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1.
Establishing a model of a monopolistically competitive industry in which risk-averse Cournot firms act under demand uncertainty and in which the output of individual firms and the number of firms in the industry are both endogenously determined by free entry and exit, this paper attempts to investigate the effects of demand uncertainty on the market equilibrium of a monopolistically competitive industry. It is assumed, for calculus simplification, that the firms are identical in the sense that they have the same monopolistic power and the same production technology. The paper presents some interesting and useful comparative statics results which are contrary to those proposed in the existing papers.This is a revised version of my paper which was firstly presented to the annual meeting of the Japanese Association of International Economics held in 1988 and then included partially in my book published in 1989. I am indebted to professors D. Bös, S. Fujino, M. Ohyama, M. Nishijima, to the members of the Public Economics Research Seminar in Bonn, and to two anonymous referees for their helpful discussions and useful suggestions. Any remaining errors, however, are my responsibility.  相似文献   

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Summary The standard neoclassical growth model is modified by introducing a market structure characterized by monopolistic competition and variable demand elasticities. In equilibrium, the price elasticity of the demand schedule facing a typical firm is a function of the aggregate savings rate. The latter feature results from an assumed wedge between the elasticity of substitution across goods in productive activities and that in consumption. In contrast with most examples in the literature our model does not require increasing returns (internal or external) in order to generate multiple equilibria.Thanks are due to Jess Benhabib, Duncan Foley, Oded Galor and participants in seminars at the Econometric Society Summer Meetings (Boston, 1993), NBER 1993 Summer Institute, CORE, UAB, and European University Institute for helpful comments.  相似文献   

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Optimal monopolistic strategy under demand uncertainty   总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0  
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New Keynesian general-equilibrium static models showed the fiscal multiplier is an increasing function of the degree of monopoly. Here, I develop a simple intertemporal model allowing us to study the steady-state role of optimal capital stock (and depreciation) in the fiscal policy transmission mechanism. The GDP multiplier may be locally decreasing in the degree of monopoly when the number of firms is fixed, but results depend strongly on the set of parameter values chosen. Using a net-output definition or allowing for free entry leads to unambiguous dominance of the long-run monopolistic multiplier over the Walrasian one.
Luís F. CostaEmail: URL: http://www.iseg.utl.pt/~lukosta/
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Abstract .  Three sources of gains from trade under monopolistic competition are (i) new import varieties available to consumers; (ii) enhanced efficiency as more productive firms begin exporting and less productive firms exit; (iii) reduced markups charged by firms due to import competition. The first source of gains can be measured as new goods in a CES utility function for consumers. We argue that the second source is formally analogous to the producer gain from new goods, with a constant-elasticity transformation curve for the economy. We suggest that the third source of gain can be measured using a translog expenditure function for consumers, which, in contrast to the CES case, allows for finite reservation prices for new goods and endogenous markups.  相似文献   

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Government spending is a policy instrument used to sustain economic development and improve social welfare. Empirical observations, however, reveal a significant decrease in the government spending to GDP ratio for the United States. In addition, the United States has been observed to exhibit a rise in firm heterogeneity in productivity in recent decades. This paper shows that the optimal size of government expenditure will decrease as firm heterogeneity increases. We thus indicate that the rise in firm heterogeneity in productivity may serve as a plausible vehicle to explain the decline in the share of government spending in GDP for the United States.  相似文献   

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A dynamic overlapping-generations model of a semi-small open economy with monopolistic competition in the goods market is constructed. A tariff increase reduces real output and employment and improves the terms of trade, both in the impact period and in the new steady state. The tariff shock has significant intergenerational distribution effects which are different for creditor and debtor nations. Bond policy neutralizes the intergenerational inequities and allows the computation of first-best and second-best optimal tariff rates. The first-best tariff exploits national market power, but the second-best tariff contains a correction to account for the existence of a potentially suboptimal product subsidy.  相似文献   

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The main purpose of this study is to illustrate, with a simple monopolistic competition trade model, how trade liberalization (i.e., a decline in trade costs) can affect domestic entrepreneurs’ decision between providing domestic or foreign brands, and thus the degree of foreign brand penetration. It is shown that, as trade costs decrease, more entrepreneurs choose to provide foreign brands. Furthermore, the shift to foreign brands is shown to magnify the negative impact of trade liberalization on the profits of firms selling domestic brands.  相似文献   

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We extend the protection for sale model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) by introducing a general model of monopolistic competition with variable markups and incomplete pass-through. We show that the structure of protection emerging in the political equilibrium not only depends on the weight attached by the government to consumer welfare when making its policy decision, but also on the degree of market power of firms and on the terms-of-trade variations due to the degree of pass-through. Our results highlight the importance of preferences in shaping the structure of protection and are consistent with the occurring of protectionism also in unorganized industries.  相似文献   

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This paper challenges the conventional academic view that international outsourcing is just another form of gainful trade. Contrary to that view, we show that labour‐service outsourcing can reduce the high‐wage country's welfare even when product‐market trade is beneficial, within a model that combines involuntary unemployment and monopolistic competition. Outsourcing's impact on welfare is worsened by a definite loss of jobs and a possible contraction in the range of varieties produced worldwide. While owners of capital benefit from outsourcing under certain conditions, labour's welfare always falls.  相似文献   

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This paper compares the equilibrium firm output, market area, price of services, and level of net benefits in monopolistically competitive spatial equilibrium versus the multiplant monopolists spatial equilibrium. Through a computer simulation, it is found that the welfare comparisons depend on population density—the monopolists equilibrium is superior to the monopolistically competitive equilibrium in high density areas and vice versa, contrary to traditional economic theory in which distance is assumed costless.  相似文献   

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Leo Kaas 《Economic Theory》2001,17(2):307-323
Summary. It is known that overlapping generations models with imperfectly competitive firms may exhibit a continuum of stationary equilibria. The reason of this indeterminacy is that different price expectation functions of consumers lead to different objective demand functions against which firms maximize. All these expectation functions fulfill perfect foresight in the equilibrium, but they can be arbitrary off the equilibrium. In this paper it is shown that it is not this arbitrariness which is responsible for the indeterminacy, but that the continuum of stationary equilibria emerges even if expectation functions are rational. Received: March 25, 1999; revised version: February 16, 2000  相似文献   

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We study the indeterminacy of equilibrium in the Fujita–Krugman [When is the economy monocentric?: von Thünen and Chamberlin unified, Reg. Sci. Urban Econ. 25 (1995) 505–528] model of city formation under monopolistic competition and increasing returns. Both the number and the locations of cities are endogenously determined. Assuming smooth transportation costs, we examine equilibria in city-economies where a finite number of cities form endogenously. For any positive integer K, the set of equilibria with K distinct cities has a smooth manifold of dimension K-1 as its interior for almost all parameter values in a regular parameterization. The disjoint union of these sets over all positive integers K constitutes the entire equilibrium set.  相似文献   

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Abstract.  Actual trade and tariff policy prefers ad valorem tariffs to specific tariffs. Yet in this paper we show that, in a setting of monopolistic competition, realizing a given restriction on imports via a specific tariff would generate more consumer utility than obtaining the same restriction via an ad valorem tariff. JEL classification: F12  相似文献   

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We show that an ad valorem tax is better than an equal-revenue unit tax when consumers spend some fixed proportion of income on taxed goods, when firms use constant mark-up pricing, and entry and exit drive per-firm profit to zero. These key assumptions implies that ad valorem taxes are superior in oligopoly as well as monopolistic competition, showing that earlier results on taxes in monopolistic competition (Schröder in J Econ 83(3):281–292, 2004) are not due to the mode of competition, but rather are due to the functional forms used.  相似文献   

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This paper shows that a monopolistically competitive equilibrium can evolve without purposive profit maximization. Specifically, this paper formulates a precise evolutionary dynamic model of an industry where there is continuous entry of firms that randomly select their output levels on entry and fix their output levels thereafter. Firms exit the industry if they fail to pass the survival test of making nonnegative wealth. This paper shows that the industry converges in probability to the monopolistically competitive equilibrium as the size of each firm becomes infinitesimally small relative to the market, as the entry cost becomes sufficiently small, and as time gets sufficiently large. Consequently, in the limit, the only surviving firms are those producing at the tangency of the demand curve to the average cost curve and no potential entrant can make a positive profit by entry.  相似文献   

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