中国环境关税体系建立的初步构想

;环境关税体现了关税的环境保护职能,而且完全符合WTO的原则.目前,美国和OECD成员国等都已成功实施了环境关税措施.然而,中国还没有将环境保护作为一种指导思想贯穿到整个关税制度改革中.本文在简要介绍国外环境关税的实施现状和分析中国建立环境关税体系必要性的基础上,借鉴国外的成功经验,并结合中国的实际情况,提出了建立中国环境关税体系的初步构想.     

环境关税的贸易效应分析

环境关税作为与环境有关的贸易措施被越来越多的国家使用,其实质是借助价格机制使国际贸易商品的环境成本内部化,从而实现利用关税手段达到环境保护的目的.环境关税的贸易效应主要包括贸易条件恶化效应、贸易歧视效应、贸易结构效应和贸易优势效应.当前中国应研究和制定环境关税制度,既要加强环境关税的相关立法工作,也要积极参与制定有关环境关税的国际规范,加强与发展中国家的团结与合作.     

经济发展方式转变视角下的环境规制研究

资源的稀缺性特征决定了可持续的经济发展必然是建立在资源的有效配置基础之上,如何兼顾环境保护和经济发展成为影响经济社会发展亟待解决的核心问题。我国不同经济发展阶段的环境规制政策有一个演变过程,虽然我国实施环境规制政策取得了一些成效,但仍然存在环境规制作用环节不完备、法规制度体系不完善等问题,环境规制对经济发展有一定制约性,可以通过建立环境保护的市场激励机制、完善环境与经济协调发展的财税体制以及建立环境友好型技术创新体系,促进环境保护与经济发展方式转变。     

新《环境保护法》“环境教育”条款有效实施的思考——以环境教育立法为出路

环境教育是提升公众环境意识和引导友善环境行为的主要方式,也是保护和改善生态环境的重要途径。新《环境保护法》第九条作为我国环境教育的"宪法性条款",对推动环境教育发展有重大意义。但是,当前中国环境教育存在着体系不健全、缺乏资金和师资保障等困难。因此,新《环境保护法》中"环境教育"条款的有效实施面临诸多阻碍。纵观国外的环境教育实践,是通过立法不断提升和推进的过程。未来中国的环境教育应当以立法为出路,构建完善的环境教育法律制度,以实现环境教育长期稳定的有序发展。     

环境监管失职罪刑法适用之完善对策

作为渎职犯罪的一种,环境监管失职行为的入刑,表明了中国对环境保护的重视与远见。自环境监管失职罪从1997年《刑法》修订入刑适用至今,本罪在司法实践中,已出现不少法律适用上的困惑与难题亟需妥善解决。主要从环境监管失职罪的实施现状、存在问题、国外的相关规定以及中国所应采取的相关对策为视角,探求针对环境监管失职犯罪实施的完善对策,以期为环境保护起到加强作用。     

中国对外贸易绿色发展的挑战和应对北大核心CSSCI

中国对外贸易蓬勃发展的同时也带来了严重的生态环境问题。资源环境逆差日益严重,碳泄漏引发的国际争议越来越激烈。从"十一五"开始中国尝试建立绿色贸易政策体系,但面临诸多挑战,不仅与"促出口,保增长"政策产生强烈冲突,更是在国际上频频引发贸易摩擦。结合国外发达国家实施绿色贸易政策的经验,对中国对外贸易的绿色发展提出如下建议:战略上必须要避免落入"环境比较优势"陷阱,警惕高能耗产业转移的"锁定效应",要对贸易政策进行环境影响评价;在战术上要恰当利用WTO环境例外规则,构建针对出口的绿色贸易壁垒,积极主动地协调贸易发展与环境保护的关系。     

发达国家绿色税收体系对我国的启示

正1.绿色税收体系的建立应与我国的立法进程相配合。国外的绿色税收体系除了有较为完备的征收和管理体系外,一个主要的特点就是有相关法律法规的保护。我国已经颁布的中华人民共和国环境保护法、海洋环境保护法、水污染防治法等从法律的角度为绿色税收体系的建立和实施提供了可靠的保障。随着经济社会的进一步发展,在我国目前的立法体系中,环境保护法的相关立法与现实经济生活的运行还有较大差距,我国依法促进节能减排、降低能耗的力度将会加大,法律调控的范围也将逐步扩大到生产生活的各个领域,因此,建立完善的绿色税收体系亟须完善立法体系和更新立法原则,以法律为     

中国对外贸易绿色发展的挑战和应对

中国对外贸易蓬勃发展的同时也带来了严重的生态环境问题。资源环境逆差日益严重,碳泄漏引发的国际争议越来越激烈。从"十一五"开始中国尝试建立绿色贸易政策体系,但面临诸多挑战,不仅与"促出口,保增长"政策产生强烈冲突,更是在国际上频频引发贸易摩擦。结合国外发达国家实施绿色贸易政策的经验,对中国对外贸易的绿色发展提出如下建议:战略上必须要避免落入"环境比较优势"陷阱,警惕高能耗产业转移的"锁定效应",要对贸易政策进行环境影响评价;在战术上要恰当利用WTO环境例外规则,构建针对出口的绿色贸易壁垒,积极主动地协调贸易发展与环境保护的关系。     

河南服装出加工企业"碳关税"应对策略研究

随着经济的迅速发展,环境保护问题日益严重,受到了社会各界的高度重视,低碳经济发展势在必行.为了维护国家的根本利益,碳关税随之应运而生.在这种环境下,服装加工企业的发展受到了很大的影响,本文针对碳关税政策的实施环境下对河南服装加工企业在发展中存在的问题以及主要的应对策略进行了深入研究,希望可以找到河南服装加工企业发展低碳经济的可行手段.     

警惕:绿色贸易壁垒的威胁

１９９２年里约热内卢世界环境和发展大会召开以来，在世界范围内掀起了环境保护浪潮。这股浪潮已对国际贸易产生了深刻的影响。随着乌拉圭回合的结束以及关税的降低和对非关税壁垒的约束，用关税和传统的非关税措施来限制进口的余地已经很小，国际贸易壁垒将逐渐转向苛刻的技术标准和环境标准，并将形成新的主要贸易壁垒──绿色贸易壁垒。其主要表现形式有：１．环境进口附加税。环境进口附加税是指进口国以环境保护为理由，对某项产品除征收一般关税外，再加征额外的关税。例如：１９８７年美国对从加拿大、欧共体及墨西哥进口的石油课征…     

美国碳关税政策对中美贸易的影响

基于环境保护和贸易保护的目的,美国提出了征收碳关税诉求。这将对中国对美国的商品出口产生什么样的影响?本文根据我国各行业的碳排放强度和出口贸易细分数据,分析了美国征收碳关税可能会对我国各行业出口贸易的影响,并提出,中国应该在多边贸易组织的框架下对美国将实行的碳关税政策进行限制约束,及时调整国内产业结构。     

Measuring China’s trade liberalization: A generalized measure of trade restrictiveness index

Neither simple average nor import-weighted average tariff indexes are ideal measures of tariff barriers. In this paper, we propose a generalized trade restrictiveness index (GTRI) that extends Feenstra’s (1995) tariff restrictiveness index (TRI) by relaxing the crucial assumption of a small open economy. We show that the GTRI can be measured using import tariffs, import shares, and the corresponding import and foreign export elasticities. We then apply the GTRI to examine how trade restrictiveness has evolved in China from 1997 to 2008, the period in which China entered the WTO. The GTRI indicates a higher level of protection than simple and import-weighted averages, but lower than the TRI. We further show a negative correlation between tariffs and product export supply elasticity, indicating that strategic trade policy was being pursued prior to China’s WTO accession. Finally, we calculate the welfare loss and terms-of-trade gain due to tariff protection. The overall tariff pass-through increases from around 28% to almost 47% because of the WTO.     

我国关税调整对广东经济贸易的影响分析

2011年以来,我国对进口关税进行了一系列新的结构性调整。这是我国外贸政策调整和转变的一次具体表现,从我国外贸战略角度看,贸易平衡发展和转型升级是当前我国外贸发展面,晦的紧迫任务。本文收集近年我国关税调整方案及其对广东经济贸易的影响,首先是对近年来我国关税调整政策内容进行了归纳和总结,提炼了关税调整政策的指导思想和主要特征,进而分析了这一系列调整对广东的经济特别是对外贸易增长和发展转型所造成的影响,最后从政府和企业两个层面提供了政策建议。     

OPTIMUM-WELFARE AND MAXIMUM-REVENUE TARIFFS IN MIXED OLIGOPOLY WITH FOREIGN COMPETITORS

This paper re-examines the important tariff ranking issue under a linear mixed oligopoly model with foreign competitors and asymmetric costs. We demonstrate that under Cournot competition, when the size of domestic private and foreign private firms become more unequally distributed, optimum-welfare tariff will exceed maximum-revenue tariff. We also show that under Stackelberg competition, when the domestic government protects its domestic sector, it will levy higher optimum-welfare tariffs versus maximum-revenue tariffs; however, when it decides to open its doors more for foreign competitors, it will need to levy higher maximum-revenue tariffs versus optimum-welfare tariffs. The above results remain valid whether the domestic public firm acts as a leader or a follower.     

Self-selecting tariffs under pure preferences among tariffs

The behavioral assumptions for welfare analysis of self-selecting tariffs are generalized to be consistent with those maintained in empirical models of tariff choice. When customers have pure preferences among tariffs, it is shown that the optimal self-selecting tariffs provide strictly greater welfare than mandatory marginal cost prices, contain marginal prices that do not equal marginal cost, and can Pareto dominate an existing tariff. As an illustration of the theoretical results, optimal self-selecting tariffs are calculated empirically for a local telephone company.     

Strategic tariffs, tariff jumping, and heterogeneous firms

The majority of research to date investigating strategic tariffs in the presence of multinationals finds a knife-edge result where, in equilibrium, all foreign firms are either multinationals or exporters. Utilizing a model of heterogeneous firms, we find equilibria in which both pure exporters and multinationals coexist. We utilize this model to study the case of endogenously chosen tariffs. As is standard, Nash equilibrium tariffs are higher than the socially optimal tariffs. Unlike existing models with homogeneous firms, we find that non-cooperative tariffs promote the existence of low-productivity firms relative to the socially optimal tariffs. This highlights a new source of inefficiency from tariff competition not found in models of homogeneous firms. In addition, we find that in many cases the Nash equilibrium tariff when FDI is a potential firm structure is lower than when it is not. As a result, FDI improves welfare by mitigating tariff competition.     

Fortress Europe: Jericho or Château d’If?

Traditional analysis of customs union formation suggests that it leads to an increase in members' external tariffs. This paper stresses two aspects of European trade and trade policy—a large volume of intra-industry trade between similar countries and a political motivation for tariffs—and highlights a role for tariff coordination in a model of differentiated products in which tariffs affect domestic costs and thus export prices and the magnitude of monopolistic rents. We show that when workers choose the tariffs and receive but a small portion of tariff revenues, the union's tariff wall falls.     

The 2018 US-China trade conflict after forty years of special protection

ABSTRACT

In 2018, the United States suddenly increased tariffs on nearly 50 percent of its imports from China. China immediately responded with tariff retaliation covering more than 70 percent of imports from the United States. This article assesses what happened in 2018 and attempts to explain why. It first constructs new measure of special tariff protection to put the sheer scope and coverage of the 2018 actions into historical context. It then uses the lens provided by the 2018 special tariffs to explain the key sources of economic and policy friction between the two countries. This includes whether China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and industrial subsidies, as well as China’s development strategy and system of forcibly acquiring foreign technology, were imposing increasingly large costs on trading partners. Finally, it also examines whether the US strategy to provoke a crisis – which may result in a severely weakened World Trade Organization (WTO) – was deliberate and out of frustration with the institution itself.     

全球价值链影响下的中国关税水平*——来自中国制造业的证据

本文基于中国政治经济背景,构建了一个关税影响因素理论模型,且利用2005—2011年中国制造业134个部门的数据,通过OLS和Tobit方法进行了经验验证。结果表明：（1）外国最终产品中的中国增加值越高,或者中国最终产品中的外国增加值越高,则中国对于该产品的关税水平越低;（2）贸易协定的签署不仅会直接降低中国的关税,还会扩大中国增加值上升对关税的负影响,削弱外国增加值上升对关税的负影响。