RISK MEASURES: RATIONALITY AND DIVERSIFICATION

When there is uncertainty about interest rates (typically due to either illiquidity or defaultability of zero coupon bonds) the cash‐additivity assumption on risk measures becomes problematic. When this assumption is weakened, to cash‐subadditivity for example, the equivalence between convexity and the diversification principle no longer holds. In fact, this principle only implies (and it is implied by) quasiconvexity. For this reason, in this paper quasiconvex risk measures are studied. We provide a dual characterization of quasiconvex cash‐subadditive risk measures and we establish necessary and sufficient conditions for their law invariance. As a byproduct, we obtain an alternative characterization of the actuarial mean value premium principle.     

AN AXIOMATIC APPROACH TO CAPITAL ALLOCATION

Capital allocation techniques are of central importance in portfolio management and risk-based performance measurement. In this paper we propose an axiom system for capital allocation and analyze its satisfiability and completeness: it is shown that for a given risk measure ρ there exists a capital allocation  Λ_ρ  that satisfies the main axioms if and only if ρ is subadditive and positively homogeneous. Furthermore, it is proved that the axiom system uniquely specifies  Λ_ρ  . We apply the axiomatization to the most popular risk measures in the finance industry in order to derive explicit capital allocation formulae for these measures.     

A unified approach to systemic risk measures via acceptance sets

We specify a general methodological framework for systemic risk measures via multidimensional acceptance sets and aggregation functions. Existing systemic risk measures can usually be interpreted as the minimal amount of cash needed to secure the system after aggregating individual risks. In contrast, our approach also includes systemic risk measures that can be interpreted as the minimal amount of cash that secures the aggregated system by allocating capital to the single institutions before aggregating the individual risks. An important feature of our approach is the possibility of allocating cash according to the future state of the system (scenario‐dependent allocation). We also provide conditions that ensure monotonicity, convexity, or quasi‐convexity of our systemic risk measures.     

SHAREHOLDER RISK MEASURES

The aim of this paper is to put forward a new family of risk measures that could guide investment decisions of private companies. But at the difference of the classical approach of Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath and the subsequent extensions of this model, our risk measures are built to reflect the risk perception of shareholders rather than regulators. Instead of an axiomatic approach, we derive risk measures from the optimal policies of a shareholder value‐maximizing company. We study these optimal policies and the related risk measures that we call shareholder risk measures. We emphasize the fact that due to the specific corporate environment, in particular the limited shareholders' liability and the possibility to pay out dividends from cash reserves, these risk measures are not convex. Also, they depend on the specific economic situation of the firm, in particular its current cash level, and thus they are not translation invariant. This paper bridges the gap between two important branches of mathematical finance: risk measures and optimal dividends.     

TRACTABLE ROBUST EXPECTED UTILITY AND RISK MODELS FOR PORTFOLIO OPTIMIZATION

Expected utility models in portfolio optimization are based on the assumption of complete knowledge of the distribution of random returns. In this paper, we relax this assumption to the knowledge of only the mean, covariance, and support information. No additional restrictions on the type of distribution such as normality is made. The investor’s utility is modeled as a piecewise‐linear concave function. We derive exact and approximate optimal trading strategies for a robust (maximin) expected utility model, where the investor maximizes his worst‐case expected utility over a set of ambiguous distributions. The optimal portfolios are identified using a tractable conic programming approach. Extensions of the model to capture asymmetry using partitioned statistics information and box‐type uncertainty in the mean and covariance matrix are provided. Using the optimized certainty equivalent framework, we provide connections of our results with robust or ambiguous convex risk measures, in which the investor minimizes his worst‐case risk under distributional ambiguity. New closed‐form results for the worst‐case optimized certainty equivalent risk measures and optimal portfolios are provided for two‐ and three‐piece utility functions. For more complicated utility functions, computational experiments indicate that such robust approaches can provide good trading strategies in financial markets.     

Certainty equivalent,risk premium and asset pricing

This paper attempts to determine the certainty equivalent of an uncertain future cash flow or value through the option pricing method, and builds models of certainty equivalent and certainty equivalent coefficient. Based on the model of certainty equivalent coefficient, this paper further derives models of risk premium and risk-adjusted discount rate. The latter is a new capital asset pricing model (CAPM) accounting for total risk rather than with only the systematic risk accounted for as in the current CAPM. The reliability in relevant financial analysis, valuation, decision making and risk management may be enhanced with these new models.     

Kommunaler Altschuldenfonds: Verringerung der effektiven Schuldenlast anstreben!

High indebtedness is a major burden for many municipalities in Germany. Moreover, the high stock of cash credits indicates severe economic imbalances and bears significant interest rate risk. Hence, debt funds for cash credits are currently under discussion in Germany. However, a sustainable solution to the municipalities’ debt problem requires a reduction of the current debt burden and the prevention of new indebtedness. In this context, high stocks of cash credits are a symptom of structural fiscal problems rather than the actual disease. Thus, their reduction would be an important component of a number of measures, but only part of the solution.     

Market Efficiency and Price Discovery in Cocoa Markets

ABSTRACT

This paper tests the efficiency and price discovery mechanism in the cocoa cash and futures markets over the period March 1981–August 2009. The results indicate that the price discovery is done in the cash market and spreads to the futures markets and that the futures price can be seen as an unbiased predictor of future cash prices. There is no sign of a risk premium in the futures price. Since the cash behaves like a random walk we cannot reject market efficiency.     

上市公司财务预警分析--基于现金流模型的实证研究

本文从财务危机的预警机理出发,选取能反映企业财务安全的“现金制”指标,采用主成分分析法,通过对我国上市公司财务危机状况的实证研究,建立了上市公司财务预警模型———T分数模型。该模型针对目前以“ST”作为财务困境企业的分界点不能准确判断出企业是否有足够的现金流、是否能够真正避免财务危机这一现状,结合本文给出的各项现金类指标,能够从企业现金流的角度判断企业是否存在财务困境、能否偿还各类到期利息及债务,为企业提供了一个更为准确的预测自身财务危机的工具。     

Risk premia in forward exchange rates: systematic or unsystematic?

International traders frequently use forward exchange transactions to hedge their cash flows in foreign currencies. A key issue is whether the forward rates are efficiently priced. There is evidence of time-varying risk premia in forward exchange rates. Are these risk premia systematic or unsystematic? This article uses a market model to explain risk, implying that the risk premium in the forward rate varies pari passu with the beta of the return to speculative forward positions. Assuming the unobserved risk premium is proportional to the forward premium allows testing the predicted relations; the data reject the joint hypotheses of the model and systematic risk. In terms of a simple factor model explaining the covariation of the forward premium, the risk premium, and the expected percentage rate of change of the spot exchange rate, the assumption that the forward premium and the risk premium are proportional can be relaxed without changing the empirical results.     

Valuing Internet Business

Is there a bubble in internet stock prices, has the new economy changed the rules of stock valuation? In this article, the authors argue that the old rules still apply. The only way to test the reasonableness of new economy stock prices is to model the company's ability to generate cash in the future. This analysis also allows the development of a view about the performance that would be needed to justify current valuations. The analysis suggests that many internet valuations are stretched. Investors are focused on growth prospects for the firms, but realistic analysis about future profitability has been neglected in what will be an increasingly competitive world. Further, investors' assumptions that the new economy businesses will not require assets are unrealistic in many cases. Finally, because some new economy stocks are overvalued, there is a risk of misdirection of productive resources.     

Alignment or entrenchment? Corporate governance and cash holdings in growing firms

This study contends that the association between corporate cash holdings and corporate governance is subject to the investment environments that firms face. For example, firms with an abundance of investment opportunities have a strong incentive to hold cash in order to maintain their competitive positions. Shareholders accept high levels of cash holdings in such growing firms if corporate governance can protect their interests. This study examines the effects of corporate governance on cash holdings for a sample of high-tech firms. The results show that CEO ownership, the directorship of venture capitalists (VCs), and independent directors play critical roles in corporate cash policy. In addition, the boards are more effective when the firms' CEOs are also their founders or when VCs hold a large stake of company shares. The effects of corporate governance are more significant in younger firms while the effects of firm-specific economic variables are more significant in older firms in the sample.     

Put Option Premiums and Coherent Risk Measures

This note defines the premium of a put option on the firm as a measure of insolvency risk. The put premium is not a coherent risk measure as defined by Artzner et al. (1999). It satisfies all the axioms for a coherent risk measure except one, the translation invariance axiom. However, it satisfies a weakened version of the translation invariance axiom that we label translation monotonicity. The put premium risk measure generates an acceptance set that satisfies the regularity Axioms 2.1–2.4 of Artzner et al. (1999). In fact, this is a general result for any risk measure satisfying the same risk measure axioms as the put premium. Finally, the coherent risk measure generated by the put premium's acceptance set is the minimal capital required to protect the firm against insolvency uniformly across all states of nature.     

OPTIMAL RISK SHARING FOR LAW INVARIANT MONETARY UTILITY FUNCTIONS

We consider the problem of optimal risk sharing of some given total risk between two economic agents characterized by law-invariant monetary utility functions or equivalently, law-invariant risk measures. We first prove existence of an optimal risk sharing allocation which is in addition increasing in terms of the total risk. We next provide an explicit characterization in the case where both agents' utility functions are comonotone. The general form of the optimal contracts turns out to be given by a sum of options (stop-loss contracts, in the language of insurance) on the total risk. In order to show the robustness of this type of contracts to more general utility functions, we introduce a new notion of strict risk aversion conditionally on lower tail events, which is typically satisfied by the semi-deviation and the entropic risk measures. Then, in the context of an AV@R-agent facing an agent with strict monotone preferences and exhibiting strict risk aversion conditional on lower tail events, we prove that optimal contracts again are European options on the total risk.     

Carbon Risk,Carbon Risk Awareness and the Cost of Debt Financing

We seek insights into potential benefits for firms adopting strategies to improve business sustainability in a carbon-constrained future. We investigate whether lenders incorporate a firm’s exposure to carbon-related risk into lending decisions through the cost of financing, and if so, importantly whether firms can mitigate the penalty by demonstrating an awareness of their carbon risks. We use a sample of 255 firm-year observations from eight industries over the period 2009–2013. We measure carbon-related risk exposure as the firm’s historical carbon emissions and our primary measure of carbon risk awareness is based on the firm’s willingness to respond to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) survey. We document a positive association between cost of debt and carbon risk for firms failing to respond to the CDP. Further, this association is economically meaningful, with a one standard deviation increase in carbon risk mapping into between a 38 and 62 basis point increase in the cost of debt. Equally, we find that this penalty is effectively negated for firms exhibiting carbon risk awareness. Our results are robust when we consider alternate measures of carbon awareness—disclosure through alternative medium to the CDP and firms’ annual cash investment in new capital assets using “cleaner” technology. Our results highlight not only the importance of carbon awareness as a business strategy for polluting firms, but also its importance to lenders exposed to their clients’ default and reputational risk. The debt market appears to incorporate historical carbon emissions and forward-looking indicators of carbon performance.     

RISK MEASURES AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PROCESSES

In this paper we propose a generalization of the concepts of convex and coherent risk measures to a multiperiod setting, in which payoffs are spread over different dates. To this end, a careful examination of the axiom of translation invariance and the related concept of capital requirement in the one-period model is performed. These two issues are then suitably extended to the multiperiod case, in a way that makes their operative financial meaning clear. A characterization in terms of expected values is derived for this class of risk measures and some examples are presented.     

Fragmentation and complementarity: The case of EFPs

With the proliferation of alternative markets, concerns have arisen that they may induce lower liquidity on centralized exchanges. In futures markets, the use of an alternative trading mechanism known as exchange of futures for physicals (EFPs) has increased sharply in recent years. EFPs provide a means to obtain futures positions, coupled with offsetting cash positions, away from the centralized exchange. Traders use EFPs to ensure a desired price on complex packages of trades, thus avoiding the transactional risk (slippage) that is inherent in the centralized market. Theoretical analysis establishes that any detrimental effects of fragmenting the centralized market can be offset by traders' knowledge of another opportunity to trade without transactional risk. If EFPs attract more risk‐bearing capacity, there could even be a net benefit to the central market. An empirical analysis suggests that EFP trading is motivated by transactional risk because it represents a larger portion of total trading during periods of unusually high volatility when slippage is apt to be more of a problem. Consistent with the notion that alternative markets can be complementary to centralized exchanges, we find that EFP trading is not associated with reductions in market quality and may act as an outlet for extra volume when markets are under the most stress. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 22:697–727, 2002     

Explaining the use and effects of humour in advertising: an evolutionary perspective

Prior reviews have outlined the state of research of humour in advertising and showed that some findings deserve further explanations. This paper makes the point that evolutionary psychologists’ explanations of the functions of humour can provide new or alternative explanations for these findings and suggest new research avenues. The evolutionary functions of humour have been widely discussed in the literature, but advertising researchers have neglected biological nature and biological evolution as additional or alternative explanations for humour in advertising. The paper contributes to the advertising literature and broadens perspectives for research on humour in advertising by reviewing research on the evolutionary functions of humour, by showing how these functions can explain the use, effects, and moderators of humour in advertising beyond the explanations provided in prior literature, and by suggesting new propositions for future research on humour in advertising.     

TAX BASIS AND NONLINEARITY IN CASH STREAM VALUATION

The value of a future cash stream is often taken to be its net present value with respect to some term structure. This means that a linear formula is used in which each future payment is discounted by a factor deemed appropriate for the date on which the payment will be made. In a money market with taxes and shorting costs, however, there is no theoretical support for the existence of a universal term structure for this purpose. What is worse, reliance on linear formulas can be seriously inaccurate relative to true worth and can lead to paradoxes of disequilibrium. A consistent no-arbitrage theory of valuation in such a market requires instead that taxed and untaxed investors be grouped in separate classes with different valuation operators. Such operators are linear to scale but nonlinear with respect to addition. Here it is established that although these valuation operators provide general bounds applicable across an entire class, individual investors within a tax class can have more special operators because of the influence of existing holdings. These customized valuation operators have the feature of not even being linear to scale. In consequence of this nonlinearity, investors from the same or different tax classes can undertake advantageous trades even when the market is in a no-arbitrage state, but such trade opportunities are limited. Some degree of activity in financial markets can thereby be understood without appeal to differences in utility functions or temporary disequilibrium due to random disturbances.     

Is there Informational Value in Corporate Giving?

In this article, we propose that giving in cash and non-cash (in-kind) differ in their relation with the giving firm’s future corporate financial performance (CFP) and only cash giving is associated with future CFP. Using a novel dataset from ASSET4 that differentiates corporate giving over a sample period of 2002–2012, we examine three competing hypotheses: (1) agency cost hypothesis that cash giving reflects agency cost and destroys value for shareholders, (2) investment hypothesis that cash giving is an investment by management that aims for better future return, and (3) information hypothesis that cash giving has informational value to shareholders as cash is a critical resource at a firm and giving is a decision by managers who are insiders. We find that indeed, only cash giving is positively associated with future CFP and firm value, measured by Fama–French five-factor abnormal risk-adjusted stock returns, future return on assets, and Tobin’s Q. In addition, we find that the positive association exists only between excess, i.e., unexpected, but not expected cash giving and future CFP. Our empirical findings support the information hypothesis, but neither the agency hypothesis nor the investment hypothesis, and are robust to a number of endogeneity tests, including orthogonalized cash giving, instrumental variable regression using geography-based instruments, and propensity score matching. Furthermore, we show that the positive association between future CFP and unexpected cash giving is only pronounced at firms with good governance and relatively higher sales growth where agency problems are less likely, and at firms with no alternative mechanisms to demonstrate the strength of cash flow. Additionally, we do not find evidence that suggests in-kind giving to possess any informational value.