基于信号传递博弈模型的我国食品安全问题探析

本文运用信号传递博弈模型的原理来分析我国食品安全问题。认为:我国食品安全形势之所以异常严峻,关键原因是食品监管机构的打击行动属于高成本类型,由此决定了监管机构对食品违法犯罪行为的一次次默许或疏于打击,导致不法食品企业不断修正被打击的后验概率大小,预期利润的净现值不断加大,强烈刺激着不法企业的违法犯罪动机;文章最后分析了我国食品监管机构的打击行动属高成本类型的具体原因,并给出简要的对策建议。     

网络扩展中的合谋与信号发送

基于逆向选择模型,本文分析了合谋和信号发送对网络扩展容量的影响。模型结果表明,当同时有两条或者更多的网络线路需要扩展时,网络公司之间的合谋将使得监管机构更难对它们进行甄别,低效率网络公司的向下扭曲变大,高效率网络公司的信息租金增加。监管机构利用其他不可验证相关成本信息可以改善规制合同菜单,降低网络扩展容量扭曲。     

食品市场交易与监管博弈分析

食品市场是一个典型的信息不对称市场。本文从有无政府监管两个方面,对食品市场中不同利益主体之间的博弈情况进行分析。在无政府监管情况下,企业生产劣质产品,消费者以低价购买劣质商品;而在政府监管下,食品生产企业生产劣质产品的概率降低,因此,在食品市场中,政府应加强监管,保障食品安全。     

考虑筹资成本内生性的商业银行信息披露策略研究北大核心CSSCI

文章在考虑银行筹资成本内生性的条件下,以信息披露度作为传递信号构建信号博弈模型,研究了不完全信息条件下不同风险承担类型的银行对于信息披露度的选择问题。证明了合并均衡、分离均衡以及混合均衡解存在的条件。并用2006-2013年国内32家银行的面板数据分析证明了信息披露对商业银行风险承担的约束效应以及隐性存款保险制度对约束效应的影响。研究发现,只有隐性存款保险制度的赔付比例较低、监管机构对于高风险银行的处罚力度较大并且由高信息披露带来的竞争劣势成本较小时,高效率的分离均衡才会出现,此时低风险银行以较低成本获得投资、高风险银行被淘汰、信号传递有效、投资者的投资风险降低。     

上海市PM2.5治理的博弈分析

基于博弈论的方法论,就空气中PM2.5污染治理问题,建立工业型企业与政府监管机构的不完全信息的博弈模型。对比分析初始博弈模型和拓展模型,得出PM2.5污染控制的相关举措,以使企业能够自主地对PM2.5主要污染物来源进行控制和治理,促使社会总效益最大化。     

基于协同治理视角的上市公司会计信息披露的演化博弈与实证

上市公司会计信息披露是企业向政府和社会公众传递企业自身财务经营等会计信息情况的重要途径,是证券市场赖以生存的基础之一。对会计信息披露有效和准确的监管保证了真实准确和完整规范的会计信息在市场中有效传递,进而保障了证券市场的良性运行。本文通过构建监管部门、上市公司和公众在会计信息披露监管中的演化博弈模型并用计量模型进行检验,厘清三者利益和行为的相互作用关系,探究监管部门的监管选择。研究表明,监管部门对上市公司监管水平受上市公司信息披露质量和公众监督的影响,应提高监管水平、加大处罚力度,对上市公司分类、精准监管,同时保证公众监督的权利才能达到更好地协同治理成效。     

地方政府与监管机构的“A股退市博弈”

自2014年年末沪深两市祭出"史上最严退市制度"以来*ST博元、欣泰电气等A股上市公司已因违反新规而遭到永久退市。文章通过选取地方政府与监管机构两个利益相关者,运用"博弈论"理论,深入研究地方政府与监管机构就A股上市公司退市与否之间的博弈。文章研究结果表明,地方政府应减少对上市公司的退市干预,与监管机构共同维护良好的退市制度。我国证券市场要实现资源优化配置,实现上市公司合理进入和退出A股市场机制,最终要实行注册制,而退市制度的严格实施是顺利实施注册制的根本要求。     

固定支付方式下ICT推动节能减排的策略研究

ICT推动工业企业节能减排,实现绿色低碳发展,需要ICT低碳技术研发商、工业企业和政府的协同努力。考虑研发商和工业企业面对的研发和市场不确定性,分析二者通过固定支付方式合作时各自的最优投入,给出政府的激励和监管策略。研究表明ICT低碳技术研发商的最优投入与工业企业的买断费用、政府的资金资助和惩罚力度有关,而工业企业的最优投入仅与政府的税收优惠有关。增加买断费用或政府资金资助和惩罚,能够激励ICT低碳技术研发商提高其最优投入;增加政府税收优惠能够提高工业企业的最优投入;但需合理设置买断费用和政府经费资助的首期拨付比例以防范ICT低碳技术研发商的道德风险。     

面向平台经济治理的多主体行为策略演化博弈研究

平台经济治理对于推动我国经济高质量发展具有重要意义。本文构建一个具有多参数的演化博弈模型,采用MATLAB 软件对多主体行为策略演化博弈进行仿真分析,从而优化政府、平台企业及平台用户的行为策略选择。研究结果表明：（1）当创新监管成本较高时,政府难以维持更有效的“创新监管”而倾向于选择“传统监管”。（2）在演化初期,政府对平台企业的处罚对提升创新监管概率有正向作用,而随着时间演化处罚力度小的会率先收敛于稳定策略点。（3）平台用户在面对平台企业不合规经营行为时,只有在自身利益受到损害,且投诉成本低于维权收益时,才会选择投诉。通过对政府、平台企业和平台用户等多主体行为策略研究,分别从不同主体不同影响因素视角提出相关对策,以促进平台经济高质量发展。     

信息结构与金融监管激励:一个理论分析框架

金融监管的设计是为了纠正市场失灵、保护存款人和投资者的利益,然而信息不对称条件下,监管者的目标会偏离这一社会目标,导致监管者提供有效监管的激励不足和监管的低效率。基于这一认识,本文通过建立存款人与监管部门、监管当局与金融机构三方的监管博弈模型,对金融监管中的激励问题进行了分析。结果表明,不同的信息结构决定着不同的监管激励水平,从而直接影响着监管效率和社会福利水平。信息不对称程度愈大,监管激励水平愈低,监管效率也就愈低。中国当前金融监管中的主要问题也正是监管者及金融市场的透明度较低而缺乏监管激励所致。因而我国金融监管改革的关键不在于是否从宏观层面加强或放松金融监管,而在于如何通过监管当局及金融市场的信息透明度建设形成微观监管主体提供有效监管的激励。     

风险投资项目选择的信号传递博弈分析

由于风险投资公司和申报项目的企业之间存在信息不对称而引起的逆向选择问题,本文提出运用信号传递博弈模型,即以商业计划书作为一种可靠的市场信号,将好项目和差项目区分开来。同时对避免逆向选择问题的发生提出了一些建议。     

The Voluntary Inclusion of Forecasts in the MD&A Section of Annual Reports*

Abstract. In this study, we appeal to theories advanced by Darrough and Stoughton (1990) to enhance our understanding of why some firms may voluntarily include directional forecasts in their annual reports while others do not. The data are consistent with their predictions that a firm's disclosure policy reflects its concern for both financial market valuation and product market competition. We find that for “good news firms, the probability of forecasting is increasing in the financing requirements but decreasing in the threat of competitor entry. The converse holds for “bad news” firms. These results lend further empirical support to the observation that the familiar good news hypothesis tested in the management earnings forecast literature offers only a partial explanation for the decision to forecast. Interestingly, however, even after controlling for financial and product market considerations, an overall voluntary disclosure bias still exists in the data. The data also provide support for the OSC's concern about a voluntary disclosure bias. Only 17.5 percent of our sample forecasts represent revisions downward relative to the previous year's results. However, in contrast to the OSC's concern about a general lack of forward-looking disclosures in annual reports, 35.9 percent of our sample firms include directional forecasts in their MD&A or elsewhere in the annual report.     

Signaling Game for Concession Term Winning of BOT Project under Type Plotting

Private sector who competes for the BOT project is plotted into two types according to BOT project different types. Different concession term is given to deal with distinct types of private sector. When private sector transfers its signal to indicate their types, there will be three kinds of conditions. An analysis is given for condition of equilibrium between government and private sector with principle of separating, consolidation, pooling equilibrium.     

我国财政监督模式架构的过渡:行政型与立法型

我国现行的财政监督模式,是一种行政型财政监督模式。它在结构上呈现四边形的特点,具有较强的不稳定性。博弈分析表明,这种模式会导致政府失去外在约束,走向偷懒或违规。政府官员如将主要精力集中于处理上下级关系上,将不利于增加产出。因此。行政型财政监督模式需要向立法型财政监督模式转变。     

Voluntary financial disclosure in an entry game with continua of types*

Abstract. A key characteristic of the reporting of private management information is that managers do not always report their information, and they reveal or withhold both “good” and “bad” news. Several recent papers provide models of managers' voluntary disclosure decisions. These models are typically constructed so that managers do not always disclose or withhold their information, despite rational behavior by both the privately informed managers and interested uninformed parties external to the firm. Our paper seeks to contribute further to this literature by developing a richer model of the forces that might influence a manager's decision to disclose private information. Our model is a direct extension of the model in Darrough and Stoughton (1990). In our model, there is a continuum of possible private incumbent signals and the entrant may be privately informed about the cost of entry. Partial disclosure of private information results from the tension that exists between an informed manager's desire to communicate good news to (and hide bad news from) the capital market and his desire to communicate bad news to (and hide good news from) competitors in the firm's product market. Résumé. La communication par la direction de l'information privilégiée qu'elle détient présente une caractéristique déterminante: les gestionnaires ne font pas toujours état de cette information, et ils révèlent ou retiennent l'information aussi bien «positive» que «négative ?. Dans plusieurs études récentes sont proposés des modèles décisionnels en matière de présentation volontaire d'information par les gestionnaires. Ces modèles sont habituellement construits de telle sorte que les gestionnaires ne communiquent ou ne retiennent pas toujours l'information, malgré le comportement rationnel affiché tant par les gestionnaires dépositaires de l'information privilègiée que par les parties intéressées extérieures à l'entreprise qui ne disposent pas de cette information. Les auteurs ont voulu ici enrichir ces études en élaborant un modèle plus étoffé des forces susceptibles d'influer sur la décision du gestionnaire de communiquer l'information privilégiée dont il dispose.     

不对称信息条件下征纳双方税收筹划的博弈

税收筹划作为一种节税行为应当符合相关的法律规定。但在现实条件下,由于政府征税与纳税人追求最大利益是相违背的,双方就形成了一种博弈关系。政府在实际征管中要考虑政府的政策选择和纳税人对此的反应和行为选择;纳税人在实行筹划行为时会权衡自己所能得到的利益和可能受到的惩罚,双方博弈的后果最终会达到一种均衡,使得征纳双方都能接受。     

Causes for business failures: Understanding the 1997 Korean crisis

This paper explains why the Korean business sector is in such bad shape based on the hypothesis that it is partly due to bad management and partly due to bad systems and policies. Bad management of business firms, especially the large ones belonging to chaebols, was a crucial element in fermenting the crisis. This stems from the deeper problem of the lack of an effective corporate governance mechanism. There did not exist effective mechanisms with which inefficient managers could be punished. Thus, when large firms went on prolonged investment binges, nothing could have prevented them. The grave ill effects of financial controls long used by the government, were another crucial elements that instigated the current crisis. The policy, whose essence was to create economic rents through interest rate controls and allocate those rents to designated areas, had produced many ill effects. The policies, among others, made borrowers overly dependent on debts and lenders extremely burdened with non-recoverable loans, making both very vulnerable to bad shocks. If Korea can reform her government-dominated economic system toward a more market-dependent one, she will emerge from the current crisis much stronger.     

基于演化博弈的环境信息披露监管研究

考虑到政府监管部门与公司均为有限理性参与人,文章通过构建环境信息披露演化博弈模型,分析政府环境信息披露监管部门和公司的策略变化及演化趋势,并针对达到的演化博弈稳定状态进行分析。结果表明:环境信息披露监管的稳定状态与公司环境信息披露的成本、政府环境信息披露监管成本、处罚力度等因袭密切相关。根据分析结果,提出针对环境信息披露监管的政策建议。     

Does Accounting Conservatism Discipline Qualitative Disclosure? Evidence From Tone Management in the MD&A*

We investigate whether accounting conservatism, which has been found to be effective in constraining management opportunism in other settings, constrains upward tone management (UTM) in the Management's Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) portion of the 10-K filing. We hypothesize that conservatism makes it harder for managers to opportunistically downplay bad news and magnify good news when discussing current performance. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that UTM is negatively associated with several accounting conservatism proxies. Additionally, we hypothesize and find that this association is stronger for firms where managers have higher incentives to manipulate tone. In supplemental analyses, we find evidence to suggest that our results are not due to an endogenous relationship between conservatism and UTM. We also find that conservatism neither encourages downward tone management (DTM) nor constrains managers from conveying real information about future good news. Together, our results suggest that accounting conservatism improves disclosure narratives.