Equity‐based incentives and collaboration in the modern multibusiness firm

Research summary : This paper examines the role of equity‐based incentives in fostering cross‐business‐unit collaboration in multibusiness firms. We develop a formal agency model in which headquarters offers equity and profit incentives to business‐unit managers with the objective of maximizing total expected firm returns. The resulting compensation contract provides a rich mechanism for aggregating value from collaborative interactions across business units, aligning managers' efforts with the firm's growth prospects and organization structure and managing the dual risks in profits and firm market value. The inclusion of equity incentives elicits higher levels of own‐unit and collaborative efforts over the profits‐only contract. Our results suggest that equity‐based incentives are most beneficial when profitability is uncertain relative to long‐term growth prospects, in firms pursuing related diversification strategies, and in periods of rising equity markets. Managerial summary : Equity‐based compensation such as restricted stock grants and options are increasingly common, not only for CEOs and other top executives, but also for business unit managers and other non‐C‐suite employees. The paper studies the role of such “global” incentives in enabling multibusiness firms to benefit from cross‐unit collaboration. Results from our model show that managerial contracts that include appropriate levels of equity incentives, in addition to profit‐based incentives, generate higher own‐unit and collaborative efforts. We also find that equity incentives are likely to be most beneficial for large firms in high‐growth sectors, for firms pursuing a related diversification strategy, and in periods of rising stock markets. The model can also provide useful guidance on designing return‐maximizing compensation contracts for business unit managers in different firm, organizational, and industry contexts. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Time to exit: Rational,behavioral, and organizational delays

Existing studies of exit delay typically focus on rational, behavioral, or organizational explanations in isolation. We integrate these different theoretical explanations, develop testable hypotheses for each, and examine them using the population of US banks between 1984 and 1997. Banks' exit behavior is not consistent with theories emphasizing the option value of avoiding reentry costs. Patterns of exit do, however, support models of rational delay under ability uncertainty. Controlling for this source of rational delay, we find evidence of delay due to behavioral bias—firms discount negative signals of profitability relative to positive signals—and organizational considerations—delay increases with the separation of ownership and control. These results demonstrate that all three sets of theories are necessary to describe exit behavior. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do foreign entrepreneurs benefit their firms as managers?

Research summary: The entrepreneurship literature has extensively studied an individual's decision to found a new venture, but it has little to say about the individual's choice to operate this venture personally or hire an agent. This decision is particularly challenging for foreign entrepreneurs, who, in addition to traditional factors, such as agency costs and personal preferences, need to take into consideration the benefits and liabilities of foreignness. Using novel data on foreign entrepreneurial firms and instrumenting for the owner‐manager choice with a visa policy change, we find that managing foreign entrepreneurs significantly improve firm performance. Our results further suggest that foreign owner‐managers reduce operating costs but have no effect on the firm's productivity and growth. Managerial summary: Immigrants represent a significant part of the population in the United States and Europe and are often more entrepreneurial than local nationals. However, a person starting a firm in a foreign country faces unique challenges. One important choice that a foreign entrepreneur has to make is whether to operate the firm personally or hire a local agent. Foreign entrepreneurs are often believed to be worse managers because they have limited local knowledge and skills. However, our results point to the contrary: We find that managing foreign entrepreneurs significantly improve firm performance by decreasing firms' operating costs. This happens because foreign owner‐managers often have access to unique resources, higher work incentives, and superior management skills acquired at home. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A NEW APPROACH TO DEPRECIATION MEASUREMENT FOR PUBLIC UTILITIES: COMMENT

This paper examines the use of a simple heuristic for evaluating projects. We posit that ranking projects by IRR and rejecting marginal projects can be superior to a NPV rule if 1) project managers have incentives to overstate cash flow forecasts that occur late in a project's life, 2) project rankings determine project acceptance because not all positive NPV project's are accepted, and 3) a project's IRR is greater than the WACC. In these instances, the IRR heuristic undervalues distant cash flows and thus, reduces project managers' incentives to positively bias forecasts.     

Knowledge sharing and safeguarding in R&D collaborations: The role of steering committees in biotechnology alliances

Research Summary: This research contributes to alliance governance research by demonstrating how partners' administrative controls in nonequity collaborations regulate knowledge transfers across partners. These administrative controls can take the form of board‐like joint committees having explicitly delineated authority over certain alliance activities. We illuminate governing committees as an important, albeit neglected, instrument for administrative control in the governance of non‐equity alliances, and we demonstrate that these organizational mechanisms facilitate knowledge flows within the scope of an alliance. We also show that governing committees safeguard against misappropriation hazards, particularly when a partner possesses the incentive and ability to engage in such behavior. This study extends alliance governance research beyond the implications of the equity‐nonequity dichotomy to consider a wider and richer gamut of governance instruments available to address the challenges associated with knowledge transfers in alliances. Managerial Summary: Non‐equity alliances are important vehicles to collaborate with external partners, particularly in the biopharmaceutical industry and other high‐tech sectors. To guide these collaborations effectively, partners can use the contract to custom‐build jointly‐staffed managerial units with clearly demarcated decision‐making responsibilities. We demonstrate that these organizational mechanisms facilitate knowledge flows within the scope of an alliance. We also show that governing committees also safeguard against misappropriation hazards, particularly when a partner values a firm's knowledge highly, or it possesses the required ability to absorb and assimilate a firm's knowledge. Our results imply that contractually‐defined managerial interfaces provide a channel to regulate knowledge‐sharing in collaborative alliances.     

Entrepreneurial finance meets organizational reality: comparing investment practices and performance of corporate and independent venture capitalists

This paper investigates the effect of compensation of corporate personnel on their investment in new technologies. We focus on a specific corporate activity, namely corporate venture capital (CVC), describing minority equity investment by established‐firms in entrepreneurial ventures. The setting offers an opportunity to compare corporate investors to investment experts, the independent venture capitalists (IVCs). On average, we observe a performance gap between corporate investors and their independent counterparts. Interestingly, the performance gap is sensitive to CVCs' compensation scheme: it is the largest when CVC personnel are awarded performance pay. Not only do we study the association between incentives and performance but we also document a direct relationship between incentives and the actions managers undertake. For example, we observe disparity between the number of participants in venture capital syndicates that involve a corporate investor, and those that consist solely of IVCs. The disparity shrinks substantially, however, for a subset of CVCs that compensate their personnel using performance pay. We find a parallel pattern when analyzing the relationship between compensation and another investment practice, staging of investment. To conclude, the paper investigates the three elements of the principal‐agent framework, thus providing direct evidence that compensation schemes (incentives) shape investment practices (managerial action), and ultimately investors' outcome (performance). Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Model of the Asset Disposition Decision of the RTC

The purpose of this paper is to develop a model of the asset disposition decision for the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). In this paper, we focus on the primary goal of the RTC—to maximize the net present value of the cash flows generated through holding and selling the assets it acquires. A major decision it faces is whether to hold or sell assets. This decision ultimately depends on the RTC's discount rate versus that of the marginal buyer. A second question relates to the decision of which assets to sell first and which ones to delay sale. The model developed in this paper characterizes the asset disposition decision process of the RTC for different types of assets. We develop a set of optimal disposition rules based on the simple premise of a multi-period cash flow maximization. In addition, we test some of these rules by analyzing RTC disposition performance. Through this exercise, we hope to provide some guidance to the RTC in implementing its enormous task as well as to policy makers in charting the progress of the RTC. The main results of this analysis indicate that liquid assets and retail deposit franchises should be sold as quickly as possible. Illiquid assets that are performing and do not have high servicing costs are good candidates to finance through senior/subordinated securities or sale with seller financing by the RTC. Illiquid non-performing assets are good candidates for equity participation financing by the RTC. The sales proceeds obtained by the RTC will be increased if buyers have greater certainty with respect to expected cash flows and RTC sales policies.     

Incentive Problems and General Partner Compensation in Limited Partnership Real Estate Investments

When a general partner raises capital for a real estate syndication, prospective investors should price-protect against incentives of the general partner to misrepresent project cash flows. In this study, I evaluate the structure of the general partner's compensation and specific project characteristics to determine if compensation structure can mitigate agency costs. Results indicate that front-end compensation is higher for the high reputation general partner and that the compensation structure varies with the degree of management expertise required and the financial risks of the investment.     

When do firms undertake R&D by investing in new ventures?

We explore the conditions under which firms are likely to pursue equity investment in new ventures as a way to source innovative ideas. We find that firms invest more in new ventures—commonly referred to as ‘corporate venture capital’—in industries with weak intellectual property protection and, to some extent, in industries with high technological ferment and where complementary distribution capability is important. Furthermore, we find that the greater a firm's cash flow and absorptive capacity, the more likely it is to invest. Our results suggest that in Schumpeterian environments incumbents may supplement their innovative efforts by tapping into the knowledge generated by new ventures. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The fog of feedback: Ambiguity and firm responses to multiple aspiration levels

This study examines firms' responses to performance assessments relative to multiple aspiration levels. We argue that comparisons of performance to multiple aspiration levels over time affects the interpretative clarity of feedback and, consequently, shapes a firm's responsiveness. We further conceptualize the relationship between performance relative to social and historical aspirations as ambiguous, inconsistent, and consistent performance feedback. Empirically, we examine the effects—on firms' responsiveness—of weak, negative, and positive correlations between performance relative to social and historical aspirations, where responsiveness is measured in terms of new product introductions. We find that both inconsistent and consistent feedback increase a firm's responsiveness, whereas ambiguous feedback dampens responsiveness. Our focus on this type of feedback ambiguity is novel, and it establishes the functional form of the relationship between feedback clarity/ambiguity and responsiveness. This paper augments the behavioral theory of the firm and research on performance feedback; it also extends previous work on ambiguity in strategic decision making. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Compensation strategy: does business strategy influence compensation in high‐technology firms?

Drawing on the strategic employee group concept, this study empirically examines whether a firm's innovation strategy influences compensation systems for strategic employee groups in the high‐technology industry. We focus on compensation packages for R&D employees who play a critical role in successful implementations of innovation strategy. Using compensation data for middle‐level managers and professional employees from 237 firms in the high‐technology industry, we found that a firm's strategic intention to pursue innovation has a significant influence on the relative pay level, compensation time horizon, and stock option vesting period lengths of this strategic employee group. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Political hazards and firms' geographic concentration

Research summary : We examine the relationship between the geographic concentration of a firm's sales and the firm's vulnerability to expropriation hazards. Although expanding outside the home location can initially increase a firm's exposure to government expropriation, we find that this effect reverses when a firm's sales outside its home location have reached a point at which it has sufficient resources to better influence government actions and to pose a credible threat to exit the market in which it is being targeted. We supplement this main result by identifying two moderating factors: the firm's level of political capital and the effectiveness of institutional constraints on government behavior. We find support for these hypotheses from survey data on privately owned enterprises in China. Managerial summary : This research advises firm managers that certain market activities might knock their firms' economic interests out of alignment with the government's political interests, and thus, influence the political hazards they face, particularly in emerging markets such as China, which has attracted strong interest of many firms with respect to entering the market. Here, all else being equal, the firms' geographic concentration exposes them to different levels of state expropriation—but not in a simple linear fashion as suggested by the conventional wisdom of local protectionism or that of the bargaining advantage generated by the threat of relocation: Those who are “stuck in the middle” ended up paying twice or even three times as much unauthorized levies as the purely local or the most expansive firms. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Who leaves,where to,and why worry? employee mobility,entrepreneurship and effects on source firm performance

We theorize that the value provided by the firm's complementary assets has important implications for the exit decisions of employees and their subsequent effects on the firm's performance. Using linked employee‐employer data from the U.S. Census Bureau on legal services, we find that employees with higher earnings are less likely to leave relative to employees with lower earnings, but if they do, are more likely to create a new venture than join another firm. Employee entrepreneurship has a larger adverse impact on source firm performance than moves to established firms, even controlling for observable employee quality. Our findings suggest that in knowledge intensive settings, managers should focus on tailoring compensation packages to help minimize the adverse impact of employee entrepreneurship, particularly among high performing individuals. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of exit barriers upon strategic flexibility

The conceptual construct, exit barriers, is expanded using both statistical findings and the results of field studies. The immobility of resources, it is suggested, can be overcome by helping marginal competitors to exit from potentially volatile businesses. The implementation of such tactics can be adapted to the firm's own strategic commitment and to the nature of the business in question, although it is expected that firms which might consider purchasing the physical and intangible assets of competitors in order to help them to scale high exit barriers, must themselves perceive the business to be of sufficiently high strategic importance to do so.     

Choose to Fight or Choose to Flee? A Network Embeddedness Perspective of Executive Ship Jumping in Declining Firms

Research summary: Executives in declining firms may engage in ship‐jumping behavior (i.e., voluntarily move to new employers before the failure occurs) to avoid the stigma of failure. However, it is unclear how executives decide whether or not to jump ship. Building on a network embeddedness perspective, we highlight how three network‐based indicators (i.e., executive social capital, the social capital of other peers in the declining firm, and the declining firm's alliance network) influence the executive‐level ship‐jumping decision by shaping its benefits and opportunity costs. Using data from executives at failing firms in China, we find support for our hypothesized relationships. Our research provides important insight into the network mechanisms driving the ship‐jumping decision. Managerial summary: Executives at failing firms have a choice: stay and attempt to rescue the firm from failure or exit and avoid the stigma of the failure (i.e., jump ship). Yet, little is known about what factors affect this choice. We propose that social capital plays an important role in the decision. Our evidence from specially treated (*ST) public firms in China finds that ship jumping is lowest at low and high values of social capital, and highest at moderate levels of social capital (an inverted U‐shaped relationship). In addition, higher levels of peer social capital (in the declining firm) as well as a well‐established firm‐level alliance network discourage the ship‐jumping choice. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

MODELLING REGULATORY DISTORTIONS WITH REAL OPTIONS

The introduction of uncertainty can make a significant difference in the valuation of a project. This manifests itself, inter alia, in the regulatory constraints that can affect the valuations of the firm's investment which, in turn has an adverse impact on consumers' welfare. In particular, the inability to exercise any or all of the delay, abandon, start/stop, and time-to-build options has an economic and social cost. With this view in mind, we specify and estimate a model where regulatory constraints impact on the firm's cash flow and on investment valuation with real options methods.

This paper uses real options analysis to address issues of regulation that have not been previously quantified. We show that regulatory constraints on cash flow have an impact on investment valuations in the telecommunications industry. Specifically, a model is developed to estimate the cost of regulation for broadband services. We show that the cash flow constraints and the inability to delay and abandon has a significant cost. Because some costs are not recognized in a static view of the world, this failure to recognize the operation and implications of non-flexibility by regulators (which can be modeled by real options methods) will lead to a reduction in company valuations which in turn will lead to a reduction in economics welfare.     

Explaining Asset Mispricing Using the Resale Option and Inflation Illusion

We investigate the overconfidence theory and inflation‐illusion hypothesis of asset mispricing. Both concepts address subjective asset valuation but place the impetus on differing explanations within the standard dividend‐growth model. We find that one of the theoretical outcomes of overconfidence—asset turnover—consistently explains mispricing in U.S. housing markets. Further, we find that asset turnover subsumes expected inflation in certain specifications, suggesting that dispersion in investors' beliefs is a better explanation of asset mispricing than the investors' inability to properly discount future cash flows.     

Managerial compensation and corporate spinoffs

Research summary : This article investigates how corporate spinoffs affect managerial compensation. These deals are found to improve the alignment of spinoff firm managers' incentive compensation with stock market performance, especially among spinoff firm managers that used to be divisional managers of the spun‐off subsidiary, and particularly when the spun‐off subsidiary performs better than or is unrelated to its parent firm's remaining businesses. By contrast, incentive alignment does not improve for the parent firm managers running the divesting companies. This finding appears to be driven by a significant post‐spinoff increase in these managers' incentive compensation, the magnitude of which is inversely related to governance quality in their firms. Together, these results elucidate how spinoffs influence managerial compensation in diversified firms and the companies they divest. Managerial summary : This article explores how spinoffs affect incentive alignment: the correlation between incentive compensation and stock market performance. The incentive alignment of spinoff firm managers improves following these deals. These gains are the largest when spinoff firm managers used to be divisional managers of the spun‐off subsidiary and when the spun‐off subsidiary performs better than or is unrelated to the other businesses in the parent firm. By contrast, incentive alignment does not improve for parent firm managers. Instead, the level of these managers' incentive compensation rises significantly post‐spinoff, and the magnitude of this increase is inversely related to governance quality in these firms. Together, these results shed light on the ways in which spinoffs influence managerial compensation in diversified firms and in the companies they divest. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rent appropriation of knowledge‐based assets and firm performance when institutions are weak: A study of Chinese publicly listed firms

Research summary : A firm's strategic investments in knowledge‐based assets through research and development (R&D) can generate economic rents for the firm, and thus are expected to affect positively a firm's financial performance. However, weak protection of minority shareholders, weak property rights, and ineffective law enforcement can allow those rents to be appropriated disproportionately by a firm's powerful insiders such as large owners and top managers. Recent data on Chinese publicly listed firms during 2007–2012 were used to demonstrate that the expected positive relationship between knowledge assets and performance is weaker in transition economies when a firm's ownership is highly concentrated and its managers have wide discretion. Moreover, rent appropriation by insiders was shown to vary with the levels of institutional development in which a firm operates. Managerial summary : Investing in knowledge‐based intangible assets (e.g., R&D) is an important value‐creation activity for the firm. Such value creation process can be facilitated by large shareholders and powerful managers, who can then take an advantageous position with critical insider information on these valuable intangible assets and therefore enjoy more opportunities to appropriate more value from them, leaving less value for other minority shareholders. The value distribution becomes increasingly skewed against minority shareholders when the institutional protection for them is weak. Indeed, in a large sample of Chinese publicly listed firms, we found that R&D investment becomes less positively associated with firm financial performance with the presence of large shareholders, high managerial equity, or CEO/Chairman duality, especially in Chinese provinces with weak institutional development. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.