Powerful CEOs,cash bonus contracts and firm performance

We investigate whether powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) influence the conditions of their cash bonus contracts. Specifically, we examine (i) the association between CEO power and the proportion of ex-ante cash bonus to base salary (bonus ratio), (ii) the association between CEO power and the relative use of non-financial to financial performance targets in cash bonus contracts, and (iii) the performance consequences of incorporating non-financial targets in cash bonus contracts. Results show that powerful CEOs are associated with greater ex-ante bonus ratios and higher proportions of non-financial performance targets compared to less powerful CEOs. Furthermore, the use of quantitative and corporate social responsibility (CSR)-related non-financial performance targets is positively associated with subsequent firm performance, and the use of undefined non-financial performance targets is negatively associated with subsequent firm performance. These results are robust to alternative econometric specifications and variable definitions.     

Why do managers avoid EPS dilution? Evidence from debt–equity choice

Survey evidence reveals that managers prefer to avoid dilution of earnings per share (EPS), though financial theory suggests it is irrelevant in firm valuation. We explore contracting and behavioral explanations for this apparent paradox using a large sample of debt–equity issuers. We first provide evidence that firms with greater agency conflicts between managers and shareholders are more likely to use EPS as a performance measure in bonus contracts. After controlling for possible endogeneity related to compensation contract design, we find that managers are more likely to avoid earnings dilution when their bonus compensation explicitly depends upon EPS performance. This effect is increasing in the magnitude of bonus compensation for this subset of firms; we document no such associations for the firms that do not use EPS in setting bonus pay. Additional tests of firms’ speed of adjustment to target leverage ratios and firms’ debt conservatism levels indicate that explicitly rewarding executives on EPS performance helps to resolve underleveraging problems. We also find that clientele effects are associated with managers’ aversion to earnings dilution. Our findings provide a deeper understanding of the factors that underlie the use of accounting performance in compensation contracts and new evidence on the implications of the contracting role of accounting in firm decision-making.     

Non-executive compensation in German and Swiss banks before and after the financial crisis

We provide an extensive overview of the determinants of compensation schemes for non-executive employees in the German and Swiss financial services industry. We analyze how pay systems adjust in the aftermath of the financial crisis and find that the crisis had a deep impact on short-term bonus payments. Our results indicate that restrictions on bonus payments may lead to higher fixed salaries and, hence, to a lower performance sensitivity of compensation. We also show that fixed compensation packages are highly standardized between banks, whereas bonus payments are more strongly related to differences between individuals. In Germany, bonuses vary to a higher extent across companies, whereas in Swiss banks, the differences are almost negligible when adding firm controls.     

Optimal job design in the presence of implicit contracts

We characterize the optimal job design in a multitasking environment when the firms use implicit contracts (i.e., bonus payments). Two natural forms of job design are compared: (i) individual assignment, where each agent is assigned to a particular job and (ii) team assignment, where a group of agents share responsibility for a job and are jointly accountable for its outcome. Team assignment mitigates the multitasking problem but may weaken the implicit contracts. The optimal job design follows a cutoff rule where only the firms with high reputation concerns opt for team assignment. However, the cutoff rule need not hold if the firm can combine implicit incentives with explicit pay‐per‐performance contracts.     

The association between non-financial performance measures in executive compensation contracts and earnings management

Executive compensation, especially cash bonus compensation, has come under fire by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the US Federal government, and the media for its role in the current economic crisis. Specifically, the SEC has argued that some compensation packages provide incentives for risk-taking that may undermine shareholder value over the long-term. Short-term incentive payments to executives in the form of cash bonuses are mostly contingent on reaching targets of accounting-related measures or financial performance measures (FPMs). However, the incentives from these payments may lead to accrual manipulation and earnings management (EM). Alternative measures are non-financial performance measures (NFPMs). We expect that firms that employ NFPMs in bonus contracts will have a lower prevalence of EM, since these measures tend to focus executives on the long-term. In this paper, we examine the type of performance measures used by firms in the S&;P 500 index in their cash bonus compensation. We find that firms that use both FPMs and NFPMs have lower discretionary accruals compared to firms that use only FPMs, consistent with lower income-increasing EM. However, we do not find evidence of a reduction in EM behavior using the incidence of meeting or just beating analyst earnings benchmarks, another common EM proxy. In additional tests on a subset of firms with equity offerings, in which incentives for income-increasing manipulation are likely high, we find that firms with NFPMs have lower discretionary accruals. The implication is that NFPMs can be used in compensation contracts to reduce EM behavior and mitigate erroneous executive compensation. This is important to investors as well as regulators, especially in light of the recent debate on compensation reform.     

Bank debt covenants and firms’ responses to FAS 150 liability recognition: evidence from trust preferred stock

We examine the relation between accounting-based debt contracts and the economic response of firms with trust preferred stock (TPS) to mandated liability recognition under Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 150. Our results show that firms’ financial covenants significantly affect their choice to redeem versus reclassify their outstanding TPS. Specifically, firms with bank debt covenants that would be adversely impacted by recognizing TPS as a debt liability are 26.88% more likely to redeem their TPS after FAS 150. We also find that firms are significantly more likely to redeem versus reclassify their TPS after FAS 150 if they used the original TPS proceeds to retire existing debt (id est, to enhance their balance sheets). Our findings suggest that when bank debt contracts use “floating” Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to construct financial covenant terms, changes in the underlying GAAP measure significantly influence firms’ economic behavior.     

An investigation of the short‐ and long‐run relations between executive cash bonus payments and firm financial performance: a pitch

This letter is a discussion of the application of the pitch template developed by Faff (2015) to a financial accounting research topic. The pitch template focuses ideas into key areas, giving clear and concise direction in planning and structuring the research idea. In this instance, the template is used in a nonlinear manner to develop a research proposal to investigate the relation between cash bonus payments and firm financial performance.     

Valuation before and after tax in the discrete time, finite state no arbitrage model

We establish necessary and sufficient conditions for a linear taxation system to be neutral—within the multi-period discrete time “no arbitrage” model—in the sense that valuation is invariant to the exact sequence of tax rates, realization dates as well as immune to timing options attempting to twist the time profile of taxable income through wash sale transactions.

“In the study of investments, taxes are largely a source of embarrassment to financial economists.” (Introduction to Dybvig and Ross 1986) “Accordingly, my approach in this chapter is to examine the restrictions on the income measurement rules applicable to financial instruments implied by the requirement that the rules be linear. . . . Linearity is a desideratum of a tidy tax system.” (Bradford 2000, p. 373–374)

     

Reputation concerns and herd behavior of audit committees - A corporate governance problem

This paper offers an explanation for audit committee failures within a corporate governance context. The management of a firm sets up financial statements that are possibly biased. These statements are audited/reviewed by an external auditor and by an audit committee. Both agents report the result of their work, the auditor acting first. Both use an imperfect technology that results in a privately observed signal regarding the quality of financial statements. The audit committee as well as the auditor are anxious to build up reputation in the labor market. Given this predominant goal they report on the signal in order to maximize the market’s assessment of their ability. At the end of the game the true character of the financial statements is revealed to the public with some positive probability. The market uses this information along with the agents’ reports to update beliefs about the agents’ abilities. We show that a herding equilibrium exists in which the audit committee “herds” and follows the auditor’s judgement no matter what its own insights suggest. This result holds even if the audit committee members are held liable for detected failure. However, performance based bonus payments induce truthful reporting at least in some cases.     

Getting compensation right - The choice of performance measures in CEO bonus contracts and earnings management

This paper examines whether the choice of performance measures in CEO bonus compensation contracts is associated with earnings management. From a sample of FTSE350 Index firms over the period of 2005–2014, we investigate the relationship between earnings management, through discretionary accruals and real activities management, and (1) the use of and extent of reliance on financial and non-financial performance measures in CEO bonus contracts; and (2) the use of long-term and short-term measures in CEO bonus contracts. We find less income-increasing manipulation through discretionary accruals and expenses when non-financial performance measures (NFPMs) are used alongside financial performance measures (FPMs) and when the NFPMs are used to a larger extent than FPMs. Furthermore, we find less discretionary accruals when long-term performance measures are used. This implies that non-financial and long-term measures encourage executives to work towards the long-term success of the company rather than their own short-term reward.     

Monetary Policy and Financial Markets

Monetary policy and financial markets are intrinsically linked. Central banks conduct monetary policy by influencing financial market prices. Financial market prices reflect the expectations of market participants about future economic and monetary developments. Monetary policy works primarily through expectations. Transparency and credibility render monetary policy more effective. However, they are no substitutes for action. If a credible central bank uses words with the explicit aim of substituting them for action, it will risk losing credibility. To avoid what has been described as “the dog chasing its tail” problem, central banks must exercise caution in basing their monetary policy decisions on financial market information. The information about expected future developments reflected in market prices must be continuously cross-checked against economic and monetary indicators in what amounts to a “checks and balances” approach to monetary policy.     

Costly state verification and multiple investors: the role of seniority

Many financial claims specify fixed maximum payments, varyingseniority, and absolute priority for more senior investors.These features are motivated in a model where a firm's managercontracts with several investors and firm output can only beverified privately at a cost. Debt-like contracts of varyingseniority generally dominate symmetric contracts, and, wheninvestors are risk neutral, it is optimal to use debt-like contractswhere more senior claims have absolute priority over more juniorclaims. In addition to motivating several features of debt andpreferred stock, the model offers an explanation for structuresused in leveraged buyouts, asset-backed securitizations, andreinsurance contracts.     

The residual claim of rank and file employees

This paper estimates the intensity of the value-maximization incentives for average employees generated through the combination of wage, salary, and bonus mechanisms. This is accomplished through estimation of the elasticity of average employee hourly compensation with respect to changes in firm performance. This performance elasticity indicates the degree of alignment between employee and shareholder objectives, and it can also be interpreted as an incomplete residual income claim for employees. The estimated performance elasticity for the full sample of firms is not significantly different from a CEO salary-plus-bonus performance elasticity of 0.1 published in Coughlan and Schmidt [Journal of Accounting and Economics 7 (1985) 43]. Jensen and Murphy [Journal of Political Economy 98 (1990) 225] find that CEOs received approximately US$3.25 for each US$1000 increase in shareholder wealth. This translates to an elasticity of just over 57, but most of these payments come through channels other than salaries and bonuses. Jensen and Murphy report a performance sensitivity of salary and bonus payments for CEOs that is equivalent to analogous elasticities for rank and file workers reported in this paper. While the rewards CEOs receive through salary and bonus channels are larger than those of average employees in absolute terms, these rewards represent comparable fractions of income. This paper also finds differences in the pay-performance link based on firm size. The estimated performance elasticity is 0.197 in small firms and is indistinguishable from zero in large firms. The results indicate that firms use wage, salary and bonus adjustments to direct approximately 5.3% of firm value increases to employees. Although the precise link between pay and performance is not visible with this data, these results indicate that average employees benefit when the firm performs well.     

A Theory on REIT’s Advisor Choice and the Optimal Compensation Mechanism

This paper proposes a model which examines the power of monitoring and forcing contract on improving managerial efficiency. We put particular focus on its implication regarding the choice of advisor type used by REITs. This question has long been a puzzling one in real estate literature. Our model provides a theoretical justification regarding the potential appeal of external managerial structure, which is usually regarded as being inferior to internal managerial structure. A crucial driving force regarding advisor choice is the heterogeneity on monitoring power between internal and external advisors and across REIT firms. Provided that the gap of monitoring power is large enough between internal and external advisors, shareholders could make use of the heterogeneity, and induce higher effort levels from external advisors. We motivate the rationale for expecting a “monitoring advantage” over external management from two aspects: the dual-role of external advisory firm and a bigger reputational cost associated with external advisor. Furthermore, we are able to specify the range within which an improved monitoring power is Pareto-optimal for both REIT shareholders and advisors. One implication is that, as agents, it may also be to the benefit of advisors to be better monitored. Finally, we compare the difference between fixed and stochastic forcing contracts. Our findings show that with their imperfect performance measures, the stochastic forcing contracts always dominate the fixed one.     

No-arbitrage in Discrete-time Markets with Proportional Transaction Costs and General Information structure

We discuss the no-arbitrage conditions in a general framework for discrete-time models of financial markets with proportional transaction costs and general information structure. We extend the results of Kabanov et al. (Finance Stoch 6(3):371–382, 2002; Finance Stoch 7(3):403–411, 2003) and Schachermayer (Math Finance 14(1):19–48, 2004) to the case where bid-ask spreads are not known with certainty. In the “no-friction” case, we retrieve the result of Kabanov and Stricker (Preprint 2003). Additionally, we propose a new modelization based on simple orders which appears to be powerful whatever the information structure is.     

Evaluation of Subjectivity in Incentive Pay

The study aims to investigate the determinants of subjective bonus payouts in the UK financial industry. Bonuses are increasingly linked to wider business goals, such as quality and customer service, firm reputation and employee hiring and retention policies, thus replacing the traditional focus on output or profit measures. A new conceptual work on subjectivity is used to evaluate these bonus practices. Results indicate that a variety of contextual factors have influenced the firms to make greater use of subjectivity in bonus payouts. Of these, organizational interdependency appeared to be the most forceful factor, followed by management’s strategic focus, long-term investment in intangibles, economic constraints, performance target difficulty, and competition. The analysis suggests that subjectivity acts as a mechanism that aligns the interests of individual employees with the firm’s performance goals. The study also draws attention to the costs of subjectivity in performance evaluation.     

Changes in bonus contracts in the post-Sarbanes–Oxley era

We examine whether the relation between earnings and bonuses changes after Sarbanes–Oxley. Theory predicts that, as the financial reporting system reduces the discretion allowed managers, firms will put more weight on earnings in compensation contracts to encourage effort. However, the increased risk imposed by Sarbanes–Oxley on executives may cause firms to temper this contracting outcome. We examine and find support for the joint hypothesis that the implementation of Sarbanes–Oxley and related reforms led to a decrease in earnings management and that firms responded by placing more weight on earnings in bonus contracts. We find no evidence that firms changed compensation contracts to compensate executives for assuming more risk.     

REIT Splits and Dividend Changes: Tests of Signaling and Information Substitutability

Recent work on stock splits have attempted to relate the information value associated with splits with that from dividends signaling. This paper extends this genre of research by evaluating the issue of dividend predictability using REIT data where the self-selection issue associated with dividend payment is minimized. The use of REIT data also eliminates the “differential expectations” effect for non-dividend paying firms, thus rendering a more robust test of the information substitutability hypothesis postulated by Nayak and Prabhala (2001). To the extent that stock splits are signals of future cash flows, we further examine the question of leverage predictability associated with REIT splits, particularly for highly levered firms. We find that REITs that use dividend changes as a signaling mechanism prior to splits have smaller price responses to the private information revealed by splits than those that do not provide such signals, consistent with the notion that dividends and splits are indeed information substitutes. Further, REIT splits provide useful information about future dividend and leverage changes.