中国国有商业银行激励机制：一个新的非线性激励契约

我国传统的银行管理人激励方法是根据银行最终实现的收益决定对管理人的奖励，一般是线性的：本文通过对这种线性激励契约的剖析，发现由于银行管理人的有限责任以及企业软约束的存在，银行的预期收益与风险水平呈倒U字的二次关系，因此线性激励契约只会使管理人过度冒险，而无益于银行的预期收益。因此，本文构建了修正的资本资产定价模型，并在此基础上提出了一个新的非线性激励契约：对管理人的奖励计划不再是连续的，而是提供一个有限的奖励范围以避免银行管理人的过度冒险；只有当银行管理人选择的风险水平不超过最优风险水平时，他才可以拿到与其努力水平相等的奖金。     

上市银行高管过度激励与风险承担水平的实证研究

本文基于我国14家上市银行2007-2013年的数据,通过考察不同性质银行的高管所面临的过度激励与风险承担之间的关系,检验了我国商业银行高管薪酬激励机制的有效性.实证结果表明:第一,我国上市商业银行高管薪酬存在过度激励,且过度激励会造成银行风险承担水平的提高.第二,不同性质银行高管的过度激励对风险承担水平的影响是不同的.国有控股银行高管若受到过度激励,有可能会盲目扩大经营规模,增加银行的经营风险;而非国有控股银行的高管相对而言,这种激励作用会较弱.为此,要进一步推进商业银行高管薪酬改革,防止过度激励.尤其是国有控股银行高管薪酬机制设计要更加关注风险因素.     

供应链金融中存货质押融资的收益共享契约研究

本文研究供应链金融中存货质押融资模式下收益共享契约的设计问题,即在需求不确定和银行风险(Downside-risk)规避的前提下,通过对契约合同中收益共享系数的范围控制以实现供应链的协调。本文首先给出了考虑银行利息支出成本的供应链收益共享契约模型,其次分析了银行下侧风险控制模型下的供应链内收益共享系数应满足的约束条件,最后得出银行风险规避系数对收益共享系数有一定影响,即当质押率处于一定范围内时,在银行下侧风险控制的影响下仍可得到使供应链协调的契约,当质押率大于这一范围时,供应链成员间无法达成有效契约协调,而当质押率小于这一范围时,银行风险规避对收益共享系数的约束不影响最终契约中该系数的范围。     

公平关切影响银行激励决策吗? ——基于线上农产品供应链金融的分析

以农产品电子订单质押融资为例,运用委托代理理论,分析线上农产品供应链金融业务中公平关切在银行与B2B平台间的激励契约设计中的效应问题.研究发现:公平关切能够提高B2B平台努力水平;银行激励及收益随着公平关切系数增加呈现先增加后减少的变化特征.鉴于此,银行设计激励契约时应关注B2B平台公平关切因素以提高激励效应.     

商业银行特许权价值风险约束效应研究

从银行特许权价值的定义入手,利用样本银行1998～2007年的年度数据,阐述和分析了银行特许权价值的风险约束效应。研究结果表明,银行特许权价值对银行的风险行为有很强的约束效应,即拥有较高特许权价值的银行不会倾向于采取过度冒险的经营行为,而那些特许权价值较低的银行会增加冒险经营的动机。     

商业银行经济资本回报率应用探讨

经济资本回报率是经风险成本调整后的收益与经济资本的比率，它在综合考核银行的盈利能力时充分考虑银行的风险管理能力，因此又称风险调整后的收益率，其计算公式如下：RAROC=收益-预期损失/经济资本（非预期损失）；     

加强微观审慎监管是构建金融体系稳定的关键

全球金融危机爆发后,二十国集团(G20)以及国际标准制定者对全球金融体系监管改革提出多项建议。这些改革提议大都强调对银行的监管,以便帮助全球金融体系化解银行的过度风险,遏制银行的过度冒险行为。     

高铁PPP项目与商业银行风险——影响机理和博弈分析

基于不完全契约理论,本文分析了高铁PPP项目中银行过度承担风险的影响机理,并构建三方动态讨价还价博弈模型,计算得出风险分担的最优纳什均衡解.结果显示:契约机制难以有效约束公共部门和私营部门向银行过度转移风险行为;三方威慑作用和损耗系数决定了实际博弈中的风险分担比例;公共部门威慑作用更大,损耗系数更小,处于优势地位,易使私营部门和银行形成"同盟"与公共部门对抗.银行若想降低己方的风险比例,应更多了解对方的信息与谈判策略,减少谈判次数,降低损耗成本.     

加强微观审慎监管是构建金融体系稳定的关键

全球金融危机爆发后，二十国集团（G20）以及国际标准制定者对全球金融体系监管改革提出多项建议。这些改革提议大都强调对银行的监管，以便帮助全球金融体系化解银行的过度风险．遏制银行的过度冒险行为。     

高铁PPP项目与商业银行风险——影响机理和博弈分析

基于不完全契约理论,本文分析了高铁PPP项目中银行过度承担风险的影响机理,并构建三方动态讨价还价博弈模型,计算得出风险分担的最优纳什均衡解.结果显示:契约机制难以有效约束公共部门和私营部门向银行过度转移风险行为;三方威慑作用和损耗系数决定了实际博弈中的风险分担比例;公共部门威慑作用更大,损耗系数更小,处于优势地位,易使私营部门和银行形成"同盟"与公共部门对抗.银行若想降低己方的风险比例,应更多了解对方的信息与谈判策略,减少谈判次数,降低损耗成本.     

商业银行股权激励的特殊意义与现实问题分析

银行业普遍存在的管制,使银行面临着有限的控制权市场和接管威胁,从而大大降低了市场约束银行管理者的能力,因此对银行而言,通过股权激励机制协调股东和管理者的利益、降低代理成本显得尤为重要.我国商业银行实施股权激励不应盲目照搬西方国家的范例,应慎重选择股权激励的实施范围,目前最好只局限在高级管理人员,通过对股权激励机制的合理设计来充分发挥其长期激励效应,切不可盲目扩大激励范围,将股权激励演变成一种新的福利措施.应尽快建立起以经济资本为核心的业绩考核体系,在经济资本的约束下实现业务发展模式和盈利模式的转变.股权激励机制的有效实施离不开完善的银行治理结构.     

资本约束、激励相容与银行业监管

金融风险可以划分为商业性金融风险和制度性金融风险.制度性金融风险是我国银行业面临的最主要风险,因此银行监管激励相容度是更适合我国国情的概念.在银行发展史上,呈现出两种迥异的银行成长模式:一种是资金约束型的数量成长模式;一种是资本约束型的质量成长模式,资本约束型的质量成长模式是商业银行的必然选择.资本约束机制与激励相容机制共同发挥作用是银行监管激励与约束机制有效运作的必要条件.激励相容和资本约束要以监管绩效为基础协调发挥作用、不可分割.资本约束与激励相容理念不仅体现在理论研究中,而且体现在国际银行业监管实践中.     

高管声誉激励契约的强度、效用及作用途径——一个中国情境下的实证检验

通过对部分高管进行访谈,并运用中国上市公司2007~2013年的平衡面板数据进行实证检验,结果表明：高管声誉激励强度与公司规模显著正相关,高管人力资本在两者之间具有中介作用;声誉激励通过与显性激励的交互效应从而对公司绩效产生间接的效用,具体而言,声誉激励与薪酬激励之间存在互补效应,与股权激励之间存在互替效应;产权性质能够对高管声誉激励效用产生显著的影响。     

销售人员线性激励合同的信息经济学分析

销售经理往往很难监督销售人员是否努力工作,使得销售人员的激励合同很难基于销售人员的努力程度,而是基于销售人员的销售业绩.运用委托代理理论构建的销售人员基于销售业绩的线性契约,探讨销售提成系数以及基本工资的影响,有利于销售人员激励合同的确定.     

Dividend taxes and stock volatility

How do dividend taxes affect stock volatility? If a risk-averse executive faces price risk through his incentive contract, changes in stock volatility due to dividend taxes may increase agency costs and therefore decrease overall welfare. In this paper, I use a decrease in dividend taxes as a natural experiment to identify their effect on the firm’s idiosyncratic stock return volatility. Stock volatility decreased after the tax cut for firms at which executives have larger sensitivity to stock price in their incentive compensation package relative to firms at which executives have a smaller sensitivity. Therefore, with risk-averse executives and risk-neutral shareholders, dividend taxes may exacerbate agency costs. The increase in agency costs will decrease shareholder welfare, which can be partially offset by the use of options in the employment contract.     

The Owner–Manager Conflict in Insured Banks: Predetermined Salary versus Bonus Payments

This article examines the incentive of a bank's owners and manager to increase the level of assets risk if bank deposits are insured. The model consists of three players: a public insurer (e.g., the FDIC), the bank's owners, and its manager. Empirical evidence has shown that the management of risk (e.g., credit and interest rate risk) and a low level of audit and control can be instrumental in causing banks to fail or get into financial difficulties. In the model, the form of compensation to the manager plays a crucial role in determining the level of asset risk. The article shows under which conditions and form of compensation bank's owners and manager have an incentive to raise the risk level. The model is run first under the assumption that the information between the bank and the insurer is symmetrical, and then under the assumption that it is asymmetrical for two forms of pay: a predetermined salary; and bonus payments whose value is not known at the time the contract between the owners and the manager is signed. The article also examines whether there is a Pareto-optimal contract between the owners and the manager as regards the risk level, given the two forms of pay. This question is important because the absence of such a contract could indicate the existence of a source of instability in the banking system.     

State contingent banking and asset price bubbles: The case of Islamic banking industry

This paper examines how state contingent banking can help neutralize challenges like debt overhang and lack of optimal risk takings, problems associated with conventional banking that can eventually manifest in the creation of asset price bubbles and a financial crisis. Our analysis also contributes to the literature on Islamic banking which considers state contingent contracts as ideal from a religious perspective. We develop a model of banking with state contingent contracts on the liability and asset sides. Our model shows that in state contingent banking, the returns for the depositors, bank and the borrowers are more aligned with the real economy, which reduces the incentive for excessive borrowing, lending and investing. Our model also shows that with the state contingent banking on the liability side, during periods of heightened macroeconomic risk, depositors' payoff would be more volatile reducing the liquidity influx from the real economy to the banking sector. This neutralizes the pressure on state contingent banks to excessively lend on the asset side. Our model further demonstrates that state contingent contracts on the asset side can help avoid too much (or too little) lending by reducing the managerial discretion in charging low (or high) interest rates. With returns linked to the prices of the underlying assets, state contingent contracts may prevent lack of optimal risk taking.     

管理层权力、高管人力资本激励与企业绩效

合理的高管人力资本激励机制是发挥高管人力资本效用进而提高企业绩效的有效途径。本文通过实证检验管理层权力、高管人力资本激励与企业绩效的关系,结果表明:高管货币薪酬与企业绩效显著正相关,与国有企业相比,非国有企业的相关性更明显;管理层权力削弱了高管货币薪酬对企业绩效的激励作用。国有企业的在职消费与企业绩效显著负相关,但非国有企业其二者之间的相关性并不显著;管理层权力加大了在职消费对企业绩效的负向影响。高管团队内部薪酬差距与企业绩效显著正相关,且非国有企业比国有企业的相关性更明显;管理层权力削弱了高管团队内部薪酬差距对企业绩效的激励作用。     

Incentive effects of stock purchase plans

Financial economists are interested in whether alternative compensation plans are adopted primarily for tax, incentive or signaling reasons. As most compensation plans have tax implications, examining for other effects is difficult. In this paper we examine the stock market reaction to employee stock purchase plans which are ‘non-tax advantageous’ and adopted for incentive/signaling reasons. The results suggest that (1) equity-based compensation schemes have a positive effect on shareholder wealth for reasons other than tax reduction, (2) a motive for adopting these plans is to align managerial and shareholder interests, and (3) equity ownership motivates key executives more than subordinate employees.     

Accident Year Development, Bonus Banks, and Insurance Incentive Compensation

Insurance claims can take years to resolve, which makes insurance performance measurement—and incentive compensation based on such measurement— challenging. The insurance industry utilizes a method of analysis called accident year analysis to manage the temporal challenge inherent in insurance claims. Despite the managerial and economic utility of this method of analysis, it has generally not been applied to incentive compensation programs for insurance company executives and employees. This article will explain accident year analysis, and will show how it can be merged with the bonus bank concept and the Insurance Performance Measure, which is an insurance economic profit metric, to construct an economically consistent insurance incentive compensation program.