Underwriter choice and earnings management: evidence from seasoned equity offerings

Using a sample of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), this paper examines the association between the choice of financial intermediary and earnings management. We contend that with more stringent standards for certification and intense monitoring, highly prestigious underwriters restrict firms’ incentives for earnings management to protect their reputation and to avoid potential litigation risks, while firms with greater incentives for earnings management avoid strict monitoring by choosing low-quality underwriters. Consistent with our predictions, we find an inverse association between underwriter quality and issuers’ earnings management. In addition, we find that underwriter quality is positively related to SEOs’ post-issue performance, even after controlling for the effect of earnings management. We also find that firms with low-underwriter prestige and high levels of earnings management under-perform the most. However, the effect of underwriter choice on post-issue performance does not last long.

Underwriter reputation,earnings management and the long‐run performance of initial public offerings

This study contributes to the extant literature on the nature of earnings management surrounding initial public offerings (IPOs) by investigating the role of underwriter reputation. We argue that prestigious underwriters will protect their reputation by carefully monitoring and certifying financial information on IPO firms, thereby limiting any potential earnings manipulation. As a result, those IPO firms that are associated with more prestigious underwriters are likely to exhibit substantially less‐aggressive earnings management. Conversely, we find the existence of a negative relationship between earnings management and the post‐offer performance of an IPO firm’s stocks only for those firms associated with less‐prestigious underwriters.     

The Pricing of French Unit Seasoned Equity Offerings

Units are bundles of common stock and warrants. By issuing units, firms precommit to a future and uncertain seasoned offering at the exercise price of the warrants. This study shows that the issuance of units seasoned offerings in France is accompanied by significant abnormal returns of on average 9–12%, depending on the computing methods. Underpricing increases with the risk of the issuer and the relative size of the future seasoned equity issue linked to warrant exercises. Our results are consistent with our signaling hypothesis.     

Return and risk in initial public offerings of both shares and warrants

In the past few years there has been an increasing number of new issues of shares of common stock together with warrants intended to raise interest in initial public offerings of relatively young, growing firms. In this study we examine the pricing efficiency of stocks and warrants offered simultaneously to the public as a single unit. We present a model for evaluating the warrants in such offerings and test it empirically against data from the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange, where such offerings have become standard. We find that the issued units are usually undervalued, allowing for significant abnormal positive returns. But, while the warrants are usually underpriced, the stocks are overpriced. Largely consistent with the evidence from other financial markets around the world, we also find abnormal negative rates of return in the long run.     

Seasoned equity offerings and the short- and long-run performance of initial public offerings in the UK

In contrast to the US practice, rights issues is the predominant method of raising additional equity capital in the London market. the UK evidence for the period 1980-1991 provides no support to the hypothesis that IPO firms deliberately underprice to signal their quality and facilitate subsequent seasoned equity offerings. the level of initial returns is related neither to the size of the issue nor to the price response at the announcement of a rights issue. the results demonstrate, however, that firms with higher first day returns are quicker in returning to the market for additional equity capital. There is also strong evidence to suggest that the announcement of a seasoned equity offering follows a period of significant rises in the stock prices of reissuing firms. Such gains are, however, dissipated quickly in the 18 months after the announcement of the seasoned equity offering. the level of underperformance is particularly pronounced for firms that raised relatively small subsequent amounts of capital in relation to funds raised at the initial offering. Thus, the paper documents a pattern of post-issue behaviour which is fundamentally similar for both unseasoned and seasoned equity offerings.     

Accounting information and the valuation of Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs)

This study investigates the association between publicly available information disclosed in the SEO prospectus and offer prices of SEOs, as well as the association between this type of publicly available information and stock returns subsequent to an SEO after controlling for self-selection bias. The empirical evidence shows that disclosure of the planned uses of the SEO proceeds reveals value-relevant information which has been incorporated by the underwriters in setting the offer prices. Control for self-selection bias appears necessary to obtain unbiased estimates in the regression model explaining the determinants of offer price in SEOs.     

Intended Use of Proceeds,Underwriter Quality and the Long‐run Performance of SEOs in the UK

We document that prospectus disclosure of (i) the motives for a seasoned equity offering, and (ii) the choice of underwriter explain the long‐run performance of equity issuers in the UK. Firms citing investment needs show no abnormal performance after the offering and have higher investment rates post‐issue compared to the period before the offering. Issuers that state general corporate purposes and recapitalisation motives underperform, have similar investment rates pre‐ and post‐issue, and their leverage tends to increase after the offering. Further, consistent with the certifying role of underwriters, equity issues underwritten by high‐quality brokers show no evidence of post‐issue abnormal returns, but offerings taken public by low‐quality underwriters exhibit negative abnormal performance. Together, our results document the significant role that prospectus information on the intended use of offering proceeds and on the underwriter play in predicting issuers post‐offering performance in the UK.     

Firm diversification and earnings management: evidence from seasoned equity offerings

Popular press suggests that diversified firms are more aggressive in managing earnings than non-diversified firms. We examine this claim in the seasoned equity offering (SEO) setting, where firms have been shown to have the incentive to manage earnings upwards. Using the cross-sectional modified Jones [(1991) J Accounting Res 29:193–228] model to measure discretionary current accruals, we find that discretionary current accruals are higher among diversified firms than in non-diversified ones. Our evidence is consistent with the view that the extent of firm diversification is directly related to the degree of earnings management. We further show that diversified issuers with high discretionary accruals underperformed other SEO firms.

Influence of media coverage and sentiment on seasoned equity offerings

This article examines the role of media in seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) price and market reactions on SEO announcements. Using a sample of SEO deals in UK, we find that media coverage is significantly and negatively related to SEO price discounts and market returns around SEO announcements. Moreover, we document that more pessimistic media sentiment predicts larger SEO price discounts and more negative market reactions to SEO announcements. In summary, both media coverage and media sentiment influence investor decisions in SEOs, but through different mechanisms.     

Underwriter Spread, Underwriter Reputation, and IPO Underpricing: A Simultaneous Equation Analysis

This paper studies the relationships between underwriter reputation, underwriter spread, and IPO underpricing. We consider the information content of underwriter spread and find that it conveys information pertinent to IPO quality. Because underwriter spread is endogenous, underpricing and underwriter spread are jointly determined in a simultaneous equation system. Also, we examine the IPO market for evidence of segmentation, and our results suggest some market segmentation. Underwriter spread impacts initial underpricing for a group of medium-reputation underwriters, while underpricing affects underwriter spread for groups of low- and high-reputation underwriters. Consequently, high-risk IPOs may not be priced the same way as low-risk IPOs. We attribute this finding to regulation, competition, and/or market segmentation.     

Investor sentiment,SEO market timing,and stock price performance

This article details an investigation of the impact of investor sentiment on the probability of firms conducting seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and on stock price performance around and subsequent to SEOs. The results show that investor sentiment has a positive impact on SEO probability and that this impact is stronger for small and young firms. Furthermore, firms conducting SEOs during high sentiment periods experience less severe short-run price drops around the issuance yet more severe post-issue long-run underperformance, compared with firms conducting SEOs during low sentiment periods. These effects of investor sentiment on stock price performance are stronger for small, young, and high market-to-book ratio firms.     

Private Placement of Common Equity and Earnings Expectations

We examine earnings forecast revisions by analysts subsequent to the announcement of private equity placements. Results show that analysts make significant upward revisions to their forecasts for current-year earnings. Furthermore, these forecast revisions are significantly related to announcement-period abnormal returns, but not to the risk changes accompanying the equity placement. These findings are consistent with the information hypothesis, which suggests that private equity placements convey favorable information about future earnings.     

Wimp or tough guy: Sequential default risk and signaling with mortgages

When analyzing what to do with a currently defaulted loan, the lender must consider the impact of his foreclosure versus workout decision on the expected payoff of subsequent loans as well as on the payoff of the current loan. This is because borrowers with future loan payoff dates can observe the lender's actions and update prior information regarding the lender's toughness or wimpiness when dealing with defaulted loans. In this paper we consider the strategic interaction between a lender and multiple borrowers, where borrowers have distinct, sequentially maturing mortgage loans and where the lender has private information regarding the magnitude of his foreclosure costs. We find that a variety of strategic outcomes can occur that explain the co-existence of workout and foreclosure in the mortgage marketplace. In general, the lender's workout/foreclosure response depends on the cost of bluffing (e.g., foreclosing when workout is cheaper) versus the value of reducing expected defaults and workout concession losses on future loans (e.g., imperfect foreclosure cost information leads future borrowers to payoff the mortgage when default would have been optimal under perfect information). Given recently revised expectations regarding the depth of the real estate recession, our results may explain the move by many lenders away from granting workout concessions and toward taking a harder line when dealing with defaulting borrowers.     

Independent director reputation incentives,accruals quality and audit fees

While prior research provides abundant evidence that independent directors are associated with favorable outcomes, researchers have only recently started to investigate the impact of independent director reputation incentives. This study examines whether the reputation incentives of independent directors are associated with accruals quality and audit fees. The results reveal a negative relationship between the proportion of independent directors with relatively low reputation incentives and accruals quality. Further, the proportion of independent directors with relatively low reputation incentives is positively associated with audit fees, suggesting that auditors view lower reputation incentives as increasing risk. We also find that Big 4/5 auditor office size moderates the relationship between independent director reputation incentives and audit fees. Specifically, our results indicate that audit fees increase less in response to lower reputation incentives as office size increases, suggesting that larger offices respond to the risks associated with lower reputation incentives more efficiently than smaller offices.     

Initiating coverage,broker reputation and management earnings forecasts in Australia

We examine more than 5000 recommendations made by Australian brokers in the period 1996–2001. We find evidence that initiating recommendations produce greater share price responses than continuing recommendations, particularly for hold, underperform and sell recommendations. We also find evidence that initiating recommendations made by higher‐reputation brokers and those made in the absence of a management earnings forecast attract different share price responses. Finally, we find that share price responses to initiating recommendations, conditional on the market consensus recommendation, are significantly different to continuing recommendations.     

公司声誉、审计师声誉与权益资本成本——基于中国民营上市公司的经验证据

以2009~2013年中国沪深两市 A 股民营上市公司为样本,实证检验审计师声誉、公司声誉与权益资本成本的关系。研究发现：限制其他条件,审计师声誉、公司声誉分别与公司权益资本成本呈显著负相关。进一步研究发现,随着公司自身声誉的逐步建立,审计师声誉对于公司权益资本成本的影响将会逐渐减弱,公司声誉对于审计师声誉具有替代作用。     

Agency Problems and the Performance of Venture-backed IPOs in Germany: Exit Strategies,Lock-up Periods,and Bank Ownership

Abstract

The agency problems for initial public offerings are well documented in the literature. The objective of this research is to investigate the potential conflicts of interest for the ‘Neuer Markt’ in Germany. Of special interest are venture-backed IPOs and those in which banks acted as venture capitalist, underwriter, and provided analyst recommendations. High initial returns and outperformance are observed over the first 6 months of trading, which decreases significantly over the subsequent 18 months. The individual performance depends on the VC's underwriter and bank affiliation, exit behaviour, and lock-up commitment. Venture capitalists, and especially banks, timed their exit well. This indicates some serious agency problems in the German IPO market.     

Cash holdings,risk, and expected returns

In this paper I develop and empirically test a model that highlights how the correlation between cash flows and a source of aggregate risk affects a firm's optimal cash holding policy. In the model, riskier firms (i.e., firms with a higher correlation between cash flows and the aggregate shock) are more likely to use costly external funding to finance their growth option exercises and have higher optimal savings. This precautionary savings motive implies a positive relation between expected equity returns and cash holdings. In addition, this positive relation is stronger for firms with less valuable growth options. Using a data set of US pubic companies, I find evidence consistent with the model's predictions.     

Underpricing, Subsequent Equity Offerings, and the Long-Run Performance of Japanese IPOs

Using data on IPOs that are issued in Japan during January 1975–March 1989, we examine the deliberate underpricing and overreaction hypotheses to explain high initial returns at offering dates. Specifically, we analyze the cross-sectional pattern of the short- and long-run performance of IPOs. The obtained results indicate that the deliberate underpricing theories which we examine are unable to explain the high initial returns on the Japanese IPOs. Furthermore, for the average of the IPOs, the empirical results are not consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. However, there is evidence consistent with the hypothesis that for a certain minority group of IPOs, the high initial returns occur due to overreactions by investors. We interpret the overall results as indicating that the high initial returns on the Japanese IPOs can be attributed to a mixture of both underpricing and investor overreaction. We conjecture that the binding regulations in Japan led to underpricing. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.