Environmental Enforcement with Endogenous Ambient Monitoring

We consider an inspection game between n polluting firms and an environmental enforcement agency. If the cost of monitoring ambient pollution is low enough, the optimal inspection policy consists in imposing the maximal possible fine, and mixing between observing ambient pollution and not conducting any inspection at all. However, with stringent upper limits on the fine, the agency mixes between observing ambient pollution and inspecting all firms. The observation of ambient pollution is always followed by sequentially rational firm inspections. Comparisons with Franckx (2002a, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 43, 71–92, 2002b, Topics in Economic Analysis Policy 2(1), Article 1) show that commitment power has a very strong impact on the value of prior information.     

Regulatory Compliance with Costly and Uncertain Litigation

Harrington (1988) and more recent papers by Heyes and Rickman (1999), Livernois and McKenna (1999), and Heyes (1996) have attempted to explain how a relatively large fraction of firms are thought to be in compliance with environmental regulations despite the fact that expected penalties for these violations are deemed rather low. This paper offers an alternative explanation for the interesting paradox by incorporating costly and uncertain litigation.     

海盗犯罪的经济分析及对策

借助\"理性经济人\"理论和波斯纳理论分析海盗的犯罪成本构成,可得出海盗的犯罪成本包括直接成本和惩罚成本。增加海盗犯罪的惩罚成本是目前预防和制止海盗活动唯一可行的选择,并且应体现惩罚成本的可能性、严厉性和及时性。     

Personalist Economics: Moral Convictions,Economic Realities,And Social Action

We examine the relationship between the administrative enforcement of environmental regulation, ethnic heterogeneity, and other community characteristics in New Jersey and New York. We find that the percentage of non-white population in a community is positively related with administrative penalties imposed on violators. However, penalties are lower in more ethnically diverse communities. This result may be due to the fact that these communities are less likely to coordinate to create solidarity across ethnic groups and demand stronger enforcement.     

外部性理论在森林环境资源定价中的应用

本外部性理论是解释经济活动与森林生态环境问题的基础理论。本文利用外部性理论对森林环境外部性的计量分析进行初步的演绎和推算，推出公式为森林环境资源价格=森林资源产品原木的国际价格-边际生产成本-边际使用成本。     

Controlling Pollution with Relaxed Regulations

We investigate the features of optimal environmental policies composed of pollution standards and costly inspection processes, where fines for exceeding the standards depend both on the degree of transgression and the environmental technology that the firm uses to reduce the social impact of its polluting activity. We show that the main characteristics of these policies depend crucially on when the firm selects that technology with respect to the timing of the policy announcement. In fact, the firm has incentives to over-invest in green technologies when the policy is announced afterwards; and to under-invest in them if the environmental authority plays first. Surprisingly, we find that both the firm and the regulator prefer that the firm invests in technology before the policy is announced, even when this implies that expected penalties for noncompliance might be zero.     

中国排污费制度监管环节博弈分析

对中国排污费监管问题建立博弈模型进行分析、研究得到:(1)当罚金、超标排污费较高时,地方政府能否从超标排污中获得直接利益不是企业超标排污决策的重要影响因素;(2)若罚金与超标排污费较小,超标排污是企业较好的选择;(3)若罚金与超标排污费之和大于污染治理成本两倍,且大于政府监督成本,企业超标排污的概率与监督成本成正比关系,与超标排污费与监督成本之和成发比例关系;(4)地方政府所能获得罚金与超标排污费,以及必须承担的监督成本多少对超标排污有重要影响。     

我国生活废弃物的经济分析与对策

I. Introduction Domestic wastes refer to discharges that are produced by our daily life or other social activities and cannot be utilized or recycled within certain time and spatial extent. Firstly, the sources of domestic wastes are various and scattered, such as wastes produced by consumption, various rubbishes in daily life etc. Domestic wastes in- volve every field, enterprise, and individual. However, the wastes have not been treated rationally to lead to envi- ronmental pollution. Secon…     

Pooling of Uncertainty: Enforcing Tradable Permits Regulation when Emissions are Stochastic

An under-appreciated advantage of tradable permits regulation is its ability to create better decision-making when emissions are stochastic. In general, the distribution of stochastic actual emissions around intended emissions results in over- or under-compliance. Permit tradability reduces the extent to which actual aggregate emissions deviate from regulatory targets, by giving firms an additional mechanism for responding to uncertainty. We construct a two period model of permit regulation with ex post enforcement to demonstrate how the permit market distributes uncertainty, and to illustrate the importance of expectations toward permit market outcomes.     

我国生态环境保护的法律问题研究

生态环境保护旨在实现生态文明社会,法律是重要保护手段。当前我国生态环境保护的立法、司法、执法以及守法都存在诸多问题,这很大程度上是导致生态环境问题的根源。环境法治要求健全生态环境保护立法功能、加强生态环境保护执法功能、发挥生态环境保护司法功能以及践行生态环境保护守法功能。     

环境执法监督与空气质量—来自中央环保督察的准自然实验证据

2016年确定的中央环保督察旨在对环境执法监督形式进行创新性改革,是中国推进生态文明建设的重大制度安排,空气质量被生态环境部纳入督察工作的重点内容.采集全国256个地级及以上城市的面板数据,利用中央环保督察这一准自然实验,使用多期双重差分法评估其对空气质量的改善效果.结果表明:中央环保督察对空气质量指数的降低发挥了显著作用,被督察省份的空气质量指数(AQI)平均下降3.184个单位;单项污染物治理效果表明,中央环保督察对PM10、SO2、O3浓度的降低有显著贡献,但对PM2.5、NO2和CO浓度的影响不显著;进一步地,运用平行趋势检验、反事实检验与倾向得分匹配检验证明回归结果的可靠性;动态效应分析发现,中央环保督察的政策效果具有滞后性,并且随着反馈意见的颁布减弱;机制检验与异质性分析结果表明,中央环保督察政策效果呈现东部、西部、中部地区逐渐减弱的现象,且中央环保督察对空气质量的影响机制中存在技术创新效应.     

Strategic pricing and entry deterrence under price-cap regulation

This paper shows that dynamic price-cap regulation allows the regulated firm to deter entry. Under dynamic price-cap regulation, the allowed prices in each period are an increasing function of the prices set in the previous period. By setting a low price before entry, the regulated firm can commit itself to charge a low price in the event of entry. If this price is sufficiently low with respect to the potential entrant's fixed cost, entry does not occur. Whether the regulated firm prefers to deter or accommodate entry depends on the level of the entry cost for the prospective entrant, on the tightness of the price-cap and on the degree of market power of the competing firms in case of entry.     

环境立法管制对企业出口国内附加值率的影响*

本文通过理论建模和经验数据研究了环境立法管制与中国企业出口国内附加值率之间的关系。结果发现,环境立法管制有助于提升中国企业出口国内附加值率。机制分析证明：一方面,加强环境立法管制的“成本效应”促使直接受约束的企业寻找其他可替代要素。这种替代效应的大小取决于企业对污染型资源的依赖程度。“创新效应”通过改变企业生产效率影响企业成本加成。这两种效应均影响了出口国内附加值率。另一方面,环境立法管制提高了本国企业出口到国外市场的生产率下界,使间接受约束的企业改变定价策略,进而影响出口国内附加值率。本文研究表明,地区严格的执法力度有助于扩大环境立法管制对污染型资源依赖程度较低企业出口国内附加值率的积极影响。     

Strategic Choice of the Price Structure and Entry Deterrence Under Price Cap Regulation

This paper shows that a price‐capped firm under the threat of entry in some of the markets it serves can strategically manipulate its price structure to deter entry. In doing so, the regulated firm uses the price cap constraint as a commitment device to an aggressive pricing behaviour in case of entry. A (dynamic) price cap generally entails that the prices allowed today are a function of the previous‐period prices and that the tighter is the constraint on each price, the larger is the quantity sold of this good in the previous period. Hence, the regulated firm may strategically choose its price structure before entry to place a tighter regulatory control on the prices set in the (potentially) competitive markets and to make it optimal to charge in these markets – in case of entry – prices so low that entry is unprofitable.     

环境立法管制对企业出口国内附加值率的影响

本文通过理论建模和经验数据研究了环境立法管制与中国企业出口国内附加值率之间的关系。结果发现,环境立法管制有助于提升中国企业出口国内附加值率。机制分析证明:一方面,加强环境立法管制的\"成本效应\"促使直接受约束的企业寻找其他可替代要素。这种替代效应的大小取决于企业对污染型资源的依赖程度。\"创新效应\"通过改变企业生产效率影响企业成本加成。这两种效应均影响了出口国内附加值率。另一方面,环境立法管制提高了本国企业出口到国外市场的生产率下界,使间接受约束的企业改变定价策略,进而影响出口国内附加值率。本文研究表明,地区严格的执法力度有助于扩大环境立法管制对污染型资源依赖程度较低企业出口国内附加值率的积极影响。     

Pareto-improving Untied Aid with Environmental Externalities

This paper shows that even untied aid is Pareto-improving if and only if the marginal propensity to consume the polluting good in the donor country is sufficiently larger than in the recipient country.