碳标签——贸易保护主义的新措施

"碳标签"制度是继"碳关税"之后我国对外贸易所遇到的又一个贸易壁垒,在当今低碳经济成为世界经济主流的背景下,它的实施将对我国商品出口造成重大阻碍,因此,如何应对"碳标签"所造成的不利影响就成为我国对外贸易必须解决的问题。文章从分析"碳标签"的贸易保护性质入手,列举了它对我国对外贸易所造成的影响,并提出了相应的措施。     

论碳关税及我国的应对策略

开征碳关税,将极大地冲击我国企业对欧美市场的出口,使我国对外贸易和国内经济发展面临困境.尽管我国政府已经明确反对欧美开征碳关税,但由于碳关税在国际上是一个争议很大的问题,反对者与支持者都能从国际多边协议中找到相应的理由.因此,我国在反对欧美征收碳关税的同时,也有必要对碳关税可能给我国造成的影响进行分析,并研究应对策略.     

论碳关税及我国的应对策略

开征碳关税,将极大地冲击我国企业对欧美市场的出口,使我国对外贸易和国内经济发展面临困境。尽管我国政府已经明确反对欧美开征碳关税,但由于碳关税在国际上是一个争议很大的问题,反对者与支持者都能从国际多边协议中找到相应的理由。因此,我国在反对欧美征收碳关税的同时,也有必要对碳关税可能给我国造成的影响进行分析,并研究应对策略。     

碳关税对我国贸易的影响研究

随着我国对外贸易的发展,受到外国的贸易保护也越来越多,碳关税对我国对外贸易产生了一定的影响,本文主要就碳关税对我国贸易的影响进行论述,并提出了一些应对策略,希望为我国对外经济贸易的发展提供参考。     

“碳关税”壁垒对我国高碳产业的影响及应对策略

近年来,一些发达国家以应对气候变化为由提出对进口的排放密集型产品征收特别的二氧化碳排放关税,将"碳贸易限制措施"扩大为"碳关税"壁垒。"碳关税"的开征必然对占据我国出口市场一半以上的高碳产业造成严重冲击。因此,我国政府和企业应主动采取参与国际贸易规则的制定、优化产业结构、创新技术等措施应对"碳关税"壁垒。     

碳关税背景下对外贸易低碳化发展的必然性分析

后危机时代,在发达国家经济发展速度放缓,而发展中国家经济发展势头迅猛的背景下,发达国家采取以保护环境为名、贸易保护为实的新型绿色贸易壁垒措施——碳关税。作为最大的发展中国家,中国的对外贸易在世界中占据着首要位置,成为出口量最大的国家。面对碳关税政策,中国的对外贸易走向低碳化既是对外贸易增长的需要,也是可持续发展的必然选择。文章通过分析碳关税征收将对中国对外贸易产生的利弊影响,提出对外贸易低碳化发展的趋势和实现低碳化发展的路径。     

碳关税贸易壁垒对中国对外贸易的影响及对策

近期西方国家宣称已将碳关税计划提进日程,征收碳关税的可能性加大,作为全球第一贸易大国,中国的出口贸易面临新挑战。基于国际经济环境和中国国情,分析碳关税的征收对中国对外贸易的影响,提出中国积极应对碳关税贸易壁垒的对策建议。     

低碳经济时代中国对外贸易策略研究

低碳经济对我国粗放型的外贸增长方式提出了新的挑战,碳关税、碳标签等单边贸易政策已成为我国对外贸易发展的障碍。为实现低碳背景下我国对外贸易的持续发展,要理性认识和把握低碳经济浪潮,加快产业结构升级,大力发展服务贸易,积极开拓新兴贸易市场,并在气候问题谈判和低碳规则制定中争取更多的话语权,为我国对外贸易发展创造良好环境。     

碳关税：对中国的影响及其应对

“碳关税”是一种新型的国际贸易壁垒，并逐渐成为一些发达国家实施贸易保护的新工具。本文通过对碳关税形成与发展的描述，阐述了碳关税对中国对外贸易、相关产业及其就业的可能影响，并就如何应对碳关税提出建议。     

碳关税壁垒对我国工业品出口的影响及对策研究

全球环境的恶化使人们越来越关注碳排放问题,发达国家正在考虑通过对不实施减排的国家征收碳关税。从碳关税提出的背景出发,阐述低碳经济背景下碳关税壁垒的相关特征,运用局部均衡法分析碳关税对我国整体的影响,同时也运用可计算的一般均衡模型测算不同的碳关税对我国工业品出口影响的程度。通过分析发现碳关税的征收将对我国经济和贸易产生重大影响,建议我国企业要顺应低碳经济发展趋势,加快研究和发展低碳经济。     

我国关税调整对广东经济贸易的影响分析

2011年以来,我国对进口关税进行了一系列新的结构性调整。这是我国外贸政策调整和转变的一次具体表现,从我国外贸战略角度看,贸易平衡发展和转型升级是当前我国外贸发展面,晦的紧迫任务。本文收集近年我国关税调整方案及其对广东经济贸易的影响,首先是对近年来我国关税调整政策内容进行了归纳和总结,提炼了关税调整政策的指导思想和主要特征,进而分析了这一系列调整对广东的经济特别是对外贸易增长和发展转型所造成的影响,最后从政府和企业两个层面提供了政策建议。     

Preferential trade and mis-invoicing: Some analytical implications

This paper examines how different trade policies affect illegal trade practices, foreign exchange market and the degree of illegal capital outflow. It builds up a three-country preferential–non-preferential trade model where low or zero tariff prevails in the preferential trade channel and higher tariff is exercised in the non-preferential trade channel. We show that initially the preferential trade channel is likely to encourage illegal capital outflow and non-preferential trade channel is conducive for illegal transactions in foreign exchange in the local market. But finally a low tariff regime takes care of both illegal capital outflow and black market for foreign exchange.     

Partial Privatization,Foreign Competition,and Optimum Tariff*

Using a simple international mixed oligopoly model with one public and one or more foreign firms, this paper examines the effect of partial privatization or foreign competition on optimum tariffs and finds that foreign competition lowers the optimal tariff rate but partial privatization raises it. This result implies that trade liberalization is welfare improving if a country opens up its economy by allowing foreign competition. However, the liberalization policy is not desirable when the country only partially or completely privatizes its publicly‐owned enterprises.     

Trade Liberalization and the Profitability of Domestic Mergers

It is often thought that a tariff reduction, by opening‐up the domestic market to foreign firms, should lessen the need for a policy aimed at discouraging domestic mergers. This implicitly assumes that the tariff in question is sufficiently high to prevent foreign firms from selling in the domestic market. However, not all tariffs are prohibitive, so that foreign firms may be present in the domestic market before it is abolished. Furthermore, even if the tariff is prohibitive, a merger of domestic firms may render it nonprohibitive, thus inviting foreign firms to penetrate the domestic market. Using a simple example, the authors show that, in the latter two cases, abolishing the tariff may in fact make the domestic merger more profitable. Hence trade liberalization will not necessarily reduce the profitability of domestic mergers.     

Redistribution,state trading enterprises and ‘politically optimal’ tariffs

State trading enterprises (STEs) are widely used and can be viewed as instruments of trade policy. We analyse two aspects: the first is their potential trade distorting effect; the second is how they modify the case for the ‘politically optimal’ tariff. We show that the STE can reduce the need for a tariff designed for domestic redistribution. This result introduces some ambiguity about how STEs are interpreted: from a multilateralist perspective, they should be dealt with in the same way as other non‐tariff barriers; from a nationalistic perspective, they can reduce the need for ‘politically optimal.’     

Mergers and Trade Policy under Oligopoly

For an oligopolistic industry, the effects of mergers on the domestic country's optimal trade policy are analyzed. If the domestic country pursues an optimal trade policy then it will always lose as a result of a foreign merger. The optimal domestic response to a foreign merger is to decrease (increase) the tariff if demand is concave (convex) and to increase the production subsidy. The foreign merger reduces foreign welfare when the domestic country pursues its optimal trade policy. The optimal domestic response to a domestic merger is to leave the tariff unchanged and to increase the production subsidy.     

Privatization in a Small Open Economy with Imperfect Competition

We look at privatization in a general equilibrium model of a small, tariff‐distorted, open economy. There is a differentiated good produced by both private and public sector enterprises. A reduction in government production in order to cut losses from such production raises the returns to capital and increases the tariff revenue, which are welfare‐improving. However, privatization also leads to lower wages and possibly fewer private brands. This lowers workers’ welfare, which may make privatization politically infeasible. Privatization can improve workers’ welfare with complementary reforms, e.g., attracting foreign investment or trade liberalization.     

Protecting consumers through protection: The role of tariff-induced technology transfer

We consider a duopolistic trade model where a tariff induces the foreign firm to transfer its superior technology to the domestic rival. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, such a tariff raises consumers’ surplus relative to the free trade situation. We characterize the optimal tariff with and without precommitment on the part of the local government. Possibility of technology transfer reduces the optimal tariff rate compared to the no-transfer situation.     

Economic liberalization and welfare in a model with an informal sector

The paper reexamines the conventional results relating to inflow of foreign capital, removal of protectionism and structural reform programmes, in a small open economy in terms of a two-sector general equilibrium model with an informal sector. The paper shows that in the presence of labour market distortion and a protectionist policy, inflow of foreign capital may be desirable irrespective of the pattern of trade of the economy due to its favourable impact on welfare. But the welfare implications of tariff reductions and/or structural adjustment programmes, such as deregulating the formal sector labour market, depend crucially on the economy's trade pattern. The paper provides an answer to the question as to whether in a developing economy labour market reform and tariff reform should go hand-in-hand or whether one should precede the other for welfare improvement.
JEL classification: F10, F13, F21, O17.     

技术壁垒的作用机理与我国对外贸易

随着世界经济全球化和国际贸易投资自由化进程的进一步加快,世界各国纷纷大幅度降低关税和取消配额等数量限制措施,技术性贸易壁垒成为一种新的贸易保护主义手段,已对我国的对外贸易特别是出口贸易构成重大影响。因此,我们应对技术壁垒的作用机理进行认真分析,并采取积极措施跨越国外的技术壁垒。