Tax coordination with different preferences for public goods: Conflict or harmony of interest?

The paper analyzes strategic commodity taxation in a model with trade in a single private good that is simultaneously imported by consumers of a high-tax country and exported by its producers. Conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium are given, and an asymmetry is introduced through different preferences for public goods. Two tax coordination measures are discussed—a minimum tax rate and a coordinated increase in the costs of cross-border shopping. It is shown that tax coordination generally benefits the high-tax country while the low-tax country will gain only if the intensity of tax competition is high in the initial equilibrium or if governments are pricesensitive toward the effective marginal costs of public good supply.     

Interjurisdictional Tax Competition in a Federal System of Overlapping Revenue Maximizing Governments

Academic literature in public finance has focused on interjurisdictional tax competition—namely among similar types of local governments—but has leaved vertical externalities arising from interactions between two overlapping governments sharing the same tax base aside. The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple model within which interjurisdictional tax competition and vertical interactions between two overlapping governments that share the same tax base can be analyzed simultaneously. We find that interjurisdictional tax competition reduces the global tax rate set by both overlapping governments (federal and local) but is unable to solve completely the distortion arising from vertical externalities. The model is also extended to allow for government subsidies to industrial capital. We give sufficient conditions for capital subsidies to be more efficient to attract capital when they are granted at a federal level rather than at a local level.     

Interregional redistribution through tax surcharge

The paper considers a utilitarian federal government that levies a tax to finance a national public good or to effect a redistributive policy. Regions differ in their incomes and in their preferences for a local public good. First, we assume that the central government observes each region's public expenditures (and, hence, local tax revenues) but cannot perfectly observe revenues and preferences. We derive the (constrained) Pareto-efficient allocation and show how it can be implemented by a surcharge on local taxes. The level of redistribution that can be achieved is limited by the fact that it may be difficult, or even impossible, to distinguish low-income regions with a high preference for the public good from high-income regions with a low preference. Then we allow for the possibility that the central government can observe incomes through a costly audit. We examine the optimal audit policy and study the impact of audits on the optimal taxation scheme. Throughout the paper we focus on the properties of average and marginal tax rates and on the resulting under- or overprovision of regional public goods.     

Fiscal federalism and local public finance: A computable general equilibrium (CGE) framework

This paper attempts to make an argument for the feasibility and usefulness of a computable general equilibrium approach to studying fiscal federalism and local public finance. It begins by presenting a general model of fiscal federalism that has at its base a local public goods model with (1) multiple types of mobile agents who are endowed with preferences, private good endowments, and land endowments, (2) local governments that produce local public goods funded by a property tax, and (3) a land market that capitalizes local policies to equilibrate supply and demand. To this, a state (or national) government producing a state public good is added, and all levels of government abide by majority rule voting. A computable general equilibrium framework is derived from this theoretical model and calibrated to New Jersey micro tax data. It has been applied elsewhere to study the dominance of property in local tax bases as well as the general equilibrium effects of state or national intergovernmental programs such as redistributive grants in aid, district power equalization, and the deductibility of local taxes. Results in these areas are summarized and potential future applications discussed.     

Fiscal Externalities and Efficient Transfers in a Federation

This paper investigates properties of the second best allocation in a fiscal federal system in which both federal tax and intergovernmental grants are involved and the taxation is distortionary. Also, optimal federal grants and tax policies in a decentralized fiscal system are examined. Our major findings are: (i) the second best does not require the equalization of marginal cost of public funds across regions in a conventional form; (ii) matching grants based on either the local tax rates or tax revenues should be introduced to internalize the tax externality; and (iii) once lump-sum and matching grants are optimized, federal tax policy becomes redundant so the optimal fiscal gap is indeterminate.     

我国财政支出结构的实证分析

基于2006-2011年我国31个省份一般财政支出数据,运用因子分析方法对我国不同时期各地的财政支出结构进行实证分析。结果发现：第一,一般公共服务、国防、公共安全、教育和科学技术等13个不同支出项目可以通过＂偏高级经济技术＂、＂偏社会保障服务＂、＂偏基本设施建设＂较好地反映;第二,地方政府活动的范围和方向以高级经济技术为中心,但逐渐转变为以基本设施建设为中心,后来又转变偏社会保障服务,充分反映不同时期政府政策的重点。最后,笔者分别从财政政策、政府管理模式、财政赤字、税收政策四个角度阐述这一财政支出变化的原因。     

Capital Controls as Taxation Policy

This paper studies the public finance implications ofcontrols on international financial capital flows, proposinga model of controls as distortionary taxation. The model formalizesa capital controls rule that conforms real-world stylized factsand is sustainable in the long-run. Capital controls are shownto distort agents' optimal intratemporal portfolio decisionsand intertemporal consumption decisions, affecting the dynamicsof financial and real variables. We use the model to analyzethe feasible set of tax instruments—in terms of level andmix—available to the government and the complex relationshipsbetween expenditures and taxes mediated by the foreign sector.     

Dynamic Effects of Extending the 2001 and 2003 Income Tax Cuts

This paper focuses on the impact of permanently extending most of the provisions in EGTRRA and JGTRRA, coupled with potential legislative changes to the AMT, on the federal deficit, the distribution of after-tax income, and economic growth. The paper shows that including moderate behavioral responses offsets 16 percent of the static revenue loss estimate from 2005 to 2014. In addition, including behavioral responses implies that the percentage change in after-tax income from permanently extending the 2001 and 2003 income tax cuts would be largest for taxpayers with incomes ranging from $20,000 to $40,000. Finally, the simulation results suggest that extending the 2001 and 2003 income tax cuts and reducing the growth rate of government spending (excluding Social Security and Medicare), assuming that government expenditures are cut to avoid dramatic increases in government consumption relative to GDP in comparison to historical norms, would increase investment, employment, and output. However, postponing the implementation of tight spending controls would more than offset the positive benefits of lower tax rates on the size of the economy and leave future generations with fewer resources for private consumption and production.JEL Code: E62, H20, H30, H60The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect those of the Baker Institute for Public Policy or any other organization. This paper was partially written while the author was employed by the Joint Committee on Taxation.     

Tax Evasion and Auditing in a Federal Economy

This paper analyzes the relation between tax auditing and fiscal equalization in the context of fiscal competition. We incorporate a model of tax evasion by firms into a standard tax competition framework where regional governments use their audit rates as a strategic instrument to engage in fiscal competition. We compare the region’s choice of audit policies for three different cases: A scenario of unconfined competition without interregional transfers, a scenario with a gross revenue equalization (GRS) scheme and finally, a scenario with net revenue sharing (NRS), where not only the revenues from taxation but also the regions auditing costs are shared. Without regional transfers, fiscal competition leads to audit rates which are inefficiently low for revenue-maximizing governments. While in general GRS aggravates the inefficiency, NRS makes the decentralized choice of auditing policies more efficient.JEL Code: H26, H71, H77     

Political economy of prudent budgetary policy

The principles of tax smoothing and public debt management with stochastic shocks to future national income are extended for prudence. A prudent government deliberately underestimates future national income and the tax base, especially if the variance and persistence of shocks hitting the tax base are large and the tax rate is high. As a precaution the tax rate is thus set higher and public spending lower to build precautionary buffers. This leads to gradual reductions in debt and debt service over time and thus, depending on political preferences, cuts in taxes or increases in public spending. Prudence offsets the intertemporal spending, tax and debt biases resulting from common-pool distortions. Appointing a strong finance minister with as many voting rights as the spending ministers combined ensures that the intratemporal common-pool distortions of an excessively large public sector are eliminated. A strong and prudent minister of finance can thus offset the impatient profligacy of squabbling spending ministers. However, if voters care about outcomes on election eve, finance ministers are tempted to build excessive precautionary buffers early on to dish out tax cuts and boost spending on election eve. Too much prudence may thus be abused for short-run electoral gains.     

Sub-sovereign bond buyback: a way forward for debt-laden regions in austerity

ABSTRACT

Previous academic literature has criticised bond buyback as a ‘”boondoggle” benefiting a country’s creditors’—meaning that buybacks are a wasteful use of public money. This paper challenges the narrow financial–economic perspective behind that statement by adopting a broader socio-political framework that includes the potential benefits of buyback for citizens, not just financial market costs. In particular, buyback does not necessarily require a budget surplus via higher local taxes and/or increased austerity measures.     

Tax Setting in a Federal System: The Case of Personal Income Taxation in Canada

In a decentralised tax system, the effects of tax policies enacted by one government are not confined to its own jurisdiction. First, if both the regional and the federal levels of government co-occupy the same fields of taxation, tax rate increases by one layer of government will reduce taxes collected by the other. Second, if the tax base is mobile, tax rate increases by one regional government will raise the amount of taxes collected by other regional governments. These sources of fiscal interdependence are called in the literature vertical and horizontal tax externalities, respectively. Third, as Smart (1998) shows, if equalisation transfers are present, an increase in the standard equalisation tax rate provides incentives to raise taxes to the receiving provinces. A way to check the empirical relevance of these hypotheses is to test for the existence of interactions between the regional tax rate, on the one hand, and the federal tax rate, the tax rate set by competing regions, and the standard equalisation tax rate, on the other hand. Following this approach, this paper estimates provincial tax setting functions with data on Canadian personal income taxation for the period 1982–1996. We find a significant positive response of provincial tax rates to changes in the federal income tax rate, the tax rates of competing provinces, and the standard equalisation rate (only for receiving provinces). We also find that the reaction to horizontal competition is stronger in the provinces that do not receive equalisation transfers.     

从税收视角看江苏的外贸顺差

近年来,我国对外贸易发展较快,出现了较大规模的顺差,引起了国内外的普遍关注。江苏外贸发展在全国很具代表性,外贸顺差近几年增长较快,反映出外贸结构以及税收政策等深层次问题。本文在分析江苏省外贸顺差成因的基础上,从税收角度提出了解决江苏外贸顺差过大的政策选择。     

House Prices and the Structure of Local Government: An Application of Spatial Statistics

When two internally homogeneous communities decide to jointly provide a public service, residents of each community lose some control over the public service provision. The loss of control over public schooling provision contributes to a $2,929 or 3.5 percent drop in constant-quality house value. Increased heterogeneity of the consolidated district is responsible for almost all the drop; the increased number of service recipients alone is responsible for almost none of the drop. The spatial hedonic, corrected for sample selection bias, also suggests economies of scale gains from school district consolidation must be worth at least $3,369—4 percent of house value.     

Establishing bounds on the tax advantage to debt

The partial dismantling of the imputation tax system that commenced in July 1997 once more opens the discussion on the relative tax advantage to debt and its impact on the cost of capital. In this paper we examine the implications of these recent changes for the value of the tax advantage to debt. We analyse the value of debt-related tax shields by computing the individual tax liabilities of 1268 quoted companies that reported during the period 1980–2000 taking account of any tax exhaustion or surplus ACT. We use these estimates to establish an upper bound on the tax advantage to debt. We conclude that even following the 1997 changes in the imputation tax system the probable value for the average current tax advantage to debt in the UK at present is at most about 13% of the value of debt.     

Optimal money and debt management: Liquidity provision vs tax smoothing

Conventional wisdom on public debt management says that liquidity demand should be satiated and that tax rates should be smoothed. Conflicts between the two can arise when government bonds provide liquidity. Smoothing taxes causes greater variability in fiscal balances, and therefore in the supply of government liabilities. When prices are flexible, and can jump to absorb fiscal shocks, the tradeoff between liquidity provision and tax smoothing is eased; when they conflict, optimal policy subordinates tax smoothing to satiating liquidity demand. When price fluctuations impose real costs, conflicts necessarily arise and optimal policy gives primacy to neither goal.     

Behavioral Public Finance: Tax Design as Price Presentation

In this essay we review the evidence from marketing research about price presentation of consumer products and discuss how these lessons have been applied—consciously or unconsciously—in the design of the U.S. tax system. Our perspective is that, in most situations, the designers of the tax system attempt to minimize the perceived burden of any given amount of tax collections. We allow, though, that in certain situations an additional goal is to maximize the perceived burden of others. We also investigate how, when the objective is to encourage a particular activity, price presentation may enhance the achievement of that goal for a given amount of tax subsidy. We conclude by addressing the ethical and normative implications of price presentation in the tax system.     

Tax Competition and Tax Coordination in the European Union

This paper examines the tax competition literature and attempts to draw out its implications for the debate on corporate tax coordination within the EU. It begins with the early basic tax competition model, which derives conditions under which underprovision of public services occurs and tax harmonization unambiguously improves welfare for all states in the union. The paper then turns to a wide variety of extensions of this model, some of which reinforce its results and others that yield rather different conclusions. The analysis concludes by considering the implications of the tax competition literature for the debate on EU corporate tax coordination, drawing on some recent efforts to synthesize this vast literature by estimating the efficiency costs of tax competition and simulating the efficiency gains from various tax coordination palns.     

中国公共预算约束软化的体制成因：理论分析与实证检验

科学和民主的预算管理制度建立前,税制和分税制对政府预算约束有重要作用。中国税制和分税制缺乏内生约束机制,地方政府有空间和激励突破预算框架参与过度财政竞争,使公共预算约束软化。根据公共预算软约束的估计和面板 probit模型,1994年的税制和分税制改革整体硬化了全国预算收入约束,但导致东部的预算收入约束软化,且未改善预算支出约束。现行税制和分税制下,不规范的税收优惠政策、投资扩张冲动和专项转移支出依赖是导致公共预算约束软化的重要机制。     

Oil price and reserve location—Effects on oil and gas sector returns

We provide market evidence of the effects of reserve location on oil and gas (O&G) company returns. Prior studies have shown that commodity sector stock returns are affected by commodity prices. In a new contribution to natural resource valuation literature, returns for 51 O&G companies are shown to be directly and negatively affected by exposures to (location specific) progressive fiscal terms. We add a reserve location proxy—‘R’—to the Fama–French framework; differentiating between companies' performances based on the proportion of oilfield assets subject to progressive tax terms. Companies with oilfield assets owned under progressive production sharing fiscal terms are unable to capture the benefits of oil price increases—and as result significantly under-perform companies with concession asset holdings.