论企业财产的浮动抵押

一、浮动抵押的含义及特征 所谓浮动抵押,是指权利人以现有的和将有的全部财产或者部分财产为其债务提供担保.债务人不履行到期债务或者发生当事人约定的实现抵押权的情形,债权人有权就约定实现抵押权时的动产优先受偿.     

浮动抵押的价值取向及其移植借鉴

浮动抵押突破了传统固定抵押制度对抵押物范围的局限,将其从“现存财产“扩大到“将来财产“,因其在商业融资中有巨大的价值,在国际商业信贷中备受青睐.与固定抵押相比较,浮动抵押的界限显然较为模糊,实务操作中变数较大.我国在对外借款中,已经出现了浮动抵押条款.建议结合我国国情,借鉴国外相关立法,构建高效、实用的浮动抵押制度.     

企业融资中的抵押制度探讨

企业作为融资主体,如何扩大其抵押标的、增加它的担保能力是当前研究抵押担保问题的关键.来源于大陆法国家的财团抵押制度和英美法国家的浮动抵押制度在秩序与效率的价值冲突协调中将企业财产结合体作为一个整体对待,通过采用适当的公示方法,设定一个抵押权来为企业资金融通提供担保,在企业融资方面作用显著,这对于我国目前的担保立法和实践来说具有重大借鉴意义.因此,我们需要通过对财团抵押和浮动抵押优缺点的辩证认识来反思我国的企业财产抵押制度并完善之.     

浅析抵押期间抵押财产的转让

抵押财产的存在是实现抵押权的前提和基础,抵押财产的转让必然会涉及到抵押权人的担保利益,同时为维护市场交易秩序,法律应保护抵押财产受让人基于合同产生的信赖利益,因此在立法上需要进行更为合理的利益和价值权衡.本文在理性看待我国《物权法》相关规定合理性的同时,客观分析其存在的不足,构建更为合理的抵押财产转让制度.     

浅析我国房地产抵押制度

房地产抵押是以不转移占有的方式设定,为充分发挥物权的功能,房地产的抵押权与租赁权、典权应为相容之权.为解决抵押权与承租权、典权在行使时可能产生的冲突,应以权利确定的先后来规定各权利之间的效力.     

略论我国最高额抵押制度

最高额抵押制度是随着经济生活的发展,为了迎合连续陆交易所提出的简化担保程序和成本的要求而出现的一类特殊抵押权制度,已经为许多国家陆续接受。我国《担保法》规定：本法所称最高额抵押,是指抵押人与抵押权人协议,在最高债权额限度内,以抵押物对一定期间内连续发生的债权作担保。《物权法》第203条规定“为担保债务的履行,债务人或者第三人对一定期间内将要连续发生的债权提供担保财产的,债务人不履行到期债务或者发生当事人约定的实现抵押权的情形,抵押权人有权在最高债权额限度内就该担保财产优先受偿。     

论完善我国抵押权的实现方式

我国《担保法》规定的抵押权实现方式为 :与抵押人协议 ,或向人民法院起诉 ,其满足条件是债务履行期届满抵押权未受清偿。这种规定对保护债权人的债权很不充分。文章阐明 ,为快捷实现抵押权 ,立法应允许抵押人与抵押权人自由约定 ,实践中抵押权人可直接通过办理公证 ,直接申请法院处分抵押物 ,来实现抵押权。同时 ,还应保护善意第三人的合法权益 ,借鉴国外有关抵押权实现的理论来充分保护债权 ,促进经济发展。     

浅析我国房地产抵押制度

房地产抵押是以不转移占有的方式设定,为充分发挥物权的功能,房地产的抵押权与租赁权、典权应为相容之权。为解决抵押权与承租权、典权在行使时可能产生的冲突,应以权利确定的先后来规定各权利之间的效力。     

完善土地抵押权制度的探析

在我国,土地抵押是指土地使用权人在法律许可的范围内,在不转移土地占有的情况下,将土地使用权作为债权的担保;当债务人不履行债务时,债权人有权依法处分该土地使用权并由处分所得的价款优先受偿。其中,提供土地使用权作为担保的,为抵押人,接受土地使用权担保的债权人,为抵押权人。土地抵押权是指在土地抵押关系中,抵押权人对作为抵押物的土地使用权和土地附着物所享有的处分权和优先受偿的相关权利。从我国现行法律规定来看,土地抵押权是指土地使用权抵押权,法律只允许对土地使用权进行抵押,而对土地使用权以外的其他土地他项权利,没有明确规定。一、土地抵押权的法律特征     

试论留置权对税收优先权之排斥

2001年修订的《中华人民共和国税收征收管理法》(以下简称《税收征管法》)正式确立了我国的税收优先权制度,该法第四十五条规定,"税务机关征收税款,税收优先于无担保债权,法律另有规定的除外;纳税人欠缴的税款发生在纳税人以其财产设定抵押、质押或者纳税人的财产被留置之前的,税收应当先于抵押权、质权、留     

个人住房贷款行为与房贷调控的有效性分析

本文利用成都市房地产交易的微观数据(2004—2006),实证检验了我国房地产信贷政策的变化对微观个体住房贷款决策行为的影响效果。我们发现,地方购房者的贷款决策对中央利率调控有明显反应。实证结果显示:当长期贷款利率升幅较短期贷款利率升幅高0.1百分点时,贷款者选择短期贷款的概率增加8.4个百分点;而且利用商业住房贷款利率和公积金贷款利率变动差异的"自然实验",我们有效控制了可能由宏观政策内生性产生的计量问题,从微观角度为长、短期利率政策的有效性提供了更可靠的实证检验。此外,我们还发现首付比例政策并没有得到地方银行的严格实施。因此,文章建议政府进一步重视利率政策对房地产市场的调整,而包括首付比例等相关政策的实施需加强对地方执行部门监管的力度。     

资源金融炒作与次债CDO精巧设计:为国际金融资本挖掘了坟墓

由美国"次贷危机"诱发的"金融海啸"的本质是资源金融炒作与次债CDO精巧设计"碰撞"的结果,是国际金融资本因贪婪给自己挖掘的坟墓。由此,我国应高度重视资本大规模流动的监测和对策研究,加强国际合作来限制资源金融的炒作,注重金融创新风险濡染机制的研究,完善对金融创新的有效监管。     

The ratchet effect and bargaining power in a two-stage model of competitive bidding

Summary. In the model presented, a buyer uses competitive bidding to facilitate her purchase of a good (the primary good of the exchange). Not included in the original purchase is the possible procurement of a good related to the original purchase: the supplementary good. The primary and supplementary goods are closely related; knowing a bidder's cost of producing the primary good implies that the buyer can infer the bidder's cost of producing the supplementary good. I show that a bidding mechanism for the primary good will fail to ensure an efficient allocation if the buyer learns the bid of the winner and the price of the supplementary good is determined through sequential bargaining. Received: August 22, 1996; revised version: June 23, 1997     

Mechanism design with a liquidity constrained buyer: The 2×2 case

This paper studies the implications of buyers' liquidity constraints for the optimal selling strategy. The possibility that a buyer faces a binding liquidity constraint affects the seller's strategy in a nontrivial way. Specifically, when a seller has one unit of a good to sell to a buyer with a quasilinear utility function, the `no-haggling' result indicates that textbook monopoly pricing is optimal, absent liquidity constraints. Introducing a potentially binding liquidity constraint vitiates the no-haggling result, and can make it strictly beneficial for the seller to use nonlinear pricing, to commit to a declining price sequence, or to require the buyer to post a cash bond.     

On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems

A buyer and a seller can exchange one unit of an indivisible good. While producing the good, the seller can exert unobservable effort (hidden action). Then the buyer realizes whether his or her valuation is high or low, which stochastically depends upon the seller's effort level (hidden information). The parties are risk neutral—they can rule out renegotiation and write complete contracts. It is shown that the first best cannot be achieved whenever the ex post efficient trade decision is trivial. The second-best contract is characterized and an application of the model to the choice of risky projects is briefly discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78, D23, D82.     

Intertemporal pricing in laboratory posted offer markets with differential information

Summary. This paper analyzes intertemporal seller pricing and buyer purchasing behavior in a laboratory retail market with differential information. A seller posts one price each period that a buyer either accepts or rejects. Trade occurs over a sequence of "market periods" with a random termination date. The buyer and seller are differentially informed: The seller's cost of producing a unit of a fictitious good is known and constant in all periods, but the buyer's value for the good (demand) is a random variable governed by a Markov Process whose structure is common knowledge. At the beginning of each period the unit's value is determined by "nature" and is privately revealed only to the buyer. The market termination rule is a binary random variable. We conduct 32 laboratory experiments designed to study intertemporal pricing by human subjects in the Posted Offer Institution when demand follows a stochastic process. There are four series of experiments: 8 with simulated buyers, 8 with inexperienced subjects, 8 with once experienced subjects, and 8 with twice experienced subjects.     

Price and information disclosure in the private art market: A signalling game

In this paper, we model private art market agents’ strategic interactions in presence of two types of asymmetric information, about artwork quality and buyer’s knowledge, assuming the seller does not know how informed is the buyer while the buyer does not know the quality of the artwork before purchase. If the seller can choose either a high or a low price and the buyer can signal his type to the seller, we identify the conditions for both equilibria with pooling buyer signalling strategy and with separating strategy, as well as conditions for equilibria where the seller fixes the price according to the actual quality and where he posts prices trying to take advantage of buyer’s limited information. Finally, we identify the condition for the emergence of a “counter-lemon” result, where low-quality artworks and uninformed collectors exit the market, suggesting that seller uncertainty does not directly benefit the buyers, but it can impact the quality traded in the market.     

Indeterminacy and directed search

The directed search approach assumes each seller posts a fixed price and, ex post, randomly allocates the good should more than one buyer desire the good. This paper assumes sellers can post prices which are contingent on ex post realized demand; e.g. an advertisement might state the Bertrand price should there be more than one buyer, which corresponds to an auction outcome. Competition in fixed prices and ex post rationing describes equilibrium behavior. There is also real market indeterminacy: a continuum of equilibria exists which are not payoff equivalent. Sellers prefer the equilibrium in auctions.     

诚信视角下的税收伦理问题探讨

诚信在社会主义新时期税收中的作用越来越凸显,日益引起了人们的关注和重视。在市场经济条件下,诚信是税收的保障,税收伦理与诚信相互依存,这种关系为我国税收创造了良好的环境。但非诚信纳税问题不可忽视,针对非诚信纳税,提倡诚信光荣的纳税美德、培育以企业为核心的税收规范．为形成制度化纳税文化体系提供对策和依据。     

美国次级房贷危机对中国房贷和金融市场的影响

美国次级房贷危机已对全球股市和美国经济产生较大影响。分析美国次级房贷危机产生的背景和原因,并指出中国的抵押贷款市场存在的重大风险。我们应该以美国次级债危机为借鉴,为中国房地产市场发展和金融市场的健康发展获得一些启示,并做好风险防范措施。