with lack of monetary and fiscal commitment and leads to stabilization policy that is close to optimal.     

Determinacy and Learnability of Monetary Policy Rules in Small Open Economies

This paper evaluates under which conditions different Taylor-type rules lead to determinacy and expectational stability (E-stability) of rational expectations equilibrium in a simple "New Keynesian" small open economy model, developed by Gali and Monacelli (2005) . In particular, we extend Bullard and Mitra (2002) results of determinacy and E-stability in a closed economy to this small open economy framework. Our results highlight an important link between the Taylor principle and both determinacy and learnability of equilibrium in small open economies. More importantly, the degree of openness coupled with the nature of the policy rule adopted by the monetary authorities might change this link in important ways. A key finding is that, contrary to Bullard and Mitra, expectations-based rules that involve the consumer price inflation and/or the nominal exchange rate limit the region of E-stability and the Taylor Principle does not guarantee E-stability. We also show that some forms of managed exchange rate rules can help to alleviate problems of both indeterminacy and expectational instability, yet these rules might not be desirable since they can promote greater volatility in the economy.     

New Keynesian Macroeconomics and the Term Structure

This article complements the structural New Keynesian macro framework with a no-arbitrage affine term structure model. Whereas our methodology is general, we focus on an extended macro model with unobservable processes for the inflation target and the natural rate of output that are filtered from macro and term structure data. We find that term structure information helps generate large and significant parameters governing the monetary policy transmission mechanism. Our model also delivers strong contemporaneous responses of the entire term structure to various macroeconomic shocks. The inflation target shock dominates the variation in the "level factor" whereas monetary policy shocks dominate the variation in the "slope and curvature factors."     

Quantitative Goals for Monetary Policy

We study empirically the macroeconomic effects of an explicit de jure quantitative goal for monetary policy. Quantitative goals take three forms: exchange rates, money growth rates, and inflation targets. We analyze the effects on inflation of both having a quantitative target and hitting a declared target. Our empirical work uses an annual data set covering 42 countries between 1960 and 2000, and takes account of other determinants of inflation (such as fiscal policy, the business cycle, and openness to international trade) and the endogeneity of the monetary policy regime. We find that both having and hitting quantitative targets for monetary policy is systematically and robustly associated with lower inflation. The exact form of the monetary target matters somewhat (especially for the sustainability of the monetary regime) but is less important than having some quantitative target. Successfully achieving a quantitative monetary goal is also associated with less volatile output.     

Survey forecasts in Brazil: A prismatic assessment of epidemiology,performance, and determinants

This paper assesses the behavior of survey forecasts in Brazil during the inflation targeting regime, when managing expectations is one of the cornerstones of the conduct of monetary policy. The distinctive database of the survey conducted by the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) among professional forecasters allows for a thorough investigation of the epidemiology, determinants, and performance of forecasts. The main results are: i) top performing forecasters are influential to other forecasters; ii) survey forecasts perform better than vector autoregressive model-based forecasts; iii) common forecast errors prevail over idiosyncratic components across respondents; iv) inflation targets play an important role in inflation expectations; and v) agents perceive the BCB as following a Taylor rule consistent with inflation targeting. The last two suggest high credibility of the monetary authority.     

Globalization, Macroeconomic Performance, and Monetary Policy

The paper argues that many of the exaggerated claims that globalization has been an important factor in lowering inflation in recent years just do not hold up. Globalization does, however, have the potential to be stabilizing for individual economies and has been a key factor in promoting economic growth. The paper then examines four questions about the impact of globalization on the monetary transmission mechanism and arrives at the following answers: (i) Has globalization led to a decline in the sensitivity of inflation to domestic output gaps and thus to domestic monetary policy? No. (ii) Are foreign output gaps playing a more prominent role in the domestic inflation process, so that domestic monetary policy has more difficulty stabilizing inflation? No. (iii) Can domestic monetary policy still control domestic interest rates and so stabilize both inflation and output? Yes. (iv) Are there other ways, besides possible influences on inflation and interest rates, in which globalization may have affected the transmission mechanism of monetary policy? Yes.     

The Value of Interest Rate Stabilization Policies When Agents Are Learning

We examine the expectational stability (E-stability) of rational expectations equilibrium in the "New Keynesian" model where monetary policy is optimally derived and interest rate stabilization is added to the central bank's traditional objectives of inflation and output stabilization. We consider both the case where the central bank lacks a commitment technology and the case of full commitment. We show that for both cases, optimal policy rules yield rational expectations equilibria that are E-stable for a wide range of empirically plausible parameter values. These findings stand in contrast to Evans and Honkapohja's findings for optimal monetary policy rules in environments where interest rate stabilization is not a central bank objective.     

A General Theory (and Some Evidence) of Expectation Traps in Monetary Policy

I show that multiple equilibria are a general property of economies under full monetary policy discretion. Three simple conditions are sufficient to rule out, generically, a unique equilibrium in a static economy. The key departure from Barro and Gordon (1983) is to consider bounded welfare costs of inflation. I also show that in a two Markov equilibrium economy the inflation response to certain perturbations is, generically, qualitatively different in each equilibrium. Finally, I discuss some evidence on inflation dynamics that supports the hypothesis that U.S. monetary policy was caught in an expectation trap during the high inflation episode of the 1970s.     

What do technology shocks tell us about the New Keynesian paradigm?

Researchers have used unanticipated changes to monetary policy to identify preference and technology parameters of macroeconomic models. This paper uses changes in technology to identify the same set of parameters. Estimates based on technology shocks differ substantially from those based on monetary policy shocks. In the post-World War II United States, a positive technology shock reduces inflation and increases hours worked, significantly and rapidly in both cases. Relative to policy shock identification, technology shock identification implies: (i) long duration durability in preferences instead of short duration habit, (ii) built-in inflation inertia disappears and price flexibility increases. In response to technological improvement, consumption durability increases hours worked because households temporarily increase labor supply to accumulate durables towards a new, higher steady state level. Limited nominal rigidities allow inflation to fall because firms are able to immediately cut prices when households’ labor supply increases. Finally, we consider alternative data constructions and econometric specifications; we find that (i) and/or (ii) hold in nearly every case.     

Monetary policy transmission in vector autoregressions: A new approach using central bank communication

In this paper, we study the role played by central bank communication in monetary policy transmission. We employ the Swiss Economic Institute’s Monetary Policy Communicator to measure the future stance of the European Central Bank’s monetary policy. Our results indicate, first, that communication has an influence on inflation (expectations) similar to that of actual target rate changes. Communication also plays a noticeable role in the transmission of monetary policy to output. Consequently, future work on monetary policy transmission should incorporate both a short-term interest rate and a communication indicator. A second finding is that the monetary policy transmission mechanism changed during the financial crisis as the overall effect of monetary policy on (expected) inflation and output is weaker and of shorter duration during this period compared to the overall sample period.     

Optimal inflation persistence: Ramsey taxation with capital and habits

Ramsey models of fiscal and monetary policy featuring time-separable preferences and a fixed supply of capital predict highly volatile inflation with no serial correlation. In this paper, we show that an otherwise-standard Ramsey model that incorporates capital accumulation and habit persistence predicts highly persistent inflation. The result depends on increases in either the ability to smooth consumption or the preference for doing so. The effect operates through the Fisher relationship: a smoother profile of consumption implies a more persistent real interest rate, which in turn implies persistent optimal inflation. Our work complements a recent strand of the Ramsey literature based on models with nominal rigidities. In these latter models, inflation volatility is lower than in the baseline model but continues to exhibit little persistence. We quantify the effects of habit and capital on inflation persistence and also relate our findings to recent work on optimal fiscal policy with incomplete markets.