中德股份公司监事会制度的比较及启示

我国股份公司与德国一样,都采用公司内部治理既有监事会、又有董事会的二元制模式。但在实践中,我国监事会制度的监督效果不彰,流于形式。因此,对德国监事会制度的优点进行借鉴,对于完善我国的公司治理制度具有重大的意义。     

国有商业银行监事会制度的理论基础与国际经验

监事会制度作为公司治理结构的重要制度之一,是降低代理成本、分权制衡和公司自我约束的必然选择。本文在学习借鉴监事会制度理论基础、国际经验的基础上,分析国有商业银行建立监事会制度的必然性,探讨完善国有商业银行监事会制度的对策建议,进一步发挥其治理功效。     

国有企业监事会制度对策研究

目前,我国国有企业监事会制度在监事成员选任,激励机制,法律责任约束等方面存在缺陷,使国有企业运行效率低下,严重制约了国有企业的保值增值。构建完善的国有企业监事会制度,对防止国有资产的流失,确保国有资产的保值增值具有十分重要的意义。     

制度安排与监事会治理

本文针对监事会监督不力,在上市公司内部毫无作为的现象,以被证监会处罚的公司为研究对象,从现有的制度安排进行分析。分析发现,现有的制度安排本身并没有对监事会寄予很高的期望,监事会流于形式在所难免。本文分析的意义在于:监事会消极履职除本身独立性、激励机制等因素影响所致以外,与外部制度安排也有重要关系,有效的制度安排及其执行才是监事会发挥积极作用的治本之举。     

完善我国证券公司监事会制度

一个国家公司内部监督模式的形成有其深刻的经济、法律和政治文化背景，不存在哪一种监督模式好或不好的问题，关键是哪一种更适合一国国情。因此，我国证券公司在借鉴国际成熟市场的成功经验时，不仅要考虑移植其现成的体制与规则，更要考虑其形成原因和演变进程，加大对其历史案例和现实缺陷的研究，并结合我国社会环境及自身所有权结构和公司内部治理的实际情况，以求在更客观更全面了解的基础上为我所用，不能随意就其中一种监督机制生搬硬套。     

完善我国国有商业银行监事会制度的思考

本文回顾了国有商业银行监事会制度的建立过程。实践证明,国有商业银行监事会制度是一项既符合国际惯例又紧密结合中国实际的行之有效的制度创新。进一步完善国有商业银行监事会制度需要处理好几组关系。监事会本身也需要根据实践的发展不断丰富和完善。     

独立董事制度与监事会制度的兼容性探讨

我国上市公司治理结构的缺陷使得大股东对上市公司资产的侵占、大股东与上市公司的关联交易和上市公司的弄虚作假等问题日益突出,不断引发丑闻案件,使人们对监事会彻底丧失信心,把监事会讽称为"橡皮图章".证监会希望能够通过引进英美独立董事制度解决上市公司治理中的这一棘手问题.但独立董事制度的引入,不可避免导致了不同法系治理模武的摩擦,以及与我国监事会制度的冲突,独立董事制度与监事会制度的兼容性问题便由此摆在了我们面前.     

完善监事会监督职能的几点建议

国外发达国家有比较成熟的公司监事会制度,对比美国、德国、日本公司监事会特点,提出了完善我国公司监事会监督职能的几点建议。企业应根据实际情况,采取不同的法人治理结构;确立监事会工作原则,从程序上保证监事会监督职能有效实施;完善监事会工作方法,在实体上保证监事会监督职能的实现。     

城商行公司治理中的监事会建设

城市商业银行的公司治理结构自1995年国务院批准在大中城市以城市信用社为基础组建城市商业银行以来,全国目前已有城市商业银行149家。城市商业银行是中国在特殊的历史条件下,中央为整肃城市信用社、化解地方金融风险、为中小企业提供金融支持而产生的。经过16年的发展,城市商业银行已经由最     

Derivatives Use, Corporate Governance, and Legislative Change: An Empirical Analysis of New Zealand Listed Companies

Abstract:   This paper examines if board composition has any systematic bearing on derivatives usage by New Zealand listed companies. We also test if derivative usage changed following the introduction of the new 1993 Companies Act. The Act raised expectations of directors' fiduciary responsibilities and the perceived risk of liability on outside directors for poor investment decisions. Using a dataset of listed New Zealand companies in 1994 and 1997, we find companies with higher growth opportunities and a greater proportion of outside directors were less likely to use financial derivatives following the introduction of the new Act. Our results supplement the US‐based literature on derivatives usage by illustrating that internal governance mechanisms can play a role in corporate derivatives policy, and that the legislative and regulatory environment may affect this role.     

董事会委员会有效性与治理溢价——基于中国上市公司的经验研究

本文从投资者角度出发,以是否存在治理溢价作为衡量标准,对董事会专业委员会的有效性进行了分析。通过对沪深两市2002～2005年间面板数据的分析发现,在董事会中设立提名委员会、战略委员会和审计委员会,能够为投资者带来显著的治理溢价,这与麦肯锡公司在2000年和2002年两次对投资者所作调查得出的结论相一致。这些研究结论为我国公司治理改革提供了重要启示,即在资源和时间有限的情况下,应优先解决那些关键治理环节和要素;与此同时,对于尚未发挥应有效力的分委员会,应该分析并克服限制其作用发挥的消极因素,在既有的资源及禀赋约束下,充分发挥董事会专业委员会的积极治理作用。     

The Nature of Board Nominating Committees and Their Role in Corporate Governance

This study examines the association between the employment and composition of nominating committees with board and ownership characteristics. First, the results suggest that the likelihood of using a nominating committee is inversely related to the level of inside ownership and positively weakly, related to the independence, but not the number, of outside board members. Second, the percentage of insiders participating in the committee is positively related to inside ownership, and negatively related to proxies for outside director quality. Finally, outside directors are more likely to serve on the nominating committee the more outside directorships they hold, and the longer their tenure in the firm. The likelihood of insider committee membership rises with a director's equity investment, with board tenure, and with other committee memberships. Taken together, the results are consistent with nominating committees substituting inside ownership in controlling management, mostly improving board quality, and being staffed with independent, experienced, and knowledgable members.     

Corporate Governance Reform,Board Structure,and Its Determinants in the Banking Industry—Evidence from Taiwan

This study employs the data of twenty-seven banks listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2000–11 to examine the determinants of board structure, e.g., board size and the independent directors ratio. The evidence shows that bank size, the degree of revenue diversification, and the CEO’s shareholding are positively associated with the independent directors ratio. A higher outside block shareholding is correlated with a larger board size and a higher independent directors ratio. As the creditors’ stake decreases, a larger board and greater board independence are required to maintain internal corporate governance. Finally, banks with M&A activity tend to downsize their board sizes and reduce board independence in the subsequent period.     

Governance Mechanisms and Ownership in an Emerging Market: The Case of Turkish Banks

This study investigates the relations of board structure, ownership concentration, and ownership type with the performance of banks operating in Turkey from an agency theory and resource-dependency perspective. We use financial ratios and established measures of board characteristics and ownership structure. Our results indicate that board size and duality do not significantly influence the returns on assets of Turkish banks. On the other hand, the tenure of board members is negatively related to performance. Our analysis of board composition reveals a curvilinear relationship with banks' performance, implying that boards composed of a majority of either insiders or outsiders enjoy high performance. Also, ownership concentration and ownership type do not influence firm performance. The results of the financial variables are robust in all models.     

Board diversity reforms: Do they matter for EU bank performance?

We examine the impact of governance reforms related to board diversity on the performance of European Union banks. Using a difference‐in‐difference approach, we document that reforms increase bank stock returns and their volatility within the first 3 years after their enactment. The type of reform matters, with quotas increasing return volatility. The effectiveness of reforms depends on a country's institutional environment. The impact of reforms on return volatility is found to be beneficial in countries more open to diversity, with common law system and with greater economic freedom. Finally, reforms play a bigger role in banks that have ex ante less heterogeneous boards.