A new fuzzy unidimensional poverty index from an information theory perspective

This article proposes to use an information theory approach to design a fuzzy unidimensional poverty index. In order to avoid the usual binary definition of poverty, a fuzzy set approach has been used. The total population is partitioned into three mutually exclusive groups around the poverty line. This builds on fuzzy set theory whereby the definition of the threshold of who is poor or non-poor is fuzzy. This article proposes a method using a membership function and a confidence interval of poverty line to identify to what extent households can be considered as poor or non-poor. According to this membership function, a relative entropy measure is adopted to assess an aggregation method of fuzzy individual poverty. An application using individual well-being data from Tunisian households is presented.     

Which type of producer organization is (more) inclusive? Dynamics of farmers’ membership and participation in the decision‐making process

Producer organizations (POs) provide benefits to smallholders by alleviating market access challenges. However, whether all farmers benefit from a PO is still a question. Limited evidence is available on whether POs are inclusive of poor farmers. Even if the poor join, do they participate in decision‐making? We conducted interviews with 595 smallholder dairy farmers in Kenya. We distinguish three groups; members of a bargaining PO, members of a processing PO and non‐members. We show that membership is related to the structural characteristics of the organization: processing POs favor membership of farmers that are wealthier, more educated and more innovative. As to participation in the decision‐making process: older, male and specialized farmers have a higher chance of being involved than poor farmers. Factors distinguishing farmer participation in decision‐making between bargaining and processing POs are highlighted. We find that a bargaining PO is more inclusive of all groups of farmers, while women and poor farmers are excluded from decision‐making in a processing PO. Our findings contribute to policymaking on inclusive development.     

Selecting Your Inflation Targeters: Background and Performance of Monetary Policy Committee Members

Abstract. This paper starts by describing the composition of monetary policy committees (MPCs) in inflation‐targeting and non‐targeting countries. The experience of MPC members on their inflation performance is then compared, opposing inflation targeters with non‐targeters. Our sample covers the major Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries, in the period 1999–2008. Our results first show that MPCs are different in inflation‐targeting (versus non‐targeting) countries. They also reveal that policy‐makers' backgrounds influence inflation, and that the influence of MPCs' experience is much greater in inflation‐targeting countries, while size effects are more important for committees that do not target inflation.     

Unidimensional and multidimensional fuzzy poverty measures: New approach

the analysis of deprivation is usually seen as a unidimensional condition. However, recently it is considered to be a multidimensional one. A useful tool for such analysis is to view deprivation as a degree providing a quantitative expression to its intensity for individuals. Such fuzzy conceptualisation has been widely adopted in poverty and deprivation research. This paper aims to further develop and refine this strand of research. First, we re-examine two aspects introduced by the use of fuzzy measures, as opposed to conventional poor/non-poor dichotomous measures, namely the choice of membership functions and the rules to manipulate, resulting fuzzy sets. Secondly, we propose fuzzy monetary and non-monetary measures with the membership functions of poor and non-poor. An application based on individual well-being data from Tunisian households in 1990 is presented to illustrate use of one of the proposed concept.     

The eye of the beholder. Reconsidering the notions of pro‐poor growth and progressivity,with an application to Vietnam

Both policymakers and economists have tried to find criteria to assess whether economic growth is pro‐poor. In this paper we reconsider the inequality‐oriented approach originally proposed by Jenkins and Van Kerm. They look at the changes in the whole income distribution, and decompose the change in income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, into a progressivity and a reranking component. They define a pro‐poor (or progressive) change as one where the changes in income are more to the benefit of those who are initially poor than to the benefit of those who are initially rich. We challenge this assumption, and maintain that also the point of view of the finally poor and the finally rich should be taken into account when evaluating whether growth is pro‐poor. We suggest a new decomposition method, based on an inequality index of the generalized entropy family, which allows the change in income inequality to be decomposed exactly into a forward‐looking and a backward‐looking progressivity component. Our empirical illustration, using data from household surveys in Vietnam, shows that economic growth in Vietnam has been pro‐poor from a forward‐looking perspective, but not from a backward‐looking perspective.     

Endowment,industrial structure,and appropriate financial structure: a new structural economics perspective

Standard policy advice at times of fiscal adjustment is to protect public spending on the poor. However, the political economy of fiscal adjustment could well indicate the opposite direction, to protect the non‐poor from adjustment. This point is illustrated by three case studies based on research on social programs in Argentina, Bangladesh, and India, focusing on how targeting performance varied with aggregate outlays. The results suggest a tendency for program spending on the non‐poor that is protected from budget cuts.     

Dependency traps in self‐targeting food aid programs

We present an economy of farmers where food aid is warranted due to poverty traps triggered by nonconvex production sets. We model a food‐aid intervention as a dynamic game between a food‐aid manager and the farmers in a context of asymmetrical information. The food‐aid manager is motivated by a relief objective and targets farmers suffering the poverty trap. The food‐aid manager uses a self‐targeting mechanism by providing the aid through a food wage in exchange for participation in the intervention's activities. Guided by the relief objective and targeting constraint, he fixes the food wage equal to the reservation wage of the farmers not suffering the poverty trap. Dependency traps will then happen every time there is a considerable technological and nutritional gap between farmers who are in and out of the poverty trap. When there is a gap, poor farmers earn more working for the reservation wage of the well‐off farmers than by working in their own farm. Dependency can be overcome only if the food‐aid program allows farmers to upgrade their productive technologies and catch up with those farmers who are out of the poverty trap.     

What Stops Dutch Households from Taking Up Much Needed Benefits?

It is common for individuals not to take up welfare benefits. The most common explanation is that people make a rational choice between the utility they expect from the benefit and the effort required to take‐up. Most studies utilize surveys, which are subject to misreporting and measurement errors, to determine eligibility and non‐take‐up rates. This study uses a novel dataset based on administrative data sources, which provides a more accurate identification of eligible households and take‐up. Furthermore, this study documents non‐take‐up of a compensation to which nearly 5 million Dutch households are entitled. The richness of the data allowed us to conduct a detailed analysis of key drivers of non‐take‐up. The analysis largely confirms the transaction‐costs hypotheses. However, we found an unexpected effect. Although, in general, the probability of take‐up increases when income decreases, those with the lowest income or wealth do not have the highest probability of take‐up.     

MEASURING POVERTY USING BOTH INCOME AND WEALTH: A CROSS‐COUNTRY COMPARISON BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SPAIN

We study the correspondence between a household's income and its vulnerability to income shocks in two developed countries: the U.S. and Spain. Vulnerability is measured by the availability of wealth to smooth consumption in a multidimensional approach to poverty, which allows us to identify three groups of households: the twice‐poor group, which includes income‐poor households who lack an adequate stock of wealth; the group of protected‐poor households, which are all those income‐poor families with a buffer stock of wealth they can rely on; and the vulnerable‐non‐poor group, including households above the income‐poverty line that do not hold any stock of wealth. Interestingly, the risk of belonging to these groups changes over the life‐cycle in both countries while the size of the groups differs significantly between Spain and the U.S., although this result is quite sensitive to whether the housing wealth component is included in the wealth measure or not.     

Does Preferential Trade Benefit Poor Countries? A General Equilibrium Assessment with Nonhomothetic Preferences

We develop a Ricardian model of trade with nonhomothetic preferences to analyze preferential trade agreements (PTAs) among countries of different stages of economic development. The richer a country is, the more likely will PTAs improve its terms of trade, also when it is a non‐member. Rich non‐member countries are also less likely to incur welfare losses from PTAs. PTA membership only guarantees welfare gains for countries that are too poor to import the goods rich countries produce. For all other countries, the welfare effects of joining PTAs depend on the world income distribution and on the strength of comparative advantages.     

DRIVERS OF PRO‐ACTIVE MEMBER PARTICIPATION IN AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES: EVIDENCE FROM BRAZIL

Effective governance of cooperatives depends on the pro‐active participation of members in the governance. However, it is commonly argued that, especially in cooperatives with high heterogeneity of membership, additional decision‐making and influencing costs could emerge if members who participate in the governance do so to obtain direct or indirect economic benefits at the individual farm level. The objective of this paper is to assess whether or not farmers’ economic motivations for continued association are relevant drivers of pro‐active participation. Data originate from 148 farmers from a large agricultural cooperative in Brazil. The results suggest that economic motivations for continued association are drivers of participation in the General Assembly, but not of ‘pro‐active’ participation in boards and committees.     

模糊—物元综合评价法在环境空气质量评价中的应用研究

模糊综合评价法在大气环境质量评价中运用较为普遍,也是较为理想的一种方法模式。但目前该方法中隶属函数普遍采用"降半梯形"形式建立,每一级别的隶属函数仅与相邻上、下两个级别存在隶属关系,当污染级别浓度分布过于离散时,可能会遗失很多有用的信息,使评价结果出现误差。因此创新性地将物元分析法中关联度函数引入模糊综合评判法中,隶属度函数进行改进,建立了模糊—物元综合评价模型,通过将该模型与模糊综合评判模型的实例对比验证分析,结果表明:此模型相比于后者要更加合理、准确,实现了对大气环境质量评价方法的丰富和发展。     

Fuzzy Chronic Poverty: A Proposed Response to Measurement Error for Intertemporal Poverty Measurement

A number of chronic poverty measures are now empirically applied to quantify the prevalence and intensity of chronic poverty, vis‐à‐vis transient experiences, using panel data. Welfare trajectories over time are assessed in order to identify the chronically poor and distinguish them from the non‐poor, or the transiently poor, and assess the extent and intensity of intertemporal poverty. We examine the implications of measurement error in the welfare outcome for some popular discontinuous chronic poverty measures, and propose corrections to these measures that seeks to minimize the consequences of measurement error. The approach is based on a novel criterion for the identification of chronic poverty that draws on fuzzy set theory. We illustrate the empirical relevance of the approach with a panel dataset from rural Ethiopia and some simulations.     

Willingness to pay for environmental goods in Norway: A contingent valuation study with real payment

The study seeks to determine the maximum willingness to pay (MWTP) among a random sample of Norwegians, for membership in the largest environmentalist association in Norway, Norges Naturvernforbund (NNV). The study includes three stages: (1) a contingent valuation study, testing hypothetical MWTP; (2) those whose stated MWTP is at or above the current membership fee are then asked to pay this fee; (3) those individuals who do not pay in stage 2 are interviewed, and asked to consider revising their MWTP statement. The study is seemingly the first of its kind in comparing hypothetical and actual MWTP by typing valuation of a public good (the environment) to the value of a private good (membership of the NNV). The results show a rather poor correspondence between hypothetical and actual MWTP, since only 6 out of 64 who stated that they were willing to pay the membership fee in stage 1, actually paid this voluntarily in stage 2. Possible reasons for this discrepancy are discussed, on the basis of data from the telephone interview in stage 3, and on information gathered in stage 1. The data indicate that a substantial part of this discrepancy is due to MWTP being overstated in stage 1, but that other reasons also are important.     

Corruption, Bribery, and Wait Times in the Public Allocation of Goods in Developing Countries

What are the nexuses between corruption, bribery, and wait times in the public allocation of goods in developing countries? This question has received scant attention in the literature. Consequently, we use queuing theory to analyze models in which a good is allocated publicly, first in a non‐preemptive corruption regime and then in a preemptive corruption regime. Specifically, for both regimes, we calculate wait times for citizens who pay bribes and for those who do not. Second, we use these wait times to show that bribery is profitable for citizens with a high opportunity cost of time. Third, we show that high and low opportunity cost of time citizens will have dissimilar preferences as far as the corruption regime is concerned. Finally, we conclude with some across‐citizens and across‐corruption regimes observations about the value of preemption, the benefit from bribery, and a measure of resource misallocation in the economy.     

A New Approach to Unidimensional Poverty Analysis: Application to the Tunisian Case

Fuzzy conceptualization of privation has been a step closer to more realistic handling of poverty. However, fuzzy approaches to poverty are still grounded on parametric axioms. Moreover, construction of poverty lines within these approaches still relies on ad‐hoc methods. In this paper, we advance instead a fuzzy procedure based on the non‐parametric bootstrap method, allowing us to depict fuzzy unidimensional privation states with boundaries drawn spontaneously from data. Fuzzy non‐parametric measures of privation within each state as well as a collective fuzzy non‐parametric index of poverty are derived, along with their corresponding confidence intervals. The new approach is applied to the analysis of poverty in Tunisia in 2005.     

RAISING CAPITAL BY ISSUING TRANSFERABLE MEMBERSHIP IN A WORKER COOPERATIVE

It is generally recognized that worker cooperatives have a disadvantage in raising capital compared with conventional capitalist firms. In this paper, we explore a method for a worker cooperative to raise non‐redeemable equity by issuing transferable membership shares as financial securities.     

Need,Merit and Politics in Multilateral Aid Allocation: A District‐level Analysis of World Bank Projects in India

We assess the targeting of foreign aid within recipient countries by employing Poisson estimations on the determinants of the World Bank's allocation of project aid at the district level in India. The evidence of needs‐based location choices is very weak as long as the poverty orientation of overall commitments is taken as the yardstick. It is only for some sectors that we find stronger indications of needs‐based allocation when combining sector‐specific commitments with corresponding measures of need. The evidence for a merit‐based allocation of World Bank aid is even weaker. We typically do not find evidence that aid allocation is affected by political patronage at the state or district level. However, the World Bank prefers districts where foreign direct investors may benefit from projects related to infrastructure.     

Microcredit,Labor, and Poverty Impacts in Urban Mexico

Improved household accessibility to credit is a significant determinant of intra‐household allocation of labor resources with important implications for productivity, income, and poverty status. However, credit accessibility could also have wider impacts on poverty if it leads to new hires outside the household. This paper contributes to the existing literature on microcredit in two important ways. First, it investigates the routes through which microcredit reaches those in poverty outside the household. We test whether by lending to the vulnerable non‐poor microcredit can indirectly benefit poor laborers through increased employment. Second, we conduct the study in the context of urban poverty Mexico. This is relevant when considering that labor often represents the only source of livelihoods to the extreme urban poor. Our findings point to significant trickle‐down effects of microcredit that benefit poor laborers; however, these effects are only observed after loan‐supported enterprising households achieve earnings well above the poverty line.