GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION AND THE COMPOSITION OF PRIVATE EXPENDITURE: A CONDITIONAL ERROR CORRECTION MODEL

In this paper we provide empirical evidence of the relationship between government purchases and private expenditure by adopting a microeconomic approach. Using UK quarterly data, a long‐run demand system conditioned to the public sector is obtained by specifying a vector error correction model in which government consumption is assumed as an exogenous I(1) forcing variable. Our findings reject the hypothesis of separability of individual preferences between public and private expenditures, with simultaneous crowding‐out/in effects. Moreover, crowding‐out effects of government consumption on private spending are found to be larger for those goods and services that produce similar utility.     

MEASURES OF TOTAL HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION

By expenditure on education, health, housing and other public services, governments provide many goods and services which are alternatives to, or additional to, household expenditure on consumption. In most Western national accounts, the two forms of consumption are rigidly separated. Yet the combination of the two–the concept of total household consumption–has obvious importance for the measurement and comparison of living standards and for the formulation and analysis of policy. This concept is recommended as an additional aggregate in the revised SNA. It is displayed in the UN International Comparison Project (ICP). It is used as a major aggregate ("total consumption of the population"), although hitherto generally excluding nonmaterial services, in the Material Product System. Yet it is rarely shown explicitly in Western national accounts. One reason is the slow progress in the analysis by purpose of government expenditure.
This paper shows how far figures of total household consumption, and of its division between collective and private consumption, can in fact be derived, for the advanced countries, from the data provided to the UN Yearbook of National Accounts , supplemented b y the ICP. The results show first the wide national variations in the relation between the two forms of consumption but, secondly, the gaps in information on this crucially important topic. The relation between direct government expenditure for collective consumption and transfer payments to households ("social income") is also examined. High and low levels of these two forms of State support to consumption reinforce each other almost as often as they offset each other. But, again, the data provided by national accounting statistics are very incomplete.
This paper was prepared for the 16th General Conference of the IARIW, August 1979.     

IMPROVING THE ANALYTICAL AND DATA FRAMEWORK OF THE GOVERNMENT SECTOR FOR NATIONAL GOALS ACCOUNTING*

Provision of “market goods” follows the decision rules of traditional microeconomics; pricing and resource allocation for such goods tend towards Pareto optimality. The provision of “collective goods,” by contrast, depends on political (or quasi-political) collective decision processes; beneficiaries often receive a share of collective goods free of charge or well below average or marginal (private or social) costs. No inherent tendency towards optimality may be presumed and separate analysis of collective goods becomes an essential part of national goals accounting. The national-income-accounts (NIA) distinction between personal consumption expenditures (PCE) and government purchases of goods and services corresponds roughly to a division between market goods bought by the consumer and a major category of “collective goods” (i.e. “public goods” provided by government). However, a significant proportion of PCE represents “collective goods” paid for by government, business, or nonprofit organizations and provided on behalf of the consumer, whereas a part of NIA government purchases represents services paid for by the consumer (i.e. “market goods”). This article develops operationally meaningful distinctions among “market goods,”“collective goods,” and “tied aid” (a mixed category with market-good and collective-good characteristics). These distinctions are determined by the nature of the decision processes–rather than by the characteristics of the beneficiary or the supplier. This classification is related to the national income accounts and major discrepancies are pinpointed. The blurring of the distinction among market goods, collective goods and tied aid is found to be most consequential in the NIA treatment of “education” and “medical care” services. NIA data for these two services are restructured for national goals accounting purposes in order to illustrate both the quantitative importance and the empirical feasibility of classifying benefits by their respective decision processes.     

TREATMENT OF SUBSIDIES IN NATIONAL ACCOUNTS*

This document contains a critical analysis of some aspects of the treatment of subsidies in the present system of national accounts (United Nations SNA and the ESA, i.e. the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts) as background to the current discussion of their revision. One of the conventions used is that subsidies are recorded as a resource in the accounts of the market producer units which actually receive them. Should this rule of the receiver be applied in every case? The paper suggests that it would be preferable to attribute subsidies to the beneficiary in those cases where a subsidy received by one unit is the counterpart of a reduction in price which he grants to another unit which buys something from him (and which is the real beneficiary), so long as the discount is only granted to specific categories of purchasers. Recording in the accounts of the beneficiary results in a better distribution in the branch accounts and moreover greater stability of the national accounts in the face of minor institutional changes. The problem of allocation arises also for transfers designed to cover social risks or needs (illness, invalidism, old age, maternity). For this category of “social” goods and services for which general government wholly or partially assumes the costs to households, the transfer is treated either as a subsidy to collective consumption or a social benefit. The institutional arrangements, which vary from country to country, product to product and over time, give rise to profoundly different recording in the accounts. In order to restrict these differences, improve comparability between countries, permit analysis of trends over time, make the accounts less sensitive to different institutional arrangements and obtain a figure for household consumption which does not depend on the particular way in which the costs of such consumption is borne, the present document suggests that consumption subsidies should be treated as individual consumption expenditure of general government.     

Testing separability of public consumption in household decisions

In this paper we propose a sequential strategy, based on the microeconomic approach of the demand theory, in order to test for separability between private and public consumption. The aim of the present work is to verify, using a conditional almost ideal demand system, whether the different components of public consumption exert conditioning effects on the allocative structure of private spending. The empirical estimation of the model and the separability tests are developed for both a demand system in five functional categories of private spending, and for a demand system in six categories, where the private expenditures on those goods and services which can also be offered by the public sector are enclosed in a single functional category. The results of the separability tests, obtained using UK data for the 1974–2000 period, show that public individual consumption plays an important role in modifying consumer choices, while public collective consumption does not affect private consumption behaviours. The relationships between the different components of private spending and public individual consumption are both of substitutability and complementarity; in particular, we find that public individual consumption and the corresponding private expenditures on ‘Health, education, recreation and social protection’ are complements.     

ON THE EMERGENCE OF NON‐PROFIT FIRMS AS ALTERNATIVES TO THE GOVERNMENT*

It is well known that many non‐profit firms coexist with government firms in industries that provide collectively consumed goods and services, such as education, healthcare, social services, and art and culture. This paper explores the specific circumstances under which non‐profit firms can emerge as alternatives to the government. We show that a non‐profit firm emerges only when the residents’ median preference for a collective good is significantly low. This finding implies that, somewhat paradoxically, a non‐profit firm emerges to replace the government and provide a collective good only when the majority of residents consider the good non‐essential.     

EVALUATING THE DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE*

This article evaluates the distribution of public expenditure on subsidized goods and services over income categories. It is argued that undifferentiated application of usual measures of dispersion must be rejected when judging the distribution of these expenditures, because there are hardly any subsidized goods and services for which the government aims at equal consumption. Such an application requires a normative distribution of expenditure. The normative distribution of expenditure is derived from a normative distribution of consumption and the distribution of normative charges. Central elements are needs of consumers and their financial capacity. The normative distribution of consumption is based on government intentions with respect to the goods and services under consideration.     

An Input–Output Analysis of the Nonprofit Sector in the USA and Germany

This paper presents an exploratory input–output analysis of the nonprofit sectors in former West Germany and the USA based on the conceptual and data structure provided by the System of National Accounts. When compared with the USA, the West German nonprofit sector catered more to government demands. A higher proportion of West German nonprofit services went to government and a smaller proportion went to households. In terms of the multiplier effect of nonprofit output, we find that an additional dollar of nonprofit services delivered to households and/or government induced indirectly an additional 83 cents of business output in the USA. By comparison, West Germany's nonprofit sector had a lower multiplier effect, with 43 Pfennig per DM1. We also find that businesses have a much larger stake in nonprofit production as intermediate suppliers when compared to their role as intermediate consumers. The economic position the nonprofit sector occupies in both countries is that of a producing sector, taking inputs from businesses and providing outputs for households and governments. This general structural characteristic suggests that the nonprofit sector is particularly sensitive to changes in government policies as well as to shifts in private household incomes, yet relatively insensitive to demand changes in other industries.     

Universal Health Care and the Economics of Responsibility

In the American health care system the cost of health insurance is underwritten by all three sectors of the economy: 1) households; 2) employers; and 3) government. However, while costs are shared, responsibility is not. The retreat of private firms and government from assuming a substantial share of the burden of health care costs is based on the presumption that health care is an individual’s responsibility, while the contributions of government and the private sector are basically optional - a matter of benevolence rather than responsibility. The outcome of the current debates over health care reform will depend on this issue of responsibility. Who should pay for health care? Is it a collective responsibility or an individual one? In this paper, we explore the economics of responsibility as it applies to health care. In the institutionalist framework, any reallocation of costs must be driven by an underlying philosophy of shared responsibility.     

Collective vs. individual lobbying

This paper presents a menu-auction model in which firms lobby the government to make an environmental regulation less burdensome. In this lobbying game, industrial interests are opposed by an environmental interest group. We compare political outcomes under two institutional arrangements. In the first, firms must join an organization that represents the interests of the industry. In the second, firms would lobby the government individually. The two arrangements result in strikingly different equilibrium outcomes. Only a small fraction of firms join the lobby group under collective lobbying, but all firms participate in lobbying activities when there is no such group. Thus, an attempt by firms to solve the apparent collective action problem through coordination would effectively backfire. The reason is that coordination among firms would increase the leverage available to the government, to demand high political contributions. We also evaluate the desirability of the two lobbying regimes from the private perspective of individual firms, and from the perspective of society as a whole. This permits us to evaluate possible restrictions on lobbying activities.     

AN INTEGRATED SYSTEM OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTS FOR AN ECONOMY OF THE YUGOSLAV TYPE

The system of social accounts described in this article is based on the following five principles: (1) Producers of goods and services are working organizations which represent groups of people or individuals organized for the purpose of earning a living by producing goods and services that satisfy individual or collective needs. Business, government, profit and nonprofit, corporate and unincorporated working organizations are treated in a uniform way. (2) Since the behaviors of the market and non-market sectors differ considerably, these two sectors are consistently separated throughout the accounting system. (3) There are four basic activities: (a) production, (b) consumption, (c) investment, and (d) income redistribution. These call for four separate accounts: (a) Working Organizations, (b) Households, (c) Community, including government and certain non-government institutions, and (d) Accumulation. The fifth account, Rest of the World, serves for balancing purposes. (4) The same classifications of transactions are used for activities and institutions, making possible complete matching of social product and financial flows accounts. (5) The system strives to achieve the maximum analytical flexibility. Some of its possibilities are visible from the classification of industries: A. Market (Material) Sector: 1. Agriculture, II. Forestry, III. Mining and Manufacturing, IV. Construction, V. Transportation, VI. Trade and Catering, VII. Handicrafts; B. Non-Market (Non-Material) Sector: VIII. Housing and Communal Economy, IX. Education, Culture, and Social Welfare, X. Public Services Social Organizations (Political, Religious, etc.), Finance and Insurance, Public Administration and Judiciary, National Defence. Sector A corresponds to the material definition of social product. Sectors A + B correspond to the SNA definition. Sectors A + B minus Industry × reflects the welfare definition. Further, Industries I-IV produce goods, V-VII market services, VIII and IX non-market services with welfare content, X intermediate nonmarket services, V-X all services.     

"大跃进"运动与中国1958-1961年饥荒-集权体制下的国家、集体与农民

1958-1961年中国发生人类历史上最为严重的饥荒,现有研究从粮食供给下降、公共食堂、城市偏向政策、缺粮区偏向、政治激进主义、政府救济不力及饥荒的历史记忆角度对大饥荒成因提出了不同的解释.在赶超战略及"大跃进"运动的背景下,本文考察了人民公社内部分配制度,发现"大跃进"运动时期人民公社大幅度提高集体积累,农民个体可消费粮食急剧下降,这可能是"大跃进"饥荒的另一重要成因.本文利用1953-1966年省级面板数据证明了上述假说,并提出集权体制下农民个体政治权利的缺失是传统社会主义饥荒频发的主要原因.     

Management of common property resources: Limits to voluntary collective action

This paper finds that the voluntary collective action may be an alternative to market and government in the management of common property resources. In developing countries, the people's capabilities to harness the preserved commons and the fairness in the appropriation of benefits from them are the limits on the voluntary collective action. It shows that collective action is possible if an outside agency plays the role of a catalyst in mitigating these limits. It also shows that there can be mutually beneficial sharing arrangements between government and village communities for the management of local forest resources. The standard result that common and state property resources turn into open access resources as population grows also holds good for the natural resources jointly managed by government and people.     

GOVERNMENT SERVICES IN RELATION TO TOTAL CONSUMPTION OF THE POPULATION IN ASIAN AND PACIFIC COUNTRIES,WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INDIA*

The paper focuses on hitherto neglected fields of trends in the total consumption of the population in the Asian and Pacific countries and pays special attention to situations in India. In doing so it presents a comparative picture on the basis of four variants of the concepts as delineated in the Technical Report prepared by the United Nations Statistical Office. The proportion of government services in the total consumption of the population in the countries depended on socio-political arrangements and policy considerations. Over the years these proportions either increased or remained constant or declined as the situation developed. In the Indian context the paper deals in detail with the magnitude and proportions of each type of government service over the period 1960-79. Recognizing that it is the access to and not provision of the services which should rightly be considered, the Indian National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) during July 1980—June 1981 collected country-wide data from households on the benefit they received from public services in the field of education, health and public distribution of essential commodities. The data from the survey in conjunction with further work proposed by the NSSO should help in the preparation of quantitative estimates of benefit received from these services by various socio-economic groups in rural and urban areas. The paper touches upon the factors affecting personal consumption expenditure. It provides broad direction for future work on the subject.     

品牌建设的公共服务性扶持

在WTO框架内,通过对品牌的分类研究以及借鉴其它国家的品牌扶持经验,提出政府应该通过提供公共服务(建设公共性品牌和群体性品牌)来扶持盈利性品牌的建设。     

FISCAL POLICY AND AGGREGATE CONSUMPTION: NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE UNITED STATES

In this paper we estimate the marginal rate of substitution between aggregate per-capita consumption and per-capita government expenditure on goods and services using US quarterly data over the period 1953 to 1993. This estimate is an important input to any attempt to assess the overall effectiveness of fiscal policy since it directly affects the size of the fiscal policy multiplier. Other recent consumption studies which incorporate the effects of government expenditure have failed to establish a stable estimate of the marginal rate of substitution. We argue that this failure results from imposing the unrealistic assumption that this parameter is constant. In contrast, we allow the marginal rate of substitution to depend on both the level and composition of government spending.     

Impact of infectious disease pandemics on individual lifetime consumption: An endogenous time preference approach

This paper considers the impact of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic on long-term individual lifetime consumption profiles. The framework for the analysis is a model that extends Strulik (2021) to include the government sector, where time preference is determined by individual health damage (deficit) distinct from normal aging. Thus, the health damage caused by COVID-19 changes the rate of time preference and consequently affects the Euler equation for consumption. Our theoretical contribution is the consistent incorporation of public health investment into the existing model to understand the effect of government measures against a pandemic. Numerical analysis based on this model is used to estimate changes in health status over time, trends in the rate of time preference, and individual lifetime consumption profiles, taking into account differences in age at the time of the pandemic and the nature of the government responses. Because the long-term negative economic impact would be enormous, we should avoid advocating for “living with COVID-19” without due consideration. The reopening of the economy must be accompanied by a commitment to the containment and elimination of infections with future novel coronaviruses.     

集体行动的逻辑与可持续发展的困境

个体理性的效率追求是经济活动的动力,但个体理性往往导致集体非理性。本文从个体理性与集体理性概念的相对性出发,探讨个体、地方政府、国家在经济活动中本位利益的追求与可持续发展目标的背离。纯粹的市场效率追求会导致“市场失灵,”政府在解决“市场失灵”时如果无法有效约束个体理性的本位利益追求与政绩偏好,在可持续发展问题上就会出现一定程度的“政府失灵”。在“双重失灵”的情况下,集体行动的逻辑必然导致可持续发展陷入困境。要在个体理性的效率追求与集体理性的“共同信念”中实现可持续发展战略,必须明确政府责任并进行追加性制度投资。     

SOME PROBLEMS OF THE MEASUREMENT OF TOTAL CONSUMPTION IN HUNGARY

Hungary has a relatively long tradition with the "Total Consumption of the Population" (TCP); this category has been regularly compiled and published in Hungarian statistics since the early sixties. The article summarises the experiences with this concept and discusses a number of open questions both of national and international interest.
One of these questions relates to the treatment of subsidies. On one hand it can be argued that subsidised prices are intermediate cases between the full price and free of charge cases and therefore the subsidy should be included in TCP; on the other hand, however, subsidies can also be interpreted as negative indirect taxes and therefore there is no reason for their inclusion. The article discusses both the arguments for and against the inclusion of subsidies in TCP.
Another issue is the problem of valuing consumption from own agricultural production, where the existing international recommendations—valuation at producer prices—may be questioned.
There are other parts of non-marketed consumption valuation of which causes several serious problems. In Hungary a special problem appears with regard to the services of owner-occupied dwellings. In the case of valuation of services provided by producers of government there are unsolved questions, too, where the formal following of the international recommendations does not give a fully acceptable solution.
The authors agree with those who think that it is necessary to make a distinction between consumption and consumption expenditure and to include the fringe benefits provided by enterprises in TCP.