Generalized cointegration: a new concept with an application to health expenditure and health outcomes

We propose a new generalization of the concept of cointegration that allows for the possibility that a set of variables are involved in an unknown nonlinear relationship. Although these variables may be unit-root non-stationary, there exists a nonlinear combination of them that takes account of such non-stationarity. We then introduce an estimation technique that allows us to test for the presence of this generalized cointegration in the absence of knowledge as to the true nonlinear functional form and the full set of regressors. We outline the basic stages of the technique and discuss how the issue of unit-root non-stationarity and cointegration affects each stage of the estimation procedure. We then apply this technique to the relationship between health expenditure and health outcomes, which is an important but controversial issue. A number of studies have found very little or no relationship between the level of health expenditure and outcomes. In econometric terms, if there is such a relationship, then there should exist a cointegrating relationship between these two variables and possibly many others. The problem that arises is that we may be either unable to measure these other variables or that we do not know about them, in which case we may incorrectly find no relationship between health expenditures and outcomes. We then apply the concept of generalized cointegration; we obtain a highly significant relationship between health expenditure and health outcomes.     

An Optimal Ad Valorem Tax/Subsidy with an Output-Based Refunded Emission Payment for Permits Auction in an Oligopoly Market

In this paper, we explores a hybrid mechanism of output-based refunded emission payment and an ad valorem tax/subsidy to remove the distortions emerging in the permit auction market and the product market. We find that first best outcomes can be achieved under such a hybrid mechanism. A clearing price equal to a Pigouvian tax will endogenously result in the permit auction market. Moreover, we extend the analysis to take into consideration the investment in abatement technology.     

Almost common values auctions revisited

In almost common-value auctions one bidder (the advantaged bidder) has a valuation advantage over all other (regular) bidders. It is well known that in second-price auctions with two bidders, even a slight private-value advantage can have an explosive effect on auction outcomes as the advantaged bidder wins all the time and auction revenue is substantially lower than in a pure second-price common-value auction. We explore the robustness of these results to the addition of more regular bidders in second-price auctions, and the extent to which these results generalize to ascending-price English auctions in an effort to provide insight into when and why one ought to be concerned about such slight asymmetries.     

Exploring pricing rules in combinatorial sealed-bid auctions

The allocation of public goods such as the radio spectrum is a difficult task that the government must face. Currently, auctions are becoming an important tool to deal with this duty. In this context, the rules that the auctioneer establishes are particularly relevant, as the final outcome depends on them. When auctioning many related items, such as spectrum licenses, the bidders’ values for one item may depend on the number of items already obtained (complements and substitutes items). In such circumstances, combinatorial auctions are the most appropriate alternative for allocating lots. This paper analyzes the implications of selecting a particular pricing mechanism on the final result in a combinatorial sealed-bid auction. The following pricing rules are selected: the first-price mechanism, the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism, and the bidder–Pareto–optimal (BPO) core mechanism, a core-selecting auction. To test these pricing rules, a simulator of the auction model has been developed. Then, to tackle the complex problem of simulating bidders’ behavior, a co-evolutionary system has been designed to identify improved strategies. The results revealed that the first-price mechanism yields inefficient outcomes and a notable reduction in the seller's revenues. Both the VCG and BPO mechanisms yield outcomes that are closer to the efficient allocation, and differences in revenues are affected by the presence of asymmetries.     

SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES IN GAMES: AN APPLICATION TO THE OVERBIDDING PUZZLE*

This article illustrates how the joint elicitation of subjective probabilities and preferences may help us understand behavior in games. We conduct an experiment to test whether biased probabilistic beliefs may explain overbidding in first‐price auctions. The experimental outcomes indicate that subjects underestimate their probability of winning the auction, and indeed overbid. When provided with feedback on the precision of their predictions, subjects learn to make better predictions, and to curb significantly overbidding. The structural estimation of different behavioral models suggests that biased probabilistic beliefs are a driving force behind overbidding, and that risk aversion plays a lesser role than previously believed.     

On recombinant estimation for experimental data

The recombinant estimation technique of Mullin and Reiley (2006) can be a useful tool for analyzing data from normal-form games. The recombinant estimator falls within a general category of statistics known as U-statistics. This classification has both theoretical and practical implications: (1) the recombinant estimator is optimal (minimum variance) among unbiased estimators, (2) there is a computationally simple method for computing its asymptotic standard error, and (3) the estimation technique can be extended to multiple outcomes and to other types of inferential procedures commonly used for experimental data, such as the sign test. Simulation evidence suggests that researchers should use the asymptotic standard error rather than the standard error of Mullin and Reiley (2006) since the latter exhibits a downward bias. JEL Classification C12, C90 Although the idea of recombinant estimation appears previously in the literature (for example, Mitzkewitz and Nagel (1993) and Mehta et al. (1994)), Mullin and Reiley (2006) is the first attempt at formalizing the econometric methodology and proposing a method for standard-error calculation.     

Multi-dimensional screening:: A user's guide

Multi-dimensional screening models have many potential applications but economists have so far been hindered by the considerable technical difficulties involved in their resolution. This paper studies the simplest formulation of the general screening model, and we provide a complete solution to this case. We then show how this model can be applied to multi-product nonlinear pricing and to multi-product monopoly regulation. Finally, we discuss how the model has been applied to other economic situations of interest, including auction design and optimal taxation.     

The Effect of Bidder Heterogeneity on Combinatorial Conservation Auction Designs

In an iterative combinatorial auction, bidders can submit bids on individual and/or on combinations of projects in a series of intermediate rounds, where bid prices are revised before a final allocation is made. The iterative format is useful for conservation service procurement as landholders can rely on market information revealed through the rounds to evaluate their choices of projects and bid prices. However, there is no single way of providing the market information. Different designs for generating price information have been proposed. Little is known about the performance of iterative combinatorial auction designs when heterogeneous bidders, with different cost structures, participate in an auction. Using an agent based model, we evaluate a selected set of designs under different bidder heterogeneity scenarios. We observe that higher degrees of heterogeneity lead to lower auction efficiency and that auction outcomes are highly sensitive to price feedback design choices.     

When curiosity kills the profits: An experimental examination

Economic theory predicts that in a first-price auction with equal and observable valuations, bidders earn zero profits. Theory also predicts that if valuations are not common knowledge, then since it is weakly dominated to bid your valuation, bidders will bid less and earn positive profits. Hence, rational players in an auction game should prefer less public information. We are perhaps more used to seeing these results in the equivalent Bertrand setting. In our experimental auction, we find that individuals without information on each other's valuations earn more profits than those with common knowledge. However, given a choice between the two sets of rules, approximately half the individuals preferred to have the public information. We discuss possible explanations, including showing that there is a correlation between ambiguity aversion and a preference for having more information in the auction.     

Auction theory adaptations for real life applications

We develop extensions to auction theory results that are useful in real life scenarios.1. Since valuations are generally positive we first develop approximations using the log-normal distribution. This would be useful for many finance related auction settings since asset prices are usually non-negative.2. We formulate a positive symmetric discrete distribution, which is likely to be followed by the total number of auction participants, and incorporate this into auction theory results.3. We develop extensions when the valuations of the bidders are interdependent and incorporate all the results developed into a final combined realistic setting.4. Our methods can be a practical tool for bidders and auction sellers to maximize their profits. The models developed here could be potentially useful for inventory estimation and for wholesale procurement of financial instruments and also non-financial commodities.All the propositions are new results and they refer to existing results which are stated as Lemmas.     

A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis

In this paper, we examine which auction format, first-price or second-price, a seller will choose when he can profitably cheat in a second price auction by observing all bids by possible buyers and submitting a shill bid as pretending to be a buyer. We model this choice of auction format in seller cheating as a signaling game in which the buyers may regard the selection of a second price auction by the seller as a signal that he is a shill bidder. By introducing trembling-hand perfectness as a refinement of signaling equilibrium, we find two possible strictly perfect signaling equilibria. One is a separating equilibrium in which a noncheating honest seller selects a first price auction and a cheating seller does a second price auction. In another pooling equilibrium, however, both cheating and non-cheating sellers select a second price auction. The conclusion that a seller chooses a second price auction even if he cannot cheat is in contrast to the previous literature, which focused on the case of independent values. We thank an anonymous referee for useful comments that have improved the paper. This research was partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B) 15310023 and (C) 18530139.     

Collusion Without Conspiracy: An Experimental Study of One-Sided Auctions

The study investigates collusion-nonfacilitating features of one-sided auctions. We report the results of oral nondescending bid auction experiments in which the strict bid improvement rule was absent, and compare them with the results of sealed bid auction experiments. In the sealed bid experiments the outcomes converged to the competitive equilibrium. In the oral auctions, collusive outcomes emerged and were sustained with bidders using bid matching strategies. We conclude that oral auctions provide opportunities for tacit coordination and collusion enforcement that do not exist under the sealed bid. Therefore, the strict bid improvement rule becomes critical for breaking collusion.     

The Herodotus paradox

The Babylonian bridal auction, described by Herodotus, is regarded as one of the earliest uses of an auction in history. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium analysis of this auction. We provide such an analysis for the two-player case with complete and incomplete information, and in so doing identify what we call the “Herodotus paradox.”     

Entry and Competition Effects in First-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Procurement Auctions

Motivated by several interesting features of the highway mowing auction data from the Texas Department of Transportation (TDoT), we study three competing procurement auction models with endogenous entry. Our entry and bidding models provide several interesting implications. For the first time, we show that even within an independent private value paradigm, as the number of potential bidders increases, bidders' equilibrium bidding behaviour can become less aggressive, and the expected procurement cost may rise because the "entry effect" is always positive and may dominate the negative "competition effect". We then develop structural models of entry and bidding corresponding to the three models under consideration, controlling for unobserved auction heterogeneity, and use the recently developed semi-parametric Bayesian estimation method to analyse the data. We select the model that best fits the data, and use the corresponding structural estimates to quantify the "entry effect" and the "competition effect" with regard to the individual bids and the procurement cost.     

International emission permit markets with refunding

We propose a blueprint for an international emission permit market such as the EU trading scheme. Each country decides on the amount of permits it wants to offer. A fraction of these permits is freely allocated, the remainder is auctioned. Revenues from the auction are collected in a global fund and reimbursed to member countries in fixed proportions. We show that international permit markets with refunding lead to outcomes in which all countries tighten the issuance of permits and are better off compared to standard international permit markets. If the share of freely allocated permits is sufficiently small, we obtain approximately socially optimal emission reductions.     

Informational Size and Efficient Auctions

We develop an auction model for the case of interdependent values and multidimensional signals in which agents' signals are correlated. We provide conditions under which a modification of the Vickrey auction which includes payments to the bidders will result in an ex post efficient outcome. Furthermore, we provide a definition of informational size such that the necessary payments to bidders will be arbitrarily small if agents are sufficiently informationally small.     

The insider's curse

The paper shows that in an open-ascending bid auction with multi-dimensional uncertainty about private and common value components, private information about the common value has negative value for a bidder if there are sufficiently many bidders. We discuss the role of the visibility of bids and the multi-dimensionality of private information for this result.     

Imperfect Competition in Auction Designs

We study the competition between two owners of identical goods who wish to sell them to a pool of potential buyers. The sellers compete simultaneously setting reserve prices for their second price sealed bid auctions. Upon observing the set reserve prices, the buyers decide simultaneously in which auction to bid. We show that this game has (at least) one equilibrium and that all equilibria are inefficient: reserve prices are not driven to zero (cost). We also discuss where and why the parallel between optimal auction design and optimal pricing in the case of monopoly breaks down for oligopoly.     

Auction design and auction outcomes

We study the impact of spectrum auction design on the prices paid by telecommunications operators for two decades across 85 countries. Our empirical strategy combines information about competition in the local market, the level of adoption and a wide range of socio-economic indicators and process specific variables. Using a micro dataset of almost every mobile spectrum auction performed so far—both regional and national—we show that auction design affects final prices paid. Two designs (SMRA with augmented switching and CCA with core pricing) result in auctions with systematically higher normalized returns. Further, we document that spectrum ownership appears to affect prices paid in subsequent auctions. We discuss the mechanisms of cost minimization and foreclosure faced by operators in different regulatory environments. Our findings have implications for policy-makers and regulators.     

Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction

In second price Internet auctions with a fixed end time, such as those on eBay, many bidders submit their bids in the closing minutes or seconds of an auction. We propose an internet auction model, in which very late bids have a positive probability of not being successfully submitted, and show that late bidding in a fixed deadline auction can occur at equilibrium in auctions both with private values and with uncertain, dependent values. Late bidding may also arise out of equilibrium, as a best reply to incremental bidding. However, the strategic advantages of late bidding are severely attenuated in auctions that apply an automatic extension rule such as auctions conducted on Amazon. Field data show that there is more late bidding on eBay than on Amazon, and this difference grows with experience. We also study the incidence of multiple bidding, and its relation to late bidding.