共查询到6条相似文献,搜索用时 4 毫秒
1.
David A. Ralston Jane Terpstra‐Tong Robert H. Terpstra Xueli Wang Carolyn Egri 《战略管理杂志》2006,27(9):825-843
This paper raises the question and provides empirical evidence regarding the status of the evolution of the state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) in China today. In this study, we compare the SOEs to domestic private‐owned enterprises (POEs) and foreign‐controlled businesses (FCBs) in the context of their organizational cultures. While a new ownership form, many of the POEs evolved from former collectives that reflect the traditional values of Chinese business. Conversely, the FCBs are much more indicative of the large global MNCs. Therefore, we look at the SOEs in the context of these two reference points. We conclude that the SOEs of today have substantially transformed to approximate a configuration desired by the Chinese government when it began the SOE transformation a couple of decades ago to make them globally competitive. The SOEs of today appear to be appropriately described as China's economic dynamic dynamo for the future. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
2.
This study develops a model grounded in the contingency theory (i.e., context–structure–performance) applicable to Chinese state‐owned enterprises (SOEs). Using data from a sample of 205 industrial SOEs, the study shows that SOE growth performance relative to the industry is positively predicted by formal control, inversely predicted by decentralization, and positively predicted by the interaction of the two. Customer product knowledge utilization, unrelated to growth performance relative to the industry, is positively predicted by formal control and the interaction of formal control with decentralization. Foreign induced industry competitiveness, technological turbulence, size, and production technology routineness are treated as context variables and modeled accordingly. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
3.
This study examines whether political connections lead state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) to behave differently from privately owned enterprises (POEs) in acquiring land parcels at auctions and explores the underlying mechanisms that drive the price premiums paid by SOEs. We find that SOEs pay 11.9% more than POEs for observably comparable land parcels at auctions, and the price premiums SOEs pay are mainly driven by wholly state‐owned enterprises (WSOEs). In particular, we provide evidence that SOEs have advance access to information about the development of land parcels in 134 state‐level special economic zones, and land parcels purchased by SOEs lead to positive stock market performance. We also show that an anti‐corruption campaign that weakens political connections and reduces the information advantage leads to a decrease in the price premiums paid by SOEs. 相似文献
4.
Quy Nguyen Huy 《战略管理杂志》2011,32(13):1387-1410
The literature on top‐down strategy implementation has overlooked social‐emotional factors. The results of a three‐year field study of a large technology firm show how top executives who favor an affect neutral task approach can inadvertently activate middle managers' organization‐related social identities, such as length of time working for the company (newcomers versus veterans) and language spoken by senior executives (English versus French), generating group‐focus emotions. These emotions prompt middle managers—even those elevated to powerful positions by top executives—to support or covertly dismiss a particular strategic initiative even when their immediate personal interests are not directly under threat. This study contributes to the strategy implementation literature by linking senior executives' actions and middle managers' social identities, group‐focus emotions, and resulting behaviors to strategy implementation outcomes. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
5.
Windfalls of emperors' sojourns: Stock market reactions to Chinese firms hosting high‐ranking government officials 下载免费PDF全文
Research summary: We contribute to the corporate political activity (CPA ) literature by showing that investors value companies that host visits of high‐ranking government officials (P resident and P remier). We argue that investors may value host official visits for two reasons: (1) the signal received about possibility of firm accessing government‐controlled resources via promotion or protection; and (2) the certification effect from such high‐powered visitors elevating the firm's reputation and legitimacy. Results from an event study analysis of 84 high‐ranking government official visits in C hina from 2003 to 2011 indicate that investors responded positively to host firms as reflected by stock market performance. Furthermore, the greatest positive reactions accrued to firms experiencing weaker prior period financial performance and to firms that are privately compared to state‐controlled . Managerial summary: Do visits by high‐ranking government officials influence firm stock market performance? Studying a sample of C hinese public firms that hosted 84 visits by the C hinese P resident and the P remier from 2003 to 2011, we find that investors reacted positively to such visits compared with a group of non‐host firms from the same industry and with similar financial performance and size. In addition, firms with weaker prior financial performance and private firms benefit the most from hosting such visits. Our findings imply that hosting visits of high‐ranking government officials can signal future government‐controlled resource inflows and boost host firms' reputation and legitimacy . Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
6.
It is well documented that firms respond to regulations in their home jurisdictions. We present hypotheses that firms also respond to regulations in jurisdictions where they do not operate. We examine renewable‐power provision in the U.S. electric utility sector between 2001 and 2006, and find that firms adopt more renewable‐power generation when their peers (i.e., firms in the same regulatory jurisdiction) face greater renewable‐power standards in other jurisdictions. The underlying mechanism is that forward‐looking firms assess when extrajurisdictional regulations foreshadow regulatory changes where they operate. Our analyses support this mechanism versus plausible alternatives. We demonstrate firms acting strategically to respond to extrajurisdictional regulations and show that the central conduit motivating this response is the extrajurisdictional footprint of firms operating in the same jurisdiction as a focal firm. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献