广州道路交通拥挤状况及拥挤定价策略研究

广州近年来城市规模持续扩张,市民出行需求和机动车保有量持续逐年较快增长。晚高峰处于拥堵状况的主干道已占全路网的30%。本文从经济学的角度,分析了道路拥挤的成因,对拥挤定价理论的应用进行了分析,提出并分析了在广州中心区域实施拥挤定价收费措施的对策和效果预期。     

交通拥挤的经济学分析

驾车行驶的社会成本高于私人成本, 导致均衡车流量高于最佳车流量, 产生交通拥挤。为了减少交通拥挤, 可以从公路的使用和汽车的使用两条思路出发, 分时间和路段征收相应的公路使用费, 适当调整汽油价格和停车费, 并辅助其他一些有效的政策, 对交通量加以调节。     

城市地区交通拥挤收费效应分析

文章在对城市地区交通拥挤收费理论进行论述的基础上,根据交通流量和交通系统运行总成本之间的相互关系,对交通拥挤所产生的外部成本进行分析。并结合随机效用理论,构造了一个城市地区交通拥挤收费影响效果评估模型,提出了模型的求解算法,并利用一个实例,对该模型的运用进行了分析。     

国外城市道路定价的理论与实践

城市交通拥挤及相关的环境污染问题,实际上是城市公路和环境资源无偿利用产生的负外部性。该文介绍了西方国家关于城市道路定价的由理与方法,提出有效解决该问题应按照其社会价值或社会成本对城市公路进行定价。可行的政策手段有拥堵收费、通行税、泊车费等。我国可以借鉴国外城市道路定价手段,来解决大城市交通拥挤和空气污染等问题。     

由深圳拟征收交通拥挤费引发的思考

近期媒体对深圳拟征收交通拥堵费的追逐,引发了新一轮的对交通拥挤收费的思考与讨论。文章在深圳征收交通拥挤费可行性分析的基础上虽然得出深圳目前适合实施交通拥挤收费来解决交通拥堵问题,但却面临着一系列实施交通拥挤收费的困境。基于此,文章认为深圳应当减缓该项政策的出台,并提出了相应的对策。     

试析基于TDM的城市交通拥挤对策研究

城市交通供给与需求之间的矛盾是引发城市交通拥挤和堵塞的主要问题,从交通需求管理的角度出发,结合国内外城市的实践经验,提出解决城市交通拥挤的对策。本文针对城市交通拥挤的状况,对如何采取有效措施,治理交通拥挤和堵塞,保障城市交通的畅通,是城市交通建设与管理部门巫待解决的问题。笔者从交通需求管理（traffic demandmanage ment,TDM）的角度出发,对城市交通拥挤的对策进行探讨。     

城市交通拥挤的经济学分析

本文通过运用经济学基本分析模型--成本收益分析,以武汉市主干道为例,考察了城市公路交通的有效使用水平,以期为城市规划管理工作者提供一种新的思路.     

城市交通拥挤的经济学分析

本文通过运用经济学基本分析模型--成本收益分析,以武汉市主干道为例,考察了城市公路交通的有效使用水平,以期为城市规划管理工作者提供一种新的思路。     

伦敦生活成本全球最高

最新一项针对全球大城市的研究表明，伦敦是全球生活成本最高的城市。 尽管伦敦在食品和服装方面相对便宜，但它在出租车、火车和旅馆方面是最贵的。除了纽约，伦敦的住宿成本至少是其它大城市的两倍。     

道路交通拥挤原因及改善路径探究——以太原市为例

城市道路交通拥挤是我国当前社会较为普遍和严重的一个现象。文章以太原市为例,基于经济学供求理论,对交通拥挤问题的原因进行了分析,并结合太原市实际交通状况及社会经济特点,对太原市交通改善提出一些建议。     

从博弈论的角度分析交通拥堵和拥堵收费问题

本文从博弈论角度考察了交通拥堵的微观经济学问题,并从出行者的出发时间决策入手,通过建立简单的两人拥堵博弈模型,分析了参与者在互动行为影响下,由自己和他人的行动共同决定的得益情况,并进一步将模型应用到拥堵收费定价研究中.     

Congestion with heterogeneous commuters

We study a congestion model where a continuum of heterogeneous commuters make a binary choice between riding a bus and driving private vehicles for their commutes. Formulating the model as a large game, we establish the existence and uniqueness of a nontrivial Nash equilibrium and analyze how a gasoline tax affects the allocation of commuters between public transportation and private vehicles at the equilibrium. Based on the analysis, we provide a sufficient condition under which a gasoline tax is Pareto improving. We also prove the existence of a socially optimal policy that minimizes the aggregate loss to all commuters.     

Congestion and Optimal Immigration Policy

This paper presents a model to explain the stylized fact that many countries have a low ratio of migrants in their population while some countries have a high ratio of migrants. Immigration improves the income of the domestic residents, but migrants also increase the congestion of public services. If migrants are unskilled and therefore pay low taxes, and the government does not limit access to these services, then the welfare of the domestic residents decreases with the number of migrants. Visa auctions can lower the cost of immigration control and substitute legal migrants for illegal migrants. If the government decides to limit the access of migrants to public services, immigration control becomes unnecessary and the optimal number of migrants can be very large.     

Strong Equilibrium in Congestion Games

[6]introduced the class of congestion games and proved that they always possess a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Here we obtain conditions for the existence of a strong equilibrium in this class of games, as well as for the equivalence of Nash and strong equilibria. We also give conditions for uniqueness and for Pareto optimality of the Nash equilibrium. Except for a natural monotonicity assumption on the utilities, the conditions are expressed only in terms of the underlying congestion game form. It turns out that avoiding a certain type of bad configuration in the strategy spaces is essential to positive results.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C71, C72, D62.     

Congestion games with malicious players

We study the equilibria of non-atomic congestion games in which there are two types of players: rational players, who seek to minimize their own delay, and malicious players, who seek to maximize the average delay experienced by the rational players. We study the existence of pure and mixed Nash equilibria for these games, and we seek to quantify the impact of the malicious players on the equilibrium. One counterintuitive phenomenon which we demonstrate is the “windfall of malice”: paradoxically, when a myopically malicious player gains control of a fraction of the flow, the new equilibrium may be more favorable for the remaining rational players than the previous equilibrium.     

Congestion pricing of Canadian airports

Abstract Under congestion pricing, Canadian airports would annually save between $72 and $105 million. Social costs per landing and takeoff decrease about $300 at Toronto and Vancouver and $50 at Calgary and Montreal. Slot constraints fail to eliminate this airport congestion. Congestion prices are lower on average than existing weight‐based prices. Current airport capacity accommodates at least five more years of traffic growth before congestion reaches current levels. Substantial welfare gains occur even if dominant airlines already internalize their self‐imposed delays. This article calculates equilibrium congestion pricing schedules, traffic rates, queuing delays, layover times, and connection times by time of day.     

Congestion management in power systems

In liberalized power systems, generation and transmission services are unbundled, but remain tightly interlinked. Congestion management in the transmission network is of crucial importance for the efficiency of these inter-linkages. Different regulatory designs have been suggested, analyzed and followed, such as uniform zonal pricing with redispatch or nodal pricing. However, the literature has either focused on the short-term efficiency of congestion management or specific issues of timing investments. In contrast, this paper presents a generalized and flexible economic modeling framework based on a decomposed inter-temporal equilibrium model including generation, transmission, as well as their inter-linkages. The model covers short-run operation and long-run investments and hence, allows to analyze short and long-term efficiency of different congestion management designs that vary with respect to the definition of market areas, the regulation and organization of TSOs, the way of managing congestion besides grid expansion, and the type of cross-border capacity allocation. We are able to identify and isolate implicit frictions and sources of inefficiencies in the different regulatory designs, and to provide a comparative analysis including a benchmark against a first-best welfare-optimal result. To demonstrate the applicability of our framework, we calibrate and numerically solve our model for a detailed representation of the Central Western European (CWE) region, consisting of 70 nodes and 174 power lines. Analyzing six different congestion management designs until 2030, we show that compared to the first-best benchmark, i.e., nodal pricing, inefficiencies of up to 4.6% arise. Inefficiencies are mainly driven by the approach of determining cross-border capacities as well as the coordination of transmission system operators’ activities.     

Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing

We consider an implementation problem faced by a planner who manages a roadway network. The problem entails both hidden information and hidden actions. We solve the planner's problem by introducing a new class of mechanisms and a new notion of implementation. The mechanisms, called price schemes, attach transfers to the available routes; they do not involve direct revelation. The method of implementation is evolutionary, requiring that players who follow any reasonable myopic adjustment process eventually learn to behave as the planner desires. We show that efficient behaviour can be guaranteed using simple, decentralized price schemes.     

Congestion effects in a public-good economy

This paper considers a public-good economy with congestion, where participants jointly produce a public good from input of a private good. This economic model gives rise to a transferable-utility game, the profit game, that depends on consumer preferences and a congestion parameter. The simplicity of the game allows the maximum level of congestion that guarantees the nonemptiness of the core of the economy to be determined. It is known that the sustainability of the Lindahl equilibrium in the core of the economy depends on the distribution of profits. In this paper two distributions of profits are compared: the Lindahl solution and the marginal-contribution solution. The latter is more often in the core than the Lindahl solution which in turn Lorenz-dominates the marginal-contribution solution.