The labor market effects of introducing unemployment benefits in an economy with high informality

Unemployment benefit systems are nonexistent in many developing economies. Introducing such systems poses many challenges which are partly due to the high level of informality in the labor markets of these economies. This paper studies the consequences on the labor market of implementing an unemployment benefit system in economies with large informal sectors and high flows of workers between formality and informality. We build a search and matching model with endogenous destruction, on-the-job search, and intersectoral flows, where agents in the economy decide optimally whether or not to formalize jobs. We calibrate the model for Mexico, and show that the introduction of an unemployment benefit system, where workers contribute when employed in the formal market and collect benefits when they lose their jobs, even if they obtain informal jobs, can lead to an increase in formality in the economy, while also producing small increases in unemployment. The exact impact of incorporating such benefits depends on the relative strength of two opposing effects: the generosity of the benefits and the level of the contributions that finance those benefits. We also show important policy complementarities with other interventions in the labor market. In particular, combining the unemployment benefit program with policies that reduce the cost of formality, such as lower employment taxes and firing costs, can produce greater decreases in informality and lower impacts on unemployment than when the program is applied in isolation.     

Informal employment relationships and the labor market: Is there segmentation in Ukraine?

One of the most important factors that determine individuals’ quality of life and wellbeing is their position in the labor market and the type of jobs that they hold. When workers are rationed out of the formal segment of the labor market against their will, i.e., the labor market is segmented, their quality of life is limited, and their wellbeing is reduced. When they can freely choose between a formal or informal employment relationship, i.e., the labor market is integrated, their wellbeing can reach high levels even in the presence of informal employment. We, therefore, test whether the Ukrainian labor market is segmented along the formal-informal divide, slicing the data by gender and age. The analysis that we perform consist in the analysis of short-term and medium-term transitions between five employment states, unemployment and inactivity. We also analyze wage gaps of mean hourly earnings and across the entire hourly earnings distribution, controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. According to our results segmentation is present for dependent employees: for a large part of informal employees informal employment is used as a waiting stage to enter formal salaried employment and is not voluntarily chosen. As far as self-employment is concerned the evidence is mixed regarding segmentation in the Ukrainian labor market. This heterogeneity in outcomes implies that not all informal work is associated with a low quality of life and reduced wellbeing in post-transition economies.     

Informality,public employment and employment protection in developing countries

This paper proposes an equilibrium matching model for developing countries’ labor markets where the interaction between public, formal private and informal private sectors are taken into account. Theoretical analysis shows that gains from reforms aiming at liberalizing formal labor markets can be annulled by shifts in the public sector employment and wage policies. Since the public sector accounts for a substantial share of employment in developing countries, this approach is crucial to understand the main labor market outcomes of such economies. Wages offered by the public sector increase the outside option value of the workers during the bargaining processes in the formal and informal sectors. It becomes more profitable for workers to search on-the-job, in order to move to these more attractive and more stable types of jobs. The public sector therefore acts as an additional tax for the formal private firms. Using data on workers’ flows from Egypt, we show empirically and theoretically that the liberalization of labor markets plays against informal employment by increasing the profitability, and hence job creations, of formal jobs. The latter effect is however dampened or even sometimes nullified by the increase of the offered wages in the public sector observed at the same time.     

Transitions across labor market states including formal/informal division in Egypt

This study examines the worker transitions across labor market states including formal/informal division using panel data of 2006 to 2012 from Egypt. We generate a broad set of facts about labor market dynamics in Egypt. We first develop transition probabilities by gender across different labor market states including formal/informal sectors utilizing Markov transition processes. Government employment is the most persistent labor market state for both men and women and the out of labor force is the second most persistent labor market state for women. Unemployment is the most mobile labor market state. Informal private wage work and self‐employed–agriculture are also relatively mobile labor market states. We next identify the effects of individual, household and job characteristics on different mobility patterns by estimating multinomial logit models. We find that gender, age, education, experience, and several sectors of economic activity are associated with the transition probabilities between the labor market states considered such as formal wage, informal wage, self‐employment, unemployment, government employment, and out of labor market. Education, in particular, university degree or above is noted to play a vital role in the probability of transitions across several labor market states.     

Flexible Labor Regulations and Informality in Egypt

Do more flexible labor market regulations reduce informal employment in formal firms? This paper examines the effects of changes in labor regulations on the incidence of formal employment. Using the case of Egypt, we study the effects of the introduction of more flexible labor regulations in 2003 on the probability that non‐contractual workers will be granted a formal employment contract. To identify the effect of the law and control for potential confounding factors, we use a difference‐in‐difference estimator that measures the difference in the pre‐ and post‐law probability of obtaining a formal contract across a treatment group of non‐contractual workers initially employed in formal firms and a comparison group of non‐contractual workers initially employed in informal firms. The latter serve as a useful comparison group since informal firms are unlikely to formalize as a result of the law, so that the only way their workers can become formal is to move to another firm. Our findings show that the passage of the new labor law did in fact increase the probability of transitioning to formal employment for non‐contractual workers employed in formal firms by about 3–3.5 percentage points, or the equivalent of at least a fifth of informal workers in formal firms.     

No education,no good jobs? Evidence on the relationship between education and labor market segmentation

This paper assesses labor market segmentation across formal and informal salaried jobs and self-employment in three Latin American and three transition countries. It looks separately at the markets for skilled and unskilled labor, inquiring if segmentation is an exclusive feature of the latter. Longitudinal data are used to assess wage differentials and mobility patterns across jobs. To study mobility, the paper compares observed transitions with a new benchmark measure of mobility under no segmentation. It finds evidence of a formal wage premium relative to informal salaried jobs in the three Latin American countries, but not in transition economies. It also finds evidence of extensive mobility across these two types of jobs in all countries, particularly from informal salaried to formal jobs. These patterns are suggestive of a preference for formal over informal salaried jobs in all countries. In contrast, there is little mobility between self-employment and formal salaried jobs, suggesting the existence of barriers to this type of mobility or a strong assortative matching according to workers’ individual preferences. Lastly, for both wage differentials and mobility, there is no statistical difference across skill levels, indicating that the markets for skilled and unskilled labor are similarly affected by segmentation.     

Why should Southern economies stay in the Euro Zone? The role of labor markets

We assume a world of two countries in a fixed exchange rate system. These countries differ in the features of their labor markets. The home country is characterized by a dual labor market, with formal and informal sectors. In the foreign country, a nominal wage rigidity exists. In this context, the situation of the labor markets in each country is not optimal owing to a misallocation of workers between sectors in the domestic economy and unemployment in the foreign economy. We show that a devaluation of domestic currency implies a fall in production in each country and deterioration of labor markets in both countries.     

Labour mobility during transitionEvidence from Georgia1

This article deals with labour mobility in Georgia during economic transition. We use quarterly 1998–99 panel data to examine mobility across six labour market statuses (inactivity, unemployment, formal wage employment, informal wage employment, self‐employment and farming). Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis of labour market segmentation. Formal employment is preferred to informal employment. Unemployment is largely a queuing device for individuals with higher education waiting for formal jobs. Some self‐employment is subsistence activities and consistent with a segmented labour market, while other is high risk and potentially high return activities. Age, gender and education are significant determinants of labour mobility. Finally, informal employment serves as a buffer in times of recession – with farming and informal wage employment absorbing labour shed by other statuses during the Russian financial crisis.     

Job search and mobility in developing countries. Theory and policy implications

A labor market model is developed in which the formal sector is characterized by search frictions whereas the informal sector is competitive. We show that there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium in this dual economy. We then consider different policies financed by a tax on firms' profits. We find that reducing the unemployment benefit or the firms' entry cost in the formal sector induces higher job creation and formal employment, reduces the size of the informal sector but has an ambiguous effect on wages. We also find that an employment/wage subsidy policy and a hiring subsidy policy have different implications. In particular, the former increases the size of the informal sector while the latter decreases it.     

Employment effects of stabilization policies

This paper studies the effects of a stabilization program based on a reduction in the devaluation rate in an optimizing model with capital controls, minimum wages for unskilled labor, an informal sector, and public production of intermediate inputs. Perfect mobility across sectors of the unskilled labor force prevents the emergence of unemployment for that category of labor, but skilled unemployment prevails in equilibrium. The analysis highlights the role of endogenous labor market segmentation in assessing the wage and employment effects of stabilization policies.     

Housing and unemployment: The search for the “American Dream”

This paper constructs a model of search and bargaining across two different markets: the labor market and the housing market. Interestingly, the model highlights that housing prices and frictions in the housing market have a profound impact on labor market activity through the desire of workers to eventually purchase a home, the “American Dream.” In particular, higher housing prices adversely affect workers’ incentives in the labor market as employment can eventually lead to access to housing through the ability to purchase a home. Similarly, labor market frictions can impact housing market activity. Notably, tighter housing markets are associated with higher unemployment rates and less job creation. Consequently, our work suggests that policymakers should be very careful in implementing policies targeted towards housing – housing markets are likely to generate significant external effects to other sectors of the economy, especially the labor market.     

Informal Employment and the Structure of Wages in India: A Review of Trends

The “alternative”, “atypical” or “informal” workforce has grown in developed and developing countries alike. One of the more recent evolutions of informal employment has been of informal employment within formal enterprises. In the interest of flexibility and cost‐reduction, many formal firms increasingly resort to hiring workers on a temporary or informal basis. Alongside, and perhaps, as a result of the persistence and pervasiveness of informal employment, issues relating to inequality have come to the fore. This paper is motivated by these two intertwining aspects of Indian labor market—informality and wage inequality. Using nationally representative sample data, the paper examines trends in wage inequality among various forms of informal workers, overlaying these findings with broader trends in inequality. Using a regression based inequality decomposition, the paper compares the sources of wage inequality across different employment groups and the reasons for differences in wage inequality.     

Regulation of entry, labor market institutions and the informal sector

This paper develops a two-sector matching model that incorporates the main features of Latin American labor markets. It has an innovation in its matching structure that makes it more consistent with some key stylized facts of the informal sector in these countries. The model is numerically solved using Brazilian data and several policy simulations are performed. Reducing formal sector's entry cost significantly reduces the size of the informal sector and improves overall labor market performance. Increasing enforcement significantly reduces informality but has strong adverse effects on unemployment and welfare. Thus, the results indicate that the tradeoff between lower informal employment and higher unemployment rates is not present when one looks at policies that aim at reducing the costs of being formal, as opposed to policies that simply increase the costs of being informal.     

Informal employment in developing countries : Opportunity or last resort?

There is an ongoing debate among researchers and policy makers, whether informal sector employment is a result of competitive market forces or labor market segmentation. More recently it has been argued that none of the two theories sufficiently explains informal employment, but that the informal sector shows a heterogenous structure. For some workers the informal sector is an attractive employment opportunity, whereas for others - rationed out of the formal sector - the informal sector is a strategy of last resort. To test the empirical relevance of this hypothesis we formulate an econometric model which allows for several unobserved segments within the informal sector and apply it to the urban labor market in Côte d'Ivoire.     

Labor Informality: Choice or Sign of Segmentation? A Quantile Regression Approach at the Regional Level for Colombia

The labor market in developing countries is remarkably heterogeneous, with a small productive formal sector characterized by high wages and attractive employment conditions, and a large informal sector characterized by low productivity and volatile wages. The informal sector is particularly diverse. In this paper, we examine the heterogeneity of the informal sector at the regional level in Colombia. In general, our findings suggest that both voluntary and involuntary informal employment co‐exist by choice and as a consequence of labor market segmentation. We also find that there are striking differences in labor market characteristics across cities, particularly with respect to informal employment.     

The role of product market regulations in the process of structural change

The sectoral allocation of labor differs considerably across developed economies, even in the presence of similar patterns of structural change. A general equilibrium model that captures the stylized facts of structural change is presented. In this framework, economy-wide product market regulations hinder the development of dynamic sectors such as service industries. This is consistent with the negative cross-country relationship between product market regulations and the service employment share, discussed in the paper. Additionally, the model suggests that higher service prices and rents in regulated economies reduce labor supply, providing a rationale for the negative association between product market regulations and the employment rate previously found in the literature.     

Allocation of Labor in Urban West Africa: Insights from the Pattern of Labor Supply and Skill Premiums

Using comparable data from five West African capitals, we assess the rationale behind development policies targeting high rates of school enrollment through the prism of allocation of labor and earnings effects of skills across the formal and informal sectors, and not working. We find that people with high levels of education allocate to the small formal sector, while less educated workers allocate to the informal sector. While high levels of education are given more value in the relatively smaller sectors of salaried employment, observed skills like education appear to be fairly unprofitable in the larger self-employment sector. The fact that only the small formal sector in urban West Africa both seems to absorb highly educated workers and provide high skill premiums may be an important reason for the observed low demand for education and high dropout rates.     

Informal self-employment and macroeconomic fluctuations

Informal self-employment is a major source of employment in developing countries. Its cyclical behavior is important to our understanding of the functioning of LDC labor markets, but turns out to be surprisingly complex. We develop a flexible model with two sectors: a formal salaried (tradable) sector that may be affected by wage rigidities, and an informal (non tradable) self-employment sector faced with liquidity constraints to entry. This labor market is then embedded in a standard small economy macro model. We show that different types of shocks interact with different institutional contexts to produce distinct patterns of comovement between key variables of the model: relative salaried/self-employed incomes, relative salaried/self-employed sector sizes and the real exchange rate. Model predictions are then tested empirically for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. We confirm episodes where the expansion of informal self-employment is consistent with the traditional segmentation views of informality. However, we also identify episodes where informal self-employment behaves “pro-cyclically”; here, informality is driven by relative demand or productivity shocks to the non tradable sector.     

Trade Reform and Informal Wages

When trade reform contracts protected formal sectors in developing countries and the formal workers move to the informal sector for employment, does that reduce informal wages? Using a 2 × 2 Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson (HOS) structure with formal–informal production organization for the same commodity, we show that a tariff cut in the import‐competing sector increases both informal wage and employment under very reasonable assumptions. An increase in the price of the export commodity will also increase informal wages, although aggregate informal employment unambiguously falls even if the informal export sector is labor intensive. Furthermore, the formal–informal segmentation of each sector opens up an interesting, hitherto unexplored, possibility that the informal export sector may contract despite a price increase in this sector. Change in the overall size of the export sector is also ambiguous and conditional on the relative strengths of changes in these two segments.     

Labor and india's economic reforms

Before liberalization in 1991, India had developed exceptionally complex labor regulations which strengthened the bargaining power of unions and increased job security in the formal economy, at the cost of employment. Deregulation and privatization can be expected to strengthen competition, accelerate productivity growth, narrow gaps between formal and informal labor markets outcomes, and weaken union power. Is this happening in post-1991 India? Because India liberalized its economy so recently, and so gradually, it is too early to tell. Key areas of the economy continue to be highly regulated, including labor markets. Yet, there are signs that industrial relations are changing. Increased competition in product markets and dissipation of rents are eroding the protection labor regulations once afforded workers in formal labor markets. In a more competitive environment, the same labor regulations that once increased job security, might expose workers to greater risks.