Incentives and Standards in Agency Contracts

This paper studies the structure of state‐contingent contracts in the presence of moral hazard and multitasking. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the presence of multitasking to lead to fixed payments instead of incentive schemes are identified. It is shown that the primary determinant of whether multitasking leads to higher or lower powered incentives is the role that noncontractible outputs play in helping the agent deal with the production risk associated with the observable and contractible outputs. When the noncontractible outputs are risk substitutes and are socially undesirable, standards are never optimal. If the noncontractible outputs are socially desirable, standards are never optimal if the noncontractible outputs play a risk‐complementary role.     

Performance Standards and Incentive Pay in Agency Contracts

When the presence of limited liability restricts a principal from imposing monetary fines on an agent in case of poor performance, the principal might use other kinds of punishment threats to deter the agent from shirking. We show that under the optimal contract in this case, the principal sets a performance standard and punishes the agent if the standard is not met, but rewards the agent on a profit-sharing basis if the standard is significantly exceeded. The optimal choice of performance standards for such contracts is discussed. It is shown that punishment threats, although inefficient, often help the principal to discipline the agent.
JEL classification : D 82     

Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Data from a field experiment are used to estimate the gain in productivity that is realized when workers are paid piece rates rather than fixed wages. The experiment was conducted within a tree-planting firm and provides daily observations on individual worker productivity under both compensation systems. Unrestricted statistical methods estimate the productivity gain to be 20%. Since planting conditions potentially affect incentives, structural econometric methods are used to generalize the experimental results to out-of-sample conditions. The structural results suggest that the average productivity gain, outside of the experimental conditions, would be at least  21.7  %.     

企业理论:契约,所有权,委托代理

新古典理论主要从技术角度来分析企业,将企业视为黑箱。而新制度学派的企业理论则把目光投向了企业内部,其重点是企业的契约性质理论、所有权安排理论、委托代理理论。尽管对企业理论进行划分和整理具有一定的难度,文章仍然试图以企业的契约理论的递进层次为线索,按照理论的研究领域和核心问题给出一个解释,并给出了企业的契约理论内部框架。     

The Role of Culture,Historicity, and Human Agency in the Evolution of the State: A Case Against Cultural Fatalism

I examine how the nature of the state and its relationship to its people are determined and evolve. I bring together differing contributions of traditional institutionalism to further an emerging evolutionary-institutionalist discourse concerning the role played by culture and historicity, on one hand, and by individual actions and awareness, on the other, in shaping and reshaping the nature of the state. Such discourse is significant in understanding that, although inherited culture plays an important role in influencing the character of the state in a given society, the future of the state is not fully determined by its history. In equal measure, it depends on the volition of individuals who purposefully amend the state’s institutions through rearranging power distribution. Using Russia’s authoritarian state as a case in point, I demonstrate how this emerging evolutionary-institutionalist discourse can circumvent ideological misuse of the institutionalist paradigm in non-democratic societies.     

Piece Rates, Fixed Wages, and Incentive Effects: Statistical Evidence from Payroll Records

We develop and estimate an agency model of worker behavior under piece rates and fixed wages. The model implies optimal decision rules for the firm's choice of a compensation system as a function of working conditions. Our model also implies an upper and lower bound to the incentive effect (the productivity gain realized by paying workers piece rates rather than fixed wages) that can be estimated using regression methods. Using daily productivity data collected from the payroll records of a British Columbia tree-planting firm, we estimate these bounds to be an 8.8 and a 60.4 percent increase in productivity. Structural estimation, which accounts for the firm's optimal choice of a compensation system, suggests that incentives caused a 22.6 percent increase in productivity. However, only part of this increase represents valuable output because workers respond to incentives, in part, by reducing quality.     

North–South Outsourcing,Immigration, and Skilled Wages: Through the Lens of Incomplete Contracts

The forces of immigration and offshore outsourcing are subject to factors that leave sufficient room for incompleteness in a contract. The authors present a model that allows one to compare the effects of immigration and offshore outsourcing, on skilled wage, when both are subject to contractual incompleteness. They capture the sensitivity of the effect on the skilled wage, of immigration and offshore outsourcing to complementarities between firm‐specific human capital and human capital that is transferable across firms manufacturing intermediate goods. In particular, the authors show that the North–South gap in skilled wages is likely to (i) increase through the forces of immigration when the intermediate goods' technology is super‐modular in the North but sub‐modular in the South and (ii) decrease through the forces of outsourcing when the intermediate goods' technology is sub‐modular in the North but super‐modular in the South.     

金融契约的不完全性与企业融资行为:一个案例分析

金融契约是资本供求双方有关资本交易的约定，它是企业融资行为的基础。由于人的有限理性和机会主义倾向，金融契约不可能是一个完全契约。在金融契约不完全的情况下，融资行为是融资双方之间的博弈过程；管理者根据投资者的行为来选择努力水平和私人福利，而投资者则根据对管理者行为的预期来决定是否投资。案例分析表明，经济行为的契约化、契约完备程度以及社会履约环境与保障机制，对交易的规模和效率有着重要影响。     

Trade and Wages: a Deeper Investigation

A new presentation of the specific factors model shows how labor fares under international trade by considering how the price elasticity of the nominal wage rate responds to the terms of trade as well as factor endowments. The key empirical implication is that under a standard assumption about tastes it is straightforward to decompose the gains to labor into measurable terms of trade effects and production bias effects. This provides the basis for suggested time series studies contrasting the specific factors model with the Heckscher–Ohlin model. We then perform a new theoretical analysis of the specific factors model to compare how labor fares under autarky and free trade.     

On the Feasibility of a Liberal Welfare State: Agency and Exit Costs in Income Security Clubs

This paper investigates whether individuals might voluntarily join and remain members of a state in which high levels of social insurance are provided. That is to say, are there plausible circumstances in which a social welfare state can be regarded as “liberal” in the sense that it has the universal support of its citizens?As a point of departure, the paper demonstrates that risk-averse individuals in a setting of substantial income or health uncertainty will voluntarily join private income-security clubs. Private income-security clubs, however, cannot be entirely voluntary because they must solve the problem of adverse selection, as with entry or exit fees. The paper demonstrates that individuals may opt for governmental provision of income security services, when there is uncertainty about the quality of private club services, because naturally high exit costs allow national governments to economically address the problem of adverse selection. The analysis also suggests that liberal income security programs may have constitutional or quasi-constitutional status because of the nature of the long-term nature of the insurance contract.     

Precontractual information asymmetry between principal and agent: The Continuous Case

In the presence of precontractual information asymmetry between principal and risk-neutral agent, the optimal strategy for the principal will be to deliberately induce outcomes which are ex post Pareto inefficient, except under rare circumstances.     

Export Destination,Product Quality and Wages in a Middle‐Income Country. The Case of South Africa

A robust finding in the firm‐level literature is that exporting firms pay higher wages. Using South African data this paper investigates the relationship between export destination and wages at a worker level. South Africa, a middle‐income country, has two distinct main export markets—a regional market where per capita incomes are lower than at home, and an international market with higher per capita incomes. Our estimates show that workers in firms that export to the region earn less than those that produce for the domestic market. Those in firms that export outside the region earn more than either domestic producers or region‐only exporters. Much of this difference in wages can be explained by the premium the different types of exporters pay for skills. These results support previous studies which suggest that export destination is related to product quality which in turn is related to worker quality and therefore wages.     

The Social and Geopolitical Origins of State Transformation: The Case of South Korea

Recent debates surrounding state transformation in East Asia have tended to examine either how transformations in domestic social relations undermined the efficacy of the developmental state, or how mobilisation of coercion and consent at the international level led to the adoption of neoliberal policies. Through an examination of the case of Korea, however, this article seeks to move beyond this division between ‘domestic’ - and ‘international’ - centred analyses to provide a framework wherby mutually constitutive transformations taking place both at the level of social relations of production and at the level of the international order can be integrated to produce a conjunctural analysis of state transformation. Through deploying Gramsci's concept of passive revolution, an analysis of social and geopolitical underpinnings of korean late development is provided in order to provide an alternative explanation of the causes and nature of transition towards the neoliberal state since the latter part of the twentieth century.     

Trade and Real Wages: a Macroeconomic Model*

We offer a new paradigm to understand the effects of trade on factor rewards. It utilizes the classical‐Keynesian model, and shows that normally a country’s trade deficit hurts labor by lowering the real wage, but benefits the owners of capital. The effects of tariffs on factor rewards and employment are opposite to those of the trade deficit, which falls with a rise in the tariff rate. Countries with trade shortfalls unambiguously benefit from their tariffs, because laborers far outnumber capitalists, who suffer from the declining interest rate. Thus, tariffs lead to a rise in social welfare in trade‐deficit countries.     

The Ddeterminants of Individual Wages in Australia: Competitive and Non-Competitive Influences

This work provides a test of competitive theories of wage determination by examining the wages of identical workers across industry classifications. The finding that a set of significant industry wage differentials exists would seem to contradict a purely competitive theory of wage determination. However, the apparent presence of unmeasured human capital that is correlated with industry status does provide one potential competitive explanation for the industry wage effects. Moreover, non-competitive explanations for the differences in industry wages, such as efficiency wage theory or institutional factors, appear to be inconsistent with the nature of the wage differentials.