Principal‐principal conflicts under weak institutions: A study of corporate takeovers in China

The principal‐principal perspective is tested and extended in the context of corporate takeovers of Chinese publicly listed firms from 1998 to 2007. The resistance of a target firm's controlling shareholder toward potential takeovers reflects the conflict between the principal and minority shareholders. It was found that this resistance weakens when target firms are located in regions with more institutional development, where the minority shareholders' interests are better protected. The resistance also decreases for target firms with CEOs who are politically connected, as these CEOs may be more interested in their own political careers than in representing the interests of the controlling shareholders.Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social networking relationships,firm‐specific managerial experience and firm performance in a transition economy: A comparative analysis of family owned and nonfamily firms

The effect of social networking relationships, firm‐specific managerial experience, and their interactions on performance between family owned and nonfamily firms are studied. Using data from 106 organizations in Ghana, the findings show that family owned firms benefit more from networking relationships with bureaucratic officials than do nonfamily firms. However, nonfamily firms benefit more from networking relationships with community leaders and firm‐specific managerial experience than do family owned firms. Networking relationships with politicians impede performance for nonfamily firms. Nonfamily firms are better able than family owned firms to use their firm‐specific managerial experience to manage the resources and capabilities obtained from networking relationships with community leaders to create value. Moreover, firm‐specific managerial experience attenuates the detrimental effects of networking with politicians for both types of firms. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.