Why Do the Rich Save More? A Theory and Australian Evidence*

We provide a theory to explain the existence of inequality in an economy where agents have identical preferences and have access to the same production technology. Agents consume a ‘health’ good which determines their subjective discount factor. Depending on initial distribution of capital the economy gets separated into different permanent‐income groups. This leads to a testable hypothesis: ‘The rich save a larger proportion of their permanent‐income’. We test this implication for savings behaviour in Australia. We find that even after controlling for lifecycle and health characteristics, higher permanent income is positively related with higher savings rates and better saving habits.     

Do Currency Unions Grow Too Large For Their Own Good?

This article puts a rigorous foundation under the proposition that currency areas, as they admit more members, face a rising marginal cost curve which cuts the marginal benefit curve from below. However, at any given time, the median member faces lower marginal cost than the average member, so that, if new members are admitted by majority vote, and existing members are myopic, the currency area will expand beyond its optimum size. Although the currency area imposes negative externalities on countries outside it, we find that the existence of one currency union has no effect on the costs or benefits of forming or enlarging another.     

Do the Rich Save More? Evidence from Canada

This paper provides new evidence on the long‐standing question of whether more affluent households save a larger fraction of their income. The major difficulty in empirically assessing the relationship between incomes and saving rates is to construct a credible proxy for long‐run income—purged of transitory fluctuations and measurement error. The Canadian Family Expenditure Survey provides us with both unusually good data on savings rates and potential predictors with which we can construct reliable long‐run income proxies. Our empirical analysis suggests that the estimated relationship between saving rates and long‐run incomes is sensitive to the predictor used to proxy long‐run income. Nevertheless, our preferred estimates indicate that, except for poorest households (who simply do not save), saving rates do not differ substantially across predicted long‐run income groups.     

Do Geographic Scale Economies Explain Disturbances to Heckscher–Ohlin Trade?

This paper examines whether geographic scale economies explain the trade that remains unexplained by the Heckscher–Ohlin model. The paper develops a theoretical specification that integrates geographic scale economies into the Heckscher–Ohlin model, and develops a statistical method for detecting geographic scale economies in the distributional features of a disturbance term. The units of analysis are US states. The findings reveal that empirical support for the Heckscher–Ohlin theory is improved by accounting for geographic scale economies within states; geographic scale economies do not generate differences in Rybczynski effects across states; and the scope of geographic scale economies is contained within states.     

Do money and financial variables help forecasting output in emerging European Economies?

Whether including monetary aggregates and different financial variables into small scale BVAR models improves the accuracy of output forecasts is tested for three emerging European economies. Various specifications for the priors of the BVAR models are used. The results are found to vary with respect to prior specification, variables, as well as prediction horizon. The evidence is stronger when the forecasting accuracy is compared based on log predictive likelihood but weaker when the RMSEs are used. These results may constitute evidence against dismissing the monetary aggregates or financial variables as completely irrelevant.     

Do Higher Per Capita Incomes Lead to More R&D Expenditure?

This paper analyzes empirically the relationship between R&D and growth. The estimated elasticity of per capita R&D expenditures with respect to domestic per capita incomes lies between 1.81 and 2.93 for the ten OECDcountries studied, whereas the elasticity of R&D with respect to foreign demand lies between 0.43 and 0.68. The paper introduces a standard GDP growth accounting equation where current productivity is a function ofprevious R&D. The results indicate that OLS estimates of spillovers from R&D have an upward bias of more than 40%.     

Why Do Small States Receive More Federal Money? U.S. Senate Representation and the Allocation of Federal Budget

Empirical research on the geographic distribution of U.S. federal spending shows that small states receive disproportionately more dollars per capita. This evidence, often regarded as the consequence of Senate malapportionment, in reality conflates the effects of state population size with that of state population growth. Analyzing outlays for the period 1978–2002, this study shows that properly controlling for population dynamics provides more reasonable estimates of small‐state advantage and solves a number of puzzling peculiarities of previous research. We also show that states with fast‐growing population loose federal spending to the advantage of slow‐growing ones independently of whether they are large or small. The two population effects vary substantially across spending programs. Small states enjoy some advantage in defense spending, whereas fast‐growing ones are penalized in the allocation of federal grants, particularly those administered by formulas limiting budgetary adjustments. Hence, a large part of the inverse relationship between spending and population appears to be driven by mechanisms of budgetary inertia, which are compatible with incrementalist theories of budget allocation.     

Why Are Rich Countries More Politically Cohesive?*

We document empirically that rich countries are more politically cohesive than poorer countries. In order to explain this regularity, we provide a model where political cohesion is linked to the emergence of a fully functioning market economy. Without market exchange, the welfare of inherently selfish individuals will be mutually independent. Whoever has greater bargaining power will be willing to make decisions that enhance the productivity of their supporters at the expense of other groups in society. If the gains from specialization are sufficiently large, however, a market economy will emerge. From being essentially non‐cohesive under self‐sufficiency, the political decision‐making process becomes cohesive in the market economy, because the welfare of individuals will be mutually interdependent as a result of the exchange of goods.     

Why Doesn’t the Hong Kong Government Sell More Public Land?

Why doesn’t the Hong Kong government sell more of its enormous land holding to lower the city’s high housing price and increase the residents’ small living space? We answer the question in an overlapping generations framework. We show that while a rapid and complete privatization of government land is efficient in the absence of externalities; it is made politically difficult by a compensation gap, when the losses of current property owners are greater than the government revenue from land sales. We argue that the cross-country diversity of government land ownership owes to historical incidents in some countries (such as the U.S. in the 19th century) that allowed disposal of government land without filling the compensation gap and the absence of such incidents in others (such as Hong Kong).     

Why Do Some Households Save So Little? A Rational Explanation

This paper offers an explanation for the puzzle of low wealth holdings among a significant fraction of the elderly. Instead of invoking irrational, nonrational, or nonoptimal behavior to resolve the puzzle, it is shown that widespread low wealth holdings are consistent with a rational life-cycle model of saving with uncertain lifetime and borrowing constraint. When there is uncertainty about the length of life, it is optimal for some individuals to save little and exhaust their wealth early. The characteristics of these individuals are derived. The simulation results support that the model can account for low wealth holdings as well as early terminal wealth depletion. The analysis also rejects the common perception that uncertain lifetime reduces dissaving. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D11, D91, E21, I12, J14.     

Why Do the Gains from Trade Reform Vary Between Countries?

This paper assesses, both theoretically and empirically, the determinants of differential gains from trade policy reform across countries. The theoretical model shows that asymmetrical features of the world economy, including the relative size of the differentiated products sector in each country, the dominance of domestic markets by indigenous producers, trade costs, and the relative importance of exports, all play an important role. Results from a multi-region computable general equilibrium model substantiate the proposition that the initial pattern of asymmetry is relatively more important than scale and varietal effects, despite the fact that the latter have received more attention in the literature.     

Why Do Prices Remain Stable in the Bubble and Bust Period?

In spite of a large swing in real output growth in the bubble and bust period, aggregate prices remained relatively stable in Japan. Empirical results show that such price rigidity can be explained by the customer market model combined with financial constraints. The degree of financial constraints that firms face in the bubble and bust period fluctuates significantly, and the impact of financial positions on firms’ prices is counter-cyclical. In booms, liquidity-abundant firms invest in market share by keeping prices down, while in a recession financially constrained firms charge a high price to locked-in customers who remain loyal. Such counter-cyclicality is clearly observed in the pricing behavior of large firms that produce differentiated goods. In contrast, small firms whose product brand is not well established in the market cannot lock in customers, and hence financial constraints do not affect their pricing decisions.     

Why Excel?

Advanced Placement economics leaves thousands of high school students with a misleading impression of modern economics. The courses fail to cover key sources of growth and prosperity, including private ownership, dynamic competition, and entrepreneurship. The tools of public choice economics are totally ignored. Government is modeled as a corrective device available to impose ideal solutions. Market failure is covered, but there is no such thing as government failure. The macroeconomics course reflects the simplistic 1960s Keynesian view of stabilization policy. Time lags, incentive effects, secondary effects of budget deficits, and other factors that complicate effective use of stabilization policy are almost entirely ignored. In contrast, the 20 Voluntary National Content Standards in Economics of the Council for Economic Education illustrate what a balanced course in modern economics would look like.     

Forecaster Rationality and Expectation Formation in Foreign Exchange Markets: Do Emerging Countries Differ from Industrialized Economies?

ABSTRACT

This paper uses the Consensus Economic Forecast poll to investigate how forecasters in the foreign exchange market form expectations and whether the expectation formation process differs between industrialized and emerging countries. In order to explain the expectation formation of forecasters in countries and country groups, we analyze around 50,000 forecasts for 22 OECD member currencies. We find that differences between the way forecasters in industrialized countries and emerging countries form exchange rate expectations. However, we show that one important difference is due to a difference in forecasting behavior of emerging countries. Controlling for this feature lets the forecasting behavior in emerging countries resemble more the ones found for industrialized countries, but not for all forecast horizons.     

Do People with Specific Skills Want More Social Insurance? Not in the United States

Skill specificity is thought to increase preferences for social insurance (Iversen and Soskice, 2001, American Political Science Review 95,875), especially where employment protections are low, notably the United States (Gingrich and Ansell, 2012, Comparative Political Studies 45, 1624). The compensating differentials literature, by contrast, suggests that neither skill specificity, nor labor market protections affect preferences when wages adjust for differences in risks and investment costs. We examine these competing predictions using U.S. data on general and specific skills. Absolute and relative skill specificity have a robust positive correlation with income, but are negatively correlated with preferences for social protection. Our results strongly support the compensating differentials approach.     

Why Do Nations Trade (So Little)?

There is not nearly as much trade as standard models suggest there should be. Formal trade barriers and transport costs are too low to account for the difference. The pattern of missing trade has interesting variation across country pairs. These clues suggest the need for theoretical and eventually structural empirical work on the missing transactions costs. This paper reviews recent empirical findings and some promising research directions in search, predation and contract theory.     

Why Austrian socialism?

Socialist objectives can be achieved in a market context with the rule of law if market socialism were to take the form of competitive worker-owned and self-managed enterprises, supplemented by universally available welfare redistributions, which could include a basic income, universal capital grants, or education and health insurance vouchers.