Precautionary Saving and Endogenous Labor Supply with and without Intertemporal Expected Utility

We analyze precautionary saving behavior in a framework with labor and nonlabor income risks, an endogenous supply of labor, and a representation of preferences that disentangles attitudes toward risk, attitudes toward intertemporal substitution, and ordinal preferences for consumption and leisure. This preference structure allows us to disentangle and to describe in an intuitive way the different forces that determine precautionary saving “in the small” and “in the large.”     

Reforming the Direct–Indirect Tax Mix

This paper provides a new framework for evaluating the welfare effects of commodity tax reforms. It is shown that tax reforms are welfare improving if and only if they satisfy the following intuitive property: on average, consumer prices fall for commodities with high marginal excess burdens. The rule is then applied to analyze a shift from differentiated commodity taxation to direct flat-rate taxation of labour income. The welfare impact of such reforms can be decomposed into two effects: (i) the increase in welfare associated with substitution among taxed commodities, and (ii) the loss in welfare associated with substitution between commodities and leisure. On balance, a shift towards direct taxation is desirable when inter-commodity substitution effects are large relative to commodity–leisure substitution effects. The analysis allows us to reconcile the apparently conflicting results of the tax reform and optimal taxation literatures.     

Disability Insurance: Theoretical Trade-Offs and Empirical Evidence*

Disability insurance provides protection against health shocks that limit the ability to work. In most countries, these programmes are large and growing, both in expenditure and in number of recipients. We discuss the traditional trade-off between insurance and incentives in providing this insurance, with a focus on the US and UK experiences. There is substantial evidence on the extent of the labour supply incentive costs of disability insurance, but there has been a lack of evidence on the insurance value until very recently. Further, evidence on errors in the disability insurance process suggests false rejections of genuine claimants is a substantial problem, and these are more serious than false acceptances of healthy applicants. We provide a life-cycle framework for understanding the trade-offs and to evaluate the welfare implications of policy reforms. We argue that reforms should be focused on reducing false rejections and supporting labour market attachment. The difficulty in considering reform is that the design of disability insurance has many aspects that interact and impact on outcomes.     

A life-cycle model of unemployment and disability insurance

A general equilibrium life-cycle model is developed, in which individuals choose a sequence of saving and labor supply faced with search frictions and uncertainty in longevity, health status and medical expenditures. Unemployed individuals decide whether to apply for disability insurance (DI) benefits if eligible. We investigate the effects of cash transfer and in-kind Medicare component of the DI system on the life-cycle employment. Without Medicare benefits, DI coverage could fall significantly. We also study how DI interacts with reforms of Social Security and Medicare and find that DI enrollment amplifies the effects of reforms.     

Designing a linear pension scheme with forced savings and wage heterogeneity

This paper studies the optimal linear pension scheme when society consists of rational and myopic individuals. Myopic individuals have, ex ante, a strong preference for the present even though, ex post, they would regret not to have saved enough. While rational and myopic persons share the same ex post intertemporal preferences, only the rational agents make their savings and labor supply decisions according to these preferences. Individuals are also distinguished by their productivity. The social objective is “paternalistic”: the utilitarian welfare function depends on ex post utilities. We examine how the presence of myopic individuals affects both the size of the pension system and the degree of redistribution it operates, with and without liquidity constraints. The relationship between proportion of myopic individuals and characteristics of the pension system turns out to be much more complex than one would have conjectured. Neither the impact on the level of pensions nor the effect on their redistributive degree is unambiguous. Nevertheless, we show that under some plausible assumptions adding myopic individuals increases the level of pension benefits and leads to a shift from a flat or even targeted scheme to a partially contributory one. However, we also provide an example where the degree of redistribution is not a monotonic function of the proportion of myopic individuals.      

Who is unhappy for Brexit? A machine-learning,agent-based study on financial instability

In this paper, we assess the happiness cost of Brexit in the UK and the EU, using data from the Gallup World Poll. We implement a two-stage learning machine, using a naive Bayes classifier to extract happiness preferences of the population and then passing these onto an artificial neural network of attributes to generate dynamic happiness functions for each household, on an agent-based modelling framework. We find that there is a significant long-run cost in terms of both happiness and unemployment, which primarily affects the most vulnerable portion of the population. In addition, despite the expected instability in City's financial centre, the UK financial sector seems to be well equipped to deal with the repercussions, thus minimising the welfare costs for the country. Our findings extend the discussion of the economic costs of Brexit, by adding the welfare cost of the ensuing financial instability.     

Optimal Redistribution with Unobservable Preferences for an Observable Merit Good

This paper considers a government thatseeks both to redistribute income and to encourage or discouragethe consumption of a certain good. This good is assumed to beeither a merit or demerit good. Individuals differ in their exogenousincome and in their preferences for the merit good. The onlyvariable the government can perfectly observe is each individual'sconsumption of the merit good. In order to account for meritgood considerations, we consider a modification of the utilitariansocial welfare function in which the government imposes uniformpreferences, despite the heterogeneous individual preferences,at a level which will depend on the merit or demerit nature ofthe observable good. We derive the optimal nonlinear redistributivepolicy and compare our results to the ones that would be obtainedunder a utilitarian social welfare function that respects theown preferences of individuals.     

Optimal unemployment insurance design: Time limits, monitoring, or workfare?

This paper analyses crucial design features of unemployment insurance (UI) policies. We examine three different means of improving the efficiency of UI: the duration of benefit payments, monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. To that end we develop a quantitative model of equilibrium unemployment. The model features worker heterogeneity in preferences for leisure. The analysis suggests that a system with monitoring and sanctions restores search incentives most effectively, since it brings additional incentives to search actively so as to avoid the sanction. Therefore, the UI provider can offer a more generous UI replacement rate in a system with monitoring and sanctions than in the other two systems. Workfare appears to be inferior to the other two systems. JEL Code J64 · J65 · J68     

Social planning and coercion under bounded rationality with an application to environmental policy

We develop a theory of social planning with a concern for economic coercion, which we define as the difference between consumers’ actual utility and the “counterfactual” utility they expect to obtain if they were able to set policy themselves. Reasons to limit economic coercion include protecting minorities and preventing disenfranchised groups from engaging in socially costly behavior, or political economy considerations. If consumers are fully rational, we show that limiting coercion is equivalent to placing more welfare weight on coerced consumers at the expense of others. If, however, consumers’ rationality is bounded, counterfactual utility becomes endogenous to current policy, and the welfare loss associated with limiting coercion increases. We set up a numerical version of our model and find that the bias-related welfare loss can be substantial.     

A value explicit approach for evaluating corporate social performance

This paper develops a method for identifying, collecting, and aggregating corporate social performance data in a manner that explicitly incorporates evaluator value preferences. This approach is illustrated using survey data on the investment activities of “ethical” or “social” investors in conjunction with traditional measures of corporate social performance. It is argued that this approach improves upon other social audit methodologies by treating value issues more systematically and comprehensively, and that it would be a useful decision making tool for ethical/social investors, other corporate stakeholders, and management. Additionally, the proposed model can be used to examine critically the beliefs and values implicit in holistic/intuitive evaluations of corporate social performance.     

Wie man durch Moral ins „Geschäft“ kommt: Ein ordonomischer Beitrag zum betrieblichen Risikomanagement

Through an analysis of Alfred Krupp’s 19th-century social welfare program, this paper develops an ordonomic contribution to corporate risk management. The paper argues that companies can employ ‘morality as a factor of production’ by a differentiated business strategy of moral commitments. In this way, companies can not only considerably reduce their exposure to the undesirable risks of losing core business relationships with important stakeholders. But at the same time, businesses may increase their readiness to take desirable innovation risks that are pivotal for long-term value creation. Ultimately, the paper develops an argument for how companies can better live up to the role of being an agent of societal value creation, often articulated by concepts such as “corporate social responsibility” or “corporate citizenship”.     

Optimal and time consistent exchange-rate management in an overlapping-generations economy

This paper analyzes exchange-rate management in a simple overlapping generations model. This framework is used to evaluate alternative policies in terms of their implications for the welfare of individuals in the economy and for generating seigniorage. When the chief concern is to provide a desirable store of value, a policy of fixing the exchange rate does better when shocks are primarily of domestic origin while floating becomes more desirable when foreign shocks predominate. The same is true when the government is concerned with maximizing total expected seigniorage, although more intervention is typically desirable when generating seigniorage is the major objective. When seigniorage concerns are paramount and when the monetary authority cannot establish a reputation for conducting monetary policy in a way that makes the currency a desirable store of value, a national currency may not be viable in the absence of exchange controls. Such controls may be justified in this situation.     

An optimal rule for patent damages under sequential innovation

We analyze the optimal design of damages for patent infringement when a follow‐on innovator may infringe the patent of an initial innovator. We consider damage rules that are linear combinations of the popular “lost profit” (LP) and “unjust enrichment” (UE) rules, coupled with a lump‐sum transfer between innovators. Such linear rules can sometimes induce the socially optimal levels of sequential innovation and the optimal allocation of industry output. The optimal linear rule achieves the highest welfare among all rules that ensure a balanced budget for the industry, and often secures substantially more welfare than either the LP rule or the UE rule.     

The affect heuristic and stock ownership: A theoretical perspective

We consider asset prices and informational efficiency in a setting where owning stock confers direct utility due to an affect heuristic. Specifically, holding equity in brand name companies or those indulging in “socially desirable” activities (e.g., environmental consciousness) confers positive consumption benefits, whereas investing in “sin stocks” yields the reverse. In contrast to settings based on wealth considerations alone, expected stock prices deviate from expected fundamentals even when assets are in zero net supply. Stocks that yield high direct utility are, on average, more informationally efficient as they stimulate more entry into the market for these stocks and, consequently, more information collection. The analysis also accords with a value effect, high valuations of brand‐name stocks, abnormally positive returns on “sin stocks,” volume premia in the cross‐section of returns, proliferation of mutual funds and ETFs, and yields untested implications. If, as psychological literature suggests, agents derive greater utility from successful companies by “basking in reflected glory,” then asset prices react to public signals non‐linearly, leading to booms and busts, as well as crashes and recoveries.     

Was spricht eigentlich gegen eine private Arbeitslosenversicherung?

This article wants to base the current discussion about the privatization of unemployment insurance on a perspective of insurance economics. The arguments against private unemployment insurance are separated in two prospects: insurance technique and social policy. Therefore, the mixing of objective-technical and normative arguments, which is widely spread in the literature, is broken down. It is shown that the only criterion, which holds against private unemployment insurance, is that of “relative poorness”. Consequently, from a social policy perspective the monetary burden of actuarial premiums on people at high and medium risk is not acceptable. Arguments like positively correlated risks, moral hazard, insufficient differentiation of premiums and collectively underestimated individual unemployment risks appear to be poorly valid. As a solution of the problem of “relative poorness” a new outline for privatization of unemployment insurance is presented. The proposal focuses on a combination of private unemployment and pension insurance.     

Optimal taxation and welfare benefits with monitoring of job search

In order to investigate the interaction between tax policy, welfare benefits, the government technology for monitoring and sanctioning inadequate search, workfare, and externalities from work, we incorporate endogenous job search and involuntary unemployment into a model of optimal nonlinear income taxation. In this setting, the government faces a trade-off between boosting employment of low-skilled agents and raising work effort of high-skilled workers. If sanctions for inadequate search effort can be targeted at high productivity types for whom it is socially optimal to search, the government can afford to levy higher labor taxes on marginal workers without discouraging these agents from seeking work. This allows for lower marginal taxes on work effort of agents with a job. In contrast to workfare, job externalities in the private sector raise marginal tax rates, as the government attaches more importance to boosting employment of low-skilled workers.     

Unemployment and debt dynamics in a highly indebted small open economy

The paper analyzes the dynamic effects of a total factor productivity shock and an interest rate risk premium shock in a highly indebted open economy. In contrast to the standard open economy framework, search unemployment and wage bargaining are introduced. We find that a negative total factor productivity shock primarily has effects on the economy's production side and on welfare, but not on its stock of foreign debt and the country specific risk premium, and large part of the adjustment happens in the short-run. In contrast, a pure increase in the country specific risk premium causes substantial dynamics and a considerable reduction in foreign debt, allowing higher consumption in the long run and creating an intertemporal welfare gain, even though unemployment increases strongly in the short-run. A 50% haircut of foreign debt significantly reduces the initial response of the unemployment rate. In case of a temporary productivity shock, sticky wages imply smaller employment, but generate higher welfare than flexible wages.     

中国失业保险制度改革方向:纳入社会救助——基于历史背景与功能定位的分析

失业保险在建立和长期发展过程中,具有缓和劳资矛盾、天然双向平滑经济波动、提供失业保障和平滑个人收入的基本功能。但随着各国劳动保护及福利制度的发展,失业保险在政治和经济方面的功能减弱,且其失业收入损失补偿功能常常引发失业陷阱,于是各国进行了以促进积极就业为导向的改革。中国失业保险制度曾经为经济体制转型起到了“减震器”的作用。随着劳动保护和社会保障制度的发展和政府就业政策的完善,在二元就业结构、户籍制度、公共部门人力资源管理制度及政府承担就业促进任务的影响下,我国失业保险的政治、经济、失业人口收入补偿、就业促进功能未能有效发挥。在比较了若干改革方案后,本文认为,取消失业保险并将其功能并入社会救助体系是新时代背景下我国失业保险制度的最优改革路径。     

Information congestion

Unsolicited advertising messages vie for scarce attention. “Junk” mail, “spam” e‐mail, and telemarketing calls need both parties to exert effort to generate transactions. Message receivers supply attention according to average message benefit, while the marginal sender determines congestion. Costlier transmission may improve average message benefit so more messages are examined. Too many (too few) messages may be sent, or the wrong ones. A Do‐Not‐Call policy beats a ban, but too many individuals opt out. A monopoly gatekeeper performs better than personal access pricing if nuisance costs to receivers are moderate. The welfare results still hold when messages are presorted (triage).     

More on Properness: The Case of Mean-Variance Preferences

This paper focuses on the situations where individuals with mean-variance preferences add independent risks to an already risky situation. Pratt and Zeckhauser (Econometrica, 55, 143–154, 1987) define a concept called proper risk aversion in the expected utility framework to describe the situation where an undesirable risk can never be made desirable by the presence of an independent undesirable risk. The assumption of mean-variance preferences allows us to study proper risk aversion in an intuitive manner. The paper presents an economic interpretation for the quasi-concavity of a utility function derived over mean and variance. The main result of the paper says that quasi-concavity plus decreasing risk aversion is equivalent to proper risk aversion.