并购中主并公司的可预测性——基于交易成本视角的研究

本文将交易成本划分为显性交易成本和隐性交易成本,认为主并公司进行并购的目的是为了节约显性和隐性交易成本。在此基础上,我们以2003年发生并购的上市公司为样本,采用因子分析法和Logistic回归建立了主并公司的预测模型,发现资产专用性越强,显性交易成本越高,公司发生并购的可能性越大;中间产品市场的不确定性越高,显性交易成本越高,公司发生并购的可能性越大;公司的成长能力越强,成长能力与盈利能力之间的不平衡程度越高,隐性交易成本越高,公司发生并购的可能性越大。     

法律制度变迁、审计师选择与企业价值——基于实际控制人掏空行为视角的实证研究

本文利用2004-2009年民营上市公司的数据,首次对2006年我国将实际控制人掏空行为列入刑法这一事件对上市公司的审计师选择和企业价值所产生的影响进行了实证研究。研究发现在加大对实际控制人掏空行为的处罚力度后,掏空风险较高的公司更倾向于聘请小型会计师事务所,而且实际控制人的掏空行为有所减少。刑法调整后,由于实际控制人与中小股东的代理问题得到了有效的缓解,存在掏空风险的公司的企业价值有了显著提升,且掏空风险高的公司企业价值提升得更为显著。进一步研究还发现:在抑制实际控制人掏空行为、提升企业价值方面,法律治理能替代独立审计治理的作用,降低企业的监督成本。     

Privately Owned Railways' Cost Function,Organization Size and Ownership

This paper aims to find the optimal size of an urban private rail organization as well as to evaluate cost difference by ownership. First, after selecting privately owned rail companies, we explore explanatory variables which affect the cost of rail service. Second, keeping in mind previous cost studies of the urban passenger rail industry, we estimate variable cost function with the translog cost function and we construct the total cost function. Third, based on the average cost function, conditions are pinpointed which attain minimum average cost. Finally, based on estimated results, we calculate the size of an urban private rail company and the ownership effects on cost. We conclude that optimal size is about 231 million vehicle-km per year, with a network of 63.8 km length. In terms of total costs, public railways have higher costs than private railways. There is no cost difference, however, in terms of variable costs.     

Putting all one's eggs in one basket: Relational contracts and the management of local public services

French municipalities often contract out the provision of local public services to private companies, and regularly choose the same private operator for a range of different services. We develop a model of relational contracts that shows how this strategy may lead to better performance at lower cost for public authorities. We test the implication of our model using an original database of the contractual choices made by 5000 French local public authorities in the years 2001, 2004 and 2008.     

区域经济差异演化的一个空间均衡模型

本论文构建了一个包含人力资本形成、交易成本、迁移成本的空间均衡模型,从理论上探讨了跨代际的人力资本形成、区域的交易成本、迁移成本在区域经济差异演化中的作用,并以中国经济发展的现实背景为数据基础,模拟了中国区域经济差异的演化过程.论文认为,区域经济差异的变迁与多种因素相关,在一定的时期,当交易成本出现明显的改善时,会出现威廉逊"倒U型"结构.同时,人力资本的代际转移会导致出现差异放大的趋势,以私人投资为主的教育模式将促成这种放大,而公共教育有助于缩小代际差异.最后,社会致力于迁移成本的降低,将缩小区域经济差异.     

Public knowledge partnerships in European research projects and knowledge creation across R&D institutional sectors

This paper investigates the role of public knowledge partnerships in EU-funded framework programmes (FP) on knowledge creation across a sample of European countries. Different from previous studies, we investigate whether the impact of participation in FP on new knowledge (patents) differs across private companies, universities and public research centres. We find that, while all institutional sectors benefit from joint projects, the main benefits (in terms of patenting activity) go to universities and public research centres, while private companies benefit less. We also find evidence of important complementarities between participation in international research projects and internal innovation drivers (researchers), thus highlighting the crucial role of domestic absorptive capacity for fully benefiting from international cooperation in R&D projects.     

异质机构、企业性质与关联交易

基于2007-2009年3618家A股上市公司数据,本文从关联交易密度和关联交易频率两个维度对机构持股、企业性质和关联交易之间的关系进行了实证研究。结果发现：机构持股对企业关联交易的抑制作用并不显著,这种不显著性主要归因于证券投资基金;不同性质的机构对企业关联交易的抑制作用不同,其中证券投资基金对企业关联交易基本不存在抑制作用,而险资和合格的境外机构投资者则相反;企业性质对异质机构和关联交易间的关系有显著的调节作用,民营上市公司中机构投资者的抑制作用要强于国有上市公司。     

Does technology licensing matter for privatization?

In mixed oligopolies, technology licensing from a cost‐efficient firm to a cost‐inefficient firm has been widely observed. This paper examines the relationship between privatization and licensing (by public or private firms) with the consideration of either a domestic or a foreign private firm. We find that (a) in the case of a domestic private firm, public licensing facilitates privatization, but private licensing hinders privatization; (b) in the case of a foreign private firm, both public and private licensing facilitate privatization. Our results yield important policy implications on privatization.     

An analysis of public adaptation to climate change using agricultural water schemes in South America

This paper provides an analysis of public adaptation to climate change using agricultural water schemes in South American farms. Unlike other studies of adaptation, this paper examines the differences between private irrigation and public irrigation schemes based on around 1400 farm surveys collected across seven countries in South America which recorded detailed water schemes. We analyze the choice of water schemes in the first stage and the land values for each scheme in the second stage. We find that public irrigations do not increase in response to a warmer climate, but private irrigations do. On the other hand, we find that public irrigation schemes are provided primarily as a response to water scarcity. Moreover, we find that private irrigations are taken gradually while public irrigations are provided as a lump sum, resulting in either too much or too little provision. Therefore, public adaptations to climate change will likely involve two inefficiencies. No provision of irrigation in a hotter climate may result from a lack of knowledge. Overprovision of irrigation in dry zones may result from a lump-sum provision of a public good.     

Public versus private insurance system with (and without) transaction costs: optimal segmentation policy of an informed monopolist

Computer-mediated transactions allow insurance companies to customize their contracts, while transaction costs limit this tendency toward customization. To capture this phenomenon, we develop a complete-information framework in which it is costly to design a new market segment when the segmentation policy (number and design of segments) is endogenously chosen. Both the case of a private and a public insurer are considered. Without transaction costs, these two insurance systems are equivalent in terms of social welfare and participation. With transaction costs, this equivalence is no longer present, and the analysis of this difference is the subject of this article.     

股权结构、产权性质与债券融资成本*——基于中国上市公司的实证研究

本文基于最近十年503家上市公司发行的984只债券数据,实证检验了股权结构、产权性质对债券融资成本的影响。研究表明：股权集中度与债券融资成本正相关,制衡度与债券融资成本负相关。进一步检验发现,股权结构对债券融资成本的影响在民营企业中比在国有企业中更显著,产权性质发挥了调节作用。本文一定程度上丰富了公司债券定价理论,为发行人降低债券融资成本、投资人评估债券投资风险提供了有益启示,并为监管部门完善债券市场监管政策提供了经验证据。       

Infrastructure investment and Canadian manufacturing productivity

This paper examines the relationship between Canadian public infrastructure and private output using a Constant Elasticity and Substitution-Translog (CES-TL) cost model to describe the interaction of the public and private sectors.

We find public capital a substitute for private capital within the Canadian manufacturing sector. Additionally, the services of public capital enhance the productivity of private capital. Canadian manufacturing costs are characterized by economies of scale, indicating that less than optimal plant sizes dominated Canadian manufacturing sector during the study period. Advances in disembodied technical progress are also indicated.     

Diversification strategies and scope economies: evidence from a sample of Italian regional bus transport providers

A growing number of Local Public Transport (LPT) companies diversify their production lines by providing a large set of services. We investigate the cost structure of a sample of LPT companies operating in Italy and assess the presence and the magnitude of scope economies. We split the whole sample of firms according to their diversification strategy: private firms, mainly diversifying in competitive transport related services and public firms providing nontransport services in regulated markets. Scope economies appear sizeable for both groups but higher for firms pursuing a transport related strategy, suggesting caution in the multiutility development pursued by public LPT firms in Italy.     

Would Excess Capacity in Public Firms Be Socially Optimal?

We analyse oligopolistic interactions between a welfare-maximizing public firm and a profit-maximizing private firm in a repeated game. We find that the public firm can hold excess capacity as a strategic punishment device to sustain a subgame perfect equilibrium which is welfare-superior to the static Nash equilibrium. Basically, potential punishment from the public firm in the dynamic game can make the self-interested private firm behave in the public interest. Furthermore, if capacity is endogenous, public excess capacity can occur in a welfare efficient equilibrium when the cost of public capacity investment is higher than that of private investment.     

Factors that influence transaction costs in development offsets: Who bears what and why?

Environmental policy instruments generate transaction costs to public and private parties. There is a growing literature reporting on the size of transaction costs produced by environmental policy instruments. This paper extends that literature through an analysis of the factors that influence transaction costs in environmental policy and how this influence occurs. The theory based factors that influence transaction costs are categorised as: 1) transaction characteristics; 2) transactor characteristics; 3) nature of the institutional environment; and 4) nature of the institutional arrangements. We examined how these factors influenced transaction costs through the analysis of two Australian-based development offset schemes with different policy designs. We found evidence of all four theory-based categories of influence in the policy case studies. The degree of influence and how each factor influenced transaction costs varies across the two policies and between parties. Policy design as a component of the institutional environment had a particularly large bearing on transaction costs of offset buyers and the policy administrator. An important contribution to transaction cost theory assumes the institutional environment as given.     

The influence of ownership on the cost of bus service provision in Switzerland - an empirical illustration

In deregulated transport markets, a firm's ownership status and management system represent an important issue. Property right theory suggests that productivity and performance are higher in the private than in the public sector. In Switzerland, providers of bus transportation are traditionally corporations, though a large part of their equity shares are still held by the public sector (federal government, cantons, municipalities). This paper examines the potential impact of ownership on the cost of bus service provision for a sample of private, public and mixed bus companies in Switzerland. The estimation of a translog cost model has been considered for 34 bus transit companies observed over 5 years (1991–1995). The results only partially confirm that if the private sector holds shares in the company's capital, efficiency is enhanced. In addition, measures of economies of scale and density are derived and discussed within the actual public transport policy.     

产权界定、市场禁入与农村非正规金融——由我国第一家私人钱庄兴衰引发的思考

通过对改革开放后第一家私人钱庄兴衰的史实进行重新考察和审视,本文经研究发现,尽管权力当局把资金自由交易权界定给了监管部门,但因监管成本和信息成本过高而无法保障该产权,个人会通过参与各类非正规金融活动来攫取一部分置于公共领域的权利。本文还基于交易费用理论解释了我国金融市场禁人政策出现松动的原因,也即维持扭曲型二元金融制度的成本以及严禁农村非正规金融活动的费用都越来越高,而且国内的经济形势也提出了放松监管的要求,在这些因素的作用下监管部门执行原有金融抑制政策的力度终于降低了。     

民营企业组织结构对首次公开发行抑价和关联交易的影响

作者以1999年至2004年IPO的84家金字塔结构的民营企业为研究样本,研究金字塔型控股结构对民营企业首次公开发行(IPO)后长期市场表现的影响,并试图从不同角度阐述长期市场表现变化的原因。作者发现,从短期来看,金字塔式的组织结构越复杂,民营企业IPO抑价程度越大。从长期来看,金字塔结构越复杂的发行公司越倾向于用后续的关联交易,尤其是通过非经营性的关联交易从上市公司中收回现金,来补偿民营企业家在IPO抑价中损失的财富。     

股权激励与代理成本

传统以管理费用率作为代理成本的替代不能恰当地反映管理者在职消费和职务侵占的真实水平,本文用经过Jones模型纠正的费用率作为代理成本的替代,考察了所有权性质、总经理持股与否及持股比例对代理成本的影响。本文提供了私有制下总经理适当持股有利于降低代理成本的可靠证据,为中国上市公司即将展开的股权激励计划提供证据的支持。     

Economics of transaction costs saving forestry

Following the arguments concerning the problems of traditional forest economics in Putz (2000), this article shows that transaction cost economics can overcome some of the shortcomings of the main stream forest economics. The public forestry, subsistence forestry, non-industrial private forestry, China's share-holding forestry, and their revolutions are analyzed by the relative transaction costs of labor, capital, land and forest products. Potential implications of transaction cost economics in forest policy, including regulated access to commons, sustainable forestry criteria, ecological certificates and land tenure decentralization, have also been discussed.