Taxation, Bequests, and Short and Long Run Timber Supplies: An Overlapping Generations Problem

This paper uses an overlapping generations model with one-sided altruism to study the effects of several forest taxes that target bequests and affect timber supply. Unlike previous work, we investigate bequests and timber supply in both the short and long run when bequests are costly (e.g., taxed). The landowner's problem is examined in the short run, while the government's problem is examined in the long run assuming the existence of a steady state. We also consider taxes targeting harvests, growth, savings and bequests. Several new results are established concerning the interactions of taxes that might be used by a government to alter short and long run forest capital stocks: (i) the presence of a forest bequest tax affects the neutrality of harvest tax in both the short and long run, (ii) in the long run the bequest tax decreases bequests and timber supplies. When the bequest tax is not present, the capital income tax is neutral with respect to bequest and timber supply, while the harvest tax is neutral only if forest productivity is also not taxed. Finally, (iii) in the short run, the substitution and total effects of taxes in landowner decisions generally depend on the presence of the bequest tax. The results have implications for Pigouvian tax design and second best tax choice.     

Environmental Quality,Public Debt and Economic Development

This article analyzes the consequences on capital accumulation and environmental quality of environmental policies financed by public debt. A public sector of pollution abatement is financed by a tax or by public debt. We show that if the initial capital stock is high enough, the economy monotonically converges to a long-run steady state. On the contrary, when the initial capital stock is low, the economy is relegated to an environmental poverty trap. We also explore the implications of public policies on the trap and on the long-run stable steady state. In particular, we find that government should decrease debt and increase pollution abatement to promote capital accumulation and environmental quality at the stable long-run steady state. Finally, a welfare analysis shows that there exists a level of public debt that allows a long run steady state to be optimal.     

China's Growing Government Debt in a Computable Overlapping Generations Model

This paper simulates the effects of China's growing government debt in a computable equilibrium model of overlapping generations. Our model assumes that the government increases debt to finance its spending in the short run, and then increases taxes or cuts spending to keep the debt–GDP ratio constant. The spending‐driven government debt increases public capital and output in the short run, but decreases private investment, total capital stock, output, and net exports in the long run, and makes the future generations worse off. Among various means of debt control, a decrease in government spending seems to be the least harmful to private investment, capital stock, and output while an increase in capital taxation is most detrimental.     

Capitalists,workers, and the burden of debt

Abstract

This paper analyzes the burden of debt in a growth model that combines overlapping generations of workers who save for life-cycle reasons and dynastic agents who save for bequest reasons (‘capitalists’). Ricardian Equivalence prevails, but capitalists regard the debt serviced out of taxes on workers as net wealth. In the long run, the Cambridge Theorem holds: the relationship between the rate of profit and rate of growth is determined by the capitalist saving function, independently of worker or government saving. Two alternative closures are considered. Under exogenous growth constrained by a fully employed labor force, debt and deficits result in temporary effects on the distribution of income but permanent effects on the distribution of wealth. Under endogenous growth constrained by a fully utilized capital stock, debt and deficits result in temporary effects on the growth rates of the components of wealth and permanent effects on the level and distribution of capital.     

Environmental Taxes and the Double Dividend

This paper investigates the employment and welfare effects of an environmental tax reform, i.e. raising environmental taxes and using the revenues to cut labor taxes. The analysis reveals that such a reform does not necessarily raise employment: it may replace explicit labor taxes by higher implicit taxes on labor. However, employment may rise if the reform succeeds in shifting the tax burden away from workers to those outside the labor force. The paper explores also how distributional concerns affect optimal environmental taxes.     

Integrated water and economic modelling of the impacts of water market instruments on the South African economy

A static computable general equilibrium model of South Africa is adapted to compare new taxes on water demand by two industries, namely forestry, and irrigated field crops. Comparisons are made with respect to both the short and the long run, in terms of three target variables, namely (i) the environment; (ii) the economy; and (iii) equity. Since the taxes on the two industries do not raise the same amount of revenue, the target variables are calculated per unit of real government revenue raised by the new taxes (also referred to as the marginal excess burdens of the taxes). The model results are robust for moderate values of the water elasticity of demand in the two industries, in both the long and the short run. The tax on irrigated field crops performs better in terms of all three the target variables in the short run. In the long run the tax on irrigated filed crops is better in terms of water saving, but reduces real GDP and the consumption by poor households.     

Index to Volume 52, 2000

In an efficiency wage economy with variable profits, a shift from payroll to employment taxes will reduce unemployment if the tax level is held constant at the initial wage. However, unemployment will rise if firms are constrained to zero profits in the long run and if tax revenues are constant. This reversal of employment effects occurs because the shift in taxes reduces wages. This implies a budget deficit. Hence, taxes will have to be raised if revenues are held constant. If the firm's profits cannot change, the tax increase will cause some firms to close down and unemployment will rise. Thus, the predicted employment consequences of changes in the tax structure depend on assumptions about the time horizon and budget constraint.     

Labor Taxation in Search Equilibrium with Home Production

Conventional models of equilibrium unemployment typically imply that proportional taxes on labor earnings are neutral with respect to unemployment as long as the tax does not affect the replacement rate provided by unemployment insurance, i.e. unemployment benefits relative to after–tax earnings. When home production is an option, the conventional results may no longer hold. This paper uses a search equilibrium model with home production to examine the employment and welfare implications of labor taxes. The employment effect of a rise in a proportional tax is found to be negative for sufficiently low replacement rates, whereas it is ambiguous for moderate and high replacement rates. Numerical calibrations of the model indicate that employment generally falls when labor taxes are raised.     

Shifting Taxes from Labor to Consumption: More Employment and more Inequality?

This paper investigates the effect of shifting taxes from labor income to consumption on labor supply and the distribution of income in Germany. We simulate stepwise increases in the value‐added tax (VAT) rate, which are compensated by revenue‐neutral reductions in income‐related taxes. We differentiate between the personal income tax (PIT) and social security contributions (SSC). Based on a dual data base and a microsimulation model of household labor supply behavior, we find a regressive impact of such a tax shift in the short run. When accounting for labor supply adjustments, the adverse distributional impact persists for PIT reductions, while the overall effects on inequality and progressivity become lower when payroll taxes are reduced. This is partly due to increases in aggregate labor supply, resulting from higher work incentives.     

Endogenous fertility,Ricardian equivalence,and debt management policy

This paper develops a model in which dynastic families optimally determine fertility. Government debt represents a tax on future generations and on childbearing; the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis does not hold. Debt is welfare reducing in that it distorts the fertility decision. An increase in government debt induces a decline in fertility and an increase in the steady state capital/labor ratio. If a government inherits an existing stock of debt, the 1st-best policy is to eliminate the debt immediately. In other situations the optimal debt management policy will not, in general, entail a total elimination of the debt.     

On the Double Dividend under Imperfect Competition

We investigate whether, and under which conditions, a revenue-neutral environmental tax reform may yield an employment double dividend, i.e., an improvement of environmental quality and an increase in aggregate employment. Using a model with two market imperfections – a rigid real wage and imperfect competition in one industry – we show that an employment dividend is plausibly obtained. However, for countries where labor taxes are high and households spend a large share of their income in favor of environmentally harmful consumption goods a double dividend can nevertheless not be obtained, for under these conditions environmental quality deteriorates.     

A dynamic macroeconomic model with monopolistic behavior in the labor market

Is the monopolistic behavior of a wage setting labor union compatible, in the long and in the short run, with price stability and full employment? What is the effect, if any, of economic policies? The answers are strongly affected by the prevailing technology and by the union's objective function. With limited short run production possibilities, a short run trade-off may exist between full employment and maximum expected real wage revenues. In the long run, however, when expectations are fully adjusted, this trade-off disappears. Therefore, a labor union consistently pursuing maximum short run expected real wage revenues may not maximize long run effective real wage revenues. Price stability is granted in the long run, provided inflation is not induced by public policy. The only instrument a pure consuming government has to fight long unemployment is to reduce its share of aggregate demand.     

Optimal Monetary Policy, Taxes, and Public Debt in an Intertemporal Equilibrium

This article is devoted to a study of the optimal monetary and fiscal policies within the framework of an overlapping generations model with cash-in-advance constraints. We first characterize the intertemporal equilibrium. Then we show how to decentralize the optimal growth path using available policy instruments (i.e., labor income and capital taxes, public debt, money supply). Between the four instruments: wages and capital taxes, debt and monetary policy, one is redundant among the three last which implies that the Friedman Rule is only a special case.     

经济发展、老龄化与政府债务累积的加速效应

本文基于世界63个经济体1996—2016年的面板数据,运用静态、动态门槛回归模型研究了老龄化对政府债务规模的加速效应。研究表明,从长期来看,老龄化不仅能对政府债务产生显著的正向冲击,而且对于相对发达的经济体而言,老龄化对政府债务累积的影响更大。文章政策含义是,为了减缓加速效应,一方面我们需要通过提高全要素生产率、优化税收结构、完善国有资本划转等方式保持政府收入稳健增长,另一方面需要打破养老支出刚性,使其增长幅度与经济增速和政府收入增速相匹配。     

Fiscal incidence in an overlapping generations model with a fixed asset

We analyze a model of overlapping generations with a fixed factor (‘land’), malleable capital, and labor. We consider the dynamic effects of various fiscal policies including taxes on rent, wages, and creation of public debt on capital accumulation, land prices, and intergenerational welfare. Minimal assumptions (uniqueness and stability) imply that a land tax may initially raise land values, but the upper bound is less than one-half of the tax revenues. Assuming homothetic utility, the ratio between the long-run capital responses to a land tax and to a lump-sum transfer of equivalent revenue from the young to the old depends solely on the share of labor.     

Asset bubbles,labour market frictions and R&D‐based growth

Employing an overlapping generations model of R&D‐based growth with labour market frictions, this paper examines how employment changes induced by labour market frictions influence asset bubbles and long‐run economic growth. Asset bubbles can (cannot) exist when the employment rate is high (low), which leads to higher (lower) economic growth through labour market efficiency. We also explore the steady state and transitional dynamics of bubbles, economic growth and employment. Furthermore, we show that policy or parameter changes with a negative influence on the labour market can lead to a bubble burst.     

How much to share: Welfare effects of fiscal transfers

Recent sovereign debt crisis has challenged policy makers to explore the possibility of establishing a fiscal transfer system that could alleviate the negative impact of asymmetric shocks across countries. Using a simple labour production economy, we first derive an analytically tractable solution for optimal degree of fiscal transfers. In this economy, fiscal transfers can improve welfare by moving the competitive equilibrium with fiscal transfers closer to the social planner's solution. We then extend the model to a DSGE setting with capital, international bond and linear taxes, and we analyze how implementation of a simple revenue sharing rule affects welfare and macroeconomic variables over time. Simulation results show that risk sharing through fiscal transfers always improves welfare in the long run. However, under certain model specifications, short‐run transitional welfare loss can outweigh the long‐run benefits. These results suggest that, in designing fiscal transfers across countries, government should take into consideration the intertemporal nature of welfare gains.     

Human capital,externalities and growth in an overlapping generations model

We consider an overlapping generations model with endogenous labor supplies by young and old and a human capital accumulation process that relies on the interaction of these two types of labor. This interaction is not understood by the market hence we analyze fiscal policies designed to remedy this. We argue that taxes must be acceptable to people alive at the time of planning. This makes many proposed taxes unfeasible. Two distinct paths to growth emerge; one through increased savings and another through increased workforce participation. The long run rate of growth depends entirely on human capital but we find this to be of little relevance. Some simulation results are presented for two stylized economic blocks calibrated on the USA and the EURO-zone.     

Public debt and optimal taxes without commitment

Benhabib and Rustichini [Optimal taxes without commitment, J. Econ. Theory 77 (1997) 231-259] study the properties of optimal capital taxes in economies without commitment and no government debt. They find that capital taxes may be different from zero at steady state. This note shows that, once governments have the possibility of issuing debt and smoothing taxes over time, optimal steady state capital taxes turn out to be zero.     

GROWTH AND VARIABILITY OF SCHOOL DISTRICT INCOME TAX REVENUES: IS TAX BASE DIVERSIFICATION A GOOD IDEA FOR SCHOOL FINANCING?

School districts in Ohio have the option of diversifying their revenue base by adopting income taxes. Using a panel of Ohio school districts that adopted a local income tax from 1990 to 2008, we find that revenues are procyclical and fluctuate only mildly. The estimated short‐ and long‐run income elasticity of school district income tax revenues is 1.05 and 1.04, respectively. We also find that the school district tax base fully adjusts to its long‐run equilibrium within 2 years. Finally, we show that school district income tax adoption does not provide more stability to total school district tax revenues in the short or the long run. (JEL H71, H75)