Macroeconomic Policy Interaction under EMU: A Dynamic Game Approach

In this article, we study macroeconomic stabilization in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) using a dynamic game approach. With the aid of a stylized macroeconomic model, this article analyzes the transmission and interaction of national fiscal policies and monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) in the EMU. A special focus is on the effects of labor market institutions in the participating countries and of the introduction of fiscal stringency criteria like those imposed in the Stability and Growth Pact.     

Multiple wage-bargaining systems in the single European currency area

Little attention in the EMU literature has been paid to theinteraction between central bank monetary rules and systemsof collective wage bargaining. Analytically and empirically,coordinated wage-bargaining systems respond with real wage restraintto non-accommodating monetary policy. Since wage determinationis dominated by collective bargaining in all the EMU memberstates and wage coordination within the member states has grownsince 1980, this is a topic of potential importance. In particular,the replacement of the Bundesbank, directly targeting Germaninflation, by a European Central Bank (ECB) targeting Europeaninflation will remove a major institutional support of wagerestraint in Germany. The consequences of this for EMU are workedout under two scenarios, that inflation expectations will begenerated by ECB monetary policy and that they will reflectGerman inflation outcomes. Possible institutional developmentsare discussed including government union bargains. The Bundesbankalso played a major role in maintaining fiscal rectitude: forunderlying structural reasons, therefore, it is possible thatGermany will move to a period of fiscal activism with wage restraintand low inflation purchased through social contract negotiations.     

Co-ordinating fiscal authorities in the euro-zone: a key role for the ECB

This paper examines the conditions for fiscal restraint to emergeas Nash equilibrium in the game between fiscal authorities ina monetary union and discusses the implications for the ECB'smonetary strategy. We show that fiscal authorities fail to internalizethe adverse area-wide effects of their policies when the ECBtargets union-wide aggregates. To address this co-ordinationfailure, we propose that the ECB reacts to fiscal restraintby implementing a monetary reward. Applying the pareto- andrisk dominance criteria to the ensuing co-ordination game, weshow that the ECB can ensure convergence upon fiscal restraintby adopting a weakly countercyclical reaction function.     

Designing Fiscal Institutions in a Monetary Union

This article explores the policy and wealth consequences of alternative institutional arrangements through which fiscal policy interacts with monetary policy in a monetary union such as the EMU. The central issue of the article is the design of the appropriate monetary and fiscal institutions through a comparison of alternative arrangements to distribute power over monetary and fiscal authorities between the central authority of the union and the individual members of the union and evaluating their performance. The main results of this article reveal that delegation of the fiscal policy to a council of country representatives and the monetary policy to a council of governors is the appropriate institutional design to reduce inflation bias and better stabilize regional, idiosyncratic supply and demand shocks in a monetary union.     

Monetary policy in the Euro area – lessons from the first years

This paper investigates in a consistent semi-structural empirical framework three current issues of monetary policy in the euro area. First, regarding policy transmission we offer a three-stage procedure to combine the estimation of economic structure prior to EMU with current ECB monetary policy. Second, we test whether the regime change leads – before or after – EMU to structural instability. Third, we investigate the stance of monetary policy in Europe. We compare a counterfactual ECB reaction function based on average interest rates prior to EMU with actual ECB policy. Furthermore, we analyse actual ECB policy with interest rate projections using Bundesbank reaction functions and euroland data.We thank two anonymous referees, participants of the Royal Economic Society Conference in 2003, the Money, Macro, and Finance Annual Conference in 2002, research seminars at the Universities of Augsburg, Bochum, Bonn, Frankfurt and Bloomington/Indiana for helpful comments. Obviously, we are responsible for all remaining shortcomings.     

What are the Trade Spill-Overs from Fiscal Shocks in Europe? An Empirical Analysis***

We use a Vector Auto Regression (VAR) analysis to explore the (trade spill-over) effects of fiscal policy shocks in Europe. To enhance comparability with the existing literature, we first analyse the effects of these shocks at the national level. Here, we employ identification based on Choleski decomposition and a structural VAR, both of which lead to the same results. Then, we turn to study the cross-border spill-overs of fiscal shocks via the trade channel. Fiscal expansions in Germany, France and Italy lead to significant increases in imports from a number of European countries. In order to mimic the case of monetary union, we also shut off the effects via the short-term interest rate and the nominal exchange rate and find a slight strengthening on average of the cross-country spill-overs from a fiscal expansion. These results suggest that it may be worthwhile to further investigate the possibility of enhanced fiscal coordination.*** This research is part of the RTN project ‘Macroeconomic Policy Design for Monetary Unions’, funded by the European Commission (contract number HPRN-CT-2002-00237). We thank two anonymous referees, a referee for the ECB Working Paper series, Peter Claeys, David-Jan Jansen, Franc Klaassen, Roberto Perotti and audiences at the Dutch Central Bank and the CEPR/CREI Conference ‘Designing a Macroeconomic Policy Framework for Europe’ (Barcelona, 2004) for many helpful comments. A large part of this paper was written while Beetsma was visiting the Directorate-General for Research of the ECB. He thanks the ECB for the stimulating research environment. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not commit any of.cial institution. The usual disclaimer applies.     

The European Monetary Policy Responses During the Pandemic Crisis

This paper uses an event-based analysis to describe how the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) policy responses to the pandemic crisis have affected the European financial and economic system. The result of our exercise, which is based on the examination of the main measures taken by the ECB during 2020, is that these responses have positively affected the European economic system by improving banks’ lending activity and by indirectly creating room for expansionary fiscal policies in the euro area’s high-debt countries that do not have fiscal capacity.

     

Real exchange rate, agglomerations, and irreversibilities: macroeconomic policy and FDI in EMU

Fiscal policy in EMU has to be evaluated in the light of thechanging nature of capital mobility in Europe and its effectson growth. Most arguments about the effects of fiscal policyin EMU assume that we live in a perfect competition world witha unique natural rate of output for each country. The removalof barriers to foreign direct investment (FDI) accompanied bythe prevalence of imperfect competition mean that the naturalrate of output is to be determined by locational competition.We show that FDI is influenced by relative costs and is attractedby agglomerations, and that the level of technology dependson the stock of FDI. Sustained expansionary fiscal policieswill raise costs and make locations less attractive. Agglomerationscould be destroyed by these higher costs, and the size of thenation will shrink. These effects will constrain policy-makersmuch more than the Stability Pact.     

Monetary and Fiscal Policy Design in the EMU: An Overview

The interaction of monetary and fiscal policies is a crucial issue in a highly integrated economic area such as the European Union. This paper analyzes the design of monetary and fiscal policies in the EMU. To do so, the paper starts with an overview of the most important aspects. Next, it analyzes monetary and fiscal policy interaction in a stylized model of a monetary union, in which monetary and fiscal policy design is modeled as a dynamic stabilization game. Macroeconomic policy making and adjustment are studied under alternative forms of cooperation and in both symmetric and asymmetric settings.     

Inflation Expectations and Inflation Uncertainty in the Eurozone: Evidence from Survey Data

This paper uses the European Commission’s Consumer Survey to assess whether inflation expectations have converged and whether inflation uncertainty has diminished following the introduction of the euro in Europe. Consumers’ responses to the survey suggest that inflation expectations depend more on past national inflation rates than on the ECB’s anchor for price stability. Inflation expectations do not converge significantly faster than actual inflation rates. Regarding inflation uncertainty, the data indicate a relationship with country size following the introduction of the euro. This suggests that within EMU, inflation uncertainty may increase in countries that have a smaller influence on ECB policy. JEL no.  D84, E31, E58     

欧元区国家主权债务危机、欧元及欧盟经济

论文认为欧元区主权债务危机的基本性质属于南欧国家寅吃卯粮所导致的财政危机,但是由于欧元区在制度设置和运行机制上存在缺陷,使债务危机演变成欧元的信任危机。欧元区成员国和欧盟业已认识到欧洲货币联盟的不足,通过加强财政政策一体化来克服欧元区的内在矛盾似乎不可避免。欧元不会因为主权债务危机的冲击而垮台,但是欧洲经济将受到债务危机的拖累,增长前景不容乐观。     

Budget deficits and money creation: Exploring their relation before Bretton Woods

The sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone has rekindled the use of the North–South (core-periphery) terminology to refer to the heterogeneity of countries belonging to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In the gold standard literature, this geographical partition had already been employed to oppose the fiscal profligacy and subsequent problems of convertibility of southern countries against the fiscal probity and long convertibility records of their northern counterparts. We provide statistical evidence that the group of countries that, with available data for 1870–1938, exhibited convertibility problems during the classical gold standard, for this reason called the pre-WWI “sometimes-floaters”, shared a pattern of fiscal dominance. This finding for the sometimes-floaters (southern European and South American countries plus Japan) differs from the non-fiscal dominance pattern that we obtain for the pre-WWI “never-floaters” (northern Europe and North America countries) when the Great War and its aftermath years are omitted. We also show that the presence of fiscal dominance was partly due to the lower levels of tax efficiency and political stability in the South.     

Interest-Rate Spread and Public-Debt Dynamics in a Two-Country Monetary-Union Portfolio Model

Tracking, monitoring and steering the evolution of public debt over time will be a major policy challenge for almost all governments in the advanced countries in the years to come, in particular for those belonging to the European Monetary Union. In this paper I study public debt dynamics in a two-country monetary union where a representative, risk-averse wealth-owner optimizes his/her portfolio of sovereign bonds issued in the common currency. I obtain two main results with respect to the standard country-by-country approach. First, the interest-rate spread between the two countries is endogenized as the higher-debt country pays a risk premium which is proportional to the level of its own debt with respect to the debt of the other. Second, its debt dynamic path becomes nonlinear and dependent on the evolution of the other country’s debt. The most important policy implication is that “dynamic interdependence” is not fully considered in the implementation of EMU fiscal rules, but it may may jeopardize their goal of convergence and stability of debt stocks.     

European monetary unification: a tour d'horizon

This article takes stock of the literature and debate over Europeanmonetary unification. In contrast to other papers, where itis argued that the issues and prospects remain shrouded in uncertainty,I argue that in a number of important areas, a reasonable degreeof consensus now exists, as the result of a decade of scholarship.The subsequent stock-taking concentrates on areas where significantquestions remain, starting with the implications of surrenderingthe exchange rate and an independent national monetary policyas instruments of adjustment; the conduct of fiscal policy underthe Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability Pact; andhow quickly the European union is likely to develop an EU-widesystem of fiscal federalism to accompany its monetary union.Turning from fiscal to monetary issues, I ask whether the EuropeanCentral Bank (ECB) will be as inflation averse as the Bundesbank,what exchange-rate policy the ECB will pursue, and whether theeuro will be a leading reserve currency. I conclude with whatmay be the most contentious issue of all, namely whether Europe'smonetary union could collapse after it begins.     

EMU Stability: Direct and Indirect Risk Sharing

Our paper aims to analyze the effectiveness of different risk-sharing mechanisms in providing stability to a monetary union. We select two stylized tools with extreme and opposite features. The first is an expansionary but conventional monetary policy that is used to help EMU’s most fragile member states manage their public debts; the second is a centralized fiscal policy that allows for the transfer of a portion of these public debts from EMU’s most fragile member states to those considered EMU’s “core”. By a stylized periphery-core model of a monetary union, we compare the strengths and weaknesses of these two tools in order to reach some welfare implications in terms of union stability.     

One Money and Sixteen Needs: Has the ECB’s Monetary Policy Become More Balanced Towards the Needs of the Member States?

In this paper we analyze whether the ECB’s monetary policy has become more balanced towards the needs of the individual member states with the passage of time. We assume that the ECB’s monetary policy stance is in line with a Taylor rule and based on the overall situation in the Euro area, more specifically on the Euro area inflation rate and the overall business cycle position in the area. The question therefore boils down to investigating whether inflation and business cycles have converged since the start of the monetary union. We show that the ECB, if in existence in the 1990s, would have had an impossible task. This is because inflation and business cycles still strongly differed in that time, although convergence substantially increased in the run up to the monetary union. In this respect, the decade under EMU drastically differs from the preceding one. This being said, the evidence for a further improvement in the course of the first decade of the new millennium is mixed. This is because although inflation has further converged, business cycles have shown a tendency for increased divergence. If, however, we are willing to put weights on inflation and output gap divergence (as implied by the Taylor rule), we conclude that also in the course of the period under EMU in general the ECB’s monetary policy has become more in line with the needs of the individual members. Looking at individual countries, we show that during the first decade of its existence the ECB’s interest rate was most fitted to the needs of France and Italy, and least to the needs of Ireland and Greece (both too low) and Germany (too high). To a lesser extent there were also mismatches for Spain and Portugal (both too low). In the more recent period since 2005, the mismatch between the desired domestic interest rate and the desired ECB rate has come down for most countries (most noticeable Germany). For Belgium (for which a higher interest rate was more appropriate), on the other hand, the mismatch increased. These overall positive findings, however, offer no guarantee that the task of the ECB will become easier in the future.     

FTPL-Perspective on Tradable Deficit Permits in the EMU

The Growth and Stability Pact restricts member states in their fiscal policy but also causes inflexibility in the pursuit of wide-ranging economic and social reforms. Tradable deficit permits allow more flexibility for individual member states and provide a stick for those who exceed the deficit limit but also a carrot to those who stay below it. But does the trade in deficit permits affect the monetary objectives of the European Central Bank (ECB)? We argue that from a perspective of fiscal theory of the price level, trade in deficit permits can lead to higher inflation depending on the growth rate and the debt/GDP ratio of the member states.     

欧洲货币联盟设计中的缺陷

欧债危机暴露了欧洲货币联盟运作机制的设计缺陷:财政纪律松散、金融监管失当和欧洲央行角色定位存在偏差。危机也为欧元区矫正缺陷提供了改革契机。强化财政纪律有两种思路,制定新的"财政条约"和采取"宪制安排";提高监管效率的改革理念是实施金融监管集中化;欧洲央行应将金融稳定作为主要目标,并承担最后贷款人的角色。文章对上述理念进行了评述,指出除此之外欧盟需要开展更加广泛和深刻的改革。     

Was ECB's monetary policy optimal?

Overall, the ECB managed monetary policy quite satisfactorily in the first phase of EMU. Nevertheless, this paper asks whether monetary policy could not have been improved. In the last three years, Euroland was confronted with the first external shock. Oil prices increased considerably, leading to an increase of headline inflation of over one percentage point in 2000–01. With a specific Taylor rule one can very well understand, how the ECB sets interest rates, but it turns out that monetary policy based on the estimated Taylor reaction function was rather backward than forward looking. While it reacted with a lag to the actions of the U.S. Fed, it was overly cautious by targeting total HICP inflation. Here it is strongly argued and also demonstrated with model simulations that a monetary policy oriented towards core inflation would have resulted in a much better economic performance. The business cycle downturn could have been mitigated with no additional inflation risks.     

The stability and growth pact, fiscal policy institutions and stabilization in Europe

Ever since its inception, the EMU has been subject to controversy. The fiscal policy rules embedded in the Maastricht Treaty, and clarified in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), are probably the most contentious. The SGP has constantly been accused of being too rigid and of forcing procyclicality in fiscal policy. However, in an influential paper Galí and Perotti (2003) concluded that discretionary fiscal policy has actually become more countercyclical in EMU countries since the Maastricht Treaty. This paper argues that this conclusion stands up to several robustness tests using ex-post data, including the use of institutional variables, but not to the use of real-time data. Using ex-post data, there is some evidence pointing to a more countercyclical use of discretionary fiscal policy (or at least to less use of procyclical discretionary fiscal policy). However, the use of real-time data for the period 1999–2006 reveals that discretionary fiscal policy has been designed to be procyclical. Hence, the actual acyclical behaviour of discretionary fiscal policy in the period after 1999 seems to be simply the result of errors in forecasting the output gap, and not the result of a change in the intentions of policy-makers. As a result, there is no evidence to support the view that Maastricht rules have forced euro-area policy-makers to change their behaviour and design countercyclical discretionary fiscal policies.