International migration versus foreign investment in the presence of unemployment

"This paper extends the standard (two-factor, one-good) model of international factor movements, to include unemployment due to a minimum-income guarantee within the capital-abundant country. From this country's perspective, we establish important departures from previous (full-employment) results. Most notably, our analysis shows that: (1) free factor mobility is worse than no mobility; (2) the optimal degree of labour migration is zero; and (3) national welfare can always be maximized by an optimal flow of capital. The analysis is then extended to examine: (1) illegal migration; (2) subsidization of employment; and (3) alternative views of unemployment."     

Legal migration and illegal migration: the effectiveness of qualitative and quantitative restriction policies

By considering the optimal behaviour of illegal mi grants who must confront the various enforcement techniques adopted by the host country, we show that an increase in penalties, in travel cost, or in the possibility of detection, would be effective in the 'qualitative ' objective but not in the 'quantitative' objective. Moreover. when a host country starts accepting skilled legal migrants, if the required skill level is relatively low and the possibility of detection is sufficiently high , an increase in penalties will be effective in both objectives.     

Does home bias affect firm value? Evidence from holdings of mutual funds worldwide

This study finds strong evidence that home bias affects firm valuation at both country and firm levels. At the country level, increasing the bias of domestic investors toward home equity lowers the market valuation of home equity. At the firm level, firm value increases as the compositions of local equities held by domestic and foreign investors tend toward the firms' global market capitalization weights, but decreases as their weights deviate from global weights. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the optimal global risk-sharing hypothesis that the greater risk sharing between domestic and foreign investors in international capital markets reduces the cost of capital and hence enhances market valuation.     

Unionized labor markets and globalized capital markets

This paper studies the effects of international integration of capital markets in a world where countries differ in their labor market institutions: one country has a perfectly competitive labor market while the other is unionized. We show that workers should favor autarky in the unionized country, but oppose it in the non unionized country and vice versa for owners of capital. Aggregate gains from integration, however, are negative. We also show that, under capital mobility, an increase in relative bargaining power of unions does not always improve workers' welfare.     

The theory of international factor flows: The basic model

The basic model used to discuss the simultaneous international flow of labor and capital is a one-commodity model in which a common technology is shared between countries. The Ramaswami result, wherein an optimal restriction of labor inflows is superior to an optimal restriction on capital outflows for a capital abundant country, is extended to reveal that optimality requires inflows of both factors. Box diagrams and iso-welfare contours are used to show how optimal policy rankings are reversed if foreign labor must be paid higher home wages.     

Liquidity-constrained migrants

Liquidity constraints represent a major obstacle for potential migrants trying to meet the high cost of undocumented international migration. Some cover it by borrowing from a smuggling organization with a commitment to repay the loan by working in the destination country as bonded laborers. This paper compares alternative ways of financing migration and shows that debt bondage is optimal only if the international wage differential is sufficiently large in relation to migration costs. Tougher border controls as well as internal enforcement measures can be expected to reduce the incidence of debt-bonded relative to self-financed migration, although they may not necessarily lower the overall inflow of illegal aliens.     

Tariff Discrimination versus MFN under Incomplete Information

This paper presents a model of legal migration of temporary skilled workers from one source country to two host countries, both of which can control their levels of such immigration. Because of complementarities between capital and labor, the return on capital is positively related to the level of immigration. Consequently, when capital is immobile, host nations' optimal levels of immigration are positively related to their capital endowments. Further, when capital is mobile between the host nations, the common return on capital is a function of the levels of immigration in both countries, meaning that immigration is a public good. As a result, when immigration imposes costs on host countries, the Nash equilibrium results in free riding and less immigration than would occur in the cooperative equilibrium. These results are qualitatively unaltered when capital mobility extends to the source nation.     

Wage Effects of Labour Migration with International Capital Mobility

Wage effects of immigration are investigated in a setting with international capital mobility, which eliminates two‐thirds of the native wage effects of immigration. Without international capital mobility, overall gains from migration in the immigration region are only a small fraction of total losses to native workers, but with perfect international capital adjustment, overall gains are larger than total losses to native workers. Two alternative tax policies to eliminate the negative wage effects of immigration on low‐skilled native workers are evaluated.     

Cost of regulation and impact of EU membership on policy enforcement

Recent public debate on the costs and benefits of EU membership has focused more on the costs and less on the benefits. This paper explores the benefits from improved regulatory or policy implementation and enforcement. If actual regulatory enforcement differs from the socially optimal level, membership of a regional bloc that strengthens accountability mechanisms can improve the quality of implemented regulation. However, if the regional bloc tends to over-regulate, the overall increase in the regulatory burden, together with strengthened accountability, will move a country farther away from its socially optimal state. Membership of the EU is beneficial for countries with weak enforcement institutions, but it may worsen the welfare of countries with strong regulatory institutions. Infringement statistics indicate that no member state of the EU has a perfect record in implementation and enforcement.     

资本区际流动的动因与效应分析

资本区际流动的根本动因是逐利和避险,廉价的原材料和生产要素、新的技术以及税收、土地等方面的优惠政策都可以成为资本区际流动的动因,而且资本区际流动还可以降低风险,使资本流出地区和流入地区的资源配置接近帕累托最优的状态。本文运用国际资本流动模型,在新古典经济学理论框架下分析了资本区际流动效应,研究表明在一个国家内的资本区际流动会给流出和流入地区带来净利益,且要比同样规模的资本跨国流动给该国(无论该国是投资的东道国还是母国)增加的净收益多。     

A race to lower standards? Labor standards and location choice of outward FDI from the BRIC countries

Scholars argue that multinational corporations tend to locate their investment in countries with lower labor standards, but empirical results are highly inconsistent. In this paper, we investigate the effect of differential labor standards on the location choice of outward greenfield foreign direct investment (FDI) from Brazil, Russia, India and China (i.e. the BRIC countries). We find robust evidence that while there is a tendency toward the attraction of FDI by lower labor standards in developed countries, such a “race” is absent in FDI directed to developing countries. Location choice is highly path dependent upon previous trading relations between the home and the host country, which hampers the MNCs’ ability to arbitrage. Conversely, capital mobility at the industry level is found to intensify the race to lower standards.     

Book review

The existing literature on offshoring neglects the importance of host country conditions in affecting the boundaries of a firm. In this paper, we focus on the role of the host country's human capital in affecting the organization of offshore production. Acknowledging that an input is produced offshore only after training the host labor, we propose that this training cost depends on the human capital gap between the home and the host country. Our model finds that a sourcing firm prefers to offshore production internationally only if the human capital gap between the home and the host country is below a threshold. Secondly, as the human capital gap increases, the probability for international outsourcing vis-à-vis intra-firm trade increases. Finally, as opposed to conventional wisdom, our model shows the possibility of outsourcing inputs of a high-tech good when the human capital gap between the home and the host is high.     

On the origins of comparative advantage

This paper proposes a simple theory of international trade with endogenous productivity differences across countries. The core of our analysis lies in the determinants of the division of labor. We consider a world economy comprising two large countries, with a continuum of goods and one factor of production, labor. Each good is characterized by its complexity, defined as the number of tasks that must be performed to produce one unit. There are increasing returns to scale in the performance of each task, which creates gains from specialization, and uncertainty in the enforcement of each contract, which create transaction costs. The trade-off between these two forces pins down the size of productive teams across sectors in each country. Under free trade, the country where teams are larger specializes in the more complex goods. In our model, it is the country where the product of institutional quality and human per worker capital is larger. Hence, better institutions and more educated workers are complementary sources of comparative advantage in the more complex industries.     

Technology transfers and industry closures

There has been a shift of manufacturing industries from Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries to emerging countries. In a competitive global economy increases in productivity in any country are generally welfare-enhancing. The established industrialized countries can suffer from the collapse of some industries, and from the associated increase in unemployment. We model this process and analyze the interactions between various rigidities that cause it, such as the minimum viable scale of an industry or the number of workers who lack the necessary skills to change jobs. When, under free trade, the technology transfer causes the manufacturing industry to collapse in the home country, it experiences a discrete drop in welfare and the price of the manufactured good rises sharply. Further transfers may reverse these results. The optimal level of protection is the minimum size required to operate. Conditions that make supporting an ailing industry worthwhile can be interpreted in several ways but the conclusion is inescapable: technology transfers fundamentally affect arguments for industry protection at home.     

“逆全球化”探源:基于双边投资协定深度决定因素的研究

近年来全球化进程受阻,“逆全球化”根源有待进一步探讨。本文首次利用贸发会议“IIA绘图”数据,构建涵盖101项关键条款的双边投资协定(BITs)深度评价体系,测算了全球2539份BITs深度数据。通过理论和实证研究发现,东道国区位优势和母国所有权优势是决定BITs深度的重要因素。具体来看,东道国劳动力和自然资源禀赋的区位优势对BITs深度具有显著抑制作用,母国资本、技术和制度质量的所有权优势对BITs深度具有显著促进作用,同时母国资本和技术水平对BITs深度的影响存在异质性。进一步研究表明,2008年金融危机后,东道国劳动力资源对BITs深度的抑制作用增强,母国资本和技术水平的促进作用减弱,导致世界经济呈现“逆全球化”趋势,提高母国制度质量是实现经济全球化发展的有效途径。     

Optimal tax and tariff policies with tax credits

This paper examines the optimal tax and tariff policies for a small open economy when mobile capital receives a tax credit for taxes paid to the host country. For a capital-importing country, a tax on capital equal to the source country tax rate (to capture tax revenue) combined with a subsidy to encourage capital imports is the optimal policy. Results are also derived for cases in which only one of the instruments can be varied. For a capital-exporting country that cannot reduce its capital tax rate, a subsidy to the sector using exported capital is desirable.     

Optimal industrial policy in vertically related markets

This paper examines the optimal industrial policy for an industry with a vertical market structure. A home firm and a foreign firm both import an intermediate good from a third country to produce a final good. How the home country government sets the optimal industrial policy has to take account of both profit shifting between the two final good producers and between the intermediate good producer and the home firm. We explain how the optimal industrial policy depends on the slope of the demand curve, the levels of technology spillover and product differentiation. In particular, there exists a critical level of technology spillover at which investments of the firms are neither strategic substitutes nor complements and the optimal industrial policy is always investment tax.     

浅析农民工社会养老保险的解决路径

目前,我国农民工在社会养老保险方面参保率低、待遇低、退保率高的问题突出。其原因是农民工对养老保险认识不足,收入低难以承受保险费,工作流动性特点导致农民工参保、续保、转移困难。统筹优化我国现行农民工"进城"、"返乡"、"综合"三种养老保险模式,政府应坚持全覆盖、保基本、多层次、可持续的方针,从提高统筹层次和保障水平、增强公平性、适应滚动性及保证可持续性入手,加快出台有关强制农民工社会养老保险的法律法规,建立统一的农民工保险制度;完善执法监督、司法救助和财政激励机制;加快制定财政扶持政策,从而使我国社会保障制度更加完善。     

Financial openness,disclosure and bank risk-taking in MENA countries

In this paper, we analyze the risk-taking behavior of banks in emerging economies in a context of international capital mobility. Our paper highlights a new channel through which depositors can exercise pressure to control risk-taking. Depositors can reallocate their savings away from their home country to the more protective system of a developed economy. We recover a classical result according to which increased competition resulting from more international financial openness induces banks to take excessive risks. We find however that sufficiently high financial openness is necessary for a positive link between financial transparency and safe risk management. Finally, we test the relationship between disclosure, financial openness and bank risk-taking for a panel of 258 banks from the MENA region and Turkey.     

International Migration and Child labour in Developing Countries

This paper investigates the labor market effect of international migration on child work in countries of origin. We use an original cross‐country survey dataset, which combines information on international migration with detailed  individual‐level data on child labour at age 5–14 in a wide range of developing countries. By exploiting both within and cross‐country variation and controlling for country fixed effects, we find strong and robust evidence on the role of international mobility of workers in reducing child labour in disadvantaged households through changes in the local labour market.