Why Do Firms Adopt Profit-Sharing and Employee Ownership Plans?

Profit-sharing and employee ownership in companies have attracted considerable interest, yet there has been little research on factors predicting the adoption and maintenance of these plans. This study uses new data from a survey of 500 US public companies, and panel data on corporate financial variables, to examine factors predicting the presence and adoption of profit- sharing and employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) in the 1975–91 period. Several findings support productivity-related motivations for such plans (including higher R&D levels among old profit-sharing firms, and recent adoption of job enrichment programmes among new profit-sharing firms), while others support flexibility-related motivations (including higher variance in profits prior to the adoption of profit-sharing plans and ESOPs). Unionized firms were less likely to have either type of plan in 1975, but equally likely to adopt them subsequently (often in concessionary contracts). Comparisons of cross-sectional and panel results illustrate advantages of panel data in disentangling the causes and effects of profit-sharing and ESOPs.     

Employer Pension Contributions and 401(k) Plans: A Note

We investigate the pension choices of over 800 firms between 1988 and 1996. Using the data on pension plan finances from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 5500, required annually from firms sponsoring plans, and on firm finances from Compustat, we find support that a 10 percent increase in the use of 401(k) plans reduces pension costs per worker by 1.8 to 2.0 percent. Collective bargaining helps to mitigate the decline in employer costs.     

Indifference to profit-sharing is consistent

The incentive for a firm unilaterally to switch from a conventional wage to profit-sharing is analyzed for a duopoly as a function of the degree of market power. The point of indifference is shown to be the consistent-conjectures mode of conduct; more competitive firms will not switch while less competitive firms will switch. A proportional tax on corporate profits will not alter the incentive of a firm to adopt or reject profit-sharing.This paper embodies the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve System or of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.     

The Stampede Toward Defined Contribution Pension Plans: Fact or Fiction?

This paper questions recent conclusions that the trend in primary plan type toward defined contribution plans and away from defined benefit plans is due to increased pension regulation. Analysis of data from IRS 5500 filings by pension administrators shows that at least half of the trend is due to a shift in employment mix toward firms with industry, size, and union status that have historically been associated with lower defined benefit plan rates. Not more than half of the trend can be attributed to a "stampede" by firms with given industry, size, and union status toward defined contribution pension coverage.     

Scale Economies in Union Pension Plan Administration: 1981–1993

We confirm previous findings that as the pension plan size increases, administrative costs per participant and asset fall after controlling for the proportion of retirees in a plan. However, we question the inference that the high costs of administering small plans partly explains why small firms generally do not sponsor pension plans. This study uses Internal Revenue Service annual data to compare the administrative costs of Taft-Hartley plans from 1981 to 1993. Centralization may save costs but also may inhibit formation. Union plans are naturally small; they form at the local level.     

Toward Explaining the Growth of Defined Contribution Plans

Since 1980, defined benefit plans have steadily lost market share to defined contribution plans. In 1979, defined contribution plans had 17 percent of the primary pension market. By 1988, it was 34 percent. About half of the shift is attributable to a loss of employment in large unionized firms where defined benefit plans are used intensively. But evidence of large changes in preferences is also found in the data. One likely explanation is the introduction of a new variety of defined contribution plans, so-called 401(k)s. These pension plans have productivity traits that make them more effective competition for defined benefit plans.     

Is profit-sharing participation?: Evidence on alternative firm types from West Germany

Systematic differences are reported in the structural and performance characteristics of firms in subsamples based on (a) profit-sharing and (b) participation-in-control (employee-involvement in decision-making). Moreover, whereas group (b) firms tend to conform to a theoretical, participatory stereotype, group (a) firms do not. The coincidence of profit-sharing and participation-in-control in a given firm is not surprisingly quite low. These results cast doubt on current theoretical and policy arguments concerning productivity gains dependent on the joint use of participation and profit-sharing, but indicate that one precondition for Weitzman-type macro-economic benefits of profit-sharing in the absence of participation may be present.     

Employment Growth and Stability under Profit-Sharing: A Longitudinal Study

This study tests the hypotheses that employment will increase and become more stable when firms replace traditional reward systems with a bifurcated approach incorporating profit-sharing. Time-series data for 443 publicly traded profit-sharing firms and a closely matched group of industry non-sharers were analysed before and after plan implementation. While there was evidence that profit-sharing generated short-term growth, little support emerged for its theorized effect on employment variability. Unlike previous reports, organizational size was more likely to influence the impact of share arrangements than was industry type.     

Intellectual Capital,Monitoring, and Risk: What Predicts the Adoption of Employee Stock Options?

We use empirical analysis to analyze company characteristics associated with the adoption and maintenance of broad‐based stock option plans. First, a cross‐sectional analysis evaluates what company characteristics are now associated the incidence of such plans. Second, a longitudinal analysis examines the company characteristics that predict the adoption of such plans. Our results show that firms with higher levels of intellectual capital and capital intensity are more likely to adopt and maintain employee stock option plans.     

Cash Balance Plans and the Distribution of Pension Wealth

Recent pension plan conversions by numerous large employers have sparked debate about the merits of cash balance plans. This article compares pension wealth in traditional defined benefit (DB) plans and cash balance plans for a national sample of covered Americans aged 51 to 61. The simulations indicate that replacing DB plans with cash balance plans would redistribute pension wealth from those with long-term jobs to those with multiple short-term jobs and from those with substantial pension benefits to those with more limited benefits. Perhaps unexpectedly, women at midlife in 1992 with DB coverage would lose wealth in cash balance plans, but future cohorts of women are likely to fare better.     

Pensions and Deferred Befefits as Strategic Compensation

This paper examines labor-oriented aspects of pensions and deferred benefits. Recent work has embedded pensions in the framework of optimal compensation schemes that induce workers to behave in certain ways. Most pension formaulas present workers with securities that look like optioons the tendency for turnover rates to fall as vesting approaches, even though there has been no change in the naive valuation of pension accrual. The paper also discusses the use of pensions as severance pay and notes that the various pension formaulas have different incentive effects.     

Strategic orientations,incentive plan adoptions,and firm performance: evidence from electric utility firms

This study examines the performance implications of the fit between strategic orientations and incentive plan characteristics. Research hypotheses are based on a framework that draws upon managerial discretion and agency theories to identify the links between firm strategy, managerial motivation and control, managerial risk-bearing, and incentive plan characteristics. A pooled cross-sectional, time series research design is used to test hypotheses in a sample of 50 electric utility firms. Consistent with theory, results indicate that annual bonus plans that use cash incentives and accounting measures of performance lead to better performance among firms with Defender strategic orientations. In contrast, firms with Prospector strategic orientations realize performance benefits when they adopt stock-based incentive plans and use market measures to evaluate managerial performance. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An Empirical Analysis of the Relationship between Employee Ownership and Employment Stability in the US: 1999–2011

Do firms with employee ownership (EO) programs exhibit greater employment stability in the face of economic downturns? In particular, are firms with EO programs less likely to lay off workers during negative shocks? In this article, we examine the relationship between EO programs and employment stability in the United States using longitudinal Form 5500‐CompuStat matched data on the universe of publicly traded companies during 1999–2011. We examine how firms with EO programs weathered the recessions of 2001 and 2008 in terms of employment stability relative to firms without EO programs, and also whether such firms were less likely to lay off workers when faced with negative shocks more broadly. In our econometric analyses, we use a rich array of measures of EO at firms, including the presence of EO stock in pension plans, the presence of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), the value of EO stock per employee, the share of the firm owned by employees, the share of workers at the firm participating in EO and the share of workers at the firm participating in ESOPs. We also consider both economy‐wide negative shock measures (increases in the unemployment rate, declines in the employment‐to‐population ratio) and firm‐specific negative shock measures (declines in firm sales, declines in firm stock price). Our results indicate that EO firms exhibit greater employment stability in the face of economy‐wide and firm‐specific negative shocks.     

借鉴电网安全管理，保卫企业年金安全

企业年金是以信托关系为法律基础,企业年金基金属于职工的个人资产,是职工的"养命钱",具有定期预缴、延期给付和长期储蓄3个基本特点,伴随职工工作的全过程。企业年金运营和管理的链条长、环节多。借鉴电网安全管理机制,确保国家电网公司系统企业年金的基金安全、信息安全、系统安全、人员安全,是公司系统社保工作者的最大责任。     

Profit sharing and market structure

We study how agents decide between working for firms with profit sharing and firms in which pay is based on individual productivity. Profit sharing has the disadvantages of free riding and adverse selection. The benefit of profit sharing is that it makes easier for agents to signal their productivity. We show that in equilibrium skilled agents are more likely to belong to profit sharing organizations. The analysis provides a framework for understanding the market structure of industries like law, accounting and consulting services in which both profit-sharing partnerships and “eat-what-you-kill” firms co-exist and compete with each other.     

Defined Contribution Plans and the Distribution of Pension Wealth

Over the past 20 years, the defined benefit (DB) plan has been replaced by the defined contribution (DC) plan as the most popular form of pension plan. This study examines the likely consequences of this transformation for both the level and distribution of future pension wealth using a sample of DB and DC plans from the Survey of Consumer Finances. The results reveal that the shift from DB to DC plans is likely to simultaneously increase the level and inequality of pension wealth at retirement. The evidence also suggests that the shift to DC plans may result in less pension wealth at retirement for low‐income workers, women, and minorities.     

The Survival Rate of Defined-Benefit Plans, 1987-1995

We look at the survival rate of defined-benefit pension plans with at least 500 participants over the period 1987–1995. We find that termination in favor of defined-contribution plans is a rare event and that the vast majority of these plans survive, albeit often under a different plan sponsor or in a new merged plan. Indeed, the frequency of mergers is an important feature in the pension market and partially explains the growing number of large defined-benefit plans.     

Faculty Choice of a Pension Plan: Defined Benefit versus Defined Contribution

Worker preferences between defined-benefit and defined-contribution pension plans are estimated using a sample of faculty members at North Carolina State University. Newly hired faculty must decide between the state retirement plan (a final pay, defined-benefit plan) and one of three defined-contribution plans (TIAA/CREF, VALIC, Lincoln National). This analysis allows the authors to estimate the choice of a pension plan holding constant the place of employment. The study uses both university employment records and a faculty survey to examine the factors that determine the choice of a pension.     

Pension Substitution in the 1980s: Why the Shift toward Defined Contribution?

The relative decline of defined benefit (DB) pension plans, and growth of defined contribution (DC) plans, has been often noted but not extensively explored. This paper reports on the construction of a new longitudinal company-based data set on pension plans for the years 1980-86 (including all U.S. companies with large plans, and a 10 percent sample of companies with small plans, at any point during this period). The decline in DB coverage is primarily due to fewer participants in companies maintaining such plans, while very little of the growth in DC coverage is due to companies terminating DB plans. Also, multinomial logit analysis of manufacturing company choices indicates that the higher administrative costs of DB plans lead new adopters to favor DC plans, but this explains little of the tremendous growth in DC plans. In addition, higher industry variability and capital intensity, and smaller company size, lead new adopters to favor DC plans.     

Profit Sharing and Public Policy: Insights for the United States

Nations differ in their approach to profit sharing, with policies ranging from nonintervention to mandatory sharing. Mounting evidence that profit sharing has a positive impact on employment and productivity has spurred some American legislators and economists to propose additional tax incentives. While this option has been effective in increasing the number of plans, a more prudent response would be the creation of a national tripartite body to accelerate and enhance the quality of profit-sharing research.