Who does private equity buy? Evidence on the role of private equity from buyouts of divested businesses

Research Summary: We examine the role of nonventure private equity firms in the market for divested businesses, comparing targets bought by such firms to those bought by corporate acquirers. We argue that a combination of vigilant monitoring, high‐powered incentives, patient capital, and business independence makes private equity firms uniquely suited to correcting underinvestment problems in public corporations, and that they will therefore systematically target divested businesses that are outside their parents’ core area, whose rivals invest more in long‐term strategic assets than their parents, and whose parents have weak managerial incentives both overall and at the divisional level. Results from a sample of 1,711 divestments confirm these predictions. Our study contributes to our understanding of private equity ownership, highlighting its advantage as an alternate governance form. Managerial Summary: Private equity firms are often portrayed as destroyers of corporate value, raiding established companies in pursuit of short‐term gain. In contrast, we argue that private equity investors help to revitalize businesses by enabling investments in long‐term strategic resources and capabilities that they are better able to evaluate, monitor, and support than public market investors. Consistent with these arguments, we find that when acquiring businesses divested by public corporations, private equity firms are more likely to buy units outside the parent's core area, those whose peers invest more in R&D than their parents, and those whose parents have weak managerial incentives, especially at the divisional level. Thus, private equity firms systematically target those businesses that may fail to realize their full potential under public ownership.     

Size and relatedness of units sold: An agency theory and resource-based perspective

This study tests the effects of ownership concentration, outside director equity holdings, and corporate strategy on, and the Performance implications of, the size and relatedness of units sold by parent firms. The study is based on a model that integrates agency and resource-based theories, and a sample of sell-offs by 112 Fortune 500 firms. Ownership concentration is found to be associated positively with the sale of unrelated and small units. This relationship is strengthened when outside director equity is high. In addition, the effects of corporate strategy types on the characteristics of units sold depend on ownership concentration and outside director equity. Finally, post'sell-off performance of the parent firm is associated negatively with the relatedness of the unit sold. These results suggest that the type of unit sold depends on the type of economic benefit sought by the parent firm.     

Operationalizing and testing Galbraith's center of gravity theory

This paper develops and tests an expanded model of relatedness and firm performance, based on Galbraith's (1983) center of gravity concept. Traditional empirical approaches to relatedness have focused primarily on product similarities. This research operationalizes and tests a managerial dimension of relatedness, based on a firm's historical center of gravity, which assumes that businesses in the same vertical stage of the value chain are more similar to manage than those in different stages. Empirical results support Galbraith's hypothesis that this managerial dimension of relatedness may be more important than constrained product relatedness in achieving high performance. This finding suggests that diversified firms should operate in lines of business that are managerially similar in order to minimize complexity and apply core skills appropriately. Interestingly, while managerial relatedness was positively associated with firm performance in two out of three samples, constrained product relatedness was negatively associated with performance in two of the three samples. Taken together, these results suggest that optimal relatedness profiles may be industry specific, and that corporate relatedness may be more important in managing diversity than product relatedness. Future research should seek a better understanding of the specific dimensions which underlie both product and managerial relatedness.     

经济政策不确定性与银行贷款损失准备计提

银行贷款损失准备计提的顺周期特征加剧金融系统的不稳定,受到学界和业界的广泛关注,监管机构逐步要求银行采取前瞻性的计提策略以应对贷款损失准备的顺周期特征,经济发展越来越受到宏观经济政策不确定性的影响,银行是否考虑当前经济政策不确定性,对贷款损失准备进行前瞻性计提?本文选取2004—2017年中国126家商业银行数据,研究经济政策不确定性对银行贷款损失准备计提的影响。实证分析发现,经济政策不确定性与贷款损失准备计提显著正相关,经济政策不确定性越大,贷款损失准备计提越多,在考虑地级市领导人更替、银行高管更替、宏观经济层面遗漏变量,以及使用工具变量的内生性分析后,结果保持稳健。异质性分析发现,这一效应在上市银行、外资持股比例较高、中小银行中表现更为明显。从银行风险管理角度的机制分析发现,不良贷款越多、风险储备越少的银行,经济政策不确定性增加时,计提的贷款损失准备越多,说明风险预防动机是其主要目的。进一步的分析发现,银行在经济政策不确定性较高时增加计提,有助于稳定银行收益、降低银行破产风险。本文的研究从经济政策不确定性的视角,为中国银行贷款损失准备计提的理论和实践提供了新的解释。     

人力资本、不确定性与高新技术企业的治理

人力资本对高新技术的治理结构至关重要,从公司治理的角度看,人力资本具有以下四个方面的特征：人力资本和其所有者是不可分的,这就导致了人力资产是一种主动资产,可以由其所有者自由配置,人力资本具有不完全的替代性,可以通过资产专用性或形成一个组织来获取垄断势力,人力资本具备学习特征,可以通过“干中学”机制来实现报酬递增路径,人力资本又具有不确定性,体现在人力资本投入和产出之间的关系以及人力资本可能涉及到的团队生产方面。这些特征决定了高新技术企业的公司治理结构特征,比如合同设计必须权衡人力资本的垄断势力可能带来的交易成本和学习机制产生的报酬递增,合同必须面向未来,包含某种期权因素,重视团队激励等。但这些治理机制具有双重影响。     

论中央能源企业的产融结合之路

当前,很多大型中央能源企业已经广泛投资于金融产业,社会各界对此存在不同看法,有的赞成,有的反对.通过对我国中央能源企业发展金融产业的政策环境分析,归纳了主要中央能源企业开展金融产业的有关情况,结合现代企业产融结合的实践,提出了中央能源企业产融结合的思路和相关建议.     

On the Merits of Vertical Divestiture

This paper demonstrates that vertical divestiture may increase consumer welfare even when the divestiture eliminates substantial scope economies and precludes only limited sabotage. More generally, the merits of vertical divestiture are shown to vary with: (1) the type and the intensity of competition in the retail market; (2) the locus of scope economies under vertical integration; and (3) the relative social values of consumers’ surplus and profit.     

Does corporate strategy matter?

A revisionist view that corporate strategy does not matter has gained considerable influence in recent years. This view largely stems from empirical results of early variance decomposition studies that found negligible corporate effects associated with profitability differences between businesses. Our analysis of the variance decomposition literature shows this view to be incorrect. Not only do the studies as a group show that factors at the corporate level of organizations contribute to profitability differences, but also evidence suggests that factors specifically associated with corporate strategy contribute to corporate effects. Corporate strategy in fact does matter. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

中国传统燃油汽车退出时间表研究

基于国家汽车发展目标、节能与新能源汽车技术发展预测、出行及汽车需求趋势判断,确定传统燃油汽车退出的2050未来情景,提出传统燃油汽车退出的时间表。燃油车退出区域划分为4个层级,第Ⅰ、Ⅱ层级以功能性、限购限行及新能源汽车推广领先城市为主,第Ⅲ、Ⅳ层级则以区域为主,燃油车退出过程以点及面递进。中国传统燃油汽车退出存在不确定性。新能源汽车快速发展面临稀有金属资源供应短缺、电池回收利用率低、充电基础设施建设不足等主要问题。建议在法规层面明确传统燃油汽车退出的目标优先级;深入论证传统燃油汽车禁售时间表,建立联合工作机制;基于车型与使用场景分阶段、分区域由点及面逐步禁售与退出;地方根据自身条件评估申报,根据国家战略框架制定具体实施方案,鼓励中大型城市提前实施;评估退出方案对传统燃油汽车产业及产业链的影响,并提前引导;加快研究出台新能源汽车通行管理政策;制定存量燃油汽车退出引导政策,提升新能源汽车保有量占比。     

Does good governance prevent bad strategy? A study of corporate governance,financial diversification,and value creation by French corporations, 2000–2006

Building on and extending prior research, we propose a comprehensive framework which posits that free cash flow moderates the impact of corporate governance on financial diversification. We argue that because it increases CEO perceived risk, alignment devices increase rather than decrease financial diversification. In a sample of 59 publicly traded French corporations during 2000–2006, we show that financial diversification negatively impacts shareholder return and firm value. We obtain support for several of our hypotheses: at high levels of free cash flow, CEO variable compensation increases financial diversification, whereas chairman/CEO non‐duality reduces it. In contrast, independent directors increase financial diversification at low values of free cash flow (although weakly). We also find that ownership concentration only reduces financial diversification when free cash flow is low.Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What does a small corporate effect mean? A variance components simulation of corporate and business effects

In a widely cited paper, Rumelt (1991) presents estimates of the relative influence of corporate, business unit, and other influences on business unit profitability and finds the corporation explains almost none of the variability in business unit profitability. Using a Monte Carlo simulation, we examine the relation of variance component magnitudes to other indicators of the importance of a particular effect. Our results demonstrate that variance components can be an extremely nonlinear indicator of importance. We also question whether Rumelt's corporate effect represents the possible contributions of corporate strategy to business unit performance. This addresses a puzzle raised by Rumelt (1991) concerning the small effect of corporations in explaining performance, and suggests that Rumelt's findings should not be seen as demonstrating the insignificance of corporate strategy. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

家族企业所有者间控制权配置选择与演进

本文在现有研究基础上，引入家族性利他主义规则制度变量，探讨了投资者权益司法保护与家族性利他主义规则两类制度变量对家族企业所有者间控制权配置选择的影响。本文研究表明，两类制度变量约束下的投资者权益保护状况越好。则所有者间控制权或。股权配置可能的分散程度就越大。司法保护制度变量的状态决定了控制权或股权的分散配置是否能够突破家族的界限。并且上述结论对中国家族企业的未来演进具有现实的含义。